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Introduction
Brigitte Nerlich, Sujatha Raman, Sarah Hartley, 
Alexander Thomas T. Smith
In recent years the relation between science and society has become 
strained. In some parts of the world, mainly in the United States, 
science is said to be ‘at war’ with society (Otto, 2016). In others, 
particularly the United Kingdom, scientists have been dragged into 
debates over suspicion and contempt of experts, primarily economists 
(Mance, 2016). These developments play out against a series of crises 
in science, technology, politics and the economy, which are all 
interlinked.
In politics and economics, one can mention the 2008 financial 
crisis, threats posed by terrorism, rising tensions around the place of 
religion in science and society, the ascent of political populism, and, 
more recently, debates about the United Kingdom leaving the European 
Union – an exit (dubbed ‘Brexit’) that will have profound consequences 
for society, science and different forms of expertise. In the United 
States, a new presidency challenges established relations between 
science and politics, as well as between these domains, journalism 
and the public. In technology, controversies arise from increasing 
digitalisation, automation, cybercrime and much more, but also from 
the maturing of novel energy technologies and biotechnologies. These 
new technologies bring with them a range of ethical problems.
This volume uses recent developments in science–society relations 
as a focal point for exploring the tensions and contradictions raised 
by these large-scale issues. Over the last thirty years in the UK and 
beyond, science, policy and the public have come into conflict in a 
series of political crises. Examples include the BSE (bovine spongiform 
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encephalopathy) or ‘mad cow disease’ crisis, the almost intractable 
disputes about the commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) 
foods and crops, the effects of scientific dissent on public health (e.g. 
the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine) and the impacts of 
the politicisation of climate science on climate policy (‘Climategate’). 
Since then, we have seen the emergence of new controversies involving 
the use of scientific evidence in policy (e.g. on the proposed role of 
dental evidence to assess the age of child refugees; the emergence of 
ash dieback disease) and on the conduct of research and innovation 
(e.g. on gene editing; management of the Zika virus), where issues 
related to security are ever-present. Last but not least, many of the 
topics listed above are global in nature. In this context we have seen 
the emergence of highly public conflicts around global institutions, 
such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, where science 
and politics meet.
In order to deal with such emerging and enduring matters and their 
impacts on trust in science and politics, policymakers have proposed 
various solutions, such as promoting greater public engagement with 
science and policy, co-design of scientific research with stakeholders, 
open and participatory forms of innovation, increasing transparency 
in scientific advice for policymaking, and enhancing open access to 
scientific data and research outputs. Such solutions have begun to 
exploit a number of new digital technologies and algorithms which 
can be used for good or for ill – for sharing information quickly; for 
making information public and available for public scrutiny; or for 
increasing surveillance by the state, social groups or oneself.
We live in a society that increasingly aspires to open access, open 
data, open science and open policy. Underpinning this trend is an 
assumption that transparency and openness are in the ‘public interest’. 
They are, but there may well be dark sides to this trend that need 
to be examined. Indeed, these solutions to scientific and political 
crises might conceal or provoke a number of problems, challenges and 
questions – some new, some timeless. These are the ‘monsters’ hiding 
behind transparency, publicness and openness that we want to track 
down in this book. Keeping in mind that unknown troubles might lurk 
behind apparent solutions, we ask: what does making science more 
public, open or transparent mean, in theory and practice? Who are 
‘the public’ and how are they constituted? What might ‘public science’ 
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mean for the authority and independence of science and the capacity 
of publics to engage with science? What are the political implications 
of making science more public or transparent, and how does this relate 
to issues of legitimacy and transparency in politics and policymaking? 
What role do interested citizens play in the creation of science and 
the making of science policy? Who controls the new technologies and 
enterprises of openness and transparency? And what will happen in 
the future, given radical changes that are happening in science and 
technology, as well as politics and policy, globally and nationally?
Trying to find answers to these questions provides us with a much-
needed opportunity to rethink the relationship between science and 
politics and, more importantly, the role of science in public, the role of 
publics in science, and the role of expertise in science and policymaking, 
as well the role of faith in science and society. Others have examined 
these issues, but we seek to put them in conversation with wider 
political developments around migration, religion and neo-liberalism.
The book
The chapters in this volume are based on work carried out within the 
Leverhulme-Trust-funded Making Science Public research programme 
(2012–2017), which explored the relationships between science, politics 
and publics through a number of topical case studies. The chapters 
challenge received wisdoms about openness and transparency and 
highlight and map the pitfalls and dangers – the ‘monsters’ in openness 
and transparency. The book is motivated by the sense that there might 
be metaphorical dragons or monsters hiding behind policy initiatives 
to ‘open up’ science in response to perceived legitimacy crises in 
research and innovation systems and in the relationship between 
science and policymaking.
The phrase ‘here be monsters’ or ‘here be dragons’ is commonly 
believed to have been used on ancient maps to indicate unexplored 
territories which might hide unknown beasts. Etymologically, the 
figure of the monster is double-edged and ambiguous in a way that 
invites reflection (Haraway, 1992). ‘Monster’ has twin meanings: the 
monster serves to both warn (Latin: monere) and to show (monstrare). 
Calls and efforts to open up science evoke multiple conflicting impera-
tives, hopes and anxieties, which we explore.
4 Science and the politics of openness
Where earlier works in science and technology studies employed 
the monster or golem figure to study the social aspects of science and 
its technological creations (Collins and Pinch, 1993; Haraway, 1992; 
Law, 1991), we argue that the time is ripe to examine the positive and 
negative effects of contemporary policy initiatives and institutions 
which purport to bring science, society and publics closer together 
through processes of openness, access and transparency. Developed 
as solutions to perceived crises in science/society relations, a variety 
of policy initiatives hide dilemmas that need to be made visible and 
need to be discussed out in the open. In sum, the chapters in this 
book explore the unfolding contradictions around efforts to ‘make 
science public’.
Science and the politics of openness: challenges  
and dilemmas
For many years now, some science and technology studies scholars 
have called for new forms of ‘post-normal’ science (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1993), where scientific claims and their underlying assumptions 
are opened up to wider scrutiny, allowing a new ‘democratisation of 
science’ (Brown, 2009). Sheila Jasanoff (2002) has argued that we are 
witnessing a so-called ‘constitutional moment’ in which the claims 
of scientific knowledge and technology on behalf of the public good 
need to be openly justified rather than taken for granted. However, 
promises of openness, transparency and greater engagement generated 
by these developments must always be critically assessed. ‘People may 
not possess enough specialized knowledge and material resources’ to 
participate in apparently open forums (Jasanoff, 2003: 237). Likewise, 
privately sponsored industry research can all too easily be used through 
transparency laws to destabilise public science – for example, in cases 
of environmental and health-and-safety regulations introduced in the 
public interest (Jasanoff, 2006) – or to undermine political action on 
climate change, as journalist Delingpole (2010), for one, has attempted 
to do.
With the institutionalisation of scientific advice in government 
and an emphasis on evidence-based policy, scientific evidence 
has taken centre stage in many public and political conflicts. 
However, there are long-standing fears of a possible ‘scientisation’ or 
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‘technocratisation’ of politics (Habermas, 1970), which may shut out 
voices from areas other than science from the policymaking process. 
In this context, different stakeholders are using a range of experts 
and cherry-picking the claims or counterclaims that support their 
own political position. There are enduring debates about the status of 
expertise, and calls to acknowledge the status of lay experts (Wynne, 
1992). These have in turn informed wider debates about opening up 
and democratising discussions involving scientific knowledge and 
public policy matters. Science cannot function, argues the political 
philosopher Stephen Turner (2003), without some monopolisation 
of expertise. He therefore suggests that it is intrinsically impossible 
to subject specialised knowledge to democratic discussion (see also 
Collins, 2014). Yet, wider discussions about the purpose of science 
and its role in matters of collective interest are political and value 
based. These cannot, a priori, be left to certified experts alone (Sare-
witz, 2004), especially when laypeople or rival experts periodically 
mobilise in particular times and places to call attention to novel 
dimensions of public importance. In this context, how policymakers 
or science advisors engage with different forms of expertise becomes 
crucial.
Scientists have always interacted with a variety of publics, and 
science communication is as old as science itself. However, scientists 
are increasingly obliged to get involved in public engagement and, 
more recently, to practise responsible research and innovation, for 
reasons other than consulting, communicating with or involving 
publics. Opportunities for engagement with science and policy are 
being gradually replaced by mandated activities serving political 
functions, such as gaining ‘impact’ and contributing to economic 
growth. Fostering public engagement with science has become one 
of many political and economic performance indicators. This may 
lead to the instrumentalisation of public engagement (Watermeyer, 
2012), and a loss of trust in science and scientists.
These developments happen in a context where higher education 
serves no longer to be primarily a public good but is increasingly 
marketised and privatised. Universities in the UK are now funded by 
students (or their parents) who pay tuition fees as consumers rather 
than as co-producers of knowledge. This means that universities now 
have a much-weakened relationship with the British public, on whom 
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they no longer depend for the bulk of their teaching budget. There are 
concerns amongst leading scientists, ethicists and lawyers about ‘who 
owns science’ – that is, about the privatisation of science – and calls 
are being heard for science to serve the public good more explicitly 
(see Holmwood, 2011; University of Manchester, Institute for Science, 
Ethics and Innovation, 2010).
Science, politics and publics are entangled in a complex relationship 
with normative ideas about openness, transparency and publicness, 
ideals that are being challenged not only by classic science/policy 
scandals such as those mentioned above (BSE, GM, MMR, Climategate). 
They are also being challenged by the emergence of new technologies, 
especially digital technologies envisaged to deliver some of those ideals, 
and by institutional and technological changes in the spaces where 
science takes place (universities and industries) and where politics takes 
place (government, the media, public forums, public consultations, 
etc.). The fact that political and policy debates, expertise, and the 
media have been entangled with such normative questions for some 
time has, in recent decades, become a growing source of instability in 
Western liberal democracies (see Smith and Holmwood, 2013). This 
has raised anxieties about the role of expertise and evidence in public 
debate in an age where countering ‘fake news’ and political disinforma-
tion – or what might have once been described as propaganda or 
even ‘psychological operations’ – has become a central concern for 
policymakers, electoral strategists, journalists, broadcasters and even 
intelligence agencies following the election of President Donald Trump 
in the 2016 US elections.
We are now living in a world where words like ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ 
have to be used with considerable care in science and politics, where 
facts and truths compete with alternative facts or someone else’s truth. 
In an article for the Financial Times entitled ‘The Problem with Facts’, 
the economist Tim Harford explores, as the subtitle says, ‘how today’s 
politicians deal with inconvenient truths’. He uses a phrase that has 
gained popularity in science and society circles since 2006, when Al 
Gore produced his notorious film An Inconvenient Truth, intended 
to make what he held to be truths about climate change public. In 
chapter 12, Warren Pearce and Brigitte Nerlich examine in detail the 
film and its reverberations through ensuing climate-change debates. 
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Such debates foreshadowed and even rehearsed arguments that are 
now raging through most of science and politics, particularly in 
the USA.
Meanwhile, novel energy technologies encounter issues of 
justice and fairness when deployed across the world. In chapter 7 
Alison Mohr argues that such technologies and innovations might 
also hide monsters behind their veneer of novelty and service to 
the agendas of more openness and transparency. The open-access 
agenda is one major example in the context of research (Holmwood, 
2013). The future of new frameworks of responsible research and 
innovation (RRI) within this wider context is therefore in question. 
On the one hand, the concept of RRI promises to open up oppor-
tunities to rethink the purposes of innovation (Owen et al., 2013) 
and diversify ways of innovating in response to a societal challenge 
(Hartley et al., 2016). On the other hand, RRI is becoming reduced 
to established ways of assessing a specific technology in terms of its 
risks and benefits. All these developments need to be monitored and 
scrutinised not only for the opportunities and chances for improve-
ment they offer but also for the pitfalls and contradictions they might 
contain.
Themes
The chapters in this book map and illuminate issues (‘monsters’) 
in specific areas of science/policy practices where the complex 
problems identified above play out in particular ways and in specific 
cases.
The book is organised into four parts, around the themes of (1) 
transparency in the context of science in the public sphere; (2) 
responsibility in the context of contemporary research practice and 
governance, both globally and more locally; (3) expertise in the context 
of policymaking, risk assessment and the regulation of science; and 
(4) faith in the context of emerging tensions and misunderstandings 
between science, politics and publics regarding issues of religion. Each 
of the four parts contains an opening essay by an expert on the theme, 
and the book closes with an afterword and an epilogue reflecting on 
the contributions to the book.
8 Science and the politics of openness
Transparency
This part opens the book with an exploration of one its core topics; 
namely, transparency and openness and how they play out within 
various institutional and policy domains. Three chapters circle these 
concepts in different ways. Stephen Curry deals with an issue that 
has risen to prominence in science and university research in recent 
years – ‘open access’. He examines not only the potential of open 
access to break down barriers and open up academic research and 
knowledge to the wider public, but also the many barriers that exist or 
are emerging to impede the open-access movement. Carmen McLeod 
deals with issues of transparency and secrecy in the context of animal 
research through the lens of two transparency initiatives: the Swiss Basel 
Declaration announced in 2011, and the UK Concordat on Openness 
in Animal Research launched in 2012. In the final chapter of this part, 
Roda Madziva and Vivien Lowndes deal with transparency, evidence 
and publics in the context of a very topical issue – immigration. This 
chapter also contributes indirectly to the last part of the book, which 
deals with faith, as Madziva and Lowndes investigate faith-based claims 
being used when adjudicating asylum applications.
The part introduction by Benjamin Worthy dissects the concepts 
of transparency and openness and puts them into the context of recent 
research on these topics, as well as work on related issues around 
security, privacy, confidentiality and accountability. Worthy also 
highlights problems with radical openness in a context where ‘people’ 
might not be willing, able or interested to make use of the opportunities 
such openness affords them.
Responsibility
This part continues to explore the topic of openness, but with an 
additional focus on responsibility and justice. Three chapters move 
from the global to the more local, and from global environmental 
change and energy justice to concerns about responsible innovation 
in the context of Western concerns with genetically modified foods 
and crops.
Eleanor Hadley Kershaw presents us with an overview of the 
opportunities and challenges that emerge when trying to foster science/
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society or science/public co-production of research and engagement 
within a global institution – namely, Future Earth. Alison Mohr, by 
contrast, deals with the tensions that emerge when Western energy 
technologies are distributed in the global South and how co-production 
between energy experts, social science experts and local community 
experts can help in this context. In both cases, openness is the sine 
qua non for such global enterprises to succeed. In the final chapter, 
Stevienna de Saille and Paul Martin tackle in an almost playful but 
deadly serious way some of the potentially problematic (or monstrous) 
consequences of the ‘opening up’ agenda written into responsible 
research and innovation frameworks. They do this by inspecting stories 
about monsters that have been told and are being told around GM 
foods and crops.
The part is introduced by Barbara Prainsack and Sabina Leonelli, 
who tease out the discursive promises and risks of using buzzwords 
such as ‘openness’ and ‘responsible innovation’. They also examine 
the tensions explored in some of the chapters between efforts at 
centralisation on the one hand and opening up research and institutions 
to epistemic diversity on the other, as well as between inclusiveness 
and social justice.
Expertise
This part continues to explore issues around expertise, experts and 
publics. The first chapter in this part, by Sarah Hartley and Adam 
Kokotovich, focuses on the always hot topic of risk and risk assessment. 
They make the claim that public involvement in risk assessment is 
not reaching its full potential and argue for a new role for experts 
and publics, supported by a detailed analysis of a particular case study; 
namely, the European Food Safety Authority’s public consultations. 
We then move from food safety to emerging diseases, in this case the 
emergence of a plant/tree disease: ash dieback. The chapter by Judith 
Tsouvalis finds a similar disconnect between experts and publics and 
a similar divorce between ‘risk’ assessment and public values. Both 
chapters make a plea for not dealing with risks from a purely expert 
and technoscientific perspective. Warren Pearce and Brigitte Nerlich 
in turn explore a particular case study, the release of the film An 
Inconvenient Truth in 2006, as an example where climate change 
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expertise is taken out of the pages of science journals and into the 
public sphere, and the opportunities and problems this generates. 
Sujatha Raman, Pru Hobson-West, Mimi Lam and Kate Millar use 
a famous political speech, ‘Science Matters’, as an opportunity to rethink 
the role of engagement by minority publics in constituting the public 
interest around science in alliance with expertise.
This part is introduced by Mark Brown, who sheds light on the 
tensions between experts and publics by providing a historical overview 
of the relationship between science and democracy. He examines the 
legitimacy of expertise in the current political climate and points out 
that ‘avoiding technocracy without fostering populism is a key challenge 
of our time’.
Faith
This part continues to explore some of the topics addressed in the 
previous one, dealing with expertise, experts and publics, but with a 
particular focus on science and religion. The chapter by Fern Elsdon-
Baker questions the expertise of social scientists when dealing with 
a particular type of ‘public’ – namely, people who in one way or 
another lean towards a creationist view of life on earth. She makes a 
plea for researchers to not posit as a ‘fact’ a presumed clash between 
scientific and religious world views, cautioning against assuming that 
the latter is always a monstrous public in conflict with science, and 
to explore public perceptions of evolutionary science and religion 
without either being overshadowed by this prejudice. The second 
chapter, by David Kirby and Amy Chambers, is a fascinating explora-
tion of the struggle between film-makers and religious communities 
over shaping public views of science, including evolution, through a 
history of censorship. Chris Toumey introduces this part, weaving 
together reflections on science and religion with the themes of openness, 
expertise and responsibility in new and unexpected ways.
The book is rounded up with two closing statements, one an 
afterword by John Holmwood and Jan Balon reflecting on markets, 
neoliberalism, populism and the demise of the public university, which 
is one current issue that bedevils our (academic) lives. This is followed 
by an epilogue by Stephen Turner, who weaves together all the chapters 
presented in this book into a coherent story, by projecting them against 
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a much-needed historical background involving science, politics and 
publics.
Of course, a volume published in 2018 devoted to debates about 
the fractious relationship between science, policy and publics would 
be remiss if it were not to make more than a fleeting reference to the 
extraordinary year in politics that was 2016. In June, the UK voted 
in a referendum to withdraw from the European Union. At the time 
of writing, formal negotiations are under way between the British 
Government and their European counterparts following Prime Minister 
Theresa May’s decision to trigger Article 50, which begins the two-year 
countdown to ‘Brexit’, on 29 March 2017. The UK referendum was 
followed six months later by the election of the billionaire Republican 
Donald Trump to the White House. The outcomes of both the British 
referendum and the US presidential election have profound conse-
quences for science, which only serves to emphasise – sadly, from the 
point of view of many of our contributors – the importance of the 
questions explored in this volume in the current political climate.
We therefore end this introduction with a coda by Alexander Thomas 
T. Smith, which provides a brief snapshot (as of spring 2017) of the 
political landscape following these two electoral events, with a focus 
on some of the repercussions for science funding and policy in both 
countries.
Coda: reflections on the politics of openness 
in a new world order
Alexander Thomas T. Smith
Politically, 2016 was a convulsive, tumultuous year. On 23 June, the 
United Kingdom held a referendum on whether to remain a member 
of the European Union. On a turnout of 72%, a narrow majority – 52% 
– voted to ‘Leave’ the EU. The Conservative Prime Minister David 
Cameron, who had called the referendum and campaigned to ‘Remain’, 
had not anticipated defeat and announced his intention to step down 
the day after. Within a handful of weeks, the Conservatives elected a 
new leader – Theresa May – who took over as prime minister on 13 
July. Although she had supported Remain in the referendum – albeit 
without much enthusiasm publicly – May now declared that ‘Brexit 
means Brexit’ and committed her government to triggering Article 
50, which would begin the two-year negotiations, and countdown, to 
Britain’s departure from the EU.
Around the same time, across the North Atlantic, the Republican 
Party was about to nominate the maverick billionaire Donald Trump 
as its candidate for the US presidency. Trump had seen off a wide 
field of ex-governors and senators in a heated campaign for the 
nomination and now faced the Democratic Party’s presumptive 
nominee, former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. Few at the time 
imagined the pugnacious, impatient and thin-skinned Trump would 
defeat a veteran Democratic Party candidate like Clinton. After Britain 
unexpectedly voted to leave the EU, however, some began to wonder 
if the unthinkable might now just become possible.
The challenge for Trump remained winning enough electoral college 
votes to secure the White House, in so-called battleground states 
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where there live significant minorities whom he repeatedly offended 
during his chaotic campaign. A month before the November election, 
a recording surfaced of Trump boasting about his lecherous behaviour 
towards women. With his campaign seemingly in meltdown, most 
pollsters and political commentators expected Trump to haemorrhage 
support, particularly from female Republican voters. Such was the 
seriousness of his self-inflicted political wounds, some even thought 
he would resign before election day. The New York Times gave Clinton 
a 92% chance of winning.
The election, held on 8 November, proved that the unthinkable 
could, indeed, happen. Despite losing the popular vote to Clinton by 
three million, Trump picked up almost all the battleground states: 
Florida, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin (Clinton held Virginia). States that were rumoured some 
months earlier to be in contention, including Arizona where a sub-
stantial Latino population was thought to be mobilising against Trump, 
remained solidly Republican.
The victories of both the Leave campaign in the British referendum 
on EU membership and Donald Trump in the US presidential election 
stunned many experts, pundits and political commentators. Both 
results seemed to highlight volatility in the British and US electorates 
that had been long speculated about, but which now finally found 
tangible form, as democratic facts.
Most of the contributors to this volume wrote their chapters before 
these two political earthquakes turned many of our assumptions about 
what the citizenries of our respective countries are thinking on their 
heads. As this book goes into production, in the spring of 2017, we 
are troubled by a suspicion that, already, global events risk eclipsing 
the intellectual concerns about which our authors have written so 
eloquently here. Brexit and Trump have now become synonymous 
with instability and uncertainty. Politics, in both countries, has been 
anything but normal ever since.
After 100 days in the White House, it is clear that President Trump 
has been keen to conduct himself much as he did as a candidate, 
riding the crest of a nativist–populist tide and railing against various 
kinds of elites, in Washington DC, the mainstream media and in the 
universities. Those concerned about the future of science policy, 
including the funding of research and teaching in both the social and 
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natural sciences, are right to be worried. Trump has threatened to 
cut funding to the National Science Foundation and even abolish the 
National Endowment for the Humanities. A long-time sceptic of 
human-induced climate change, he has described global warming as 
a ‘hoax’ perpetuated by the Chinese. In a provocative move, Trump 
appointed Scott Pruitt administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). Pruitt, a lawyer from Oklahoma, is on record as having 
rejected the scientific consensus on climate change. His appointment 
has been destabilising to the EPA as an institution and has raised 
questions about the future of climate science under Donald Trump. 
It also generated anxiety amongst environmentalists, activists and 
policymakers keen to see the USA uphold its international obligations 
and continue to demonstrate leadership in reducing the global 
economy’s dependence on burning fossil fuels, fears that were confirmed 
on 1 June 2017 when President Trump announced the US would quit 
the Paris climate accord. On 6 March 2017, one friend on Facebook 
shared with me an anonymous message from a friend of his who 
works at the EPA:
[Yeah] it’s as bad as you are hearing: The entire agency is under lockdown, 
the website, facebook, twitter, you name it is static and can’t be updated. 
All reports, findings, permits and studies are frozen and not to be released. 
No presentations or meetings with outside groups are to be scheduled. 
Any Press contacting us are to be directed to the Press Office which 
is also silenced and will give no response. All grants and contracts 
are frozen from the contractors working on Superfund sites to grad 
school students working on their thesis. We are still doing our work, 
writing reports, doing cancer modeling for pesticides hoping that this 
is temporary and we will be able to serve the public soon. But many of 
us are worried about an ideologically-fueled purging and if you use any 
federal data I advise you gather what you can now. We have been told 
the website is being reworked to reflect the new administration’s policy. 
… [You] all pay for the government and you should know what’s going 
on. I am posting this as a fellow citizen and not in any sort of official  
capacity.
On their own, Trump’s intentions vis-à-vis climate science would raise 
enough questions. For advocates of science who believe the latter 
thrives best in conditions of ‘openness’ – one of this book’s central 
themes – there have also been other causes for concern.
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One particular worry is that Republican lawmakers might use 
principles of transparency and reproducibility, which are fundamen-
tal to advancing the scientific method, to ‘weaponise’ science against 
itself, using data generated from poor-quality studies to undermine 
scientific credibility and consensus with a view to discrediting and 
defunding science programmes not to their ideological liking (see 
Yong, 2017). Another concern has arisen in response to calls during 
the early days of the Trump administration to close the border to 
citizens from a handful of Muslim-majority nations in the Middle 
East and North Africa. The White House has cited concerns about 
national security in its justification for promoting this policy, which 
was articulated alongside further calls to build a wall along the 
US–Mexico border and deport millions of undocumented migrants 
living in the country. While the so-called ‘Muslim ban’ has been 
challenged successfully in the courts, the cumulative impact of 
both policy proposals has been to weaken the United States’ claim 
to be a country welcoming to immigrants and refugees. Many 
supporters of science worry this will discourage members of the 
international scientific community from collaborating with col-
leagues based at US institutions. Could the apparent hostility of the 
Trump administration towards Latino and Muslim migrants fuel a 
more negative impression that the USA is no longer ‘open’ to those 
seeking opportunities for collaboration, employment or study in the 
United States?
Similar anxieties have animated debates about the future of science 
and higher education in the United Kingdom following Brexit. For 
now, it would seem that British scholars and scientists have much to 
lose when the country departs the European Union. If the UK Govern-
ment embraces what has been coined a ‘hard’ Brexit, resulting in 
membership of the European single market being sacrificed in favour 
of uncompromising controls over borders and immigration, there is 
a risk that UK science will be denied opportunities to access EU 
research funding, participate in wider exchanges such as the ERASMUS 
scheme (European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University 
Students), or even attract well-qualified undergraduate or postgraduate 
students from EU member states. British-based researchers who are 
not citizens of the UK but are EU nationals worry about their future 
beyond the conclusion of Article 50 negotiations. Anecdotal evidence 
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suggests there has already been a negative impact on prospective 
collaborations between UK- and EU-based research institutions, even 
though Britain remains a EU member state until at least 2019 and 
can access European research funds during that time. Whether or 
not British researchers find clear answers to their many questions 
following the snap general election Prime Minister Theresa May called 
for June 2017 remains to be seen.
The uncertainties science now faces, in both the UK and the USA, 
underscore the importance of the issues explored in the chapters that 
follow. One hope of this volume is to stimulate a conversation about 
the relationship between science, publics and openness and it would 
seem, in what we might characterise as politically ‘monstrous’ times, 
the need for such a conversation has now become especially urgent. 
How might we, as scholars and supporters of funding for scientific 
research and teaching, respond in this moment of ‘crisis’ for the 
disciplines we hold dear?
There are examples from which, I would suggest, we can draw 
inspiration. On 22 April 2017, thousands of supporters of science 
marched in the United States, the UK, indeed hundreds of cities 
worldwide. The so-called ‘March for Science’ attracted considerable 
media attention. Such initiatives help raise awareness of the issues 
facing the science community as a result of the policy uncertainties 
that Brexit and Trump’s election have unleashed.
I also take inspiration from my research subjects in Kansas. Since 
2008, I have been visiting the state regularly, conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork on grassroots Republican Party politics (see Smith, 2013, 
2015, forthcoming). My particular interest has been this: how do 
political moderates seek to empower themselves in the face of right-wing 
extremism and religious conservatism?
Kansas was the perfect field site in which to explore this question. 
It has been on the front line of the United States’ culture wars for the 
last three decades. Infamously, in 2005, the State Board of Education 
held a series of hearings on evolutionary theory, with a view to making 
the case for the teaching of intelligent design in the high-school science 
curriculum. At the time, evangelical Christians who believed in 
young-earth creationism had captured the Kansas Board of Education. 
The hearings attracted media interest from around the globe before 
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moderate Kansans mobilised and overturned the creationist majority 
on the State Board of Education in 2006.
I began this research at a time when US satirists, cultural com-
mentators and politicos relished asking the rhetorical question that 
Thomas Frank (2004) popularised when he asked What’s the Matter 
with Kansas? I commenced this study before the Tea Party move-
ment came along, before the election of the socially conservative 
Sam Brownback as governor of Kansas, before far-right Republicans 
seized control of the state legislature and introduced destructive tax 
cuts that continue to imperil a wide range of government services, 
including public education. And I began this research before Donald 
Trump helped unify and give voice nationally to an angry nativist 
constituency.
But the question I sought to find answers to, in the United States’ 
heartland, now seems more vital than ever. If Kansas has been ahead 
of the curve as far as US debates about the interface between science 
and democracy are concerned, this is where I find hope. Because on 
the day Donald Trump was elected president, moderate Kansans quietly 
turned up at their polling booths and elected a string of moderate 
Republicans and Democrats to the state legislature in what some are 
beginning to understand was an important rejection of the far-right 
economic and social policies that Trump appears keen to continue 
championing nationally. Now, with a moderate majority in Topeka, 
Republican and Democratic Party legislators, working together, are 
trying to fix the damage wrought on the state’s finances after almost 
six years of a reckless politics. More than anything, this gives me hope 
– for science, for expertise, for publics that value education, for 
the renewal of a measured and moderate politics on both sides of the 
Atlantic.
If it can happen in Kansas, it can happen anywhere.1
This coda was written at the beginning of 2017.
1 National and international media organisations extensively covered both the 
UK referendum on EU membership and the election of Donald Trump as US 
president. My primary sources here are the BBC, the Guardian and the New York 
Times.
18 Science and the politics of openness
References
Brown, M. B. (2009). Science in democracy: Expertise, institutions, and 
representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chilvers, J., and Kearnes, M. (2016). Science, democracy and emergent publics. 
In J. Chilvers and M. Kearnes (eds), Remaking Participation: Science, Environ-
ment and Emergent Publics (pp. 1–28). London and New York: Routledge.
Collins, H. (2014). Are We All Scientific Experts Now? London: John Wiley 
and Sons.
Collins, H. M., and Pinch, T. (1993). The Golem: What You Should Know 
about Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Delingpole, J. (2010). ‘Postnormal-science’ is perfect for climate demagogues: 
It isn’t science at all. Spectator, February. Retrieved 14 December 2016 
from: www.spectator.co.uk/2010/02/postnormal-science-is-perfect-for-
climate-demagogues-it-isnt-science-at-all/.
Frank, T. (2004). What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the 
Heart of America. New York: Owl Books.
Funtowicz, S., and Ravetz, J. (1993). Science for the post-normal age. Futures, 
25(7), 739–755.
Habermas, J. (1970). Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and 
Politics, trans. by J. J. Shapiro. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Haraway, D. (1992). The promises of monsters: A regenerative politics for 
inappropriate/d others. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson and P. A. Treichler 
(eds), Cultural Studies (pp. 295–337). New York: Routledge.
Hartley, S., Gillund, F., van Hove, L., and Wickson, F. (2016). Essential features 
of responsible governance of agricultural biotechnology. PLoS Biology, 14(5), 
e1002453.
Holmwood, J. (2011). A Manifesto for the Public University. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic.
Holmwood, J. (2013). Commercial enclosure: Whatever happened to 
open access? Radical Philosophy, September/October. Retrieved 14 
December 2016 from: https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/
commercial-enclosure.
Irwin, A., and Michael, M. (2003). Science, Social Theory and Public Knowledge. 
London: McGraw-Hill Education.
Jasanoff, S. (2002). Citizens at risk: Cultures of modernity in the US and EU. 
Science as Culture, 11(3), 363–380.
Jasanoff, S. (2003). Technologies of humility: Citizen participation in governing 
science. Minerva, 41(3), 223–244.
Jasanoff, S. (2006). Transparency in public science: Purposes, reasons, limits. 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 69(3), 21–45.
Politics of openness in a new world order 19
Law, J. (1991). Monsters, machines and sociotechnical relations. In J. Law 
(ed.), A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination 
(pp. 1–23). London: Routledge.
Mance, H. (2016). Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove. Financial 
Times, 3 June. Retrieved 5 July 2016 from: https://www.ft.com/conten
t/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c.
Otto, S. L. (2016). The War on Science: Who’s Waging It, Why It Matters, What 
We Can Do about It. Minneapolis, MN: Milkweed Editions.
Owen, R., Stilgoe, J., Macnaghten, P., Gorman, M., Fisher, E., and Guston, D. 
H. (2013). A framework for responsible innovation. In R. Owen, J. Bessant 
and M. Heintz (eds), Responsible Innovation: Managing the Responsible 
Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society (pp. 27–50). London: John 
Wiley.
Sarewitz, D. (2004). How science makes environmental controversies worse. 
Environmental Science and Policy, 7(5), 385–403.
Smith, A. T. T. (2013). Democracy begins at home: Moderation and the 
promise of salvage ethnography. In A. T. T. Smith and J. Holmwood 
(eds), Sociologies of Moderation: Problems of Democracy, Expertise and 
the Media (Sociological Review monograph) (pp. 119–140). Oxford: Wiley 
Blackwell.
Smith, A. T. T. (2015). Kansas versus the creationists: Religious conflict and 
scientific controversy in America’s heartland. In S. Brunn (ed.), The Changing 
World Religion Map (pp. 997–1011). New York: Springer Academic Press.
Smith, A. T. T. (forthcoming). Democracy Begins at Home: Political Moderation 
in Red State America. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas
Smith, A. T. T., and Holmwood, J. (2013). Sociologies of Moderation: Problems 
of Democracy, Expertise and the Media. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Stilgoe, J., and Burall, S. (2013). Windows or doors? Experts, publics and 
open policy. In R. Doubleday and J. Wilsdon (eds), Future Directions for 
Scientific Advice in Whitehall (pp. 92–99). N.p.: University of Cambridge, 
Centre for Science and Policy; Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), ESRC 
STEPS Centre at the University of Sussex; Alliance for Useful Evidence; 
Institute for Government; and Sciencewise.
Turner, S. (2003). Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts. 
London: Sage Publications.
University of Manchester, Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation (2010). 
Who Owns Science? The Manchester Manifesto. Retrieved 14 December 2016 
from: www.isei.manchester.ac.uk/TheManchesterManifesto.pdf.
Watermeyer, R. (2012). Written Evidence Submitted by ESRC Centre for Eco-
nomic and Social Aspects of Genomics (Cesagen) Cardiff University (PE 01). 
Commons Select Committee, Public Administration Committee. Retrieved 
20 Science and the politics of openness
14 December 2016 from: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/
cmselect/cmpubadm/75/75we02.htm.
Wynne, B. (1992). Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social identities and 
public uptake of science. Public Understanding of Science, 1(3), 281–304.
Yong, E. (2017). How the GOP could use science’s reform movement against 







Christopher Hood and David Heald define transparency as a glass-like 
process allowing those outside to look in, a metaphoric and literal 
‘peering through the window’ illustrated by the glass of the German 
Reichstag (Heald, 2006; Hood and Heald, 2006). The concept is 
synonymous with openness and is rooted in the idea of letting in light 
or knowledge (Bok, 1986). Transparency over the last decade has 
been entrenched within political discourse as a kind of universal good 
that is both an instrumental means to a number of positive outcomes 
(such as improved trust or accountability) and an end in itself (Meijer, 
2013). It is, moreover, an idea that is universally supported across the 
political spectrum as a means of opening up institutions to public 
scrutiny (Birchall, 2014).
Underneath this acceptance, transparency can entail many things. 
Darch and Underwood describe it as an ‘ideologically-determined 
political initiative that can be deployed to achieve a range of different 
agendas’ (2010: 4). As these chapters show, the exact dynamics and 
divisions of the use of the term vary from country to country and 
area to area. Transparency resembles democracy itself, in that there 
is a general consensus on the concept but its interpretation is ‘open 
to complexity, contradiction and numerous varieties’: it is in some 
senses an empty signifier that can be filled by very different interpreta-
tions or emphases (Stubbs and Snell, 2014: 160). It can have numerous 
different aims and purposes, from monitoring by the public to hierarchi-
cal control of lesser bodies (Heald, 2012). Below are just three examples 
of what transparency can mean:
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• Political empowerment: it is a highly politicised instrument 
of empowerment, embodying different democratic norms and 
values (Fenster, 2012a).
• Policy solution: it can be a ‘dramatically satisfying answer to 
every crisis and question about the state’ (Fenster, 2015).
• Economic improvement: it is a means of increasing efficiency 
and even wealth, connected to a ‘consumer-citizen’ idea of 
delivery and performance measurement.
On a symbolic level, transparency policy can then be used as a 
radical weapon of empowerment, a tool of modernisation and a means 
of demonstrating an institution or organisation is more ethical, more 
honest or more trustworthy. Such a policy can ‘allow an incumbent 
to make credible promises of greater transparency and anti-corruption 
efforts to a wary public’ (Berliner, 2014: 479). It also represents an 
‘apparently simple solution to complex problems – such as how to 
fight corruption, promote trust in government, support corporate 
social responsibility, and foster state accountability’ and is an acceptable 
response to problems ‘at moments of crisis or moral failure’, a ‘visible 
response to public disquiet [with] attractive, palliative qualities for 
politicians and CEOs who want to be seen to be doing rather than 
reflecting’ (Birchall, 2014: 77).
However, beneath the symbolism of any openness policy its dominant 
message is fundamentally contested. Questions asking what sort of 
transparency is created, of whom and by whom, expose the complex 
politics underlying its use (Berliner, 2014). As the famous freedom-
of-information (FOI) campaigner Tom Blanton said, the goal to initiate 
transparency is ‘not a sudden conversion’ but one created by the ‘specific 
conditions of competition for political power’ (quoted in Darch and 
Underwood, 2010: 64). There is a constant, highly politicised struggle 
to define what a policy of openness can and should do (Fenster, 2015; 
Yu and Robinson, 2012). Classic arguments for transparency are rooted 
in both rational choice theories of behaviour change and principled 
ideas of the moral rightness of openness (Birchall, 2014; Chambers, 
2004; Darch and Underwood, 2010). For governments it is often imbued 
with a very particular, often neo-liberal, conception of state–society 
relations. More radical conceptions see it as a weapon that can be 
used against these same neo-liberal ideas and reverse the assumptions 
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of who is being open to whom, and debate the size of the political 
spaces opened (or closed) by its arrival (Birchall, 2014). Julian Assange 
and Theresa May are both vocal supporters of transparency, but they 
are unlikely to agree on what it means and who it should affect. 
Transparency remains a ‘contested political issue that masquerades 
as an administrative tool’ (Fenster, 2012b: 449).
Transparency is in sharp contrast with the idea of secrecy. The 
dangers of secrecy to becoming enlightened, and the opening up of 
forbidden matters resonate across mythology, from Pandora’s box to 
the story of Faust. Modern bureaucratic secrecy grew from the mysteri-
ous aura that surrounded the divine right of kings in the seventeenth 
century (Bok, 1986). This secrecy was justified by the demands of 
security or to protect sensitive decisions, and bound up in an aura 
designed to elicit awe and often buried in a ‘rich array of ritualistic 
and symbolic practices’ (Costas and Grey, 2014: 1425–1426). Secrecy 
can be secured in the shape of formal institutional rules and regulations 
(such as official secrecy legislation or gagging clauses), or it can be 
obtained informally through unofficial concealment, taboos and 
socialisation (such as codes of silence, or agreed and shared needs 
for secrecy).
The clash between openness and secrecy equates, rather too simply, 
to that between good and bad, and democratic and undemocratic. 
There has been a growing view in democracies across the world that 
secrecy, or too much concealment, is ‘incompatible with democracy’, 
and it continues to be associated with evil, with ‘stealth and furtiveness, 
lying and denial’ (Bok, 1986: 8). This characterisation oversimplifies 
a more nuanced reality, as secrecy is closely entwined with a more 
positive notion of privacy, while publicity can be associated with 
manipulation and distortion (Bok, 1986). There are also broad swathes 
of social and political activity where confidentiality is accepted and 
deemed necessary, from the work of juries to peace negotiations, and 
even staunch advocate of openness and transparency Jeremy Bentham 
qualified the power of publicity with the need to prevent injustice 
(Chambers, 2004).
A further difficulty is that transparency is many things at once. It 
is achieved through laws but also by technology and experiments. It 
is partly about making politicians and institutions accountable for 
what they do – sometimes over minor matters and sometimes over 
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big ones. Yet it can be, and often is, a practical tool to help people in 
their everyday lives. For all the attention given to scandals such as 
MPs’ expenses, FOI legislation and access to online data are most 
often used to help individuals and for local or ‘micro-political’ issues 
(Worthy and Hazell, 2017).
Transparency and institutions
Transparency regulations have been slowly applied across many 
institutions in the past two decades, from government to central banks 
and from local to supranational bodies. To take the example of the 
UK, the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which is possibly the 
centrepiece of Britain’s transparency regime, operates in more than 
100,000 public bodies from central and local government to the police, 
hospitals, libraries and schools. Alongside this, specific sector-based 
laws have allowed people to access certain data about a range of areas 
from medical records to estate agents’ fees, while open-data policies 
straddle many policy areas. Transparency regulations have also spread 
to the private sector, from procurement openness clauses in contracts, 
to publishing data on ownership of companies and multinational tax 
reporting.
Thus, the boundaries surrounding transparency are constantly 
moving. Disclosures using formal routes sit alongside leaks, semi-
authorised disclosures and plants, innovations, and radical actions 
like WikiLeaks or the Panama papers that can all kick-start transparency 
and gradually shift the border between open and closed or legal and 
illegal disclosures (Pozen, 2013). There is rarely a clear distinction 
between how transparency is produced. For example, is it through 
an appeal to FOI laws, a leak or whistleblowing? As a consequence, 
the legitimacy of disclosure falls along a continuum, with government 
press releases at one end and Edward Snowden at the other. It is most 
often the government that delineates what it sees as the legal boundaries 
of openness; for example, of FOI laws or secrecy legislation. Government 
frames the narrative over where transparency begins and ends. The 
exact effect of transparency varies from institution to institution. Local 
government has long held open meetings and has probably dealt more 
successfully with demands for transparency than central government. 
Parliament has struggled with scandal but has altered its culture towards 
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being more open (Worthy and Hazell, 2017). The overt assumption 
behind these changes is that transparency will trigger a chain of 
reactions across institutional domains:
•  The public will be interested and use the information and data 
that are published.
•  The public and others will act upon the data to leverage change 
across organisations.
•  Transparency will trigger cultural and behavioural change within 
institutions.
Research increasingly questions and modifies each of these assumptions. 
There is no general ideal user of information and, while some openness 
initiatives generate public interest, others do not. FOI laws in the UK 
are well used, but the numerous open-data experiments have proved 
far more variable. As Roberts (2015) points out, the chain of events 
from asking for or accessing data to actually receiving them and levering 
change is long and weak. If or whether it can lever reforms depends 
on the context in which the information is placed and whether the 
instruments are available to enforce institutional or behavioural change 
as a result (de Fine Licht, 2014). The hope lying behind transparency 
that such information will influence or persuade rational, calculating 
voters or engaged citizens has not been borne out (Bauhr and Grimes, 
2014). Users and voters hold ‘deeply engrained’ views about government 
and other institutions that are hard to dislodge. Any change coming 
about as a result of new information appears to be brief and subject 
specific (Marvel, 2016).
As to whether transparency drives cultural change, it can and has 
opened up diverse institutions from local government to parliament. 
How exactly an agent or body reacts to pressure for transparency can 
vary, from enthusiastic experimentation to minimal compliance and 
occasional outright resistance (Prat, 2006). Transparency reforms can 
transform a body or can be diluted, getting lost amid institutional 
wrangling or grinding to a halt against institutional resistance to 
change, as seen in the EU (Hillebrandt et al., 2014). While the evidence 
is slight for any perverse chilling effect, some politicians undoubtedly 
see transparency as a burden and symbolic of a constrained government, 
and have built a powerful counter-discourse around its (largely 
unsubstantiated) negative effects.
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Transparency and the public
In the chapters in this part we can see that transparency policies can 
be a powerful tool for opening up bodies as they give citizens the 
‘capacity to penetrate … defences and strategies’ built up over centuries 
to preserve secrecy, and offer them the chance to create what Jeremy 
Bentham called a ‘system of distrust’ to monitor their rulers or those 
acting in their name (Bok, 1986: 9).
Generally, only a very small percentage of the population ever use 
the tools of transparency (Worthy and Hazell, 2017). There are a 
number of ways by which the public learns about transparency issues. 
First, they often appear in the media and political discourse as solutions 
to crises. Scandals, exposés or shocks, ranging from political corruption 
to financial crashes, create a demand for greater openness. Alternatively, 
the lack of openness is seen as the cause of the crisis (Roberts, 2012). 
Secondly, as Fenster (2015) points out, transparency has also ‘captured 
the popular imagination’ in narratives about whistleblowing or heroic 
leaks, such as the leaks on the 2009 MPs’ expenses or those by Snowden 
in 2013. The existence of mechanisms such as FOI laws provide daily 
reminders in the media of the role and value of openness.
As all the chapters in this part mention, public interest in and use 
of the new transparency opportunities vary from case to case. There 
is a broad public awareness in the UK that some formal means of 
transparency exist, such as the FOI laws, and there is a general (if 
vague) support for them. In terms of leaks and ‘radical transparency’ 
such as Snowden’s leaks and WikiLeaks, public opinion is unclear and 
shifts between different contexts. While there is a powerful supportive 
folklore on whistleblowing, expectations and concerns over national 
security can divide opinion as to the ethics and effects of these actions 
(Fenster, 2012a; Roberts, 2012). Some fascinating experiments indicate 
that the public support and are reassured by the presence of transpar-
ency mechanisms but have little desire to use them, instead preferring 
to rely on other citizens to operate them and unleash their benefits 
(see de Fine Licht, 2014; de Fine Licht et al., 2014).
Research shows that there are numerous disconnects over public 
opinion and transparency, and various factors that can shape its impact:
• Context is key. Although transparency is seen as a good thing, 
the battle over what it means and what its limits should be 
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undoubtedly raises a series of competing and contradictory 
issues. Transparency overlaps with the ethics of leaks, privacy 
and national security. The view held by the public of any kind 
of transparency at any one time is highly context depend-
ent. A leaker of classified information like Snowden may be 
viewed very differently than the anonymous leaker of MPs’ 
expenses.
•  Flawed assumptions. The idea underlying transparency – namely, 
that information empowers rational, calculating citizens – is 
misplaced, though politicians continue to press it. All those 
who receive information have biases, and employ heuristic 
assumptions that shape their ideas and views. These views may 
interrupt the flow or change the meaning of information dis-
closed. All transparency systems and instruments are shaped 
by the environment and political context in which they are 
created (Meijer, 2013).
•  Competing visions and meanings. The debate over transparency 
and its effects continues, but may further complicate discussion 
rather than resolve it as different sides pull against each other. 
Governments seek a depoliticised (or redirected) transparency 
focused on efficiency or improving services, while activists seek 
greater openness of different parts of the state (and, increasingly, 
the private sector). The different language used and different 
aims may push discussion in divergent directions.
•  Fluid borders. The exact boundaries of transparency are 
constantly moving. Disclosures through leaks, semi-authorised 
disclosures and plants, innovations such as open data, and ‘radical’ 
actions like Wikileaks can all provide an impetus to transparency 
and gradually move the border between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ or 
‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ (Pozen, 2013). Meaning is greatly complicated 
by the closing off of certain issues, not least the transparency 
of citizens through government surveillance, a rarely mentioned 
aspect of the wider transparency debate (Birchall, 2014).
The chapters
The three chapters in this part discuss these themes in different areas, 
looking at the opportunities and pitfalls that transparency presents 
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across three very different institutions and systems. They show it is 
far from simple to understand transparency.
Stephen Curry examines the potential of open access to academic 
research to break down barriers and open up research and knowledge 
to the wider public. There have been notable steps forward from funders 
and also from individual online innovators. However, acceptance of 
the idea across academia has been patchy. So far, there is evidence of 
some progress but there are economic and cultural barriers to the 
need to publish, in some cases triggered by outright resistance to the 
principle of engaging more widely, as seen in the case of NASA. Demand 
for greater access on the part of citizen users is just as uneven. 
Nevertheless, the momentum provided by funders and technology 
means open access is here to stay.
Carmen McLeod examines one of the most sensitive connections 
between openness and privacy in the transparency of animal testing. 
This chapter maps two rather different approaches, in the UK and 
Switzerland, and argues that information supplied about animal 
experiments will not be enough to mend the historically troubled 
relations between animal-research science and society. On the one 
hand, it is argued that the public have a clear right to know about 
what is done in their name and, on the other, there is held to be a 
right to privacy and a need for protection. The case illustrates how 
the demands of transparency must be balanced with other competing 
and compelling needs and rights. At its borders, transparency interacts 
in complex ways with other sensitive rights including privacy, confi-
dentiality and security.
The final chapter by Roda Madziva and Vivien Lowndes on Christian 
asylum seekers and the UK Border Agency (UKBA) challenges some 
of the assumptions about openness and the idea that clear, neutral 
information is the bedrock of transparency. Information is profoundly 
shaped by its sociopolitical context and the hidden and not-so-hidden 
biases or ignorance that shape our environment. Their qualitative 
research shows how vital basic data may be misconstrued and mis-
understood, and also placed within particular institutional narratives 
that not only close off the fairness that such procedures bring but 
even create perverse outcomes.
Increased openness is frequently offered by governments or 
organisations as a symbol of their difference from their predecessors 
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or competitors, or their commitment to certain values and ways 
of working. Yet these chapters show that while transparency can 
change institutions, institutions can also remake transparency in their 
own image.
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2Open access: the beast that no-one  
could – or should – control?
Stephen Curry
‘The main thing, it seems to me, is to remember that technology 
manufactures not gadgets, but social change,’ declared science historian 
and broadcaster James Burke in a lecture given in 1985 (Burke, 2005). 
This was several years before the rise of the personal computer and 
the internet. But history’s knack of repeating itself means that the 
words are no less true of the digital transformation of the world in 
the last two decades. The recasting of information into digital forms 
that can be replicated and transmitted instantly across the globe has 
changed our relationship with it in myriad ways. This poses commercial 
challenges in some industries – music, film and newspapers, for example 
– but at the same time has given rise to whole new businesses such 
as search engines, social networking and online retailing. It has also 
created opportunities for the public to access public information, which 
is changing the provision of government services and opening up 
new avenues for democratic dialogue.
The effects have been no less profound within academia, even if 
they have been slower to work through the system. Our relationship 
with research papers and data is changing because it is easier and 
cheaper than ever before to put these scientific outputs into the public 
domain. In the era of printed journals this possibility had never arisen 
because of the costs of production and distribution. Now that these 
have largely disappeared, the question is: why not make all scientific 
research publicly available?
However, this simple question does not have a simple answer. There 
remains considerable debate about the extent to which open access 
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should be allowed to perturb the mores of scholarship and research 
or to breach the walls of the academy. At the core of discussions on 
open access, at least in policy formulations, is the idea that the public, 
as taxpayers, should have access to the research that they fund. 
Academic perspectives on open access, by contrast, tend to be more 
focused on the internal operations of scientific research, although 
there are signs that the issue is stimulating discussion within the 
academy on how research findings should be made accessible to the 
public.
The growth of open access has coincided with a shift in thinking 
about public involvement in science, from the deficit model of public 
understanding of science initiatives, which tended to see the issue 
as one of ordinary people’s lack of knowledge, to the more balanced 
notion of public engagement (Stilgoe et al., 2014). This makes it tricky 
to identify the precise effects of open access, which is the aim of this 
chapter. To set the scene, I will give a brief description of the open-access 
movement and recent policy initiatives, and discuss their impacts on 
the attitudes of scientists towards the broader open-science agenda 
and public engagement. I then consider the effects of open access (and 
allied moves) on the authority and independence of science – two issues 
that are perturbed by the increasingly blurred boundary between the 
academy and the public. Lastly, I examine the sometimes surprising 
feedback effects on open access that arise through the collaboration of 
advocacy groups and citizen scientists with professional researchers.
Although it lurks mainly in the background of the public engagement 
arena, the topic of open access nevertheless provides a useful focus 
for some of the broader issues raised by the interaction of public and 
academic domains. It sharpens the questions of what exactly the public 
wants or needs in terms of access to scientific research, and what the 
academy is prepared to yield in return for continued public support. 
Although open access has the capacity to change the dynamics of 
engagement between the public and the academy, the realisation of 
this potential requires examination of the balance of power between 
them, and clarification of the notions of academic freedom and 
responsibility. The journey since the 1990s suggests that no-one is in 
overall control of these processes. This is perhaps inevitable, and may 
even be desirable in a democratic society that aspires to be more 
open.
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What is open access and how has it been implemented  
as a policy?
Open access is very much an academic initiative, largely conceived 
as a tool for researchers. Its origins lie at the messy confluence of 
digital technology and open licensing for software (Eve, 2014; Suber, 
2012), but a defining moment appears to be Stevan Harnad’s ‘subversive 
proposal’ of 1994 (Harnad, 1994). This advocated the free electronic 
dissemination of research results, but was envisioned as ‘applicable 
only to ESOTERIC … scientific and scholarly publication’ to further 
learned enquiry by ‘fellow esoteric scientists and scholars the world 
over’. The 2002 statement from the Budapest Open Access Initiative 
(Chan et al., 2010) defined open access to the research literature as:
its free availability on the public internet, permitting any users to read, 
download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of these 
articles, crawl them for indexing, pass them as data to software, or use 
them for any other lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or technical 
barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet 
itself.
This encapsulates a broad notion of the intended audience, listing 
‘scientists, scholars, teachers, students, and other curious minds’, but 
falls short of explicitly mentioning the public.
Even so, the statement did identify open access as an ‘unprecedented 
public good’, a concept used by economists to identify commodities 
that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous – in other words, available 
to all and undiminished by their use (Stephan, 2012) – and a label 
that draws the notion of public value into the discussion. The public 
dimension has certainly featured in the formulation of government 
open-access policies, which have tended to enshrine the rights of the 
public as taxpayers. David Willetts, the former UK Minister for 
Universities and Science, and a strong driver of open access, trailed 
his thinking in a speech to the Publishers’ Association in May 2012: 
‘As taxpayers put their money towards intellectual enquiry, they cannot 
be barred from then accessing it’ (Willetts, 2012). He did not elaborate 
on what the taxpayers might do with this access, despite the fact that 
his interest in the issue was first stirred by his own difficulties in 
getting hold of research papers while writing The Pinch, a book on 
the intergenerational social contract.
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In a similar vein, the 2013 White House memorandum on open 
access stated simply that ‘citizens deserve easy access to the results 
of scientific research their tax dollars have paid for’ (Holdren, 2013). 
The EU’s guidelines on open access for its Horizon 2020 research 
programme list the same goal, but also see open access as a way 
to ‘involve citizens and society’ through ‘improved transparency of 
the scientific process’ (EU, 2014). Again, the details of how citizens 
might be involved are left as an exercise for the citizens. Perhaps 
that is because making publicly funded research accessible is just one 
component of a broader open-data policy landscape that is shaped by 
a diverse set of motivations. Return on investment remains a central 
preoccupation for governments, and the release of public research and 
data is clearly seen as a way to stimulate innovation in new products, 
services and markets. But there is also, in the UK at least, a desire 
to improve public services, and a developing recognition of the link 
between transparency and democratic accountability – both for govern-
ment and for the governance of scientific research (Boulton et al.,  
2012).
The emergent concept of responsible research and innovation (RRI), 
which places value on public input into efforts to anticipate the risks 
associated with novel avenues of research, such as nanotechnology 
or systems biology, seems likely to be co-opted as a further justification, 
but appears to be too recent to have figured in open-access policy 
formulations (Stilgoe et al., 2013).
What are attitudes to open access among scientists?
Reaction to open access among academics has been mixed. Some 
have embraced it enthusiastically. Others, though sympathetic in 
principle, have criticised various aspects of its implementation; still 
others have objected to the less restrictive forms of creative commons 
(CC) licensing as a gross infringement of authors’ rights (Allington, 
2014; Mandler, 2014). There have been lively internal debates between 
open-access advocates, publishers, learned societies, universities, 
funders and representatives of different scholarly disciplines (Eve, 
2014; Hochschild, 2016; Mainwaring, 2016).
While most scientists seem sensitive to the resonance of open access 
with the amateur ethos of sharing that still survives within the research 
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community, scientists are busy people with many pressing preoccupa-
tions, and generally only turn to the issue once a manuscript has been 
accepted for publication and the question of compliance with funder 
policies arises.
The lack of engagement among research scientists has not been 
helped by the convoluted history of open-access policy development. 
In the UK the implementation of a new policy by Research Councils 
UK (RCUK) in 2012–2013 stumbled at first. The original strong 
preference for ‘gold’ open access was subsequently refined to make it 
clear that ‘green’ open-access routes were acceptable alternatives (RCUK, 
2014). The terms gold and green open access have yet to sink deep 
roots in academic or public minds and require some clarification. 
Gold open access entails making the published paper immediately 
available via the journal, which may require payment of an article-
processing charge, with obvious cost implications that were not well 
received, particularly at a time when public funding for research was 
under severe pressure. Green open access generally means that the 
author’s peer-reviewed manuscript (not yet formatted or copy-edited 
by the journal) is made available in an institutional repository. The 
green route is free to the author – its costs hidden within repository 
investment and the traditional subscription model of publishing. 
Moreover, green open access is often subject to publisher embargoes, 
which constitute delays of months or years before the manuscript is 
released to public view.
A subsequent announcement that the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) will require all publications to be open 
access to qualify as submissions to future research excellence framework 
(REF) exercises was agnostic on whether open access should be achieved 
by the gold or green route (HEFCE, 2015). Although a bold move 
(Eve et al., 2014), this dislocation from the thrust of the RCUK policy 
added to confusion among researchers. A recent review of UK open-
access policy by Adam Tickell has recommended the harmonisation 
of RCUK and HEFCE policies in order to simplify the requirements 
imposed on researchers (Tickell, 2016). Good policy requires effective 
implementation, especially by authors and their institutions. Although 
one of the ultimate aims of open access is the public interest, it is 
possible to detect in these machinations a greater preoccupation with 
the interests of researchers.
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Some advocates see open access primarily as a service to science, 
its purpose being to accelerate and enrich the processes of research 
by freeing up public access to primary literature. Indeed, scientists 
(Breckler, 2006) and humanities scholars (Osborne, 2013) frequently 
express their suspicion that the public has little need of open access 
because they would not be able to understand research papers, a 
view sometimes deployed in defence of the status quo (Anderson,  
2015).
There is little doubt that the sophistication of the research literature, 
coupled with its formal, jargon-laden style, is a barrier to understanding 
by the proverbial man or woman in the street. But such elitist views 
underestimate the sophistication of some members of the public, as 
we shall see below, and constitute a risky attitude in a democratic 
society. They also discount the benefits of lay summaries, which are 
increasingly being offered by journals, or of mediation by science 
bloggers (who can range more widely in an open-access landscape).
Concerns have also been expressed in some quarters that open-access 
policies are an infringement of academic freedom. Such arguments 
tend to expand the definition of academic freedom beyond its broadly 
agreed provisions to protect the right of scholars to investigate and 
publish on topics of their choosing without fear of sanction from 
university employers or governments. Kyle Grayson, for example, has 
asserted that it should also include the right ‘to place your research 
where you believe it will have the biggest impact on the audience that 
you are trying to reach’ (Grayson, 2013), while Rick Anderson argues 
it also entails ‘the right to have some say as to how, where, whether, 
and by whom one’s work is published’ (Anderson, 2015). In particular, 
Anderson argues that these freedoms are lost in the imposition of 
CC BY licences, which allow free reuse by third parties (provided 
that acknowledgement and reference back to the original are made), 
and that open-access policies requiring such licences amount to 
‘coercion’. The coercion of academics is discussed in journalist Richard 
Poynder’s lengthy critique of HEFCE’s new policy of admitting only 
open-access papers in future REF assessments (Poynder, 2015). He 
argues that the exclusionary and divisive nature of the REF, which 
assesses only a minority of university researchers and teachers and is 
widely viewed as punishingly bureaucratic, makes it a strange bedfellow 
for the egalitarian impulses of the open-access movement. Poynder’s 
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view is that open-access advocates ‘made a fundamental error when 
they sought to co-opt government to their cause’.
There are certainly some legitimate issues to be tackled here (Kingsley, 
2016). The freedoms given to users of CC-BY-licensed open-access 
content to create derivative works remain a fixation among some 
humanities scholars (Mandler, 2014), fearful of remixing that obscures 
attribution or the author’s original intent. Against this view, Eve and 
Kingsley have argued that such concerns are overstated and reflect 
an underestimation of the protections afforded by CC licences and 
the ethical norms of the academy (Eve, 2015; Kingsley and Kennan, 
2015).
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that open access rubs up against 
academic freedom, as acknowledged by Curt Rice in making the case 
that open access can actually bolster the privileges accorded to scholars 
(Rice, 2013). Academic freedom remains a contested concept that 
should be considered negotiable as the place of scholarship within 
society continues to evolve. The concerns expressed by critics have 
mostly reflected a preoccupation with academic freedoms and rights, 
but it is also necessary to consider the question of responsibilities. A 
counter-view to Poynder is that the linkage of open access to the REF 
can be seen as entirely appropriate, since both are forms of public 
accountability. Whether funders should have a say in how the research 
that they support should be published is also a legitimate question, 
especially if the aim is to broaden the readership so that it might stir 
as many minds as possible, be integrated into their thoughts and give 
rise to new syntheses and insights. What more could – or should – a 
scholar hope for? That is a question that has been addressed rather 
cautiously, not least because researchers and their institutions remain 
in the thrall of journal impact factors for their career advancement 
and research assessment.
Has open access changed attitudes of scientists to  
public engagement?
Arguably, open access may serve as a useful first point of contact for 
many scientists with the broader audience for their research and 
public-facing open-science movement. But how effectively does it 
expose scientists to their public duty – for many, a concept defined 
40 Science and the politics of openness
only by the aspirational ‘plans for public engagement’ sections found 
in grant application forms?
We should note first that the UK Government’s Public Attitudes to 
Science survey (Castell et al., 2014) has revealed a popular demand 
for scientists to be more involved in discussions with the public about 
their research. Anecdotally, there is an increasing acknowledgement 
by scientists of the need to interact with various public constituencies 
(e.g. patient groups, environmental activists, citizen scientists), though 
at the same time they are wary of how to go about this. For example, 
should such interactions happen in academic or public forums, including 
social media? There is also fear of exposure to the demands of advocacy 
groups that refuse to play by the academic rules of engagement.
Even when the encounter with open access raises questions of public 
interest, penetration of the academic mindset has been limited, in 
part because of the complexity of issues at stake. These include questions 
of the reliability of open-access research literature (raised by concerns 
about vanity publishing in author-pays business models) and the 
questionable peer-review quality of so-called predatory journals, both 
of which potentially undermine public trust in research. It is difficult 
to quantify the extent of these problems, which are mitigated by the 
desire of serious scholars to protect their reputations. To a significant 
extent they predate the rise of open access (Kingsley and Kennan, 
2015) and address deep systemic problems with traditional peer-review 
processes of scholarly publishing (Smith, 2006). Related concerns have 
emerged more recently over the non-reproducibility of scientific 
findings, through either error or fraud in the original work (Casadevall 
and Fang, 2012). Open access is not touted as a ready solution to such 
ills, though the fact that it maximises the readership of the research 
literature clearly enhances the capacity for post-publication detection 
of inaccuracies.
The question of the cost of open access is one that has also exercised 
academics, but more because of its perceived incursions into research 
budgets, particularly by the gold-favouring RCUK policy, or the 
demands placed on authors not in receipt of research grants. The 
broader question of the total cost of scholarly publishing has received 
less attention – though it has not been ignored entirely (Hochschild, 
2016; Kirby, 2015; Mainwaring, 2016). In part, this is because academics 
are largely ignorant of the cost of journal subscriptions, which are 
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normally managed on their behalf by university librarians. Although 
the direction of travel is away from subscription models towards a 
totally open-access world, the details of the transition remain obscure 
and mired in enduring arguments between various stakeholders. 
Economic modelling suggests that a fully open-access publishing 
system could deliver savings by creating a market where there is genuine 
competition for publishing services (Swan and Houghton, 2012), but 
these have yet to be realised.
There is no easy escape from the dysfunctional features of the market 
in journal subscriptions, in which journals cannot be regarded as 
competing products by their purchasers and market forces are distorted 
not only by academic ignorance of the costs but also by preoccupations 
with journal prestige (Schieber, 2013). As a result, relatively little 
thought has been given by scientists to the argument that they should 
be supporting university librarians in their bids to get value for money 
in negotiations with publishers over subscription fees. There is a 
pragmatic case that researchers should be made sensitive to the issue 
of cost, especially when there is pressure on public funding, in order 
to avoid signalling privileged or insular attitudes. However, the 
complexity and lack of predictability of the pace and extent of transition 
to a functioning open-access market are significant impediments in 
this debate.
For some scientists the argument for open access is a moral one. 
Mike Taylor’s insistence that paywalls are immoral and that the sci-
entists’ job ‘to bring new knowledge into the world’ requires them to 
make it freely accessible is a challenge to long-standing norms of the 
academy (Taylor, 2013). From another perspective, while welcoming 
the potential of open access, Hochschild has raised moral questions 
about its redistributive implications, particularly for poor scholars in 
the global South under business models that require payment of 
article-processing charges (Hochschild, 2016), which have yet to be 
answered satisfactorily.
Nevertheless, there is a growing sense that the ground is shifting 
in response to public need. Recent initiatives by funders and publishers 
to provide free access to research on Ebola virus and Zika virus in 
response to serious public health crises have thrown a spotlight on 
the slow and restrictive practices that have come to dominate publishing 
(Curry, 2016). In announcing the moves to speed the release of Zika 
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virus research, the statement of the consortium of funders and publish-
ers led by the Wellcome Trust spoke of an imperative. It was not 
described as a moral imperative, but did seem to resemble one. The 
logical corollary to these initiatives is to ask why they should not be 
extended to other infectious diseases – HIV, tuberculosis and malaria 
infections have caused more harm than Ebola or Zika – or even to 
other research areas where there is a strong public interest, such as 
antimicrobial resistance; climate change; or secure supplies of energy, 
water and food? Here, the idea of open access has prised open a 
gateway that has the potential to be transformative. It has yet to be 
converted into a mainstream conduit to the public domain, but the 
norms of the academy and its duty to the public interest are evidently 
still being negotiated.
The pressures towards greater openness seem increasingly irresistible 
and they may increase yet further as the latest generation of scientists 
– which has grown up with the internet – takes its seat in the academy. 
Among them are some notable idealists. Neuroscientist Erin McKiernan, 
for example, sees access to information as a human right and has 
pledged to work as openly as possible (McKiernan, 2015). The Open 
Access Button was created by two medical students, David Carroll 
and Joe McArthur, as a web-browser tool to help readers who encoun-
tered publisher paywalls to access free versions of the research papers 
they wanted (Carroll and McArthur, 2013). Sci-Hub, a freely accessible 
repository of over sixty-two million research papers created by software 
developer and neurotechnology researcher Alexandra Elbakyan, is a 
more radical and controversial reaction to journal paywalls. Though 
the repository is clearly in breach of copyright law – at the time of 
writing, Sci-Hub is the subject of a legal complaint initiated by Elsevier 
– Elbakyan has defended it by citing the provision in the UN declaration 
on human rights that asserts the right of everyone ‘to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits’ (Taylor, 2016). The moral complexities, 
which have sombre echoes of the case brought against open-access 
activist Aaron Swartz after he had downloaded several million docu-
ments from JSTOR, are beyond the scope of this chapter. However, 
the work of these activists highlights the perspective of young people 
that the present state of scholarly publishing is increasingly ill fitted 
to the digital world. That perspective raises important ethical and 
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technical arguments about scholarly publishing that cannot ultimately 
be settled in court.
How does open access affect the authority and 
independence of science?
Scientists commonly see themselves as part of a self-governing com-
munity of experts, and science as a responsible, self-correcting process 
of knowledge generation. For this reason they defend institutions 
such as peer review, which provides scientific control over what is 
published. In the UK this perspective shores up the Haldane principle, 
the right of scientists (within certain strategic constraints set by 
government and research councils) to determine which research projects 
should be funded. However, this view of self-governance is coming 
under challenge, from government transparency, journal impact and 
RRI agendas; from related shifts in the responsibilities owed to public 
engagement; from some of the public trust issues mentioned above 
in relation to the reliability of the research literature; and from special-
interest campaign groups (e.g. on animal research, climate change, 
and genetic modification).
While the boundary between academic science and the rest of the 
world has never been impermeable, it demarcates the sphere of authority 
and independence of scientists. The growth of open science and social 
media are making this boundary more porous, and it is worth consider-
ing as a potential locus for future interactions with open access.
For the most part the relationship between scientists and social 
media remains guarded. Some have embraced the openness provided 
by new democratising channels of communication, but many continue 
to sneer at blogs, even those written by scientists. Although there 
have been cases where meaningful scientific critique has appeared in 
blogs, the view still prevails that these are not appropriate channels 
for discussions between scientists. For example, following the publica-
tion by NASA researchers of a claimed discovery of bacteria that 
could incorporate arsenic into their DNA, the space agency refused 
to engage with the critique published on the blog of microbiologist 
Rosie Redfield because it did not feel it to be ‘appropriate to debate 
the science using the media and bloggers’ (CBC News, 2010).
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However, there is a growing sense that NASA’s view is out of date. 
The website PubPeer.com has used the tools of social media to create 
a platform for open discussion of the research literature. It has emerged 
as a prominent venue for the identification of errors in research papers 
and, on occasion, instances of scientific fraud. A controversial feature 
of the platform is that commenters may remain anonymous (or 
unregistered) and their academic credentials unknown – but the 
scientists behind the site assert that the quality of comments 
from registered and unregistered users is indistinguishable (PubPeer, 
2015).
The organic – some might say unregulated – growth of PubPeer 
reflects the enabling power of the internet and is diagnostic of unmet 
need in the publishing system. However, although the identity of 
many of its users is unknown, their comments and criticisms still 
largely reflect the same internal debates among researchers about 
quality control in the published literature. Different challenges arise 
when the research being discussed touches on matters of public interest 
or concern. Although there is a recognition that transparency is the 
key to developing and maintaining public trust (Boulton et al., 2012; 
Stilgoe et al., 2013), and that scientists have a duty to respond intel-
ligently when confronted by challenges to their research, the upsurge 
in such challenges engendered by social media can pose severe difficul-
ties. As Lewandowsky and Bishop have pointed out, ‘openness can 
be exploited by opponents who are keen to stall inconvenient research’ 
because campaigners may not be ‘committed to informed debate’ 
(Lewandowsky and Bishop, 2016). These may be difficult debates for 
the scientific community, but they are important and inevitable in a 
democratic society – and need to be conducted with some care (Pearce 
et al., 2016).
Open access has not yet assumed a prominent role in these interac-
tions. However, they seem likely to become more frequent in an 
open-access world and should, it is hoped, also be better informed. 
Moreover, a general disposition towards openness is a core part of 
building trust through transparency. Experiments in open-access 
journals with open peer review (e.g. F1000Research, Atmospheric 
Chemistry and Physics) further increase the transparency of the 
scientific enterprise, as well as helping to mitigate some of the worst 
effects of anonymous peer reviews.
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What is the impact of open access on the capacity of 
different publics to engage with science?
As noted above, open access was not primarily conceived as a service 
to the general public or as a driver of public engagement. Policy state-
ments may have nodded in this direction by mentioning the rights of 
taxpayers to access the work they have funded, but there is a degree 
of blindness here because, of course, not all citizens are taxpayers.
Nevertheless, there is a broad array of public audiences for the 
research literature. This includes politicians and civil servants, policy 
researchers, media, non-governmental organisations, large and small 
businesses, independent scholars, graduates of various disciplines, 
patients’ advocacy groups, and citizen scientists. The impact of open 
access on these groups has not yet been investigated systematically 
and is hard to quantify. It seems likely to be relatively minor, given 
that only a minority of research articles is reckoned to be open access: 
current estimates are that around 20%–30% of the research literature 
is freely available through journals or repositories, though the growth 
trend is upward (Laakso and Björk, 2012; Research Information 
Network, 2015).
That said, there are various citizens’ groups that, for different reasons, 
want not just increased access to read the research literature but also 
to be able to make their own contributions to it. These include advocacy 
groups, particularly around healthcare and environmental issues (e.g. 
pollution, biodiversity), as well as the citizen-science movement. Such 
groups predate the internet (and open access). In the 1960s and 1970s 
the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science and Science 
for the People, for example, formed around concerns about weapons 
research and environmental pollution, but activists and advocates 
have been greatly stimulated by the organisational power of the web 
and the general increase in access to information that it affords. For 
example, a 2007 report concluded that health professionals have both 
underestimated the ability of patients to access and provide useful 
online resources and overestimated the hazards of imperfect online 
information (Ferguson, 2007). The threat of a phenomenon that was 
initially seen as a challenge to paternalistic medical practice is dissolving 
amid growing recognition that informed patients are valuable partners 
in managing healthcare.
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The particular benefits of open access in this space appear patchy 
and uneven, perhaps owing to the relative novelty of citizen science 
and the still-limited extent of research that is published in this form. 
But there are initiatives to overcome this. PatientPower campaigns 
for greater access, as well as providing other sources of information, 
while PatientInform is an initiative run jointly by publishers, medical 
societies and health professionals to enable access to the research 
literature to member organisations (though not directly to members 
of the public). The demand for access is widespread – in 2006, 80% 
of internet users were reported to have searched online for information 
on at least one of sixteen different medical conditions (though demand 
for access to the primary research literature will only be a fraction of 
this). This type of search activity is most prevalent among younger 
people who have grown up with the internet, and seems likely to 
increase as they reach middle and old age.
Just as interesting is the growing involvement of patient groups in 
medical research, which has led to innovations that are likely to increase 
awareness of the potential of open access. A striking recent example 
springs from work on the rare genetic disorder, N-glycanase 1 deficiency 
(known as NGLY1). The condition was identified after Cristina and 
Matt Might linked up with genetics researchers in the search for the 
underlying cause of their young son’s problematic physical and mental 
development. Genome sequencing identified previously unknown 
mutations in the N-glycanase 1 gene, and triggered the search for 
other patients. Thus far the case follows a pattern of parental advocacy 
that is familiar from Hollywood movies such as Extraordinary Measures 
or Lorenzo’s Oil, but the interesting twist here – which is an important 
signal of the dynamism of patient–researcher interactions – is that 
the push to develop a treatment for NGLY1 has kick-started a citizen-
science project (Mark2Cure) to text mine the research literature. In 
its first publication (made available as an open-access preprint on the 
bioRxiv), the project has shown that groups of citizens can identify 
and link keywords within the biomedical literature as accurately as a 
researcher with PhD-level training (Tsueng et al., 2016).
The Mark2Cure study does not have any citizen scientists as authors, 
but this is being normalised as an appropriate role. The open-access 
British Medical Journal ‘welcomes studies that were led or coauthored 
by patients’, while the health and social care journal Research 
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Involvement and Engagement (also open access) has a patient advocate, 
Richard Stephens, as a co-editor-in-chief. Beyond patient groups, 
citizen-scientist authors can readily be found in the literature on 
environmental pollution (Davis and Murphy, 2015; Padró-Martínez 
et al., 2015).
Similar developments – and challenges to traditional authority – are 
detectable across the whole spectrum of citizen-science projects, even 
in those areas where interest is driven by curiosity rather than personal 
need. Citizen-scientist projects vary enormously in scope, format and 
level of engagement between lay people and professional researchers 
(Shirk et al., 2012; Silvertown, 2009).
Attitudes to and experiences of open access vary within the 
citizen-science movement. Anecdotally, project organisers from the 
ranks of academia have reported sporadic demands for research 
papers that are usually satisfied on an ad hoc basis by distributing 
electronic versions accessed through university library subscriptions. 
Nevertheless, there is sensitivity to the issue. Robyn Bailey, who leads 
the ornithological NestWatch project at Cornell University, told me 
in an email that she was pleased to have been able to publish a paper 
co-authored with citizen scientist Gerald Clark in the open-access 
journal PeerJ (Bailey and Clark, 2014), recognising the need to 
share the results with all participants in the project. But she also 
acknowledged the pressure on academics to publish in high-impact 
journals, which can dramatically increase the costs if immediate access is 
desired.
These factors are recognised by other citizen-science projects but, 
although there is widespread understanding of the need to ensure 
that the results of such projects are made available to participants as 
part of a positive-feedback loop, open-access publication appears to 
be a relatively unusual avenue for doing so. Newsletters and blog posts 
serve as alternative means of communication that have the advantage 
of being more digestible, though for many rare diseases there are few 
secondary resources, and affected communities have no choice but 
to look at the primary literature. The Zooniverse, a diverse collection 
of projects, is unusual in having a clear policy requiring results to be 
published in open-access venues.
Citizen science is a dynamic and innovative area. Demand for access 
to the wider research literature seems likely to increase as the 
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more-engaged participants seek to better understand the science behind 
their projects. Given the increasing sophistication of the contributions 
made by citizen scientists, it also seems appropriate to ensure that 
papers arising from their projects are made available to the whole 
community by open access. A recent open-access paper from the 
EteRNA project – an online game designed to search for improved 
methods for predicting the fold of RNA (ribonucleic acid) sequences 
– has three gamers – Jeff Anderson-Lee, Eli Fisker and Mathew Zada 
– as co-authors (Anderson-Lee et al., 2016). This arose because Rhiju 
Das, the project leader at Stanford University, noticed that Anderson-
Lee and Fisker had independently compiled extensive documentation 
on their approach to the RNA-folding problem, and he encouraged 
them to write it up. EteRNA has an informal open-access policy that 
is about to be written into the end-user license agreement. ‘It just 
seems like the right thing to do,’ Das told me (personal communication, 
email, 24 February 2016).
The positive-feedback effects of open access on citizen science are 
important, not just for recognising citizen scientists’ contributions 
and enhancing their knowledge and skills, but also as a way of making 
professional scientists more aware of the high-level capabilities of 
their citizen counterparts. The wider impacts of citizen science are 
difficult to assess, but it is an activity that could further increase the 
porosity of the walls of academia in ways that could have other societal 
benefits; for example, enhancing citizen participation in discussions 
around RRI.
Concluding remarks
Open access appears to fit naturally with the goal of making science 
public, but its particular contributions can be difficult to discern. The 
picture presented in this chapter is unfinished because the forces at 
play have yet to reach any kind of equilibrium. Though the pace of 
change may not be fast enough for its most enthusiastic supporters, 
there has been an indisputable rise of open access as a result of the 
advocacy of academics and the policy initiatives of governments and 
funding agencies. Awareness of the challenge to traditional modes of 
scholarly publishing is widespread within the academy, which appears 
to be sympathetic to open access in principle, even if the various 
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requirements of policy implementation are not universally welcomed. 
Signs that it may encourage scientists to be more outward facing are 
emerging, but they are hard to separate from more general moves to 
open up the academy.
On the side of the public – or publics – levels of awareness and use 
are more limited. In certain quarters open access is seen as very 
important, but it is also just one form of research information that is 
available to citizens on the internet. That said, it is important to 
recognise that intermediaries to information such as journalists, 
bloggers or advocacy groups, also stand to benefit from increased 
open access.
The idea of open access as a journey has become something of a 
cliché, at least in the UK, but it retains a kernel of truth. Although 
the direction of travel is upwards from a relatively low baseline, the 
trajectory remains prone to deviation. Few would have predicted the 
present destination at the outset of the 1990s. Just as the diffuse 
boundaries between disciplines are reckoned to define a territory of 
creative interaction, the public–academy boundary that accompanies 
open access appears to be fertile ground. This is not just true of technical 
innovation and challenges to customs and practice in the academy. 
There are signs too, among academics, new publishers and citizen 
scientists, that it can bring new life.
As the primary producer and consumer of the research literature, 
the academy remains in overall control. But there are pressures from 
above and below for open access as part of the open-science agenda 
that offers the benefit of greater integration and mutual understanding 
between scientists and society. There are risks here, particularly in 
contentious areas of research that attract attention from combative 
campaigners, but few would contend that these can be mitigated by 
restricting access to the research literature. Public dialogue is an 
essential feature of democratic societies and can only be served by 
measures to increase the knowledge base of that conversation.
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Assuaging fears of monstrousness: UK and 
Swiss initiatives to open up animal 
laboratory research
Carmen M. McLeod
Suspicion always attaches to mystery. … The best project prepared in 
darkness, would excite more alarm than the worst, undertaken under 
the auspices of publicity. (Bentham, 1999 [1791]: 30)
The relationship between animal laboratory research science (AR) 
and society has a particularly complex, contested and troubled history 
and is associated with secrecy and obfuscation. Various works in the 
literature show societal fears that scientific experimentation on animals 
is a monstrous activity,1 asking: ‘What kind of person would do such 
an experiment?’ (Merriam, 2012: 127). Two recent policy initiatives 
– the UK Concordat on Openness on Animal Research (UKC) and 
the Swiss Basel Declaration (BD) – seek to open up science–society 
relations and AR in order to build more trust and assuage fears of 
monstrousness within this space. These initiatives illustrate the chal-
lenges of negotiating or restoring trust in the relationship between 
science and society (see Dierkes and von Grote, 2000; Jasanoff, 2004; 
Wynne, 2006) and the complications of implementing an open-science 
agenda (Levin et al., 2016). This chapter explores the complexities of 
trust and openness in science and society relations through a compara-
tive analysis of recent openness initiatives in the UK and Switzerland, 
examining the influence of historically troubled relations between AR 
science and society and considering whether the provision of more 
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information and greater transparency will be enough to mend the 
relationship.2
Historically, AR has been practised outside the purview of the public 
(Garrett, 2012), and intense debates between the AR community and 
society have sorely tested their trustful relations in the past. In the 
UK and Switzerland accusations of betrayal can be found on both 
sides of the science–society divide. In the UK, the legacy of so-called 
‘extremist’ and violent animal-rights activities from the 1990s and the 
2000s continue to taint the AR relationship.3 Scientists and scientific 
institutions working in AR claimed that secrecy was necessary for 
security reasons as they were virtually ‘under siege’ (Festing, cited 
in Shepherd, 2007: 1). In Switzerland there is a similarly troubled 
relationship of trust between AR and society (Michel and Kayasseh,  
2011).
In both countries the public has heard accusations of cruelty used 
in animal laboratory experiments, and animal-rights and anti-vivisection 
organisations often frame secrecy as a way to conceal activities that 
are unpalatable to the public. In the UK, for example, a number of 
undercover operations by animal-rights and anti-vivisection organisa-
tions have found that some scientists and animal-research technicians 
were not meeting required welfare standards towards the animals in 
their care.4 These exposés suggested that scientists could not be trusted 
to follow procedures or apply ethical practices of animal welfare in 
their laboratories, and also raised concerns about the adequacy of the 
regulatory system governing animal research. Furthermore, the UK 
and Switzerland are particularly pertinent cases to consider in this 
2 The chapter draws on data collected during a thirty-month project: Animals 
and the Making of Scientific Knowledge. This project included semi-structured 
interviews with scientists and other members of the UK AR community, and a 
focus group with members of the Basel Declaration Society, as well as a range 
of documentary sources such as organisations’ webpages, newsletters, commit-
tee notes and other grey literature, along with secondary data, such as media 
reports.
3 For a comprehensive historical overview of animal rights ‘extremism’, see Monaghan 
(1997, 2013) and Hadley (2009). 
4 A summary of undercover investigations in the UK by the British Union against 
Vivisection is provided by Linzey et al. (2015: 58–67).
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context, as both countries claim to have among the strictest regulations 
worldwide governing animal research.5
Since 2012 there has been a dramatic rise in transparency discourses 
from the UK and Swiss AR communities, which emphasise the 
importance of greater openness about the activities, goals and justifica-
tions for continuing to use animal laboratory experiments. The BD 
and the UKC are key policy initiatives within these transparency 
discourses that aim to build trust. However, a growing social-science 
scholarship questions the assumption that greater transparency will 
necessarily improve accountability and trust within governance 
frameworks (Hood and Heald, 2006; Meijer, 2013; Worthy, 2010), 
and highlights the potential tensions between secrecy and openness 
(e.g. Birchall, 2011; Jasanoff, 2006; Strathern, 2000).
The ‘technologies of secrets’, a term employed by Holmberg and 
Ideland (2010) in a Swedish case study, refers to the patterns that 
underlie the fluid and flexible boundaries of openness and secrecy. 
They argue that, in the Swedish context, AR openness initiatives are 
often carefully stage-managed so as to allow what they term ‘selective 
openness’ in order to control (and preserve) existing power relations 
between science and the public. McLeod and Hobson-West (2015) 
suggest that, in contrast, openness initiatives in the UK, at least, are 
allied towards ‘cautious openness’, potentially allowing for greater input 
from interested members of the public. However, their research also 
highlights the variation in the discursive framing of the meanings of 
openness and what outcomes might be expected.
For scientists and institutions, opening up animal research also 
comes with attendant anxieties about the dangers of being more 
transparent, and whether such risks will outweigh the benefits of 
allowing greater public access inside the laboratory. In particular, the 
notions of openness, trust and mistrust must be considered against the 
5 For example, in 1985 it was claimed that ‘the current Swiss law for the protection 
of animals is already one of the most stringent in the world’ (Jean-Jacques Dreifuss 
(University of Geneva), cited in MacKenzie, 1985: 17). The revised Swiss animal 
protection law, which came into effect in 2008, is also described as ‘one of the most 
strict worldwide’ (Swissinfo.ch, 2014). Similarly, in the UK there are frequent claims 
that the country has ‘some of the strictest [animal research] regulations in the world’ 
(Science Media Centre, 2013).
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backdrop of the troubled relationship between AR and society, which 
since the early 1980s has included betrayals and controversy. In the 
UK, fears of the past continue to haunt AR practices. This troubled 
history is also pertinent in the Swiss context, as is outlined below.
The troubled history of animal research and  
science–society relations
The Head of the UK Animals in Science Regulation Unit (ASRU) 
recently commented that a ‘vicious circle of distrust’ has developed 
in the AR domain (MacArthur Clark, 2015). This narrative of distrustful 
relations associated with AR dates from the 1970s, particularly the 
impact during the 1990s and 2000s of both the increase in exposés 
of unethical and non-compliant activities by scientists and serious 
instances of hard-line and violent animal-rights activism. This historical 
context remains a fundamental challenge to trust in contemporary 
debates about transparency and AR.
The UK has a long history of AR protests, including some animal-
welfare and anti-vivisection organisations that have been campaigning 
since the end of the nineteenth century. Although most organisations 
have tended to engage in non-violent forms of protest, during the 
1970s and 1980s a marked increase in direct action (both legal and 
illegal) brought animal research into the spotlight (Matfield, 2002). 
From 1996 many AR breeding facilities were targeted, resulting in 
the closure of several of the smaller companies (Monaghan, 2013). 
Huntington Life Sciences, the largest contract research company in 
Europe, then became the focus of a campaign involving attacks on 
company infrastructure and staff, as well as secondary targets such 
as banks, stockbrokers and client companies. In 2001, owing to fears 
about the impact of animal-rights groups on Huntington Life Sciences, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland refused to renew a loan to them of $20 
million. This led to concern about the future of the country’s bioscience-
based industries, and the UK Government introduced legislation 
targeting illegal animal-rights activities, which included a specific 
police task force with powers to arrest any person found protesting 
outside a private residence (Matfield, 2002).
Direct-action animal-rights activities continued throughout the 
2000s against other AR-related organisations, including pharmaceutical 
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companies (Monaghan, 2013). In addition, several UK universities 
were also targeted. The most high-profile (and ongoing) protest involved 
the University of Oxford in 2004, following the University’s announce-
ment that a new biomedical sciences building would include a rehoused 
animal unit. A campaign was initiated by a group called SPEAK in 
an effort to halt the construction of the new building, with the particular 
concern that primates would be housed in the unit. While this campaign 
began as lawful protests with letter writing and non-violent demonstra-
tions, the co-founder of SPEAK was eventually convicted in 2009 of 
conspiracy to commit arson.6 In addition, the Animal Liberation Front 
began publishing warnings that individuals associated with the new 
building (including building contractors and suppliers) ‘were going 
to get some’ (Animal Liberation Front communiqué posted on their 
Bite Back website, cited by Monaghan, 2013: 938).
Two incidents stand out in this historical narrative for their mon-
strous and distressing nature, because they involved grave robbing. 
In 2004 a campaign of intimidation was carried out against the Hall 
family who owned Darley Oaks Farm (breeding guinea pigs) in Staf-
fordshire. This campaign included sending threatening letters to 
employees, and then the body of the owner’s mother-in-law was 
removed from a cemetery by four activists who were linked to the 
Animal Rights Militia. Her remains were not recovered until 2006 
(Ward, 2005). In media coverage the animal-rights activists responsible 
were described as being ‘worse than animals’ (Wright and Pendlebury, 
2004: 9). The second case of grave robbing occurred in Switzerland 
in 2009, when the CEO of Swiss-owned Novartis, Daniel Vasella and 
his family, were targeted. An urn with Vasella’s mother’s ashes was 
stolen from the family cemetery and has never been recovered. 
Additionally, two crosses were placed in the family plot inscribed 
with the names of Daniel Vasella and his wife, also depicting a fictional 
date of their death (Stephens, 2009).
This historical narrative of violent direct action against AR scientists 
and supporters has had a powerful impact on relations between the 
AR community, animal-rights and animal-welfare groups, and the 
6 SPEAK is a grassroots organisation that continues to organise protests and rallies 
in Oxford and Cambridge on animal-related issues. See, for example, http://
speakanimalliberation.blogspot.co.uk/.
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wider public. However, since 2012 there has been a general sense that 
the more extremist and violent actions against animal researchers 
and animal-research institutions and industry have largely diminished. 
Speaking of Research, which began in the UK as a pro-AR group and 
now provides international AR news, articulates a narrative of fearful 
scientists now being able to speak up for their research:
Until recently scientists were afraid to talk about their own research 
using animals, resulting in animal rights groups monopolizing the debate 
on animal testing – however in the last few years all this has changed. 
(Speaking of Research, 2015)
In the UK this decline is attributed to a number of factors, including 
tighter policing leading to the imprisonment of core violent perpetra-
tors, and the amendment and introduction of new legislation (Mona-
ghan, 2013).7 Several initiatives have also been developed to support 
people who have been affected by violence from animal-rights activists. 
For example, in 2004 a group called Victims of Animal Rights Extrem-
ism was set up with a membership of 100 people who had suffered 
violence and harassment. This group lobbied the UK Government to 
establish legislation specifically giving harsher convictions for illegal 
activities linked to animal-rights ‘extreme acts’ (Bhattacharya, 2004).
UK and Swiss initiatives to open up animal research
Following the decline in instances of violent and illegal actions against 
AR researchers and institutions, the AR community has increasingly 
begun to point to transparency as a means to reduce continued 
opposition to AR, as well as a way to address misinformation. In the 
UK and Switzerland, in particular, significant initiatives have emerged 
which portray openness as the key to building greater rapport between 
scientists and citizens over the use of animals in research.
Two major surveys of public attitudes to animal testing made a 
significant contribution to the initiation of these new transparency 
initiatives because they suggested there was declining public support for 
AR. The first was a Special Eurobarometer on Science and Technology 
7 Although some statistics from the USA suggest that individual scientists are more 
likely to be targeted now, rather than institutions (see Grimm, 2014).
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carried out in 2009 across six EU countries (see YouGov, 2010). This 
survey reported that 84% of respondents mostly agreed that new 
guidelines should ban all animal experiments that cause severe pain 
and suffering. The survey also found that 80% mostly supported 
the publication of all information about animal experimentation, 
except confidential data that would allow the names of researchers 
or their work places to be disclosed. The European Coalition to 
End Animal Experiments (ECEAE) argued the poll highlighted a 
gap in understanding between the AR community and the wider 
public:
The outcomes of the Eurobarometer survey prove once again that there 
is an obvious gap between the claims of the scientific community about 
animal use and public opinion about the issue. (ECEAE, 2010)
The second significant contribution to the development of new 
transparency initiatives was a poll carried out in the UK in 2012 
funded by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (see 
Ipsos MORI, 2012). The poll suggested that support for animal research 
had declined, along with trust in the governance of these procedures. 
The poll found the number of people who object to animal research 
of any kind had risen (to 37%), as well as those who lack trust in the 
regulatory system (33%), and more than half the respondents (51%) 
suspected there was unnecessary duplication of animal experiments. 
These findings were widely reported in the media with headlines 
linking this growing opposition to failing trust, such as this comment 
from the Guardian: ‘Public opposition to the use of animals in medical 
research is growing and trust in both scientists and the rules governing 
the controversial practice is falling’ (Campbell, 2012).
There was some variation, however, in how scientists and com-
mentators interpreted the results of the poll. For example, Professor 
Sir John Tooke, president of the Academy of Medical Sciences, said 
he was concerned at the poll’s results. Stephen Whitehead, chief 
executive of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, 
saw the poll as ‘a wake-up call’, and a need for the UK AR community 
to be ‘more forthright about the fact that without animal research, 
the bio-pharmaceutical sector cannot continue to innovate new treat-
ments’. However, Sir Mark Walport, former head of the Wellcome 
Trust, denied that complacency among scientists had led to falling 
62 Science and the politics of openness
public support. He blamed a continuing ‘environment of intimidation’, 
which, at its most extreme, constituted ‘terrorism’ (cited in Campbell, 
2012). This variation in responses illustrates the continuing tension 
for the AR community in both seeking out support and trust from 
the wider public through greater transparency, and also fearing danger-
ous or ‘unruly publics’ (de Saille, 2015) who may put scientists or 
institutions in jeopardy as a result.
The Basel Declaration
The BD was the first AR transparency initiative to emerge in Europe. 
It was launched in 2010 by the Basel Declaration Society, a member-
ship organisation supported by donations from the pharmaceutical 
industry and other institutions affiliated to AR. The BD emerged 
out of a life sciences conference in Basel entitled ‘Research at a 
Crossroads’, held in November of the same year. This conference 
involved about eighty life-science researchers from Germany, Sweden, 
France, the UK and Switzerland. Sessions were focused around issues 
associated with non-human primates, transgenic animals, and ethics 
and communication with the wider public (Forschung für Leben,  
2010).
The BD is a one-page document with extremely ambitious goals, 
and is framed as the foundational ethical framework for animal research, 
just as the Helsinki Declaration is for human medical research:
Like the Helsinki Declaration, which forever altered the ethical landscape 
of human clinical research, the aim of the Basel Declaration is to bring 
the scientific community together to further advance the implementation 
of ethical principles … and to call for more trust, transparency and 
communication on the sensitive topic of animals in research. (Basel 
Declaration Society, 2011)
Both individuals and organisations are encouraged to sign up to the 
BD. It is significant that scientists were prepared to be individual 
signatories (rather than via an institution), because this demonstrated 
a deeper, more personal commitment to the openness agenda of the 
BD: ‘That’s why it’s good if it’s signed by individuals rather than universi-
ties … it’s a bit more commitment in a way. You do it as a person’ 
(Basel Declaration Society scientist, focus group, April 2015).
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The Basel Declaration Society is an international grassroots organisa-
tion. By signing up to the BD,8 signatories agree to ten fundamental 
principles (see Basel Declaration Society, 2011). These principles cover 
a range of topics relating to areas such as respecting and protecting 
animals, choosing research questions and experimental designs care-
fully, and acknowledging the importance of open communication 
and engagement with the public.
The UK Concordat on Openness on Animal Research
The UKC was developed through a two-step process. In October 2012 
a ‘Declaration on Openness on Animal Research’ was launched at a 
widely covered media event, coordinated by Understanding Animal 
Research, a membership organisation that promotes and supports 
AR interests. At this event, over forty research institutions and funders 
promised to adhere to the UKC that was to be developed over the 
following year, followed by public consultation.9 The final version of 
the UKC sets out requirements for universities, industry and related 
organisations to be more open about the ways in which they use 
animals in scientific, medical or veterinary research. Signatories are 
required to report annually to Understanding Animal Research about 
the progress of these commitments. Only organisations and institutions 
(not individuals, as in the Swiss case) can sign up to the UKC, and 
they are required to make the following four commitments: (1) to be 
clear about when, how and why animals are used in research; (2) to 
enhance communications with the media and the public about research 
using animals; (3) to be proactive in providing opportunities for the 
public to find out about research using animals; and (4) to report on 
progress annually and share experiences (Understanding Animal 
Research, 2014).
As stated earlier, the UKC was initiated as a direct response from 
the AR community to concerns about the declining support for animal 
laboratory research suggested in the results of the 2012 Ipsos MORI 
8 In 2017, the total number of signatories to the BD (both individuals and organisations) 
was 4,621 (Basel Declaration Society, 2017).
9 In 2017, the number of signatories to the UKC was 116 organisations (Understanding 
Animal Research, 2017).
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poll. The press release for the 2012 Declaration highlights the expecta-
tion that public confidence in AR will be boosted through openness 
about both the procedural aspects of AR and promotion of the benefits 
of AR:
Confidence in our research rests on the scientific community embracing 
an open approach and taking part in an ongoing conversation about 
why and how animals are used in research and the benefits of this. 
(Understanding Animal Research, 2012).
Key aims in the UKC and the BD
There are three key aims that cut across the UK and Swiss animal-
research openness initiatives. These aims highlight the hoped-for 
benefits from greater transparency of AR, but also signal the continued 
tensions which attach to science–society relations in this arena.
Facilitating a more informed public dialogue
Both initiatives seek to provide the public with the opportunity to be 
more informed about AR. The BD frames dialogue with the public 
on animal welfare in research as involving transparency and ‘fact-based 
communications’ (Basel Declaration Society, 2011). It is also anticipated 
that providing more information will benefit both supporters and 
critics of AR. For example, a report from a meeting organised by 
Understanding Animal Research and the Basel Declaration Society 
in 2012 states:
These [findings from the meeting] corroborate the notion that transpar-
ency and open dialogue increase understanding of both the needs of 
scientists and the concerns of critics in a mutually beneficial way. 
(McGrath et al., 2015: 2430; emphasis added)
Both the BD and the UKC seek to provide more information to the 
public in order to counter misinformation, with the ultimate goal of 
achieving greater public support. However, both initiatives explicitly 
distance the provision of such information from a straightforwardly 
educational approach, and encourage ‘two-way inclusive discourse’ 
(Basel Declaration Society, 2015) and allow ‘people to come to their 
own position on this issue’ (Understanding Animal Research, 2014: 
5). This first aim of improving dialogue is therefore framed around 
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society and the provision of information to members of the public. 
While benefits for AR are anticipated from a better informed public, 
both initiatives are careful to emphasise that transparency and openness 
are important values in their own right. In contrast, the second aim 
is framed around science and the benefits that can come from greater 
openness between animal researchers themselves.
Building solidarity and support between animal researchers
The troubled history between AR and society outlined earlier has 
contributed to a sense of vulnerability for many people working in 
animal research. Both the BD and the UKC initiatives anticipate benefits 
not only to the public through the provision of more information and 
cooperation, but also to the AR community. The BD, in particular, 
has a mandate to build and support an open international AR 
community.
Underlying the push for improved solidarity is a presumption that 
greater transparency will not completely eliminate controversy or the 
potential for future conflict with critics of AR. This was highlighted 
in a Nature article that covered the announcement of the BD. Stefan 
Treue, director of the German Primate Center in Göttingen, comments: 
‘The animal issue is never going to go away. … We need solidarity 
among all researchers’ (cited in Abbott, 2010: 742). Solidarity is 
envisaged in different ways. Firstly, it involves the provision of support 
in response to direct action against the AR community. An example 
of this occurred in 2013 after an AR facility at the University of Milan 
was occupied by an animal-rights group, resulting in damage and the 
release of animals in the unit (Abbott, 2013). The Basel Declaration 
Society organised a ‘Call for Solidarity’ and collected 5,700 signatures 
from BD signatories, which were then presented at a rally in support 
of AR in Milan (Basel Declaration Society, 2013a).
A more complex and challenging feature of solidarity is the sharing 
of research data between researchers. Both the UKC and the BD 
encourage researchers to follow the ARRIVE guidelines,10 which aim 
10 The Animal Research: Reporting of in vivo Experiments (ARRIVE) guidelines were 
developed by the UK National Centre for Replacement, Refinement and Reduction 
of Animals in Research in 2010. See: https://www.nc3rs.org.uk/arrive-animal- 
research-reporting-vivo-experiments.
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to improve and maximise information published on AR and as a 
consequence, minimise unnecessary and repetitive studies (McGrath 
et al., 2015). A position statement on the importance of open access 
(see chapter 2) and sharing research results was also developed following 
a workshop organised in London by the Basel Declaration Society 
and Understanding Animal Research in 2013. This statement does 
acknowledge, however, the challenges of increased data sharing 
because of potential proprietary interests in the results of AR experi-
ments (see Basel Declaration Society, 2013b), which is a tension 
acknowledged in the open-science agenda more broadly (see 
chapter 5, and Levin et al., 2016).
This second aim of the UKC and the BD – to build solidarity between 
the AR community and to encourage the greater sharing of information 
– reveals there are always limits placed on what, and with whom, 
information about AR is shared. In this light, the third aim, of building 
trust, has increased importance.
Building trust in animal research and scientists
The final key aim identified here relates to building trust in animal 
research and science–society relations. In the Swiss context this goal 
was explicitly articulated by several scientists during a focus group 
meeting. One participant commented that through education and 
dialogue it was possible to ‘to take away the fears that are there, to 
explain what is going on – and then the trust can be built up and 
everything works much better’ (Basel Declaration Society scientist, 
focus group, April 2015; emphasis added). However, another scientist 
argued that the complexity of AR was impossible to fully explain 
to the public and therefore trust needed to precede openness: ‘If 
people don’t trust you, you can explain as much as you like; they 
will not buy it’ (Basel Declaration Society scientist, focus group, April 
2015).
In the UK, linking transparency to trust and confidence in animal 
research is also unequivocally referenced in the UKC, where signatories 
are asked to recognise that in order to be seen as trustworthy they 
are under an obligation to be ‘be open, transparent, and accountable’ 
in relation to all AR activities (Understanding Animal Research, 2014). 
Another example in the UK reveals how a concern that falling public 
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trust in the AR regulatory system might impact on support for animal 
laboratory research funding. One of the signatories to the UKC, the 
Association of Medical Research Charities, explains that trust in AR 
governance is vital for funders, ‘as they need the public’s trust to 
continue funding work to fight diseases and find better treatments’ 
(Nebhrajani, 2014).
The three aims outlined above illustrate how the UKC and BD seek 
to renegotiate society–science relations and AR under the aegis of 
greater transparency, but there are some ongoing difficulties and 
challenges to this agenda.
Challenges to renegotiating trust through more openness 
in AR
Yeates and Reed (2015: 504) argue that while transparency in AR 
sounds ‘apodictically good’, the value of openness initiatives must 
always depend on how, and with whom, information is actually shared. 
Signatories to the UKC are required to make specific information 
about their use of animals publicly available. One area where this has 
led to quite significant changes is the provision of information on 
institutional websites. A survey carried out by the author in June 2013 
of ten UK university websites showed that most only had generic 
statements about experimentation on animals, giving very little specific 
information about what AR was carried out within the institution. 
Only two websites had details about the animal species used in research 
or any information about procedures. In contrast, a survey of websites 
of ten universities that were listed as signatories to the UKC in March 
2016 revealed that all now provided details of the number and types 
of animal species used each year in the institution.
University College London (UCL), among other universities, has 
publicised this new approach to openness on its institutional website. 
In a 2014 Times Higher Education article, a senior academic explains 
UCL’s commitment to transparency and openness and the UKC (see 
Else, 2014). In the same article, however, a spokesperson for the British 
Union for the Abolition of Vivisection welcomed greater transparency 
but feared that the new website was merely a public-relations exercise 
that sought to ‘sanitise the reality of what life in a laboratory is like 
for animals in experiments’ (Bailey, cited in Else, 2014). This comment 
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suggests that on its own the provision of more information to wider 
society is not enough, and increased transparency does not necessarily 
lead to more trust. Philosopher Onora O’Neill (2002) has observed 
that transparency and openness initiatives can actually have a detri-
mental impact on trust because of fears that the information provided 
is being cherry-picked. O’Neill also highlights the centrality of con-
fidence in the individuals and institutions that provide information, 
and that, without this, transparency and openness will not be enough 
on their own to build trust.
A further missing component in these discussions about trust and 
transparency is that scientists are rarely encouraged to speak about 
their own values and how they intersect with their research on animals. 
Therefore, these values remain hidden, or at least the moral and ethical 
ambiguities inherent to AR are almost never part of the information 
made available. This tendency to disassociate the personal views of 
animal experimenters from their work was highlighted in a 1995 
report on AR scientists in the USA, which suggested that the use of 
dispassionate language tended to reinforce an image of scientists as 
cold, unethical and uncaring (Rowan et al., 1995). Over two decades 
later there is still very limited space allowed for AR scientists to reflect 
upon or discuss how their values and ethical decisions relating to 
their research fit into the wider socio-political and economic landscape 
(see McLeod and Hartley, 2017). In terms of building trust in the 
relationship between science and society in connection to animal 
research, therefore, there needs to be more openness about how values 
and ethics are incorporated into animal-research decision making by 
scientists, and how they are included in the AR regulatory framework. 
Of course, this is challenging, given the history of conflict on AR and 
the potential of making scientists more vulnerable if personal details 
about their values are made more accessible. This observation leads 
to the importance of research to understand the challenges and 
experiences of scientists and institutions who are being asked to embrace 
transparency initiatives such as the BD and the UKC. Historical studies 
suggest that AR scientists who feel stigmatised or threatened are less 
likely to be comfortable with being open about their research (Arluke, 
1991; Birke et al., 2007). Participants in this current research who are 
actively promoting and driving forward the openness agendas in the 
UKC and the BD have expressed a degree of frustration that some 
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AR scientists still require convincing that it is safe for them to be 
more open about their research.
Conclusion
A historical relationship of mistrust has shaped the relationship between 
science and society on the topic of AR, and both sides believe that 
monstrousness exists on the other. Rudolf Wittkower, a historian 
writing on the cultural history of monsters, explained that ‘monsters 
– composite beings, half-human, half-animal – play a part in the 
thought and imagery of all people at all times’ (cited in Gilmore, 2003: 
11). Animal research crosses this composite boundary, as animals 
become experimental subjects for the benefit of humans (primarily), 
and it is easy to understand why research involving animals elicits 
such cultural and social discomfiture.
The UKC and the BD both emerged out of an increased concern 
from the animal-research and biomedical communities that the societal 
mandate for conducting AR was declining. The three key aims of 
these initiatives discussed in this chapter suggest: (1) there is a genuine 
commitment to providing more information and opportunities for 
meaningful public dialogue; (2) the promotion of solidarity within 
the AR community could lead to more open access to data (although 
this is complicated by commercial interests); and (3) in both the UK 
and Swiss contexts, openness and trust are being discursively con-
structed as interlinking motifs.
However, it is important to recognise that transparency initiatives 
such as the UKC and the BD are unlikely to be enough on their own 
to build greater trust between the AR community and wider society. 
There also needs to be evidence of the trustworthiness of the AR 
regulatory system and the accountability processes that govern it 
(Dodds, 2013) as well as more opportunities for animal-research 
scientists (safely) to reflect upon, and make more transparent, the 
value-based decision making that is an inextricable part of their work, 
in order to then have a more productive conversation with wider 
society. The biggest challenge to opening up AR remains how to provide 
these opportunities and spaces where there can truly be inclusive, 
co-productive and safe conversations that move beyond caricatures 
of monstrous scientists or publics (see also chapter 8).
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4What counts as evidence in adjudicating 
asylum claims? Locating the monsters  
in the machine: an investigation of 
faith-based claims
Roda Madziva, Vivien Lowndes
Since around 2007, evidence-based policy (EBP) has emerged as a 
buzzword intended to signal the end of conviction-driven, ideological 
politics and heralding the aspirations for policymaking to be anchored 
in ‘evidence and to deliver what works unsullied by ideology or values 
considerations’ (Botterill and Hindmoor, 2012: 367; Clarence, 2002). 
The political impetus and preoccupation with activities associated 
with the idea of EBP are widespread. The belief that rational evi-
dence will strengthen the basis for policymaking has been widely 
welcomed in many policy areas, including in contested spheres such as 
immigration.
As well as being an issue of profound contemporary relevance, 
immigration is a highly politicised field and the focus of moral and 
ideological contestation. Thus, evidence, assumed to speak for itself 
(Wesselink et al., 2014), has been called upon as a neutral arbiter in 
resolving perceived immigration problems and as one way of transcend-
ing ideological and humanistic conflicts (Spencer, 2011). Writing in 
the context of the various immigration policy crises, Boswell (2009) 
has shown how policymakers have often sought to find solutions to 
perceived problems of trust and legitimacy by turning to evidence in 
the form of expert knowledge. In this way, the role envisaged for 
evidence illustrates the trend towards openness and transparency as 
a way of generating renewed trust and legitimacy. Indeed, in political 
rhetoric, successive UK governments have routinely expressed a 
commitment to opening up immigration debates to allow policy and 
decisions to be influenced by reliable evidence rather than emotion 
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and prejudice in order to increase transparency and build public trust 
in relation to immigration issues (Green, 2010).
However, more generally, the presentation of evidence as rational and 
neutral has raised important questions of how evidence is identified, 
mobilised and adjudicated in the policy process (Lowndes, 2016). 
Among other things, critics have shown that the perception that 
evidence is neutral overlooks the significance of the context in which 
evidence is produced. As Wesselink et al. (2014: 342) argue: ‘what is 
policy-relevant evidence is determined by context. EBP’s rhetoric looks 
for neutral, context-free and universally applicable evidence [which] 
fits badly with this reality.’ Closely related to this is the observation 
that evidence must ultimately be interpreted, a process that many 
maintain involves persuasion and argument (Clarence, 2002; Kisby, 
2011; Majone, 1989). As argued by Majone (1989) evidence exists only 
in the context of an argument; thus, it differs from data (raw material) 
or information (categorised data). Moreover, the way that evidence 
is interpreted is subject to individuals’ understanding of the social 
world and what they consider to be important (Clarence, 2002: 5).
For instance, the assumptions of the policymaker or civil servant 
working in a policy context may determine what is understood as 
constituting evidence, the selection or prioritising of one form or 
indeed a specific piece of evidence over another and the interpretation 
of that evidence in the development of an argument (Kisby, 2011: 
123). Thus, decisions often reflect not only beliefs about what works 
but judgements about what is feasible as well as elements of ideological 
faith, conventional wisdom and habit (Botterill and Hindmoor, 2012: 
369). The presentation of evidence as neutral may serve to obscure 
the real political judgements and serendipities involved in contested 
policy areas like asylum. However, insights can be drawn from Pearce 
and Raman’s (2014: 390) work on the new randomised controlled 
trials that interrogates the ways in which appeals to evidence are made 
as a way of opening up the limits of expertise. These authors have 
suggested what good evidence would look like, emphasising the need 
for evidence to fulfil at least three key principles; namely, attentiveness 
to plurality, diversity and institutions.
This chapter presents a critical analysis of the ways in which evidence 
is identified and mobilised in the asylum process. It looks at how 
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evidence is actively constructed, embodying processes of meaning 
making that are underpinned by particular sets of power relations. The 
chapter draws on research from an extreme case – the adjudication of 
faith-based asylum claims – the characteristics of which enable us to 
locate the monsters in the machine more readily. In the spirit of this 
book we make use of the monster metaphor throughout the chapter 
to highlight issues of potential discrimination, prejudice and bias. We 
also identify a number of other issues inherent in the adjudication 
of faith-based claims and highlight the challenges to evidence-based 
approaches to the determination of refugee status. To better understand 
the limits of claims to openness and transparency via EBP, we have 
researched the experience of Christian asylum seekers, analysing key 
informants’ narratives and Home Office assessment processes and 
policy documents.
We begin with a brief description of the research upon which 
this chapter is based. We then present a discussion of the lived 
experiences of Pakistani Christians seeking asylum, in three sec-
tions. We start with the context of the experience of reception, 
followed by the problems of evidencing the Christian faith and then 
the challenges of evidencing persecution, before we turn to our 
conclusions.
Research design and methodology
This chapter is based on qualitative research conducted between 
June and December 2015. Data were collected from forty research 
participants through interviews, focus groups and informal conversa-
tions as well as individual case reviews. The sample includes fifteen 
Pakistani Christians (five refugees and ten asylum seekers – five women 
and ten men), with the other twenty-five participants consisting of 
migrant support organisations; churches; Pakistani Christian com-
munity leaders; and professionals such as legal advisors, immigration 
judges, and those working in interpretation and translation. Snowball 
sampling and existing contacts facilitated our research access to 
these participants. The research aimed to gain an understanding 
of Christian asylum seekers’ experiences of seeking asylum in 
the UK.
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The research encounters were audio recorded and transcribed before 
the analysis, using thematic and conversational techniques. While the 
study has delivered depth, the findings cannot be taken to be representa-
tive of the experience of Pakistani Christians in the UK or indeed of 
Christian refugees from Muslim-majority countries more generally. 
Our intention was to study the experience of the particular individuals 
we spoke to and to draw ‘analytical generalisations’ (Yin, 2003) – that 
is, propositions that could then form the basis of research with a 
wider sample and in a variety of locations.
Pakistani Christian asylum seekers’ arrival and  
UK policy context
Although there is a long history of migration from Pakistan to the 
UK, the population of Pakistani nationals seeking asylum in the UK 
became significant towards the end of the 1990s in response to the 
socio-political and religious repressions prevalent in their country of 
origin. The continual deterioration in Pakistan’s human rights situation, 
particularly in the context of the country’s infamous blasphemy laws, 
which foster the persecution of minority groups such as Christians, 
has seen the country ranked the sixth highest asylum-producing nation 
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
in 2014. Concurrently, the UK was rated among the top destinations 
for Pakistani asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2013). Correspondingly, more 
recent asylum statistics (Home Office, 2015a) have shown that Pakistani 
nationals constituted the second largest group (registering 2,302 cases, 
after Eritrea, with 2,583) of all asylum applications lodged in the UK 
in the year ending June 2015. However, in the absence of information 
on how many of these applications were lodged on the grounds of 
their Christian faith, Pakistani asylum seekers are regarded as a 
homogenous group.
We argue that the presentation of Pakistani asylum seekers as a 
homogenous ethnic group has the danger of masking other individu-
alised identities such as religion or faith, which may in turn obscure 
the context of the reception experience.
The socio-political atmosphere of the UK is characterised by public 
and political discourses on growing asylum and immigration flows, 
ethnic and faith diversity, and their supposed link to community 
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tensions and even terrorism (Joppke and Torpey, 2013). Particularly 
with regard to faith, as a presumed secular society the UK presents 
us with a paradox. On the one hand, successive governments have 
continued to show a public policy interest in faith communities that 
are often portrayed as providing moral leadership, social networks 
and access to hard-to-reach groups. Yet on the other hand, faith has 
become an unsettling aspect of multiculturalism, not only in the UK, 
but in Europe as a whole, especially in the terrorist attacks that came 
after September 11, 2001 (Dinham et al., 2009). More specifically, in 
the UK the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001 
and the subsequent 7/7 bombings in London in 2005 have led to 
public criticism of the concept of multiculturalism for its overly tolerant 
approaches to cultural difference, leading to a growth in diversity, 
segregated societies and the promotion of bad faith (extremism), often 
associated with Muslim identities (Lentin, 2011). Indeed, issues of 
the perceived and real problems of the integration of Muslims, and 
questions about accommodating Islam as a religion, are at the heart 
of current public policy debates, especially as the current migration 
crisis continues to unfold, and as Muslim identities become increasingly 
framed by global events (Statham and Tillie, 2016).
Moreover, the rhetoric of the perceived failure of multiculturalism, 
especially by political leaders across Europe (e.g. Cameron, 2011) has 
been juxtaposed with the claim to racelessness (Lentin, 2011). In the 
context of the claim that society in the UK is now a post-racial one, 
intolerance towards particular groups of immigrants has come to be 
justified on the basis of their cultural or religious incompatibility 
rather than their race (Statham and Tillie, 2016). Thus the political 
claim is that that culture or religion, rather than race, is to blame for 
the perceived negative aspects of diversity. When presented in this 
way, diversity becomes then a happy sign, a sign that racism has been 
overcome (Ahmed, 2007: 164).
Thus, in both political and public discourse, especially in the UK, 
it is increasingly claimed that it is no longer racist to talk about 
immigration control and that people can now have a sensible debate 
about immigration, where the notion of sensible involves making use 
of statistical evidence. Pointing out the limits to openness and transpar-
ency, Anderson argues that ‘the claim to racelessness is not paralleled 
by a claim that immigration policies are not designed to keep out 
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certain nationalities’ (Anderson, 2013: 42), which has the danger of 
both promoting and concealing discriminatory practices towards 
particular nationalities.
Immigration controls and border inspections have given rise to 
perceptions that ‘some bodies more than others are recognisable as 
[dangerous], as bodies that are out of place … because of some trace 
of a dubious origin’ (Ahmed, 2007: 162). Before an actual claim to 
asylum can be lodged, applicants must undergo an initial screening 
process involving checklists on their country of origin, routes of travel, 
their documentation of identity, and their fit in complex ethnic or 
religious categories.
The Pakistani Christians who participated in our research experienced 
their arrival and seeking asylum in the UK as putatively Islamophobic. 
Those we spoke to believed that the Home Office operates under the 
assumption that all migrants from Muslim-majority countries, by virtue 
of their place of origin, are Muslims. Thus the conflation of nationality 
and religion has led Pakistani Christian asylum seekers to believe that 
they are often treated as suspects – a conflation that brings Pakistani 
Muslims and Pakistani Christians together as one othered entity. Writing 
of her personal experience at the borders of New York City as a British 
citizen with a Muslim background, Ahmed (2007: 163) claims that ‘for 
the body recognised as could be Muslim, which translates into could 
be terrorist … the experience begins with discomfort’.
We encountered similar experiences among the Pakistani Christians 
we interviewed, including a male asylum seeker who explained:
As a Christian asylum seeker from a Muslim majority country you face 
many obstacles in putting forward your case. The major obstacle is the 
place where you come from and the way you look – these are things 
that you can’t change. Because of the way we look immigration officials 
don’t trust us. … They don’t tell you openly that they are suspicious of 
you … but through their actions and body language, you can tell that 
you are a suspect. The problem is you can’t easily separate Christians 
from Muslims as we all look the same. … I am a Christian, but when 
people see me they just conclude that I am a Muslim. So they think I 
have come to bomb their country.
Participants expressed deep concern about the equation of Pakistanis 
with Muslims, and in turn the equation of Muslims with terrorists 
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(Ahmed, 2007), showing how this multilayered stereotyping inevitably 
functioned to obscure their own distinctive identity as Christians 
from a Muslim-majority country. In the sections that follow we 
delve into the role of evidence in the adjudication of asylum 
claims.
The adjudication of asylum claims: the policy context
The UK is signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its subsequent Protocol of 1967, as ratified in 1954 and 
1968, respectively. According to Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, 
an applicant for asylum must have a well-founded fear of persecution; 
the fear must be based on past persecution or the risk of future persecu-
tion on one or more of the specific grounds of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The 
nature of evidence that can be provided to support such fears is a key 
element in the actual process of determining whether to provide 
asylum, as will be discussed below.
In line with the UNHCR (2004) instructions on religious persecution, 
the UK Home Office guidelines state that:
persecution for reasons of religion may take various forms; for example, 
prohibition of membership of a religious community, prohibition of 
worship in private or public, prohibition of religious instruction, require-
ment to adhere to a religious dress code, or serious measures of dis-
crimination imposed on persons because they practise their religion or 
belong to a particular religious community.
However, the Home Office goes further to note that:
the simple holding of beliefs which are not tolerated in the country of 
origin will normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee 
status. … The issues to be decided are whether the claimant genuinely 
adheres to the religion to which he or she professes to belong, how that 
individual observes those beliefs in the private and public spheres, and 
whether that would place him/her at risk of persecution. (Home Office, 
2015b: 28)
These expectations raise the question of the competence of immigration 
officials in religious matters, or the extent to which they are qualified 
to assess the genuineness of an individual’s beliefs and the manner 
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in which they are practised in different socio-political and religious 
contexts. We will return to this point later.
In the asylum process, after getting through the initial screening 
process, applicants still need to undergo a substantive interview in 
which they are interviewed by an immigration caseworker. The burden 
of proof lies with the applicant. This means that applicants claiming 
refugee status on grounds of their Christian faith are expected to 
establish and demonstrate their well-founded fear of persecution on 
the basis of their Christian identity. This involves providing a personal 
testimony and supporting evidence to prove that they are Christians 
and that they were persecuted on account of their Christian identity. 
Meanwhile, the UNHCR guidelines on burden and standard of proof 
in refugee claims (1998, para. 2) stress that, while the burden of proof 
lies with the claimant, decision makers are also obligated to have an 
objective understanding of the situation prevalent in the country of 
origin. It is further suggested that the actual determination of refugee 
status need not be certain, but must be sufficiently likely to be true. 
Thus, determining whether a claimant qualifies for international 
protection demands that decision makers judge whether they believe 
the applicant’s evidence, or how much weight should be given to that 
evidence against their own understandings and interpretations of it 
(Thomas, 2006).
To assess the credibility of an asylum claim, immigration officials are 
required to consider three key criteria. The first is internal consistency, 
meaning that the claimant’s oral testimony, written statements and 
any personal documents relating to the material facts of the claim 
should be coherent and reasonably consistent (Home Office, 2015b: 7). 
Secondly, external consistency is required, meaning that the claimant’s 
testimony is expected to be consistent with the country-of-origin 
information or expert evidence. As stated by the Home Office (2015b: 
15), ‘The greater the correlation between aspects of the account and 
external evidence, the greater the weight caseworkers should attrib-
ute to those aspects.’ The third criterion is plausibility, which is an 
assessment of the apparent likelihood or truthfulness of a claim ‘in 
the context of the general country information and/or the claimant’s 
own evidence about what happened to him or her’ (Home Office,  
2015b: 17).
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We argue that for external evidence to be effectively used to support 
personal experience, it needs to properly reflect knowledge and expertise 
about the practical situation on the ground in the country of origin. 
In the Pakistani Christians’ context, the reliability of the external 
evidence that the Home Office depends upon can be questioned. The 
Home Office’s latest Country Information and Guidance document 
(February 2015) acknowledges the fact that Christians in Pakistan 
are generally discriminated against, distinguishing between Christian-
born individuals and Christian converts, and between evangelical and 
non-evangelical Christians. Christian converts and evangelical 
Christians are perceived to be more at risk than Christian-born 
individuals. The same document goes on to state that ‘in general the 
[Pakistani] government is willing and able to provide protection against 
such attacks’ (Home Office, 2015c).
Are these distinctions between Christian-born and Christian converts 
and between evangelical and non-evangelical Christians useful and 
fair, in terms of understanding the kind of persecutions that Pakistani 
Christians face in their everyday lives? What sources and forms of 
knowledge does the Home Office rely upon? We focus on these issues 
in the sections below.
Evidencing Christian faith: challenges and pitfalls
From the perspective of Pakistani Christians seeking protection in 
the UK, proving one’s faith can be a challenging exercise if the examina-
tion of it is based on biblical or doctrinal questions, which often do 
not seem to reflect the reality of individuals’ complex identifications, 
denominations or practical situations in the Pakistani context. Our 
respondents explained how they were not only expected to know and 
recite certain biblical events but also to speak in certain ways that 
conform to Western notions of Christianity. Overall, the challenges 
lie in the Home Office’s attempt to define people’s faith technically, 
while at the same time assuming it must be coherent and have Western 
or European reference points. As one male asylum seeker told us:
In my interview, I was asked questions like … How do you celebrate 
Christmas? How do you celebrate Easter? … and many other questions. 
84 Science and the politics of openness
I have now learnt that Christmas is a big event in this country not only 
for Christians but for everyone. It’s regarded as a family day, no public 
transport because everyone is celebrating Christmas with their family. 
But this is not how Christmas is celebrated everywhere. In Pakistan 
some Christians celebrate Christmas while hiding because they don’t 
want their neighbour to know that they are Christian. So when they 
ask you and you give a different answer from what they expect they say 
you are not a Christian.
A senior legal advisor with extensive experience of working with 
asylum seekers from Muslim-majority countries added that:
the question ‘How do you celebrate Christmas?’ – claimants often find 
that very hard, because in their country of origin, Christmas is about 
a particular religion. But, after living here for some years, they have 
seen that ‘Oh, Christmas is a big issue in this country.’ They are even 
surprised by the fact that even Muslims in this country tend to give 
each other presents at Christmas.
The above examples show the existence of ideological perceptions 
about how the Christian faith ought to be manifested, which suggests 
that decisions to grant asylum may often be based upon a set of tacit 
assumptions that are not backed by evidence. In line with Pearce and 
Raman’s (2014: 390) call for plurality, diversity and the involvement 
of hybrid institutions in the management of the inherent complexity 
of evidence, some of our participants expressed the need to open up 
the UK asylum system, especially by drawing knowledge and expertise 
from a cross-section of sources, including religious institutions. As a 
female vicar from the Church of England puts it:
I think it is vital for the Home Office to consider working hand in hand 
with diverse churches, when it comes to faith-based claims. More notice 
needs to be taken of the pastors, the vicars and all those overseeing 
peoples’ Christian journeys … These should be respected as experts in 
their own right.
Such an inclusive approach could in turn help the Home Office to 
generate a balanced judgement of the Christian faith and the ways in 
which it is lived and experienced in different contexts.
Another criticism in our interviews was that, in the absence of 
diverse sources of evidence, the quiz-like questioning style in the 
assessment of the Christian faith may serve to encourage the very 
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fraudulent claims that the UK Border Agency (UKBA) authorities 
fear. In the words of a legal advisor:
Those questions favour Muslims who are recent [Christian] converts 
or faking to be converts because they approach the Bible like they’ve 
approached the Quran when they were little. They learn it off by heart 
as much as they can; it’s all very fact-related.
Decision makers may seek evidence to support their own pre-existing 
assumptions and their very choice of evidence may be ‘in itself an 
activity inherently lacking in neutrality’ (Clarence, 2002: 5). In this 
way, the judges are susceptible to making incorrect decisions in two 
ways – either by rejecting genuine claimants or by granting refugee 
status to fake ones (Thomas, 2006).
Evidencing religious persecution: unveiling the monsters 
hiding in the machine
Existing research has shown that the UK Home Office’s decision making 
on asylum claims suffers from a systematic and institutionalised culture 
of disbelief,1 which operates alongside a parallel ‘culture of denial’ 
(Souter, 2011: 52). In our research it was common for participants to 
explain spontaneously why they felt they were not believed by the 
UKBA. However, we argue that the challenges to the credibility of 
the evidence offered in religious-belief cases, especially those involving 
accusations of blasphemy, seem to be more complex than in other 
refugee cases, given the uniqueness of individual cases and the need 
to understand the context in which they occur (see Kagan, 2010).
We observed that, for the Pakistani Christians in our study, one 
key area in which monsters could be hiding is in the current Home 
Office documents for the Pakistani country-of-origin information, 
particularly the distinction that is made between evangelical and 
non-evangelical Christians. In our research, a pattern emerged that 
refugee status was not granted on the grounds of religion unless it 
could be proved that an applicant had a religious profile in Pakistan. 
Yet participants’ accounts of how they experienced persecution 
1 The tendency of those evaluating applications is to start with the assumption that 
the applicant is not telling the truth (Home Affairs Committee, 2013: 11).
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consistently revealed a stark contrast between the country-of-origin 
information and the actual situation on the ground in Pakistan, where 
Christians, regardless of their religious profile, face persecution in a 
country where there is limited state protection. In one of our interviews 
a woman asylum seeker who had been refused asylum described how 
practising her Christian faith in a Muslim school made her a victim 
of blasphemy accusations. As she explains:
I was a teacher at a Muslim school. One day I was fasting because it 
was Christian Lent start date on 5th March. At break time, I was sitting 
in the staff room and one Muslim lady teacher … offered me food and 
forced me to eat, saying, ‘Take and eat.’ I then said, ‘No, I am fasting.’ 
I had a big Christian magazine I was reading and she asked to see my 
magazine. She took the magazine and the conversation ended there 
because break period was over. The following day she went to the head 
teacher and report that I was teaching Christianity. On the Friday, this 
teacher’s father came in school and said to me, ‘You gave the magazine 
to my daughter … I am giving you the chance to accept Islam.’ In few 
days I found him waiting on the gate … he was with a group of men 
… One man punched me on the eye … people gathered there, and the 
men were telling the people that she’s preaching Christianity in the 
school.
Following the first incident, the woman and her family relocated to 
another place where, as she claimed, she suffered further attacks. She 
noted that the subsequent incident occurred in front of a local police 
station, but the police did not take any action. Instead, they blamed 
her for causing problems in the school and proceeded to file a blas-
phemy case against her on the instructions of her accusers. While it 
is clear from the claimant’s account that she suffered persecution 
merely by virtue of her practising her Christian faith, as expressed 
through fasting, her asylum case was ultimately dismissed by the 
Home Office. In her rejection letter, among other things, the Home 
Office noted that:
your previous history shows you can in general live as a Christian born 
without problems in Pakistan … as you don’t seem to have any religious 
profile … Your alleged fear on return is based on threats of persecution 
from non-state agents and you have not demonstrated they will be able 
to have any influence over the state … You claim to have reported both 
incidents to police stations … but that these complaints were not fully 
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investigated. However the evidence you have provided does not dem-
onstrate that you have made efforts to pursue these complaints or take 
any action regarding the police’s failure to investigate … Given that you 
are a Catholic Christian … it is noted … that there is a strong Catholic 
community in [city] … it is considered that the size and diversity [of 
the population] will allow you to relocate with anonymity, it is reasonable 
to conclude that you will be able to continue practising your religion 
freely and quietly.
Taken together, the above excerpts show how immigration officials 
and asylum claimants subscribe to radically different narratives about 
the nature, extent and even the existence of persecution in Pakistan. 
One issue is the Home Office’s seeming misconceptions on the safety 
of Pakistanis who are Christian born in a socio-political environment 
where Christians in general are routinely targeted and abused solely 
on account of their faith. As one senior legal advisor with experience 
of dealing with Christians from the Muslim-majority countries 
commented:
In terms of the Home Office’s point that it’s been going okay for so long 
for Christian born in Pakistan, this is not true for most of the Christians. 
It’s the same thing as swimming in a dangerous stretch of sea every day. 
You can do it safe for three months, and on three months and one day 
you drown. … So the fact that someone has been able to practise their 
Christian faith in an anti-Christian society doesn’t mean they are immune 
to persecution.
We add that what makes EBP useful also makes it limited: it can 
become detached from the social and political contexts in which 
persecution occurs, as in this case.
In some cases the sorts of evidence that claimants presented were 
considered to be low in the hierarchy of evidence. This was mainly 
the case with documentary evidence such as the first information 
report (FIR). These are police reports of crimes against the person 
now claiming asylum. While many of our participants tended to rely 
on such documents as evidence for their persecution, the Home Office 
invariably dismissed them as fake. On the whole, on reviewing the 
rejection letters we found a pattern whereby the Home Office would 
increasingly refer to expert evidence to paint a broad picture of 
Pakistanis as fraudulent and opportunistic cheats, and hence potentially 
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bogus claimants. In rejection letters, the Home Office routinely stated 
that:
during a presentation at the Ninth European Country of Origin Informa-
tion Seminar held in Dublin, Ireland, on 26 and 27 May 2004, an 
Islamabad-based representative of the … UNHCR … stated that there 
is a high level of corruption in Pakistan and that it is possible to obtain 
many types of fraudulent documents or documents that are fraudulently 
authenticated by a bona fide stamp or authority.
As Boswell (2009) argues, decision makers often use expert evidence 
to make their judgements appear neutral as well as to make a justifiable 
claim to transparency and public acceptance. Our research shows it 
is possible that an institutional emphasis is emerging in which Pakistanis 
are regarded as frauds. Such an emphasis may lead to mutual suspicion 
and prejudice. In this way, asylum adjudication may boil down to 
assessing the credibility of Pakistanis as a group rather than focusing 
on individual cases.
The Pakistani Christians we worked with were wary of what they 
saw as the application of double standards by the Home Office. As 
one Pakistani pastor put it:
What puzzles me is, in one context, the Home Office claims that these 
state agencies are genuine when people say the police did not help me 
because they are corrupt, but when it comes to evidence, they say the 
authorities in Pakistan are corrupt. I see this as having double standards.
Perceived bias in relation to immigration interlocutors’ 
personal religious identities
Here we emphasise that the Home Office needs to expand its notion 
of what counts as evidence, and suggest that this can be achieved by 
drawing on the knowledge and experience of cultural and religious 
difference, particularly when dealing with cases involving religiously 
motivated persecution. As our findings suggest, given the Home Office’s 
limited inclusivity and openness, asylum claimants often lack the 
confidence and belief that their experiences are taken seriously and 
listened to by immigration authorities.
For example, the Pakistani Christian asylum seekers we interviewed 
noted that they often encountered immigration interlocutors from a 
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Pakistani Muslim heritage. This reflects the UK’s diverse religious groups, 
but some speculate that the Home Office could be deliberately allocating 
cases involving Pakistani Christians to caseworkers of a Pakistani heritage, 
presumably for linguistic reasons and assumptions of shared cultural 
understandings. However, owing to their negative experiences in their 
country of origin, the Christians we interviewed reported that they 
often lost the confidence and courage to give evidence of their persecution 
verbally and defend their asylum cases when faced with individuals 
whom they perceived to be from the perpetrator group, Pakistani 
Muslims. Participants routinely drew our attention to their refusal letters, 
which in most cases included Muslim names as signatories. Often they 
linked negative asylum decisions to the religious identities of the 
immigration officials who handled their cases. Such concerns were 
raised in the context of the Home Office’s refusal to accept claimants’ 
requests for non-Muslim caseworkers, on the basis that the system 
does not keep a database of its employees’ religious beliefs.
Claims of religious prejudice and bias were also made about other 
interlocutors such as interpreters, whom the Home Office regards as 
mere conduits through which immigration officials and asylum seekers 
achieve meaningful discourse (see Gib and Good, 2014, for a detailed 
discussion). The participants alleged that interpreters of similar national 
heritage but from the Muslim majority were ignorant of appropriate 
language to describe Christian experiences, and even undermined or 
manipulated accounts in a discriminatory fashion.
The need for religious diversity, especially in relation to Home 
Office interlocutors, was succinctly articulated by the Pakistani pastor 
we cited earlier, as follows:
In the same way the Home Office is using Muslim Urdu speakers, they 
should also consider using Urdu speakers who are Christians … or they 
should at least invite a Christian country expert such as a Pakistani 
pastor to come and sit there … because the Christian language is not 
familiar to Muslims. Here in the UK, religion is not given any value. 
The difference is that in Pakistan, that is an Islamic country, life is about 
religion … so refugees are so particular as they believe that these Home 
Office interlocutors are Muslims first, then UKBA workers second.
We suggest that opening up the asylum system through the involvement 
of, for example, interpreters and experts with knowledge and 
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understanding of the Christian faith and the manner in which it is 
practised and experienced in Pakistan would help to generate confidence 
and trust among Christian asylum seekers, perhaps even in cases 
where a claim is unsuccessful.
Conclusion
Concerns about diversity, community cohesion and the related public 
fear in the UK of infiltration from Muslim extremists shape both 
contemporary political discourse and the current restrictive border-
control mechanisms. As a result, the Pakistani Christians seeking 
asylum in the UK may be caught between a rock and a hard place. 
Initially, the reception experience of Pakistani Christians challenges 
the neutrality of immigration controls that, in practice, appear to be 
designed to target immigrants of particular ethnic backgrounds for 
increased scrutiny. In this context, Pakistani Christians can be subject 
to misdirected Islamophobia within the immigration and asylum 
system, given the assumption that the Islamic religion is a core identity 
of all Pakistani immigrants. Indeed, as Jubany (2011) argues, the 
tendency to lump together individuals from a particular country/
region into a single group seems to be a subculture of the British 
asylum system as informed by the meta-message of disbelief. This 
points to the limits to openness and transparency within the UK’s 
supposedly evidence-based immigration policy.
At the same time, in the adjudication of faith-based claims, Pakistani 
Christians often found themselves confronted with complex obstacles 
in their endeavour to provide successful evidence of their asylum 
claims. We have thus sought to make visible the monsters that could 
be hiding in the UK’s evidence-based approaches to determining 
refugee status, which point to the limited plurality and diversity in 
the sources and forms of evidence on which the Home Office draws.
Our research has analysed the challenges faced by Pakistani Chris-
tians in establishing their Christian identity, and their associated 
experience of persecution. Our data show that in the absence of good 
evidence, immigration officials often treat the Christian faith as a 
mere religious observance (judged from a Western perspective) as 
opposed to being a core component of one’s identity (hence the need 
for faith to be assessed in the context in which it is practised) 
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(Nettleship, 2015), requiring officials to be better informed and better 
trained.
We have also problematised the external evidence or country-of-
origin information published by the Home Office, which forms the 
basis of decisions on Pakistani Christians’ claims to asylum. This 
evidence appears to underestimate the extent and forms of persecution 
experienced by Christians in Pakistan. For these Christians, both in 
Pakistan and in many other Muslim-majority countries, faith not 
only informs their identity but shapes all aspects of their private and 
public life. This reflects both the way in which Christians themselves 
experience their faith and also how they are regarded and treated by 
non-Christians (as employers, neighbours, the police and the judiciary).
Finally, we have drawn attention to what appears to be a lack of 
religious diversity in the immigration interlocutors (though in a 
supposedly religiously neutral asylum system) and its impact upon 
the ability of Pakistani Christians to defend their claims verbally. Our 
participants routinely made claims of religious discrimination and 
bias in a context where their asylum cases are frequently handled and 
facilitated by caseworkers and interpreters of Pakistani Muslim heritage. 
We see this chapter as filling a significant gap, not only in terms of 
evidence, but also in current research and public debates on asylum 
seekers from Muslim-majority countries.
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Barbara Prainsack, Sabina Leonelli
Openness has become fashionable. Governments, software and even 
humans are furnished with the adjective ‘open’. This is not a quiet and 
modest adjective, but entails a demanding cluster of requirements. 
To be open means to be transparent, responsible, accountable and 
inclusive. In other words: to be open is to be good.1
What does this mean for science? If we understand openness as 
the commitment to make the tools and processes of science replicable 
and open to scrutiny, then science has had a particularly close relation-
ship with openness from its earliest beginnings. It is true that science 
has been, and still is, to a large extent an elite activity. But the idea 
that people other than those involved in the creation of a scientific 
finding need to be able to scrutinise claims in order to find possible 
errors and to corroborate or falsify hypotheses and claims is intrinsic 
to the very concept of science. It is the requirement of transparency, 
intelligibility (if only to peers) and openness to scrutiny that distin-
guishes science from other instances of skilful practice or from an 
informed debate. Openness about how we arrive at conclusions on 
the basis of evidence is what enables the type of empirical self-corrective 
knowledge creation that science has (often rightly) claimed to be.
Why is it, then, that openness – in science, but also in other domains 
of life – has become such a buzzword in the twenty-first century? There 
1 Dave Eggers’s 2013 novel The Circle is a stark illustration of this, particularly since 
it was meant as science fiction and yet seems to describe the cult of transparency 
as a solution to social problems.
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are several answers to this question. One answer lies in our political 
economy. The shift from familial to corporate capitalism (Fraser, 
2015) and the financialisation of capitalism have together solidified 
the dominance of commercial interests over politics. Corporate actors 
have easy access to national power centres, to the extent that they 
co-regulate important national policies (Gamble, 2014). As a result, 
not only governments but also citizens have lost control over important 
policy domains such as housing, work and energy (Wagenaar, 2016). 
Social inequalities have been reified; even most left-wing progressive 
movements no longer see them as something that needs to be abolished 
but instead as something to be managed. Within this political economy, 
openness – particularly when interpreted as an appeal to transparency 
as means to unmask inequalities and corruption – assumes the role 
that gallantry had in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: while 
seemingly easing the relationship between women and men, but not 
also between the rich and the poor, it can also be associated with a 
system that reinforces underlying inequalities and benefits one group 
at the expense of the other.
Making science open bears the connotation of democracy and 
equality, a bit as has been the case with the internet. There has been 
an assumption for some time that, because everybody in principle has 
equal access to web-based tools, the internet will make societies more 
democratic. As is well known by now, the supposed openness and 
accessibility of the internet has indeed given voice to some people who 
would not have been heard otherwise, but it has also given powerful 
actors even more power (Taylor, 2014). It has become clear in many 
contexts that fostering transparency does not always foster meaning 
making and intelligibility. Sometimes it may instead draw attention 
away from all the obstacles to equality and democracy that stem from 
the dominant global and socio-political order.
Another answer is rooted in the development and proliferation of 
digital tools and instruments to produce data. Once data are available 
in digital form, three key questions arise, either explicitly or tacitly: 
who owns them, who should have access to them and who should be 
allowed to use them. This is true for any digital data set – including 
our postings on social media, billing data held by health insurance 
companies or geolocation information collected by mobile phone 
companies. Scientific data, however, are under particular pressure to 
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be available, intelligible and usable to a wide range of users, because of 
the expectation that knowledge production (particularly that sponsored 
by public money) should benefit society at large and be accessible by 
citizens at all times and in all available formats. There is an emerging 
consensus that, wherever ethically and legally possible, research data 
should not only be open to any interested scientist but also to the general 
public as the funders and stakeholders of science. At the same time, the 
expertise required to make data open in the sense of intelligible and 
reusable is often disregarded, with several open-data initiatives targeting 
the general public but providing few tools for them to meaningfully 
engage with the data and extract information from them.
There are other answers to the question why the notion of openness 
has assumed so much cultural importance, which we have discussed 
elsewhere (e.g. Leonelli, 2016; Levin and Leonelli, 2016; Prainsack, 
forthcoming). What the examples that we have given here show is that 
open science is a political project to an even greater extent than it is 
a technological one. The chapters in this part illustrate the range of 
these political aspects and how they may intersect and converge with 
scientific, technological and organisational concerns in the running 
of large research initiatives. In the remainder of this introduction 
we will discuss some of the themes and tensions that the chapters 
highlight and bring them in dialogue with the political and epistemic 
characteristics of the open-science movement.
Centralisation and epistemic diversity
Whenever they try to disseminate information and resources, including 
data, models, specimens, software and papers, beyond their immediate 
work circles, researchers encounter issues of standardisation (Bowker 
and Star, 1999). There is a strong and often unresolvable tension between 
attempting to preserve the diversity of practices that constitutes the 
epistemic richness of research and its outputs, and setting up common 
venues and formats where outputs can be shared, discussed and 
reused (Leonelli, 2016). Such difficulties become particularly jarring 
when attempting to manage and distribute information, and foster 
participation in massive multiheaded institutions and projects, where 
a strongly centralised structure is combined with multiple approaches 
and types of practice.
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Chapter 6 by Eleanor Hadley Kershaw highlights this beautifully by 
discussing Future Earth, one of the most complex bodies of individuals, 
resources, tools, approaches, groups, institutions and data ever assembled 
to confront a broad and all-encompassing set of environmental and 
social challenges across the globe as a whole. The ambitious scope and 
remit set for Future Earth by its governing council (comprising the 
International Council for Science (ICSU), the Belmont Forum and 
other international partners) is reminiscent of the open-science goals 
of bringing together all potential stakeholders and sharing knowledge 
and tools widely for the greater good. This is justified, since addressing 
global challenges arguably requires as inclusive and pluralistic an 
approach as possible, and thus seeks to combine efforts by experts in 
all fields and methods, capitalising on the variety of existing skills and 
knowledge. At the same time, this huge scope has resulted in an 
organisation that has little coherence or cohesion. Attempts to unify 
or even just coordinate approaches can and often do fail, as the multiplic-
ity of challenges and approaches involved (which go well beyond 
disciplines, since interdisciplinary perspectives and innovative methods 
are typically very useful to such an endeavour) defy easy standardisation 
and harmonisation across participants. The inability to resolve the 
tensions outlined by Hadley Kershaw, particularly the one between 
the will to harmonise and cooperate and the importance of respecting 
and preserving diversity, risk making Future Earth a monstrous 
enterprise that nobody understands in its entirety, and in which opera-
tions are disjointed and out of synch with one another. At the same 
time, as argued by Hadley Kershaw, such tensions and differences in 
interpretation could be seen as productive openings for negotiation.
In sum, this case in turn raises questions about the relation between 
openness and pluralism in approaches (and, particularly, disciplines), 
given the various ways in which researchers working in different fields 
and locations understand the notion of openness, the challenges and 
opportunities that it can bring, and the ways in which it can be 
instantiated (Levin et al., 2016; Tenopir et al., 2015).
Inclusiveness and social justice
Another type of pluralism, which is a motor for openness but also a 
potential obstacle to sharing and exchanging data, is geographical 
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and cultural. Chapter 7 by Alison Mohr on energy transitions research 
brings the power differentials and diversity of location and research 
environment between the North and the South into sharp relief, thus 
highlighting the challenges of social justice and spatial positioning 
that underlie attempts to apply the notion of openness across national 
boundaries. Mohr emphasises how translating Northern ideas into 
global South contexts involves deep structural changes to the latter, 
which are difficult to implement and whose systemic implications are 
hard to predict and manage. And, indeed, the situation that she 
describes parallels attempts to construct digital infrastructures for 
open-science projects that benefit the developing world. Whether 
such infrastructures target citizen scientists or professional researchers, 
they are often devised and developed by individuals based in high-
income countries, which makes it difficult for prospective users in 
low-income countries to share the same assumptions and conditions 
for entry. Open science can certainly serve to enhance social justice 
by fostering better exchange of data, better quality control of the 
information data exchanged, and cooperation in the ways in which 
research is organised (e.g. by helping researchers interested in exploring 
the same phenomenon to find each other and network). Open-science 
initiatives can also enhance the social, cultural and economic effects 
of research outputs on the various publics who, directly or indirectly, 
engage with them or are affected by them (e.g. how participants think 
about the impact of their work, what are their publics, what and whom 
they address). However, to reach these goals, openness advocates need 
to take account of the staggering differences between research environ-
ments in various parts of the world, which include not only available 
funding and resources, but also the wider infrastructure and institu-
tionalisation of scientific work (Bezuidenhout et al., 2016). Many 
open-science projects, no matter how well intentioned, do not treat 
their prospective participants as equals and tend to impose their own 
vision of what it means to do research and share information without 
taking account (and in many cases, without being fully aware of) the 
conditions under which some of their publics and users work. As 
Chris Kelty (2008) has argued in his study of the development of the 
open-source movement, an effective way to engage in open research 
is to create one’s own public through deep engagement and the distribu-
tion of stakes and responsibilities, so as to reflexively identify and 
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take into account existing inequalities – an approach that some 
citizen-science initiatives are already successfully using.
Transparency
Both Hadley Kershaw and Mohr address the scale of nested international 
structures, disciplines and institutions at global and local levels. Within 
such systems it is not clear that making knowledge open, in the sense 
of making everything accessible (for instance via online dissemination), 
enhances the transparency of the efforts at hand in a meaningful way. 
In many cases, understanding a given intervention or claim requires 
expertise and familiarity with the issues. Furthermore, the sheer quantity 
and scale of information that can be made available can baffle and 
confuse readers, rather than providing them with useful information 
(Floridi, 2014). Too often is the offer of unlimited information 
accompanied by interpretative moves left unacknowledged, such as 
with WikiLeaks (Rappert, 2015). In many instances people who make 
data accessible to others are not even aware of the assumptions and 
interpretations that have become part of the data sets, if only by ordering 
and classifying them (Bowker and Star, 1999). In sum, obtaining 
transparency is not merely a matter of making information available 
but rather a matter of explicating one’s own assumptions, providing 
critical tools to unravel complex claims or situations, and engaging 
with them critically.
Responsible Innovation
In the 1960s and 1970s several organisations and initiatives in Europe 
and in North America sought to ‘radicalise’ science (Bell, 2013; Rose 
and Rose, 1976, 1979). Fuelled by the experience of how science had 
put itself in the service of imperialistic and martial interests, culminating 
in the atrocities of World War II, initiatives associated with the radical-
science movement challenged the perception that science is something 
neutral, something independent of economic and political interests. 
The radical-science movement was not an attempt by people to tame 
or even govern science from the outside. On the contrary, it was 
driven by professional scientists. Organisations such as Scientists and 
Engineers for Political and Social Action in the USA and the British 
Society for Social Responsibility in Science in the UK argued that 
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science should be seen and analysed as an integral part of a particular 
social and political order. Responsible science thus meant that profes-
sional scientists and publics alike reflected critically on the questions 
that science asked, the methods it used and the resources it obtained.
For many national and international organisations today, responsibil-
ity in science has a very different meaning. Politics has largely been 
sucked out of it. Responsibility has mostly become synonymous with 
complying with ethical codes. Also, most of the ‘radical’ scientists of 
today, including citizen scientists and those who are self-proclaimed 
proponents of ‘forbidden’ research (e.g. MIT Media Lab, 2016), are 
no longer asking the big question of what kind of society we want 
(see also Delfanti, 2013). While some of them – among them, for 
example, do-it-yourself biologists – do challenge the norms and goals of 
institutionalised science, which they see as compromised by commercial 
interests, many of them help to make science ‘better’ within the epistemic 
commitments and rationale of institutionalised professional science 
(see Irwin, 2015; Prainsack and Riesch, 2016). They often fill the void 
that public actors have left, for example, by crowd-funding scientific 
research or by undertaking tasks that would be too onerous or too 
difficult for professional scientists to do (Del Savio et al., 2016; Prainsack, 
2014). Here, responsibility no longer means a collective responsibility 
to ensure that science contributes to making our societies more just 
and more dignified for everybody to live in. Instead, it increasingly 
connotes a duty for individual scientists – professional scientists or 
citizen scientists – to be useful to existing systems.
In its worst instantiation – and unfortunately this is the case for 
the EU’s pet concept of responsible research and innovation (RRI) 
– responsibility boils down to the duty to create a societal impact, 
which in turn is seen as an incentive – or even a societal need – to 
partner with industry. In its less depressing instantiations, contemporary 
interpretations of responsibility in science include the duty to think 
carefully about its societal impacts and to increase inclusiveness (e.g. 
Kreissl et al., 2015). Viewed in this context, Stevienna de Saille and 
Paul Martin’s approach in chapter 8 to analyse RRI using the notion 
of the monster is both intriguing and useful. Drawing upon monster 
theory (e.g. Smits, 2006) these authors argue that an entity’s monstrosity 
is not so much determined by the extent to which it is seen as infringing 
supposedly natural principles, as it is shaped by its inhabiting mutually 
exclusive categories (see pp. 152–153). To de Saille and Martin, RRI 
104 Science and the politics of openness
represents both the fear of monsters and the fear of what they call 
the ‘monstrous regiment’ (see p. 150). According to the authors, this 
is because RRI can be seen as serving two mutually exclusive goals. 
The first is to generate private wealth while socialising public risk, 
and the second is to involve publics and give them the chance to 
‘destroy the new market’ (see p. 156). While this is an original way 
of analysing RRI, it may not be the only way in which RRI can be 
seen in the current political and economic landscape. Following scholars 
such as Slavoj Žižek (2006) and Philip Mirowski (2014), what sets 
the current situation apart from previous eras is that the goals of 
economic growth, wealth creation and creating public benefits are 
seeing as entirely compatible.2 This has become possible because our 
societies have naturalised social inequalities and injustice. RRI could 
be seen as one of the tools that help to manage such inequalities.
Conclusion
Openness is not more important today than it has been in earlier 
decades. But the wide variety of goals and uses to which this notion is 
now routinely subjected has generated a complex nexus of expectations 
and associations. Many of these expectations fail to materialise in 
reality, or they do so only for a highly selected public and in ways 
that only partly reflect the intended aims. That the various meanings 
and functions of openness are often flattened in scientific and public 
discourse is unhelpful here, as it suggests that questions about the 
success or value of openness can be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
Some of the tensions and challenges pertaining to open science that 
are addressed in this part – and in this volume more broadly – cannot 
be resolved very easily; in fact, some of them may not be soluble at all, 
because they reflect the fact that openness can be interpreted in many 
different ways, and yet each interpretation can work to the benefit or 
at the expense of others. The lesson to draw from this is that, rather 
than treating openness as a term that describes the value system or 
political commitments of an institution or practice, we must take a 
2 The current boom of concepts such as effective altruism (effectivealtruism.org) and 
practices such as social-impact investing (e.g. Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011) are 
but two examples of this.
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deeper look at the values, goals and purposes that openness supports 
and realises in concrete instances. The contributions by Mohr, Hadley 
Kershaw, and de Saille and Martin all do this in different ways and 
with different results, once again illustrating the breadth and partly 
contradictory nature of practices and institutions of openness.
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6Leviathan and the hybrid network: Future 
Earth, co-production and the experimental 
life of a global institution
Eleanor Hadley Kershaw
In the opening words of A Sociology of Monsters, John Law caricatures 
a middle-class white male, middle-aged, non-disabled person’s perspec-
tive on the history of sociology: ‘We founded ourselves on class; then, 
at a much later date we learned a little about ethnicity; more recently 
we discovered gender; and more recently still we learned something 
… about age and disability’ (Law, 1991: 1). Thus, the hypothetical 
sociologist’s gradual realisation that ‘ “his” sociology had never spoken 
for “us”: that all along the sociological “we” was a Leviathan that had 
achieved its (sense of) order by usurping or silencing the other voices’ 
(Law, 1991: 1). In acknowledging the struggles – the ‘pain’ – of sociol-
ogy’s gradually expanding and more inclusive scope, Law signals the 
(potential) monstrosity of discipline and exclusivity in the formation 
and perpetuation of academic knowledge and communities.
Whether or not one subscribes to this view of sociology as monstrous, 
science and technology studies (STS) is replete with monsters. From 
Haraway’s cyborg (1991) to Latour’s appeal for us to love and care for 
our technologies rather than abandon them as Frankenstein did his 
creation (Latour, 2011), the central preoccupations of this field concern 
the (blurred) categories of and relations between nature; culture; the 
human, non-human or more-than-human; the scientific; technological; 
social; material; epistemic and the political: the construction, main-
tenance and disturbance of our ‘natural’ and ‘social’ orders and kinds. 
Whether leviathan in the sense of biblical sea monster, monolithic 
and powerful organisation, or Hobbes’s body politic ruled by the 
sovereign head of state – or whether ambiguous hybrid – the monster 
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is a useful metaphor and heuristic for exploring and describing disrup-
tions to order and control; the unusual, unfamiliar or potentially 
threatening; and our anticipation, fears and hopes.
With this in mind, might disciplines, research communities and 
knowledge domains be usefully characterised as leviathans, giant 
structures composed of many individuals governed by one singular 
centralised agency policing their boundaries? Or are they best seen 
as hybrid networks, configurations or assemblages of the scientific 
and the political, the material and the epistemic, the social and the 
natural? Or perhaps it is more productive to consider our epistemic 
apparatus not as a monster itself, but as facing monsters in the 
process of its continuous (re)formulation, (re)definition and (re) 
structuring.
This chapter explores efforts to bring about transformations in global 
environmental change (GEC) research institutions, communities and 
cultures. In particular, it focuses on the reconfiguration of several 
existing international GEC research programmes into one initiative: 
Future Earth (henceforth FE), an international research initiative on 
GEC and sustainability that was launched in 2012 and became fully 
operational in 2015. This reorganisation is accompanied (and in part 
motivated) by ambitions for a ‘new type of science’ (FE, 2014: 2) and 
‘a new “social contract” between science and society’ (FE, 2013: 11). 
To achieve these aims, FE is unique in explicitly adopting co-design 
and co-production of knowledge as a strategic agenda for the govern-
ance, coordination and production of research from global to local 
levels.
Here, co-design and co-production (and transdisciplinarity) can 
be understood as the opening up of science (or research more broadly) 
and its governance to the participation of a wider range of stakeholders, 
with the goal of transforming the ways it is done and used, as well as 
its efficacy and impact. However, we do not yet know how this 
transformation might be enacted in practice in a concrete programme. 
Given this, what are constructive ways of understanding this initiative 
and others like it? Are there monsters lurking in the uncharted ter-
ritories of the deliberate co-production of new research at a global 
scale? And what is FE – a powerful leviathanesque organisation, a 
hybrid network, a combination of the two or something else entirely? 
This chapter, written in early 2016, explores the answers to these 
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questions at a particular moment in FE’s development, drawing on 
data from a qualitative case study of FE conducted between 2013 and 
2015. FE has since evolved (and will continue to evolve for its duration), 
but may still face many of the questions and tensions considered here.
The following section provides background on transformations in 
research systems and cultures, changing science–society relations, and 
a brief introduction to the concepts of co-design, co-production and 
transdisciplinarity.
Changing research systems, cultures and  
science–society relations
Since the 1980s and 1990s, scholars of research policy and STS have 
explored changes in research systems, institutions, philosophies, cultures 
and practices. The various conceptualisations of transformations in 
the dynamics between research and society include post-normal science 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993), mode 2 knowledge production (Gibbons 
et al., 1994) and post-academic science (Ziman, 2000), amongst many 
others. While such concepts are diverse, they all describe, theorise or 
advocate a shift from the disciplinary organisation of research within 
the academy towards a greater recognition of socio-economic priorities 
and involvement of broader communities – particularly non-academic 
actors – in the governance and production of research, whether at a 
local, national, regional or global scale (Hessels and Van Lente, 2008). 
These ideas and accounts are not uncontested, but some of them have 
also taken on a performative role, both suggesting that a new organisa-
tion of knowledge production should take place (or is taking place) 
and simultaneously participating in its realisation (Godin, 1998).
Alongside the emergence of these ideas there have been increasing 
calls within national and international research (funding) communities 
for multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity; public and stakeholder 
engagement; and RRI – often to address grand societal challenges 
such as global environmental change, health or sustainability (Felt 
and Wynne, 2007). In this context, co-design and co-production have 
been advocated as research and/or governance approaches – for 
example, by UK research councils and academics (Campbell and 
Vanderhoven, 2016), as well as in wider public policy contexts (Durose 
and Richardson, 2015).
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However, while these initiatives aim to move beyond the traditional 
disciplinary organisation of research and open up research and policy 
processes to a wider range of actors, the concepts underpinning them 
retain a high degree of interpretive flexibility (Ribeiro et al., 2016), 
sometimes serving as ‘buzzwords’ that mobilise people and resources 
(Bensaud Vincent, 2014), or as ‘boundary objects’ that enable diverse 
parties with different perspectives to work together (Star and Griesemer, 
1989). In particular, co-production and related concepts such as 
co-design and transdisciplinarity have various meanings in different 
theory and practice contexts, including STS, public policy, environ-
mental and sustainability research, health, community and development 
studies, and the arts and humanities. In general, these terms refer to 
the participation or collaboration of non-academic actors in research 
(whether defining questions, gathering or analysing data, or engagement 
in other aspects of the research process) (e.g. Pohl et al., 2010), or 
the involvement of communities and/or other non-governmental actors 
in policy processes or public service provision (Bovaird, 2007). Co-
production is also employed as an analytical idiom by Sheila Jasanoff 
and other scholars in STS to signify the co-constitution of science 
(knowledge) and social (political) order (Jasanoff, 2004).
While the language of STS and cognate fields (e.g. ‘participation’, 
‘engagement’, ‘co-production’) is adopted in research governance, 
practice and broader policy contexts, the motivations for using these 
approaches in these contexts do not always follow the original logics 
espoused by scholars, and implementing the concepts can be challenging 
(Irwin, 2006; Pohl et al., 2010; Stirling, 2008). The reasons for proposing 
and adopting these approaches to reconfiguring epistemic practices, 
knowledge domains, and science–society relations are at least as diverse 
as the range of interpretations of the concepts themselves. STS scholars 
continue to argue for social agency, for opening up or democratising 
science and governance, and ensuring accountability of science/
scientists and policy makers to broader society. But they also suggest 
that, despite the proliferation of the language of STS, deficit and linear 
models persist that assume one-way relationships between experts 
and other stakeholders, and between knowledge and socially beneficial 
outcomes via policy, failing to acknowledge the uncertainties and 
limits of knowledge and governance (Jasanoff, 2003; Stirling, 2008; 
and see chapter 12).
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In the case of the co-production of research, even within STS there 
are varying rationales for advocating co-production practices, driven 
by different logics (Lövbrand, 2011, following Barry et al., 2008). One 
rationale is underpinned by a ‘logic of ontology’ that hopes to challenge 
the broad questions of collective purpose and ontological assumptions 
inherent in particular world views or issue framings. Another is a 
‘logic of accountability’ that calls for the alignment of research portfolios 
with societal need. In the context of a research project on EU climate 
policy, these different rationales seemed incompatible. Broadly speaking, 
policy makers in the co-production exercise wanted knowledge that 
would be ‘useful’ within a predefined framework, while social scientists 
wanted to challenge the policy framework.
Other initiatives to implement or study co-production have tended 
to focus on the intentional pursuit of co-production at local, national 
or regional levels and in individual projects and organisations (e.g. 
Robinson and Tansey, 2006), or the broader (often much less explicit) 
processes of the co-constitution of science and social order in national 
and international contexts (e.g. Beck and Forsyth, 2015). However, 
only a few studies have examined the adoption of co-design and 
co-production as principles for the governance and production of 
new research at a global scale (Lahsen, 2016; van der Hel, 2016). This 
chapter addresses that gap by exploring how co-production is under-
stood – and how it relates to broader questions of institutional identity 
and function – in the case of FE.
Future Earth background
FE, a major international research initiative on global environmental 
change (GEC) for sustainability, was officially launched by the Science 
and Technology Alliance for Global Sustainability in June 2012, during 
the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20).1 Its unique 
ambition is to provide a global framework and international coordina-
tion of new research on GEC and sustainability (as opposed to the 
1 The Alliance (formed in 2010) comprises the International Council for Science (ICSU); 
the International Social Science Council; the Belmont Forum of global change research 
funders; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO); the United Nations Environment Programme; the United Nations 
University; and the World Meteorological Organization (see www.stalliance.org/).
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large-scale synthesis of existing research in assessments undertaken 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the 
Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES)). It aims to become ‘a major international research platform 
providing the knowledge and support to accelerate our transformations 
to a sustainable world’ and ‘a platform for international engagement 
to ensure that knowledge is generated in partnership with society and 
users of science’, merging several existing international GEC research 
programmes (FE, n.d. a).
These programmes aimed to coordinate and promote international 
interdisciplinary research on GEC, set research agendas, and make 
links between research and policy (FE, 2013: 13). Between 2006 and 
2009 the International Council for Science (ICSU) reviewed some of 
the programmes, concluding that there was a ‘need to implement a 
single strategic framework for Earth system research in the near future’ 
because the research landscape was ‘complex, confusing, and often 
[led] to inefficient use of human, institutional, and financial resources’ 
(ICSU, 2009: 2). In 2009 ICSU and the other co-sponsors began a 
visioning process to rethink the future of the programmes (which 
converged with the development of the ‘Belmont Challenge’, a funders’ 
vision for GEC research (Belmont Forum, 2011)), and later established 
a transition team to design a new ten-year initiative to succeed them. 
FE was launched in June 2012, and became fully operational in 2015 
through the change from an interim to a permanent secretariat. Key 
features planned for the fully operational phase of FE included:
•  an emphasis on integrated research across disciplines spanning 
natural and social science, the humanities, and engineering
•  the co-design and co-production of research with stakeholder 
groups including funders, policymakers, civil society and 
business
•  the initiative’s global scope, encompassing all regions, and 
bottom-up input from the research community and other 
stakeholders
•  the accelerated delivery of solutions-oriented, policy-relevant 
research (FE, 2013; ICSU, n.d.).
The co-design and co-production of relevant knowledge in particular 
are billed as ‘one of the most innovative aspects’ of the initiative (FE, 
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n.d. b). FE thus exemplifies calls for transformations in research systems 
and knowledge-making communities towards engagement with non-
academic stakeholders. But what do co-design and co-production 
mean in FE, and why have they been adopted as core features of the 
initiative? And how can we make sense of this type of programme?
Jasanoff and Wynne (1998: 58–59) note that two potential avenues 
for development were mooted for one of FE’s precursors, the Inter-
national Geosphere–Biosphere Programme (IGBP), in the mid-1990s 
(Barron, 1994). Firstly, the ‘rich tapestry’ model, in which diverse 
(sometimes pre-existing) national and individual contributions or 
initiatives would have been grouped under the broad umbrella of the 
IGBP. Here, IGBP’s role would have been to facilitate communication 
and collaboration, but its identity, visibility and ability to attract funding 
may have been weakened. The second model was that of the ‘flagship’, 
where effort would have been focused on ‘task-oriented activity’ (such 
as major field experiments or modelling activities) with closer integra-
tion, greater harmonisation and stricter dirigisme, reinforcing IGBP’s 
status as an autonomous international programme at the cost of its 
inclusivity and diversity. In terms of the metaphorical monsters 
described at the start of this chapter, these models respectively align 
with the notion of a knowledge community as a hybrid science–society 
network, and as a monstrous leviathan.
FE faces similar dilemmas in relation to its structure and role. 
Might it become – or is it best viewed as – a loose hybrid network of 
the scientific–political, the material–epistemic and the social–natural, 
in which there may always be ambiguity around what type of organisa-
tion it is? Or is it better viewed as a leviathan, a giant monolithic 
structure composed of many individuals governed by one centralised 
agency aiming to coordinate, prescribe, direct, harmonise and stand-
ardise knowledge production, potentially to the detriment or exclusion 
of some voices? Or is it both – or neither? And what role might co-
design and co-production play in these various scenarios?
Emerging tensions and ambiguities
Drawing on a qualitative case study of FE conducted between 2013 
and 2015, this section firstly explores the diverse designations and 
roles imagined for FE, noting that ambiguities between them – and 
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in the ambitious remit of FE – were seen as potentially problematic 
by some FE and external actors. Six specific tensions and ambiguities 
arise from these diverse visions and are likely to proliferate as FE is 
extended and replicated at different scales and in different contexts. 
Ambiguities in co-design and co-production in FE are then identified, 
starting with the predominant rationale for this approach (co-
production for utility) before detailing two further views (co-production 
for democratisation, and co-production as a threat). The necessity 
of resolving these ambiguities is questioned, and their relation to 
the flagship/leviathan and rich-tapestry/hybrid-network models is 
discussed.
During the study, FE was still very much an organisation in the 
making; many aspects of its design and implementation were still 
ambiguous and yet to be determined. Data collection for this study 
was concluded before the transition from the interim to the permanent 
secretariat in 2015. FE has since evolved and will continue to evolve 
for its duration.
Visions of Future Earth and the negotiation of ambiguities
During the period of study, visions of FE – of what it is supposed to 
be and what roles and functions it is supposed to have – were diverse, 
ambitious and, sometimes, ambiguous. In official and internal docu-
ments and webpages (produced between 2010 and early 2015), as well 
as in interviews and focus groups conducted as part of this study,2 
FE has been conceptualised in a range of ways. Some of these visions 
evoke a leviathanesque ‘flagship’, for example: ‘a consolidated and 
comprehensive effort, a flagship initiative on Earth System Research 
for Global Sustainability’ (ICSU, 2011); ‘the global research platform 
providing the knowledge and support to accelerate our transformations 
to a sustainable world’ (FE, n.d. a).3 Others are more suggestive of 
the ‘rich tapestry’ of a hybrid network, for example: ‘at its core a 
2 Interview and focus group participants comprised members of the Future Earth 
Science Committee, Interim Engagement Committee, Interim Secretariat, Alliance/
Governing Council, and other actors involved in or aware of FE’s development and 
implementation.
3 This has since been changed on the website to ‘a major international research platform’ 
– perhaps as an acknowledgement that there may be other such platforms.
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“federation” of projects and other initiatives related to Global Envi-
ronmental Change’ (FE, n.d. c); an umbrella, tent, arena, network, 
and hub (e.g. interviews 7 and 8;4 FE, n.d. d). Others still might fall 
into either, both or neither category, for example: ‘first and foremost 
a community’ (FE, n.d. e); part of a global innovation system (interview 
9); amongst others.
Across the data, FE’s imagined roles and functions are as diverse 
as its definitions and designations. They include (but are not limited 
to): integrating the existing GEC programmes; creating interdisciplinary, 
integrated, authoritative knowledge on the key challenges of GEC 
and sustainability (including climate change, biodiversity loss, and 
socio-economic change); informing policy, decision making and action 
in the UN system (such as the Sustainable Development Goals, the 
IPCC and the Framework Convention on Climate Change) and at 
other levels; raising, redirecting and coordinating research funds, 
activity and capacity; bringing about a change in the culture or practice 
of scientific research; involving existing and new communities of 
researchers, particularly from the social sciences, and engaging 
stakeholders; bringing together GEC and sustainability research 
communities and refocusing GEC research on sustainability challenges; 
all at local, national, regional, and/or international levels.
This wide-ranging diversity in defining what FE is and what its 
remit entails is acknowledged in passing in two early Q&A posts on 
the FE blog. In posing questions to the Chair of the FE Science Com-
mittee and to the Interim Director of FE, ICSU communications staff 
noted respectively that ‘Future Earth seems to mean different things 
to different people’ (Mengel, 2013) and ‘Future Earth may seem like 
all things to all people’ (Young, 2013). These statements reflect the 
roots of FE’s plural definitions and purposes: on the one hand, many 
people have been involved (and have a stake) in its development, 
giving rise to a broad range of visions and interpretations; and on the 
other, the ambitions for its remit and scope are extremely broad even 
within single narratives of the initiative, incorporating a wide range 
of actors, knowledges, practices, phenomena, and scales.
4 In an effort to maintain anonymity, interview numbers (one per interview) have 
been attributed at random and do not reflect the order in which the interviews were 
conducted.
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Although diverse understandings of what FE is and might do 
emerged from the interviews, there were varying degrees of awareness 
of and concern about these differences, with some interviewees retaining 
a strong sense of FE’s purpose (from their perspective), and others 
viewing a lack of clarity around its identity, objectives and activities 
as potentially problematic. In mid-May 2014, one Interim Engagement 
Committee member argued for more specificity about FE’s intended 
achievements, stating that ‘Future Earth needs to really, really improve 
the definition of who and what it is and what its exact purpose is; I 
still think it’s a bit too vague’ (interview 10).
Lack of clarity or focus in FE’s mandate has also been flagged as 
problematic by external stakeholders. In late May 2014, Ian Thornton, 
deputy director of the UK Collaborative on Development Sciences, 
blogged about FE, having attended an ICSU workshop. He suggests 
that despite considerable awareness of FE among UK stakeholders, 
there is confusion about ‘what Future Earth will do, its value-add, 
and whether UK funders should engage more closely’ (Thornton, 
2014). He attributes this confusion to the challenges inherent in 
articulating what coordination of research can achieve, particularly 
in the context of an evolving organisational mandate, arguing that 
FE should pare back its goals and clarify what the secretariat will do: 
‘Is it mainly coordination? Or, evidence synthesis and policy influence? 
Or being a hub for debate?’ (Thornton, 2014). Indeed, during the 
period of study, FE documents and actors suggested that the initiative 
(if not specifically the secretariat) is intended to take all three roles 
identified by Thornton, and more.
Overall, the analysis of the data suggests (at least) six linked points 
of tension or dilemmas between different visions and ambitions for 
FE, at times echoing the leviathan and hybrid-network models. Firstly, 
related to Thornton’s point above, there is a potential conflict between 
visions of FE as a hub or arena for debate, dialogue and deliberation, 
and that of FE as a platform to deliver solutions-oriented, policy-
relevant knowledge and innovation outputs. The ability to achieve 
both within the same institutional and conceptual framework has 
been questioned by scholars outside the initiative (Lövbrand et al., 
2015).
This is closely linked to the second and third tensions. The second 
is between consensus and plurality, or between the desire to integrate 
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knowledge (and also to create an integrated, authoritative, singular 
organisation, programme, or brand) and the inevitable multiplicity 
of a multi-scalar, multidisciplinary, multi-stakeholder international 
initiative and its forms of knowledge (Klenk and Meehan, 2015). The 
third tension is between the ambition to bring about new ways of 
doing science while also promoting and ensuring continued authority 
for existing ways. Here we might loosely align debate and plurality 
with the hybrid-network model, and solutions and singularity with 
leviathan (with caution, as STS has alerted us to the reductionism of 
binaries), but the new versus existing ways do not align as neatly with 
the models. Perhaps a hybrid network is more amenable to innovation 
or novelty, and the (authority of the) status quo more easily maintained 
and elevated by a leviathan.
One participant discussed FE’s role as a forum for debate, highlight-
ing tensions between new and old:
To me, what’s exciting about Future Earth is that it is pioneering a new 
approach to thinking about and doing science, which is integrated, 
interdisciplinary, co-produced, and it also should be a forum for 
encouraging debate and encouraging this approach but in a critically 
reflective way. […] But I do think it faces real tensions because at the 
same time it’s trying to give more prominence to some fairly standard 
ways of doing science.
The participant then identified a challenge:
But the threat is that integrating everything becomes a kind of lowest 
common denominator and you lose, as it were, the cutting edge nature 
of that science – and I think both can happen there but I think we need 
to work very actively with those tensions and be aware of them and 
push on both fronts. (Interview 7)
The tension between singularity and multiplicity is perhaps heightened 
by the authority-building and fundraising aspirations for the initiative, 
particularly for those imagining its place in the UN system. One 
participant suggested that FE is ‘not trying to be totalising’, but that 
the ambition is to be ‘the main place’ and ‘the natural platform’ with 
which the UN, the European Commission and other international 
organisations wish to partner (interview 8).
Relating to authority building, there is a fourth tension between 
FE’s ambition to be inclusive (of both existing and new research and 
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stakeholder communities) versus upholding standards and setting 
limits on what counts as FE knowledge or approaches. On the one 
hand, interviewees spoke about working towards making FE ‘a growing 
tangible concern that people understand and that they want to be part 
of ’ (interview 8), and opening up FE not only to the core projects of 
the existing GEC programmes but also to other science communities, 
including ‘the mass of environmental social science across the world 
that by definition until now has been excluded from this dominant 
global environmental change community’ (interview 7). However, 
they also spoke about the need to ‘regulate the arena’ (e.g. through 
peer review, critique and allowing the most robust claims to survive), 
whether because scholars and/or stakeholders are not ‘fully aligned’ 
with FE, or ‘committed enough to the codes’, or might ‘clutter up 
the arena with false claims or with unfounded claims’ (interview 
8). Processes for affiliation with FE and ways of including other 
communities were being discussed and designed by the committees 
during the period these interviews were conducted, with varying ideas 
about the appropriate level of bureaucracy, who should be included 
and how.
Linked to this ambiguity around openness to participation or 
affiliation, there is a fifth tension between the directive action of 
establishing an initiative from the top (global and centralised) level 
down and the ambition to be responsive to the needs of society and 
to include bottom-up input from the scientific community. One 
participant argued that FE is ‘a directive programme’ and is not intended 
to do ‘purely responsive science’, that it needs to set ‘broad strategic 
directions through the [strategic research agenda] process’, but that 
there should be ‘wide engagement’ in putting those agendas together, 
and the research community should be given ‘wide freedoms’ to design 
research to meet them, without it being ‘a completely blue skies 
programme’ (interview 3).
The dilemmas between strategy/directiveness versus responsiveness, 
and between blue-sky research versus useful research, link to a sixth 
tension, which itself links back to new versus existing ways. This is 
the tension between a utilitarian focus on demand-driven science 
and the more traditional curiosity-driven model. Again, we might 
loosely align inclusivity and responsiveness with the hybrid-network 
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model, and setting standards and strategy or direction with that of 
the leviathan. But, similar to the tension between new versus existing 
modes of science, utility versus demand and curiosity versus supply 
do not map neatly onto the models.
While thinking in terms of dilemmas might suggest mutual exclusiv-
ity, these tensions are not necessarily dichotomous. However, they 
are issues that those involved in FE were negotiating and navigating 
at the time of this study, and will probably continue to face as the 
initiative further develops. While this type of ambiguity can perhaps 
be expected in the early stages of a new initiative as its identity and 
remit are still in flux, it could be argued that some stabilisation may 
occur through the social order of recognised practices, structures and 
identities, particularly as the multiple roles and functions imagined 
for FE inform design decisions made about its governance, operations 
and activities.
For example, certain aspects may find some sort of stability in FE’s 
organisational structure or its infrastructural architecture. In March 
2016 the headline of the ‘Get Involved’ page on the FE website was 
changed from ‘Future Earth is first and foremost a community’ to 
‘Future Earth is first and foremost an open network committed to 
global sustainability.’ This change was implemented in conjunction 
with the launch of the FE ‘Open Network’, an online networking tool 
to which anyone can sign up: (potentially) a concrete mechanism of 
openness and bottom-up input.5 (Of course, the extent to which such 
mechanisms will be used or will enable collaboration on equal footing 
remains to be seen.)
Despite these points of stabilisation, as FE further develops and is 
rolled out and taken up at regional and national levels (whether through 
its regional hubs or centres and national committees, and/or by other 
initiatives affiliating, or in multiple other possible ways), the same 
and further ambiguities are bound to emerge. As the FE network 
extends and becomes more complex, the FE model is also extended, 
adapted and interpreted in a diverse range of contexts.
5 These developments were at least partly driven by personnel changes between the 
interim and permanent secretariat in 2015, and the associated shifts in perspectives 
and approaches.
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Ambiguities in co-design and co-production
In addition to the tensions and ambiguities that emerge when thinking 
through and talking about FE’s identity and functions, there is ambiguity 
around the concepts and roles of co-design, co-production and 
transdisciplinarity in FE. This ambiguity has also been regarded as 
problematic by some. As noted by science writer Jon Turney in an 
FE blog post (Turney, 2014), the Design Report (FE, 2013) and the 
‘Impact’ section of the website (FE, n.d. b) perhaps prompt more 
questions than provide answers about these concepts. On the one 
hand, it is suggested that co-design and co-production require ‘an 
active involvement of researchers and stakeholders during the entire 
research process’ (FE, 2013: 22), but on the other, it seems that less 
active involvement of stakeholders may be preferred at some stages:
Co-design and co-production of knowledge include various steps where 
both researchers and other stakeholders are involved but to different 
extents and with different responsibilities […] Whilst researchers are 
responsible for the scientific methodologies, the definition of the research 
questions and the dissemination of results are done jointly. […] It is 
also recognised that the focus for this way of working should be on 
where the research and stakeholder community feel that it will bring 
the greatest benefits. (FE, 2013: 23)
The website and Design Report do not address how to reconcile continu-
ous engagement with the described division of responsibilities, nor 
how it should be decided where co-design and co-production bring 
the greatest benefits (and to whom). There are additional uncertainties 
on the roles of participants and stakeholders in co-design and co-
production, the scale at which these endeavours should happen, and 
the anticipated outputs and outcomes, stemming in part from the 
differing rationales for undertaking such processes (and more broadly 
from differing imaginaries of science, society and the relationship 
between them) (Hadley Kershaw, forthcoming).
The predominant vision of co-design, co-production and transdis-
ciplinarity in FE (in the documents and among many of the key actors) 
is that collaboration between researchers and stakeholders will ensure 
that the ‘right’ research questions are asked and therefore relevant or 
useful knowledge (and solutions) will be produced, and will be more 
likely to have impact as users have been involved in its production. 
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This utilitarian view corresponds to the logic of accountability as 
discussed on p. 111: redirecting research portfolios towards societal 
need (Lövbrand, 2011: 227), with an additional emphasis on impact 
of research. This type of rationale has been criticised for its normative 
assumption that co-produced and transdisciplinary research leads 
unproblematically to beneficial social solutions (Polk, 2014), and for 
restricting plurality, deliberation and social-science involvement 
(Lövbrand et al., 2015).
However, the interviews and focus groups conducted for this 
research revealed a broader range of understandings of co-design and 
co-production in FE. Some participants saw them as deliberative or 
reflexive processes in which multiple perspectives, commitments and 
knowledges are brought together, discussed and socially constructed:
I would see the sort of co-construction agenda as about people, all these 
people, whether they’re users, whether they’re different scientists from 
different disciplines, coming to a situation bringing their own social 
commitments and drivers and understandings and assumptions about 
the world, and bringing those together and reflecting on them reflexively, 
realising that everybody’s got a set of partial perspectives so those need 
to be deliberated on and debated out throughout the process, throughout 
the design, throughout the doing, throughout the communication. 
(Interview 7)
This view is more closely linked to visions of FE as an arena for 
deliberation, rather than as a platform for solutions, aligning with 
the logic of ontology described by Lövbrand (2011; following Barry 
et al., 2008) in which dominant frameworks and world views can be 
challenged, and ontological questions – including questions of common 
purpose – asked. That is not to say that participants voicing these 
opinions were not interested in finding solutions, having impact or 
‘making a difference’. However, this was more closely associated with 
extending agency and the rights of knowledge production or governance 
to non-academic actors, valuing their perspectives and knowledge, 
and democratising expertise:
[Co-production] is to recognise that scientific knowledge or scientists 
are not the only people who hold relevant knowledge. That knowledge 
of practitioners, decision-makers, local communities, et cetera, is valid 
knowledge. […] That is why I like to call them knowledge partners, 
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because they are not just providers of additional data, they are not 
witnesses, they are active knowledge partners, their knowledge counts. 
(Interview 5)
A third view of co-design and co-production was also apparent: 
they were perceived by some as a threat. Many participants referred 
to the ideal of objective, pure science; either expressing concern about 
how to preserve it or noting that others in FE feel that it is challenged 
by co-design and/or co-production. Some of the most significant 
contestation arose around adherence or otherwise to this ideal, as 
well as around the notions of scientific independence and academic 
freedom. One participant suggested that the involvement of private-
sector organisations (e.g. oil companies) in research could be dangerous, 
considering the elimination of conflicts of interest to be ‘the hallmark 
of science’:
For me, in the middle [of the research process] there should be a complete 
separation, I do not believe that stakeholders should ever be involved 
in the process of generating data, interpreting data or peer reviewing 
data. That, to me, provides egregious conflicts of interests that … will 
ruin the integrity of science for society, in my opinion. (Interview 2)
However, this participant was not totally against the co-design of 
research questions and priorities, as long as there was still support 
for curiosity-driven science beyond FE. Other participants felt that 
perceived risks of bias or conflict of interest associated with involving 
societal stakeholders were legitimate but manageable concerns. For 
example, one participant suggested that accountability could be built 
into the research process by stipulating that projects address questions 
of inequality when co-designing and/or co-producing with business 
or other powerful actors (focus group 2); another proposed that political 
co-option could be avoided by ensuring that the academic peer-review 
process would be undertaken by rigorous and sceptical ‘top-rate’ 
scientists (interview 8).
Some committee members noted that the ambiguity between these 
different understandings of co-design and co-production (and the 
different levels of commitment to requiring them as mandatory elements 
of any affiliated project) was potentially problematic. Several participants 
suggested that it would be necessary to develop common understand-
ings of these concepts and common ground rules, principles, processes 
Leviathan and the hybrid network 123
and practices in order to implement them and guard against conflict 
of interest and other threats. Others still stressed that there would 
probably always be multiple interpretations of these terms.
This latter view seems to strongly correlate with the hybrid-network/
rich-tapestry model of FE, and raises the question of whether FE’s 
institutional structure and accreditation/affiliation processes will be 
open and flexible enough to enable such multiple meanings and 
practices. Defined rules and shared understandings (temporary stabilisa-
tion) might be needed to avoid some of the tensions identified (such 
as conflict of interest, and ensuring that marginalised groups are 
considered when deciding with whom to co-produce) or to actually 
get something done (at least in a particular way, whether towards 
utility, democratisation, both or neither). However, any such rules or 
understandings may need to be settled and resettled as the initiative 
evolves – what one participant called an iterative ‘learning process’ 
(focus group 2).
So, where do these many differences, ambiguities and tensions leave 
us? Is FE best viewed as a leviathan, or a hybrid, or something else?
Living with ambiguity
The argument for FE as a leviathan might consider its emphasis on 
a new ‘social contract’ for science and society; the (potential) boundary 
building around what constitutes FE activities and knowledge; the 
singular nomenclature of ‘Future Earth’ (as opposed to, for example, 
‘Earth’s Futures’, or other plural alternatives); and the centralised, global 
coordination of the initiative. The argument for FE as a hybrid network 
might consider it as a boundary organisation (e.g. Miller, 2001) in its 
work to span science and politics; the (albeit initially imperfect (Padma, 
2014)) regional distribution of the global secretariat hubs, regional 
centres, national committees and international projects, and the 
diversity of its global committee members; and its efforts towards 
inclusivity, such as the recent launch of the Open Network. Centralised 
documents and processes can be blunt instruments as they condense 
a broad range of views towards consensus or settlement, but perhaps 
it is unfair to look only at those instances of crystallisation in FE’s 
development, when many other actors, knowledges, practices and 
phenomena operate within and around what some label ‘Future Earth’.
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For now it seems that there is something of both models in FE, 
depending on which lens is chosen, and perhaps it will continue to 
be an ambiguous double hybrid. However, analytically, it may be more 
useful to see FE as a continuously evolving network, assemblage or 
configuration – and part of bigger, broader networks – than as a 
rational, bounded entity (Pallett and Chilvers, 2015). It is then easier 
to take into account its multilayered development and iterations across 
different contexts, shaped by and shaping different actors, objects, 
cultures and practices; perhaps this view also opens up the possibility 
of taking a place within and/or shaping this initiative ourselves.
While FE faces many of the well-documented challenges of co-design, 
co-production and transdisciplinarity – and more, owing to the scale 
of its ambition – the various ambiguities that emerge in thinking, 
talking about and practicing FE, and what co-design and co-production 
might mean within it, are not necessarily problematic. They are 
inevitable and even necessary. They could keep FE, and especially 
co-production, alive.
Ambiguity can be seen as flexibility and openness, making space 
for conversation and the negotiation of meaning (Nerlich and Clarke, 
2001). This is particularly the case when FE is imagined as an ongoing 
experiment, which may never reach a conclusion about how this type 
of work ‘should’ be done – indeed, in which such conclusions would 
be undesirable as they would close down the potential to adapt to 
new circumstances, contexts and actors. FE is part of broader systems, 
networks and ‘ecologies of participation’, rather than a dislocated, 
self-contained institution or event to be evaluated for its successes 
and failures against rigid pre-given standards or norms (Chilvers and 
Kearnes, 2016; Irwin, 2006). The notion that FE is stepping into the 
unknown and ‘feeling the way’, and that co-production is something 
that can only be worked out in practice (at ‘field level’) in specific 
projects and contexts, has been acknowledged by various FE actors, 
whether seeing co-production as a ‘messy social experiment’ (Turney, 
2014), or thinking about a White Paper on engagement as ‘a testable 
hypothesis’ (interview 9).
From this perspective, FE should be treated with care and analytical 
generosity. Although its challenges and limitations should be acknowl-
edged, it is also constructive to recognise that, during this study at 
least, FE had already introduced changes in comparison with the 
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existing GEC programmes. Simply starting conversations about why 
and how to co-produce research has the potential to introduce 
unfamiliar questions and perhaps reflexivity to existing projects, and 
institutional developments – such as the introduction of an engagement 
committee in addition to the standard scientific committee, and 
thematic rather than disciplinary organisation of research communities 
– have the potential to effect further change to well-established social 
and epistemic orders:
I mean, one really good thing is even having discussions about [power 
relations], because in somewhere like the IGBP Science Committee I 
can assure you the notion of talking about power would never have 
come up [laughs]. (Interview 9)
Perhaps it is productive to ask how FE can maintain experimentality 
while also putting policy and structures in place. How can it – and 
similar programmes – achieve a balance between bringing itself into 
being and allowing space for development, new and multiple perspec-
tives, and bottom-up initiative? (How) can intangible processes and 
outcomes of research be valued in a culture of solutions orientation, 
policy relevance, and increasing quantification and audit (Strathern, 
2000)? How can tensions between openness and closure be negotiated?
Other scholars have suggested that humility, institutional reflexivity 
and organisational learning are key to ensuring ongoing space for 
plurality, flexibility, diversity and capacity building (Beck et al., 2014; 
Felt and Wynne, 2007; Jasanoff, 2003; Pallett and Chilvers, 2015). 
There are indications that FE aspires to achieve this type of practice, 
whether through a reflexive form of co-production, through monitoring 
and evaluating its own processes and outcomes, or in acknowledging 
that FE is an ongoing learning process. Future research could (carefully 
and generously) explore to what extent – and how – FE is managing 
to achieve this within and beyond its ever-expanding and complex 
structure and networks.
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7‘Opening up’ energy transitions research  
for development
Alison Mohr
The term ‘energy transition’ has gained increasing traction internation-
ally in research and policy communities seeking tools and concepts 
to study and explain the transformation to more sustainable energy 
systems. A significant limitation of the energy transitions literature 
is that much of it relates to the experiences of industrialised countries 
in the global North attempting to transition to sustainable energy 
futures. Yet there is also an urgent need to understand the potential 
nature of emergent transitions in the industrialising countries of the 
global South where energy is inextricably linked to development, but 
also where decarbonising the energy system may not be the core or 
most pressing objective. This prompts the question of how well transi-
tions concepts and frameworks, shaped largely by the experience of 
research based in industrialised countries, translate when applied in 
developing contexts. In this respect, transitions are relatively unchar-
tered territories that hide numerous monsters, not least in the contested 
nature of the term itself. Understandings and expectations of energy 
transitions may differ across the North–South divide; thus, how 
transition is framed and by whom will have material implications for 
livelihoods, raising the spectre of social justice and other monsters 
in energy transitions research for development.
This chapter is concerned with opening up research, specifically 
the case of global-North-led research on sustainable energy transitions 
in the global South, to examine underlying assumptions, blind spots 
and gaps, but also to identify alternative ways of doing transitions 
research that are more responsive to the public and social priorities 
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of the transitioning communities. Alternative or competing priorities 
for transitions research are best detected through a process of co-design; 
in this case the co-design of community energy systems on the basis 
of bottom-up iterative public and community engagement, as one of 
these alternative ways of doing transitions research. Making transitions 
research ‘open’ from the bottom up presupposes the embedding of 
democratic values such as inclusiveness and social justice.
I will explore how attempts to open up transitions research through 
a process of co-design can facilitate or impede values of inclusiveness 
and social justice by drawing on the experience of the ongoing Solar 
Nano-Grids (SONG) project, which aims to explore ways of co-
designing small-scale off-grid energy systems in rural Kenya and 
Bangladesh through community engagement. The SONG project 
emerged as a response to the perceived shortcomings in these countries 
of solar-home-systems (SHS) installations that provide individual 
households only with electricity for lighting and small appliances. 
While households undoubtedly gain developmental benefits from 
access to SHS, the degree to which they address the poverty of 
household members and their ability to generate an income is far less 
clear. In response, SONG systems aim to provide additional collective 
community benefits by the provision of excess energy for small-scale 
economic activities using, for example, posho (maize meal) mills and 
egg incubators.
SONG is an expressly transdisciplinary project that brings together 
social scientists, engineers and not-for-profit renewable-energy 
organisations engaged in the co-design of all aspects of the energy-
transitions research, from community engagement and implementation 
through to monitoring and evaluation. The role of social science in 
SONG is distinct in a number of ways. By research, I mean social 
science as well as engineering research. Many of the chapters in this 
book are about research understood as ‘scientific research’, which social 
scientists are critically investigating from the outside, or post hoc (of 
which ELSI, research on ethical, legal and social implications, that 
arose as an extramural research programme to the Human Genome 
project, is a prime example). In SONG, social scientists are engaged 
in problem solving, not just problematising from afar, and are actively 
involved in the design, implementation and redesign of socio-technical 
systems.
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SONG’s approach to energy transitions research is novel in that it 
is taking transitions theory, and in particular the concept of niche 
experimentation, and applying it in practice to community niches in 
Kenya and Bangladesh to facilitate energy transitions. But the applica-
tion of transitions concepts and tools in developing contexts is not 
without its practical challenges. What are the limits of research 
frameworks for energy transitions when they are transferred from 
the global North to the global South? How does co-design of energy-
transitions research actually work in practice? Who and what does it 
need to take into account?
The chapter proceeds with a brief introduction to the transitions 
literature through the lens of its principal theoretical frameworks. It 
outlines key concepts and identifies notable limitations, including the 
limited but emerging application of transitions research in developing 
contexts. Taking the position that the absent or naive conceptualisations 
of the dominant frameworks stem from the neglect of issues of distribu-
tive and procedural justice, the remaining sections show how the 
co-design of the SONG project was fundamental to addressing these 
justice deficits. The chapter concludes by reflecting on implications 
for energy transitions research arising from applying justice principles 
in practice.
Limitations of transitions research frameworks  
and concepts
The term ‘transition’ emerged from a body of literature on socio-
technical transitions (Geels, 2005; Geels and Schot, 2007) that refers to 
system-wide changes involving the complex reconfigurations of tech-
nology, policy, markets, material infrastructure, scientific knowledge, 
and social and cultural practices over time towards more sustainable 
systems, in areas such as energy (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013). Systems-
level innovations occur through ‘the interplay of dynamics at multiple 
levels’ (Geels, 2005: 368). A micro-level niche is nested within and 
interacts with a patchwork of meso-level regimes and macro-level 
landscape developments to form a socio-technical system. The core 
notion of this multi-level perspective framework is that the increasing 
traction of niche innovations from below and pressure exerted from 
above by changes in external factors at the landscape level serve to 
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destabilise the extant socio-technical regime, thus creating opportunities 
for niche innovations to become systemically embedded.
Of particular relevance to the focus of this chapter on the community 
niche as an innovation space for the development of off-grid energy 
systems is strategic niche management, a subcategory of the multi-level 
perspective. A niche refers to a protected space or ‘incubation room’ 
(Geels and Schot, 2007) at the micro level, where ‘radical innovations’ 
(Geels, 2011) are nurtured away from the normal pressures of market 
forces and technical performance to enable essential learning to take 
place (Smith et al., 2014). The niche performs an important function 
in propagating transformative innovations and providing a footing for 
their future establishment in the dominant socio-technical regime. 
A key aspect of the strategic-niche management framework is that it 
directs attention to the co-evolution of stakeholders’ visions of particular 
innovation-enabled futures, the learning gained from experiment-
ing in everyday settings and the societal embedding of new socio-
technical practices relevant to that particular innovation (Ockwell and 
Byrne, 2015).
The design and implementation of socio-technical transitions 
projects, however, have too often been narrowly framed as linear, 
top-down processes driven by the techno-economic priorities of 
implementers that limit the ability to provide just and equitable solu-
tions responsive to the priorities of the communities in transition. 
This has led to an increasing recognition of the need to address the 
justice deficits of transitions processes. The following paragraphs 
identify two prominent deficits in the socio-technical transitions 
literature – a lack of consideration of the politics of framing and of 
socio-spatial relations and dynamics – that must be attended to if 
transitions are to evolve beyond their apolitical and technocratic origins 
to become more socially just (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012).
Politics of framing
The act of transitioning from one socio-technical system to another 
is inherently political, yet existing analyses do not adequately address 
the politics of transitions (Lehtonen and Kern, 2009; Meadowcroft, 
2009; Smith and Stirling, 2007). Alongside theories about the multi-level 
dynamics of system innovations, socio-technical transitions research 
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has developed prescriptive formulations for the management of 
transitions towards more sustainable ends. Such forms of transitions 
management have traditionally been led by policy and stakeholder 
elites, who have been criticised for their tendency toward techno-
economic determinism and their lack of critical reflexivity regarding 
who participates in, and the politics of, transitions by management 
(Lawhon and Murphy, 2011). Reflexive questions such as ‘Whose 
transitions?’ and ‘A transition from what to where?’ aim to reveal the 
politics of whose priorities should steer the transitions agenda.
In any particular energy transition, the matter of who gets to define 
what transition means will have a direct bearing over the outcomes 
of the transition. Is it a transition from traditional to modern sources 
of energy, or from centralised to distributed energy systems and 
governance (or vice versa), or from no or low access to energy to 
secure and reliable access? For energy-impoverished rural communities 
in developing countries a transition may not be about renewable energy 
but rather the more fundamental issue of access to energy, whatever 
its source. A key point is that it depends on who is allowed to define 
the agenda. So the issue of whether a particular transition should aim 
to mitigate energy poverty, broadly speaking, or to increase access to 
energy, or even to reduce carbon emissions, is essentially an issue of 
the politics of framing and the radically different political understand-
ings and actions that underpin these claims. How a transition is framed, 
and by whom, may have material implications for those whose liveli-
hoods will be improved or impoverished.
In an attempt to open up the politics of transitions, Stirling (2014) 
draws a stark distinction between singular linear transitions driven 
by technological innovation and progressive transformations involving 
social as well as technological innovations shaped by a plurality of 
values and visions. Stirling argues persuasively that truly transformative 
and sustainable systemic change emerges out of the collective, bottom-
up, socio-culturally embedded energy knowledge and practices of 
those in transition.
Socio-spatial relations and dynamics
The socio-technical transitions literature is also notable for a relative 
absence of reflection about the specific spatial contexts and conditions 
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in which empirical case studies are situated, not least from a comparative 
perspective. Coenen et al. (2012: 969) claim that socio-technical 
transitions processes are characterised by ‘missing or naïve concep-
tualisations of space’, and that such ‘analyses have overlooked where 
transitions take place, and the socio-spatial relations and dynamics 
within which transitions evolve’. A lack of sensitivity to specific socio-
spatial dynamics of transitions means that the intrinsic diversity arising 
from the variety of local, social, cultural and institutional conditions, 
and stakeholder priorities and resources across those spaces has not 
been adequately acknowledged or taken into consideration. Coenen 
et al. make the point that transitions researchers would do well to 
take a closer look at the spatial unevenness and inequalities of transition 
processes whether it be from the perspective of global research and 
policy networks or of local community niches.
Recently, transitions scholars have begun to address the lack of 
attention to the role of space (see Raven et al., 2012; Smith et al., 
2010) by paying particular attention to the places in which niches are 
created, their organisation and scale of production, and how these 
places are shaped by relations between and among key stakeholders. 
Attention to space and scale is vital, given their potential importance 
when analysing energy transitions that span local and global contexts, 
such as the creation of global networks in which poorer parts of the 
global South provide resources for the energy ambitions of the richer 
North (van der Horst and Vermeylen, 2011), or where, in a globalised 
market for limited resources, they face the adverse knock-on effects 
of global-North investments in energy production (Raman and Mohr, 
2013). Geels (2010), too, recognises the theoretical limitations of the 
existing literature for dealing with the additional complexities of 
emergent or future sustainability transitions, including the uncertainty 
involved in anticipating their potential impacts across time and space.
In this chapter, the off-grid nature of SONG systems necessitates 
a specific local perspective of the socio-spatial dynamics of community-
energy-transitions niches rather than the local global perspective of 
niche development trajectories used by Geels and Raven (2006) in 
the multi-level perspective to describe how local niche experiments 
can be scaled up as cumulative local outcomes reveal generic lessons 
and rules for widespread adoption. While recognising that the local 
is always situated in broader networks that operate at different scales 
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and that a purely local-scale transition analysis risks ignoring the fact 
that localised activities and resources are subject to external pressures, 
a broad local–global perspective is beyond the scope of this current 
chapter.
Bridging the justice divide in North–South  
energy transitions research
The socio-technical transitions approach has in recent years begun 
to be applied in developing countries. A special edition of Environmental 
Science and Policy introduced by Berkhout et al. (2010) applied these 
ideas to developing Asia, to see what they revealed about the wider 
impacts of socio-technical innovations developed via niche experiments. 
A similar case study on technology innovation and transfer focuses 
on China (Wang and Watson 2010). Work on energy transitions in 
sub-Saharan Africa is limited, but researchers from the University of 
Sussex have published a number of studies focusing on SHS in Kenya. 
Byrne (2011) has shown how attempts to replicate the success of a 
Kenyan SHS initiative in neighbouring Tanzania failed as insufficient 
attention was paid to the specificities of the local context. A subsequent 
related study by Byrne et al. (2014) further demonstrates that context 
matters, as innovation processes are shaped as much by political, 
social and environmental forces as by powerful economic and insti-
tutional interests. Being aware of context is therefore critical for the 
replication of transitions initiatives across neighbouring territorial 
borders. Moreover, given its limited application in developing countries, 
it is reasonable to question the relevance of the literature framed by 
research agendas in the global North to the direct insertion of the 
findings into global South contexts. Assumptions underpinning global 
North research agendas, including those about universal access to 
electricity, the nature and pace of change between energy systems, 
and the priorities for systemic change, might not directly translate in 
developing contexts.
The absence of attention to the political and socio-spatial dimensions 
within the dominant frameworks for conceptualising sustainable-energy 
transitions may stem from a neglect of issues of distributive and 
procedural justice. Eames and Hunt (2013: 47) reason that ‘Given the 
fundamental role that energy and energy technologies play in 
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restructuring socio-economic and socio-ecological relations it is perhaps 
surprising that greater attention has not previously been paid to 
exploring the equity and justice implications of energy systems transi-
tions.’ When researchers from the global North intervene in sustainable-
energy transitions for socio-economic development and improving 
livelihoods in energy-impoverished rural communities in the global 
South, questions of equity and justice take on a more critical edge. 
But is providing universal access to clean, affordable and reliable energy 
enough to resolve injustices in energy systems transitions? Pulido 
(1996) suggests that changes to power relations, cultural practices 
and systems of meaning are also required, beyond mere (socio-)
economic restructuring and redistribution. This hints at the inadequacy 
of principles of distributive justice by themselves to acknowledge and 
address the range of valid issues of justice. A contemporary of Pulido, 
Lake (1996) agrees that it is impossible to have thorough distributive 
justice without justice in the procedures for producing that 
distribution.
In North–South collaborations it is imperative, therefore, that the 
key justice deficits of the dominant theoretical frameworks in relation 
to both the distributive and procedural dimensions of transitions 
research and practice should be addressed. Drawing on Schlosberg’s 
(2007) work on defining what environmental justice means, this chapter 
proceeds with the argument that the theory and practice of justice 
necessarily include distributive justice (to address socio-spatial inequali-
ties), but must also embrace notions of justice based in a recognition 
of differences and broad participation in the politics of transitions in 
the form of procedural opportunities. Accordingly, distributive justice 
refers to how the spatio-temporal distribution of risks and benefits 
is felt across social groups and communities and within and across 
generations, while procedural justice relates to who is granted both 
access to and participation in decision-making processes, as well as 
whose and what knowledge, interests and values are afforded recogni-
tion in such processes (Schlosberg, 2007).
Drawing on the specific case of SONG systems implementation for 
socio-economic development and livelihoods enhancement in two 
community niches – Lemolo B and Echareria – in Nakuru County, 
Kenya, the sections below detail instances where principles of distribu-
tive and procedural justice were applied in practice to inform the 
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co-design of energy transitions in these communities. It is important 
to note, as observed by Lake (1996), that principles of distributive 
and procedural justice are mutually interdependent.
The co-design of just energy transitions in Kenya
Distributively just transitions
Fundamentally, a just transition requires attention to how the socio-
spatial organisation of community niches affects community cohesion 
and the capacity of individuals to decide on a common energy future. 
To this end, the SONG project aimed to alleviate existing socio-spatial 
inequalities and prevent new ones, driven by factors such as age, 
gender, ethnicity and income, through an inclusive process of 
co-design.
The highly dispersed nature of the dwellings in the two villages 
selected by the Kenyan partner necessitated a redesign of the nano-grid 
systems to enable the distribution of power by portable batteries rather 
than lines, to accommodate the long distances between the solar array 
and central charging hub and individual dwellings. Redesigning the 
system this way meant that access was not limited to just those few 
households in a required radius, but also meant that the siting of the 
solar array was determined more by what would be a suitably secure 
and accessible location for the whole community than by who would 
benefit most from having the array sited nearby. Such decisions are 
highly political, even within a relatively small community niche. In 
the case of Echareria, the village consists of three spatially, socio-
economically and tribally disparate settlements of internally displaced 
people. The settlements correspond to waves of intercommunal conflict 
linked to electoral violence. The first settlement was established in 
1992, and households were given large blocks of land at the bottom 
of a hill, while the second and third settlements were established in 
2001 and 2007–2008, respectively, and located progressively up the 
hill on decreasingly smaller blocks of land. The SONG project team, 
sensitive to the socio-economic and cultural asymmetries in the 
community, was therefore mindful not to create or exacerbate any 
tensions between these different groups by ensuring that physical and 
financial access to the system was as equitable as possible.
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Women and children tend to be disproportionately affected by 
adverse health and environmental impacts caused by toxic smoke 
and fumes from ‘unclean’ energy as energy-related air pollution 
occurs mainly in and around households, particularly in develop-
ing countries. The major energy sources in both communities were 
kerosene for lighting and wood for cooking and heating. Replacing 
kerosene with solar electricity for lighting will improve air quality 
and help to reduce eye and respiratory infections, which are listed 
among the top ten diseases at the health clinic located nearest to 
Lemolo B. While electric cookers are beyond the load capacity of 
the SONG system, the women and children of the two communities 
stand to benefit from the transition to solar electricity in other ways, 
including improved educational achievement of children relative to 
those from non-electrified households; enhanced livelihood oppor-
tunities for women, leading to their improved economic status and 
self-reliance; and increased leisure time. Such claims support the point 
of Smith et al. (2010) that sustainable-energy transitions are more 
about distributed social mobilisation than technological innovation. 
Attention to differences across the full spectrum of intragenerational 
relationships to energy in the community niche is therefore important 
so that any concerns about distributive justice might be investigated 
within this ‘  “[micro]geography” of beneficiaries and risk-bearers’ 
(Eames and Hunt, 2013: 58).
Finally, the anticipated human and environmental harms to future 
generations caused by anthropogenic climate change are widely 
acknowledged and debated in the climate justice literature (Okereke, 
2010). Yet the intergenerational injustices, or opportunities, arising 
from sustainable-energy transitions are less well studied but equally 
deserving of attention, particularly as today’s youth and subsequent 
generations will bear the consequences of transitions already underway. 
The aspirations of youth and future generations in terms of the role 
of energy in socio-economic development and livelihoods enhancement 
are likely to differ substantially from those held by their parents or 
village elders. This justice dilemma highlights the difficulty of taking 
future generations into account in current transitions, while also raising 
questions about what are the best research processes to use to deliver 
procedural justice.
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Newell and Mulvaney (2013) make the related point that, to avoid 
reproducing or exacerbating existing intra- and intergenerational 
environmental inequalities in terms of exposure to ill health and 
localised degradation linked to global environmental threats, as 
discussed above, transitions also need to be environmentally just.
Procedurally just transitions
If communities provide a direct source of information on the effects 
of transitions on their social relations, cultural practices and livelihoods 
(and vice versa), how can transitions research be procedurally just if 
participation is contingent solely on the basis of having socio-technical 
expertise? Drawing parallels with Scharpf ’s (1999) thesis that demo-
cratic legitimacy refers to both the inputs and the outputs of a political 
system and that the two dimensions are mutually reinforcing, it can 
be assumed that the absence of attention to principles of justice in 
transitions would limit the public value of such processes. Thus, for 
any profound and lasting system change to occur, it is vital for 
households and communities to become co-designers and co-producers 
of their own energy transformation. By making little or no provision 
for communities to become informed about and included in the process 
of transitions research, implementation and governance, transformative 
change is impeded. Merely implementing transitions research agendas 
in the interest of the public good is not enough; the extent to which 
the justice dimensions of transitions research are recognised and 
attended to will have a direct bearing on its effectiveness in terms of 
creating public value for the communities involved.
A major limitation of previous SHS implementation in Kenya by 
development agencies and researchers has been a lack of routine 
engagement with project communities about their socio-economic 
priorities and aspirations, and the role of energy in achieving these. 
Where this has been the case, the public value of transitions research 
was not co-produced, rather it was imposed in a top-down fashion 
and the views of those who were to use the services were not adequately 
taken into account. Legitimate public value requires service providers 
to be more responsive to the needs of service users. The SONG project 
aimed to remedy this oversight by using the communities’ views and 
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values to inform the goals of the research and the design of the solar-
energy systems. To this end, the project team recognised the need for 
more direct and innovative opportunities for the two communities 
to participate in the script of community energy services and technolo-
gies. Transitioning communities should not only receive the energy 
services they need, but also play a role as co-designers in the shaping 
and delivery of those services.
This challenge is influencing the way the SONG project is approach-
ing the design and implementation of the SONG systems, with an 
emphasis on mutual learning and iterative development and deploy-
ment. To engage the transitioning communities in the co-design of 
their own energy futures, the project team embarked upon an in-depth 
community-engagement process with the twin aims of assessing the 
energy needs and aspirations at the level of the household, and assessing 
the socio-economic priorities and aspirations of the wider community. 
We adopted a mixed-methods approach to inform the design and 
development of SONG systems tailored to the particular contexts of 
each of the communities, including: a physical survey to map the 
spatial distribution of households, existing services, natural resources 
and proximity to external services; a household survey to identify the 
socio-demographic make-up of each and their livelihoods, the range, 
cost, and purpose of fuels and appliances currently used and expenditure 
on each; and semi-structured interviews with county- and national-level 
stakeholders to understand the broader socio-political barriers to and 
opportunities for electricity access for rural communities. The combined 
findings and continuity of contact helped us to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the local niche contexts and to identify key issues 
for in-depth exploration in subsequent focus groups.
When considering how to structure our focus groups we were 
mindful of the potential distributive intra- and intergenerational 
injustices in each of our communities, as discussed above. But intra- and 
intergenerational justices also have a procedural dimension. We 
accordingly organised our focus groups into three broadly representative 
social groups – elders, women and youth – with the assumption that 
each broad category would have a different relationship to energy 
provision and use and therefore differing expectations of transition 
based on (among other things) their status, gender and age. For 
clarification, the gender balance among the elders was heavily biased 
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towards men, while the gender split among the youth, defined in 
Kenya as between the ages of 18 and 30, was only slightly biased 
towards men.
A transition to a sustainable future and the deep structural changes 
that it entails places responsibility on communities to work coopera-
tively and inclusively to make decisions. However, this expectation 
may place a burden on communities if they lack cohesion. As Fuller 
and Bulkeley (2013: 68) note, ‘area-based communities do not imme-
diately imply the ready existence of a “community”, there may be 
multiple overlapping communities of interest’. The notion of a com-
munity is a relatively recent and somewhat artificial construct in the 
case of Echareria, which consists of sequential settlements of internally 
displaced people from different tribal groups and with decreasing 
socio-economic means. Thus, enacting a sustainable-energy transition 
in this community niche not only raises critical issues of distributive 
justice in terms of the ways in which risks and benefits are allocated, 
but equally critical issues of procedural justice, depending on whether 
the transition can address more fundamental issues of inequality in 
terms of members’ recognition and participation in community decision 
making. Including the knowledge, interests and values of participants 
from all three settlements was vital to achieving a balanced set of 
views in the household survey and focus groups.
Issues of distributive and procedural justice in North–South 
energy transitions collaborations do not cease to be important upon 
the physical implementation of the transformative technology. Pulido 
(1996) claims that injustices cannot be resolved solely through (socio-)
economic restructuring or redistribution, but also require changes to 
existing social relations, cultural practices and systems of meanings. 
This still holds if energy transitions are to be truly transformative. In 
Kenya, the SONG team witnessed first-hand the continuing control 
and maintenance of one mini-grid system by its project implementers, 
who are based in the global North. This approach to governing is the 
antithesis of a just transition. The SONG project has taken the opposite 
route. It has worked with existing leaders and governance structures 
to facilitate the setting up of broadly inclusive and formally constituted 
village energy committees (VECs) in each of the communities. The 
role of the VECs is in part to ensure the project has a social value to 
the community as a whole by running a number of small enterprises 
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such as egg incubators or posho mills, where the income is used to 
further expand the range of community services, to support individual 
entrepreneurialism or to extend to poorer members of the community 
access to energy services. The VECs will also have the responsibility 
to implement maintenance and repair training programmes for local 
youth for the better management of the systems over their lifetime.
Conclusions
This chapter was concerned with opening up global-North-led research 
on sustainable-energy transitions in global South contexts to examine 
the underlying assumptions, blind spots and limitations, in an attempt 
to identify alternative ways of doing transitions research that are more 
responsive to the priorities of the transitioning communities. As an 
example of one of these alternative ways of doing transitions research, 
the SONG project aims to generate sustainable-energy solutions and 
transformative change in two Kenyan communities through the co-
design of socio-technical systems on the basis of bottom-up iterative 
community engagement and the integration of social-science and 
engineering research. The SONG project’s ambition is novel in that 
it has taken the theoretical concept of niche experimentation and 
applied it in practice to establish community innovation niches to 
facilitate energy transitions.
A review of the socio-technical transitions literature, predominantly 
focused on the experiences of industrialised countries in the global 
North, identified a number of conceptual limitations that can be broadly 
construed as a neglect of issues of distributive and procedural justice 
that limit the ability of transitions research and its implementation 
to provide just and equitable solutions for transitioning communities 
in the global South. Addressing two prominent justice deficits among 
these – a lack of consideration of the politics of framing and of the 
socio-spatial relations and dynamics – was considered fundamental 
to achieving socially just energy transitions in the specific contexts 
of the community niches in Kenya. The co-design of the SONG project 
can thus be seen as a response to the limitations and justice deficits 
of the dominant transitions frameworks.
Attention to the principles of distributive justice related to socio-
spatial relations and dynamics in the two community niches was 
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important to ensure that inequalities driven by age, gender, ethnic-
ity and income were alleviated and not exacerbated by the SONG 
project. Issues of intra- and intergenerational justice, while absent 
in transition frameworks, were nonetheless important in the SONG 
project for drawing attention to the vital roles of gender and age in 
co-designing socio-technical systems that are responsive to different 
intra- and intergenerational priorities and aspirations, while promoting 
the equitable distribution of potential benefits and risks across space 
and time.
The lens of procedural justice spotlighted the heightened politics of 
transitions in the global South, and reminded the SONG project team 
of the need for opportunities that are both inclusive and interactive 
so that community members can participate in the script of their 
own community energy services, be co-designers in the shaping and 
delivery of those services, and thus be the co-producers of their own 
energy transitions. The case of Echareria has shown the need to take 
into account the political issue of community non-cohesion, to prevent 
the reproduction or exacerbation of any tensions between different 
social groups and to enhance the community’s capacity to decide on a 
common energy future. If energy transitions for development are to be 
truly transformative and just, then they must incorporate opportunities 
for the community to develop local governance processes and capac-
ity building that are respectful of existing hierarchical governance 
structures, but extend participation beyond them, to ensure the effective 
and inclusive management of transitions to sustainable energy futures.
In conclusion, this chapter began with the premise that making 
transitions research ‘open’ from the bottom up presupposes the 
embedding of democratic values such as inclusiveness and social 
justice. In practice, however, translating Northern concepts and 
assumptions into global-South contexts highlighted the challenges of 
social justice and spatial positioning that underlie attempts to co-design 
transitions research that spans distinct geographical and socio-cultural 
boundaries.
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8Monstrous regiment versus Monsters Inc.: 
competing imaginaries of science and  
social order in responsible (research  
and) innovation
Stevienna de Saille, Paul Martin
All monsters are undead. Maybe they keep coming back because they 
still have something to say or show us about our world and ourselves. 
Maybe that is the scariest part. (Beal, 2014: 10)
As new technological domains emerge, so too do promises and warnings 
about the future they will bring. However, as technology has grown 
ever more complex, predicting either benefits or risks has become 
increasingly difficult, particularly where a high level of control over 
natural processes is concerned. This can lead to uneasiness on the 
part of both the public and policymakers that scientific information 
alone cannot counter (Douglas, 2015). Moreover, in a time of rapidly 
increasing political and economic uncertainty, the difficulty of separat-
ing science from politics, and business interests from both, only 
exacerbates the public’s concern that necessary precautions may be 
discarded in the rush to open up new markets and find new sources 
of economic growth.
Powerful corporations do indeed succeed in shaping regulations 
to their needs, at times with great cost to public health or the environ-
ment. But potentially useful technologies can also be blocked by a 
public that does not trust those who create and regulate technology 
to hear its concerns. For some technologies these tensions have resulted 
in an intractable, decades-long debate in which each side imagines 
the other as monstrous and rampaging out of control. In this chapter 
we want to open up these ideas, to examine how the concept of 
‘monsters’ functions in entrenched controversy, and ask whether this 
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can be addressed through evolving frameworks for responsible (research 
and) innovation (RI).1
Since the 1980s it has been suggested that greater understanding of 
science (and, later, greater engagement with science) would help provide 
the context necessary for the public to feel confident of the benefits of 
a new technology, as well as mitigating fear of its risks. Historically, 
however, these imperatives to engage the public as a means of gaining 
legitimacy for new technological fields have been accompanied by a 
growing fear of those who wish to engage with science on their own 
terms (Hess, 2014; Marris, 2014; Welsh and Wynne, 2013), in particular 
through direct protest. While considering RI as a more responsible way 
of ‘embedding’ innovation in society (von Schomberg, 2014: 39), it is 
therefore also necessary to consider the ways in which it represents 
a socio-technical imaginary in which progress is achieved through 
enlightened governance of the entire research and innovation system, 
in order to keep under control both potential technological monsters 
and a potentially unruly public response.
According to anthropologist Martijntje Smits (2006), monsters 
embody inseparable but directly opposing characteristics that make 
them both horrifying and fascinating at the same time. Because the 
simultaneous fear and attraction they evoke can never be reconciled, 
monsters are more than mere creatures of the imagination; they are 
deeply rooted in the binaries of modernism – body versus mind, 
nature versus technology, superstition versus science. When we speak 
of monsters in the socio-technical imaginary in this sense, we are 
referring not to the ‘imaginary’ as non-existent, but to a concrete, 
collectively embraced, politically actionable future in which technology 
is expected to bring about certain positive, culturally intelligible 
improvements to the human condition (Jasanoff, 2015; Jasanoff and 
Kim, 2009). These are generally (although not only) framed as large-
scale scientific projects that embody national economic aspirations 
– for example, building a civil nuclear industry or setting out a strategy 
for world leadership in a new scientific field. As socio-technical 
imaginaries are also rooted in the modernist project of social progress 
1 We use RI here to refer generically to discussions around responsible innovation, 
and RRI to refer specifically to its recent formulation by the European Commission 
as part of Horizon 2020, its funding programme for research and innovation.
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through science, arguments for and against these projects also tend 
to be framed through binary opposition, so that science, rationality 
and control wind up juxtaposed against culture, emotion and messy 
nature. Monsters, therefore, can be thought of as signifiers of disorienta-
tion in imaginaries of progress, markers for that which cannot easily 
be assigned to one side of the binary or the other, perhaps cannot 
even be properly categorised at all because they too are unknown, 
like the warnings placed over the uncharted portion of an incomplete 
map. To illustrate these points more clearly in the discussion that 
follows, we will draw upon both the Frankenstein story, as one of the 
original monsters in the socio-technical imaginary of progress through 
science, and more recent metaphors from popular culture, to discuss 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), one of the most intractable 
technological controversies of our time.
While those involved in creating GMOs, particularly multinational 
corporations such as Monsanto, have been characterised as a kind of 
‘Monsters Inc.’, likewise the biotechnology sector has sometimes 
appeared to view the public as a kind of monstrous regiment, an army 
of dissent intent on thwarting the aspirations of a field that seeks only 
to improve upon nature to feed the world (Riley-Smith, 2014). We 
draw the metaphor from the highly successful animated Pixar film 
Monsters, Inc., released by Disney in 2001 (Docter et al., 2001). The 
film turns on the idea that the monsters hiding in our childhood 
closets have a reason for terrifying us every night: power for their 
city, Monstropolis, is derived from human children’s screams. Unfor-
tunately, modern children are not as fearful as they once were, and a 
scream shortage is now threatening the economic security of Monsters 
Inc., the factory which produces the ‘clean energy’ that powers the 
city. The conceit of the story is that the monsters are really just like 
us – worried about jobs, family and social status – and it is human 
children who are monstrous, radioactively toxic creatures who must 
be contained behind their closet doors lest they contaminate the normal 
world. When a human child (Boo) sneaks into the factory on the 
back of her ‘scarer’ (Sulley), her discovery throws the whole city into 
a panic. In solving the problem of getting Boo safely back to her 
world, Sulley has to reconcile his fear of human children with the 
realisation that, as a top scarer, he is the monster in Boo’s eyes. This 
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reconciliation ultimately leads the monsters to discover that children’s 
laughter is a more powerful energy source than screams.
Ultimately, as a children’s film, Monsters, Inc., validates cooperation 
and understanding as leading to better ways of producing what is 
necessary for society to prosper. However, as Tranter and Sharpe (2008: 
305) point out, it is also a parable about fear, both of running out of 
the energy upon which society depends, and – in the character of the 
CEO Waternoose, who is plotting to kidnap human children and 
torture them to produce more efficient screams – of how far some 
corporations may go to secure a profit. The film’s references to clean 
energy and a running joke about the vicious scrubbing to which 
human-contaminated monsters are subjected draw heavily on cultural 
knowledge about the civil nuclear industry, where clean energy cannot 
be separated from the deadly toxicity of the materials used and the 
waste produced, even were accidents never to occur. Boo, therefore, 
functions as both a caution against excessive fear (she is not actually 
toxic), but also as a reminder that technology can have undesirable 
social costs.
Unlike Monsters Inc., the term ‘monstrous regiment’ is several 
centuries old. It originates with a sixteenth-century Protestant reformer 
who coined the phrase to argue against the passage of the Scottish 
Crown to a woman, the Catholic Mary Queen of Scots (Knox, 2011 
[1558]). ‘Regiment’ in this time meant rule, not army. The monstrosity 
in this case was allowing a woman to assume a role that God had 
reserved for men. Terry Pratchett (2003) later used the term more 
literally in a satiric novel about a Balkans-like country engaged in an 
endless war no-one seemed to understand, fought by an army of 
women secretly disguised as men (the actual men having all been 
captured or run away). We use the term both to characterise the 
illusion of an army which does not actually exist and, ‘monstrous 
regiment’ being inherently a gendered term, the practice of ascribing 
stereotypically ‘feminine’ negative traits – such as being irrational, 
emotional and illogical – to those who attempt to oppose regimes of 
power such as science, technology, politics and the market, which are 
still very much the province of the male.
Beginning with an exploration of metaphors as carriers of meaning, 
we will then use the metaphors of Monsters Inc. and the monstrous 
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regiment to consider how certain actors and technologies become 
constructed as monstrous, and how this contributes to the continued 
intractability of some technological debates. We end by asking what 
‘monster theory’ (Smits, 2006) can offer towards a better understanding 
of competing social imaginaries in RI.
Monsters in the imaginary (rather than imaginary monsters)
Metaphors function as condensed, culturally intelligible stories, or 
‘scripts’ (Shank, 1990, quoted in Turney, 2000: 6) that guide meaning 
making towards a prespecified conclusion. Perhaps their most visible 
use in controversy is through symbolic action by social movements, 
in order to illustrate an issue that has been left unspoken (Melucci, 
1985). For example, anti-genetic modification (anti-GM) protesters 
often wear hazmat suits to illustrate the toxicity of pesticides used 
with GM crops. In particular, metaphors are able to carry meaning 
from one context to another (Hellsten, 2006), transferring or extending 
the original script to make a clear statement about how to read 
something new.
Inasmuch as monsters can be defined as an irreconcilable hybrid 
of two opposing cultural categories simultaneously eliciting both fear 
and wonder (Smits, 2006), they do not spring purely from wild 
imagination. Rather, as Smits argues, monsters require grounding in 
a culturally specific context to give them concrete existence. The script 
for Frankenstein is generally interpreted as a reflection of the uneasiness 
with which Mary Shelley and her circle of friends viewed the pace of 
change from agrarian society to industrial modernity, and it is still 
considered a cautionary tale about the capacity of technology to do 
ill as well as good (Botting, 2003; Latour, 2012; Turney, 2000). As 
Turney explains:
It is frightening because it depicts a human enterprise which is out of 
control, and which turns on its creator … [but] the myth is never a 
straightforward anti-science story … the Frankenstein script, in its most 
salient forms, incorporates an ambivalence about science, method and 
motive, which is never resolved. (Turney, 2000: 5)
This ambivalence is also apparent in the public’s tendency to amalgamate 
the scientist, Victor Frankenstein, with the flat-headed monster of 
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Hollywood films. As Smits (2006) argues, the creature’s monstrosity 
is not merely the result of being a crime against nature, as other 
commentators suggest, but rather the internal chaos caused by the 
contradictions of being simultaneously alive and dead, benign and 
lethal, natural and technological. The maker of the creature is equally 
reviled and persecuted as a man seeking the power of granting life, 
which is supposed to belong only to God, but whose horrified abandon-
ment of his creation sets a series of violent events in motion. In other 
words, both the creature and the scientist embody key binaries of 
modern progress which can never be reconciled by calling upon either 
values or science (Smits, 2006: 499). For Shelley, the context was the 
development of electricity and the industrial revolution. Cultural 
theorists have similarly argued that the surge in the prevalence of 
monstrous characters and topics in popular media post-9/11 signifies 
that the monster figure may have now ‘transcended its status as 
metaphor’ to become ‘a necessary condition of our existence in the 
21st century’ as both technology and social relations become ever 
more complex (Levina and Bui, 2013). Zombies, for example, which 
were once slow undead shufflers, are now victims of a virus capable 
of super-fast motion and driven by super-rage,2 perhaps reflecting a 
shift in the locus of public fear from the supernatural to the technologi-
cal, and from mindless violence to directed fury. As in Shelley’s work, 
therefore, monsters continue to reflect unease not only with technology 
per se but with the increasing pace and direction of change. Similarly, 
historical uprisings against the introduction of new technologies, in 
particular the Luddites smashing the first mechanised looms as a 
threat to their jobs and way of life as traditional weavers, are still 
featured in the techno-scientific imaginaries of modernity as ignorant, 
superstitious mobs standing in the way of inevitable progress (see, 
for example, Wood, 1999). They are the pitchfork-wielding villagers 
of the Hollywood version of the Frankenstein story, whose rejection 
sets the creature on its rampage, so that the cultural resonance of the 
monstrous regiment is always anti-progress and anti-science.
These two inherently irreconcilable scripts, that of technology as 
simultaneously the saviour of humanity and a kind of monster factory, 
2 As depicted in a new generation of films such as 28 Days Later (20th Century Fox, 
2002) and World War Z (Paramount Pictures, 2013).
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and the public as simultaneously the eager beneficiary and the irrational 
(yet organised) saboteur of technological progress (Marris, 2014; 
Nowotny, 2014; Welsh and Wynne, 2013) are extremely powerful in 
the debates on GMOs. But is it possible to use the values that RI 
supposedly embodies to directly grapple with – rather than seek to 
bury – the contradictions that are inherent in GM itself?
Monsters and the imaginary of RI
The socio-technical imaginary of RI – in which research and innovation, 
guided by the continual involvement of a technologically literate public, 
result in goods and services that answer society’s needs – has been 
the most recent attempt to answer unease about the risk and pace of 
change. While there is no agreed definition of RI, in general it is 
understood as a means of involving the public in an iterative and 
mutually reflexive process of shaping innovation, from upstream 
research, all the way downstream to its eventual introduction to the 
market and beyond (Owen et al., 2013; von Schomberg, 2013). However, 
it is also in the interests of multinational corporations and growth-eager 
governments to shape public engagement in ways that tend to dismiss, 
defuse and disinvite engagement from the dissenting public (de Saille, 
2015) before opposition can grow strong enough to interfere with the 
commercialisation process; in effect producing a good public for the 
product rather than a product for the public good (Thorpe and Gregory, 
2010). This has also been an irreconcilable contradiction in the 
development of RI.
Lurking deep within the imaginary of RI is the monster of recom-
binant DNA (rDNA), born in the early 1970s to both fanfare and fear, 
not least amongst the scientists, who were worried that public reaction 
to it might curtail their research. If, in this story, rDNA was an infant 
monster, the lullaby that sang it to sleep was the 1975 Asilomar 
Conference on Recombinant DNA, at which genetic scientists, 
accompanied by lawyers, journalists and government officials, agreed 
on a set of restrictions within which they could continue their work 
(Berg, 2008). Acknowledging that there was particular concern about 
rDNA’s potential siblings – viral cloning and bacterial pathogens – 
scientists set about reassuring the public that the process of recombining 
DNA to create organisms not found in nature would only ever be 
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used for good, not harm, and that these could be contained within 
the lab until mature enough to be safely released.
By the early 1980s the field of agricultural GM was slowly being 
made ‘business-friendly’ through deregulation (Stavrianakis, 2012: 
159), and in 1994, with the introduction of the Flavr Savr tomato to 
the US market, rDNA’s children finally began to leave the lab and 
seek their fortune in the world. The Flavr Savr was engineered by 
Calgene to turn off the genes responsible for softening. Ordinary 
tomatoes must be picked and shipped while they are hard and still 
green, and are then chemically ripened with ethylene gas, but these 
could remain firm while they matured on the vine. This improved 
flavour so much that despite being almost twice the price of ordinary 
tomatoes they met with good public demand.3 Ultimately though, 
Calgene was staffed by scientists, not farmers, who did not know how 
to get the tomatoes from the fields to the market in numbers large 
enough to make the business profitable.4 In 1997 the company and 
its patents were acquired by Monsanto, which promptly discontinued 
production of the Flavr Savr, as it had its own tomato under develop-
ment. A paste made from GM tomatoes was launched on the UK 
market in 1996 but withdrawn in 1998 when sales fell sharply after 
a media broadcast claimed that while the modified gene itself was 
not a risk, adverse health effects could still ensue from the GM process 
(Bruening and Lyons, 2000).
According to most of the tellers of this tale, this is when the European 
public, having until then been largely content with Asilomar’s assurance 
that science could be trusted to raise the monster with care, suddenly 
panicked and grabbed their torches and pitchforks with the intention 
of driving GMOs from their shores. Organic farmers’ associations, 
in particular, were increasingly concerned about pollen contamination 
from adjacent GM fields, as this could cause them to lose their certifica-
tion and thus their entire business. In 1998 a leading organic farmer 
in the UK sued for a judicial review of the legality of a maize test site 
adjacent to his own organic maize. He eventually won the case on 
3 One Calgene scientist interviewed twenty years later remembers they were so popular 
in her hometown of Davis, California, that greengrocers had to ration them (for a 
video report, see Winerip, 2013).
4 Again, for a video report see Winerip (2013).
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appeal, but when the GM crop was not ordered to be removed, his 
supporters invaded the field and destroyed the plants before their 
pollen could be released (Reed, 2002). In 2000 a trial jury accepted 
that the destruction was done ‘in order to prevent greater harm’, setting 
a precedent which has meant that for most similar instances since 
then, crop destruction has gone unpunished (Tait, 2009). Activists 
have subsequently destroyed more than eighty fields and test sites in 
Europe alone (Kuntz, 2012), have staged numerous protests across 
the world, and have made both carefully documented and wildly 
inaccurate claims about health and environmental risks, soil depletion, 
threats to bee and butterfly populations, predatory corporate practices, 
and social upheaval caused by adoption of GMOs.
The monstrous regiment, therefore, has certainly engaged in 
behaviour that is reminiscent of pitchforks and torches. In a more 
recent example, Ecover, a company known for its natural products, 
unexpectedly ran into strong resistance when it announced that for 
reasons of sustainability it planned to replace the palm oil in its laundry 
detergent with an oil derived from genetically modified algae (Strom, 
2014). Although initially stating that the company that supplied the 
algal oil was using synthetic biology to produce it, when protest ensued, 
some representatives subsequently tried to argue that synthetic biology 
meant creating a new organism from scratch, whereas they were only 
harnessing the algae’s ‘natural’ fermentation process (Domen and 
Develter, 2014). Ecover, in fact, had been using enzymes created from 
GM bacteria for some time (see Asveld and Stemerding, 2016, for a 
full account), but it is possible that consumers were not aware of this 
before. Neither argument was likely to defuse resistance to the product 
among Ecover’s deep green customers, who could not reconcile the 
idea of scientifically altering an organism to produce something it 
did not normally produce with the term ‘natural’ (Thomas, 2014). A 
boycott was called, after which Ecover withdrew the product and 
announced a period of public consultation. As of the end of 2016, 
any further plans to use algal oil appear to have been shelved.
In terms of the socio-technical imaginary of public engagement in 
innovation through RI, it could be said that this is how RI could and 
should function, in that the incident created an open public debate 
and the company responded to concern about a pathway of innovation 
and changed its trajectory accordingly. However, few on either side 
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would claim to be satisfied with the outcome, particularly as the 
laudably responsible goal of replacing palm oil with a more sustainable 
alternative remains unrealised. Ecover’s experience suggests that the 
difficulties of innovating responsibly are far more complex than simply 
‘engaging’ the public, and that even a company with an ethical reputa-
tion could suddenly find itself seen as Monsters Inc. if it tried to 
smooth away the irreconcilable tensions between the natural and the 
technical that are inherent in genetic engineering.
However, focusing on the irreconcilable tensions of the technology 
itself should not obscure acknowledgement of fear and fascination 
also arising from the context within which a new technology will be 
received. Monsanto, for example, has been extremely successful at 
commercialising GM crops as the solution to feeding a growing world 
population. But it has also been called ‘Monster Monsanto’ because 
of its historic production of Agent Orange, a defoliant used to destroy 
North Vietnamese agriculture during the Vietnam War, which has 
had long-term health effects on both US soldiers (and their descendants) 
and the Vietnamese population (see, for example, Ragonesi, 2004). 
Although Monsanto stopped producing Agent Orange for the military 
in 1969, its website states that it is still ‘responsible’ for the compound 
(Monsanto, 2017), whose broad herbicidal function is similar to its 
signature product, Roundup, which kills all plants except the seeds 
engineered to withstand it. Roundup’s active ingredient, glyphosate, 
has been the subject of intense scientific debate about long-term 
toxicity,5 while Monsanto was also a major producer of polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs) and dioxin, and has been sued repeatedly (and 
occasionally even successfully6) for contamination of dozens of sites 
in the USA alone. Therefore, beyond the ethical questions which have 
often surrounded Monsanto’s particular model of generating profit 
5 The World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) 
has issued a report reclassifying glyphosate as ‘probably’ carcinogenic (IARC, 2016), 
causing some member states to refuse to renew its licence for sale in the European 
Union. The European Food Standards Agency (EFSA) subsequently issued its own 
report finding it not carcinogenic if used as recommended (EFSA, 2015). As of this 
writing, the licence has been temporarily renewed while a third agency reports 
(European Commission, 2016).
6 As one high-profile example, a long-standing lawsuit over clean-up in Anniston, 
Alabama, was finally settled for $700 million (Associated Press, 2003).
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through the stringent enforcement of patents (Barlett and Steele, 2008) 
or by successfully lobbying the US Congress for laws that protect it 
from being sued in the public interest (Godoy, 2013), the company’s 
reputation as a food producer continues to be inseparable from its 
historic reputation and present market leadership as a producer of 
poison. Moreover, from the point of view of the public, the way in 
which Monsanto has pursued the commercialisation of GM can make 
all industrial actors in the field look like Monsters Inc., as well as 
making any application of GM, however useful, seem monstrous – as 
with the term Frankenstein, the creator has been conflated with its 
creation over time.
At the same time, the failure to commercialise Golden Rice, which 
has been hailed as a ‘humanitarian’ GM crop aimed at delivering 
vitamin A to areas which are traditionally malnourished, has been 
blamed on the ‘wicked’ monstrous regiment of anti-GMO activists 
destroying test fields (Riley-Smith, 2014), with some GM proponents 
even circulating images of starving children, captioned ‘Thank you, 
Greenpeace, for saving us from Golden Rice’ (Everding, 2016). Embark-
ing on a campaign of public ‘education’ about GM in the 1980s, the 
chairman of Monsanto similarly said that:
the only thing that will stand in the way of our achieving the full potential 
of our next golden era is that we will be thwarted by a public that doesn’t 
understand science or technology and that doesn’t trust us to use science 
wisely and with appropriate regard for the concerns of the public we 
serve. (Richardson, 1985, quoted in Kleinman and Kloppenburg, 1991)
The above statement resonates with the argument, common in the 
1980s and 1990s, that the public was resistant to new technology 
because there was a ‘deficit’ of scientific understanding. Trust in the 
company and understanding of the science are conflated, so that better 
science communication is assumed to produce trust in the company’s 
agenda, and when this does not happen, it is the public’s ignorance 
that continues to be blamed. Yet some scientists working on the rice 
have insisted that the problems are scientific, not political, and in the 
meantime the Philippines has reduced vitamin A deficiency by methods 
which do not include GMOs (Everding, 2016).
These examples suggest competing imaginaries of social order, one 
in which progress through technology is inevitable and desirable, no 
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matter the cost, and the other in which technology is not always 
benign, nor even always necessary for social progress. As technology 
becomes ever more complex, finding means through which we might 
be able to explore both the fascination and the fear becomes ever 
more crucial, not least to the imaginary of RI.
Monster theory, or bringing the monsters into the open
To return to our metaphors, from the point of view of Monsters Inc., 
the human world (the public) is both potentially toxic and necessary 
to produce the energy (of market acceptance) upon which successful 
innovation depends. In this imaginary the public does not understand 
either science or the importance of Monsters Inc. as a driver of the 
economy, and so is standing in the way of progress and growth. This 
imaginary, however, can also perceive ‘the public’ as more singular 
and unified than it actually is. In the case of rDNA’s great-grandchild, 
synthetic biology, Marris (2014) suggests there is now a kind of 
synbiophobia-phobia, in which an exaggerated fear of a potential 
public backlash informs the drive towards RI. Marris argues that the 
continued assumption that resistance is a product of ignorance has 
meant that, in fact, the ‘inclusive engagement’ elements of RI have 
remained mired in precisely the kind of top-down ‘we talk, you listen’ 
form of scientific communication that RI was meant to overcome. 
Science-studies scholars have long criticised such endeavours, sug-
gesting instead that the public is not a single entity, but is made up 
of many publics with many different sets of values that come into 
play. These publics need to have opportunities for meaningful engage-
ment with scientific topics, which includes the right to introduce 
questions about the social impact of technological change, rather than 
simply being furnished with more scientific information.
In Options for Strengthening Responsible Research and Innovation, 
the European Commission (2013: 14) agrees that the €300 million 
spent on safety research has not been adequate to resolve society’s 
concerns, and laments the lack of a European market for GMOs. In 
this and other key policy documents, RRI is constructed as a way to 
resolve these concerns at an early stage, so as to accelerate the pace 
of innovation without incurring the kind of intractable distrust and 
resistance which has been the case with GMOs. However, key 
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assumptions linking innovation to growth, and both to social progress, 
remain unquestioned, as does the linkage between upstream informa-
tion and downstream trust. As a tool for shaping avenues to facilitate 
meaningful engagement, it is possible that RI’s drive towards openness 
is more likely to produce an artificial closure at the earliest stages of 
the development process, thus re-entrenching old positions, rather 
than ameliorating them, as it is how technology acts in the world – what 
Frankenstein’s creature does after exiting the lab, more than the fact 
of his existence – that matters most in terms of generating trust.
Braidotti (1996: 135) suggests that ‘to signify potentially contradictory 
meanings is precisely what the monster is supposed to do’. In other 
words, it is perhaps not the intractability of polarised positions that 
is the problem, but the reluctance to honestly acknowledge that the 
contradictions cannot be prised apart. Scarers on the factory floor do 
not see themselves as monsters, but rather as the responsible producers 
of a necessary commodity. Likewise, human children are still needed 
for the energy they provide, but this can be produced in a better way 
once it becomes apparent that they are not as monstrous as the residents 
of Monstropolis fear.
In an earlier definition of the term, Law (1991) even goes so far as 
to suggest that ‘socio-technical’ is a monster in and of itself, as the 
social and the technical are generally seen as occupying mutually 
exclusive disciplinary realms. This suggests that ‘society’ exists in 
permanent opposition to science, and indeed much of the polarisation 
in the GM debate is due to a framing that relegates social and ethical 
concerns to the irrational, set in opposition to rational concerns that 
are usually framed as economic.7 In this way, by not continuing to 
acknowledge both the fear and the fascination as legitimate responses, 
corporations engaged in biotechnology are perceived as untrustworthy 
and not interested in what the consumer might really want to purchase 
(such as better-tasting tomatoes), but rather only in advancing the 
interests of industrial agriculture and their own profits (Holland, 2016).
Latour (2012) argues that the dominion and mastery that signify 
progress do not bring freedom from nature, but rather an ever-
deepening attachment to that which is being dominated and mastered. 
7 See, for example, arguments that the ‘green blob’ of environmentalists are acting 
against national economic interests (Riley-Smith, 2014).
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He argues that ‘we use the monster as an all-purpose modifier to denote 
technological crimes against nature’ because, like Victor Frankenstein, 
we are unable to either love our technological creations or accept 
that it is our own actions that turn good creations bad. Plastics, for 
example, were initially hailed as a wonder (Smits, 2006). They became 
monstrous only when it became apparent that they continued to retain 
their cultural shaping (such as bags and bottles) after they became 
waste, causing great damage out of context by, for example, clogging 
up waterways and strangling birds. In other words, RI suggests that we 
must not, like Victor Frankenstein, run away from the technological 
monsters we have created; we must love and socialise and remain 
always responsible to our monsters so we may live with them in peace. 
But loving and taming our monsters may first require that we are able 
to acknowledge that ‘monsters’ is exactly what they are.
Conclusions
RI claims that greater public involvement at the research stage will 
shape innovation towards social benefit, but it has less capacity to 
control what happens when the monsters leave the lab and begin to 
interact with the world. As we cannot separate trust in science from 
trust in the adequate regulation of its marketable technologies, attempts 
to provide more scientific information about monsters which have 
not yet left the lab often produces no difference in acceptability and 
may, in fact, provoke more distrust as the inbuilt tensions between 
claimed social benefit and real-world actions, and between corporate 
risk management and corporate profit, become clear.
For Smits (2006), taming the monster – what she calls the cultural 
domestication of a new technology – is a process of mutual shaping, 
so that the technology opens a new space in the existing social order 
even as the social order tames the technology to fit it. Indeed, not all 
monsters are necessarily the stuff of nightmares – mermaids and satyrs, 
for example, while embodying contradictions, are not nearly as unset-
tling as Frankenstein’s creature or the fast zombie. Considering 
controversial technologies through Smits’s monster theory may reveal 
some of the simultaneous contradictions inherent not only in the 
innovation itself, but in the entire shaping of the innovation system 
towards the production of economic growth even at great social cost.
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Whether the monster enables desirable or undesirable outcomes 
– whether it becomes Sully or Waternoose – will require something 
more than controlled forms of public engagement to provide a context 
in which it can be adequately socialised. RI should not be aimed at 
resolving differences, but rather seeking new forms of openness that 
can accept contradictions and explore the social and the technical as 
intertwined. Instead of leading to intractable polarisation, bringing 
the monsters out of the shadows through RI may help point to more 
useful ways of dealing directly with their potential to turn on their 
creators, thus attempting to productively address larger concerns about 
the overall pace and trajectory of technological change. We have 
suggested that the socio-technical imaginary of RI still contains a fear 
of both Monsters Inc. and the pitchfork-wielding monstrous regiment, 
the truth and exaggeration of which must be brought into the open, 
as part of the landscape in which innovation occurs. Taming, rather 
than hiding, the monster could be key to realising RI’s goal of creating 
a new socio-technical imaginary of governance which enables truly 
socially beneficial research and innovation to emerge.
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The complex relations among publicity, legitimacy and expertise have 
long been central to modern science. From the 1660s onward, Robert 
Boyle and the natural philosophers at the Royal Society legitimated 
their work in part by portraying it as a distinctly public form of 
knowledge production. Employing a rhetoric of transparency, they 
wrote meticulous lab reports in a modest style and performed their 
experiments in public. They produced expert knowledge both in public 
and through the public. But their public was largely restricted to elite 
gentlemen, and they deemed ordinary citizens unqualified and 
untrustworthy (Golinksi, 2005; Shapin, 1994). Moreover, the founding 
of the Royal Society coincided not with a democratic revolution, but 
with the 1660 Restoration of King Charles II.
Today, modern science and democracy are often portrayed as twins, 
but public acceptance of the former actually preceded the latter by at 
least a century (depending on how one defines each). Until the 
nineteenth century, most commentators saw ‘democracy’ as an unstable 
and unwise form of government, preferably restricted to the popular 
branch of systems of ‘mixed government’ that combined democratic, 
aristocratic and monarchical elements (Wood, 1992). Liberal elites 
worried about the corrupting influence of the unwashed masses and 
the ‘tyranny of the majority’. As John Stuart Mill noted in 1859, ‘The 
“people” who exercise the power are not always the same people with 
those over whom it is exercised’ (Mill, 1978 [1859]: 4). The recent 
increase of xenophobic right-wing populism in both Europe and the 
United States lends new urgency to such concerns, including questions 
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regarding the publicity and legitimacy of expert knowledge. What 
aspects of science should be made public and to whom? Will public 
scrutiny of expertise increase or decrease its legitimacy?
The chapters in this part explore such questions in the context of 
specific areas of scientific and political controversy: risk governance, 
biosecurity, climate change, animal research and fisheries management. 
Democratic citizens have often seen scientific experts as uniquely 
qualified to speak for the public and the public interest. Many have 
assumed that science is intrinsically supportive of a wide range of 
public goods: economic growth, technological progress, national 
security, cultural enlightenment, informed decision making and, more 
generally, the public interest itself. But the notion that science has 
intrinsic value no longer seems widely accepted, and so governments 
have sought to increase the perceived public value of science by directly 
involving members of the public in science policy. But public engage-
ment can be messy and unpredictable, and so public officials and 
other elites typically try to constrain it in various ways.
The first two chapters in this part examine government attempts 
to engage publics in risk governance. As the authors point out, public 
officials have usually seen risk assessment as a value-free ‘scientific’ 
stage of knowledge production, and hence as an unlikely venue for 
public involvement. In contrast, they have understood risk management 
as a value-laden policy stage, and hence as appropriate for participation 
by non-experts. In the cases examined here, however, government 
initiatives to engage the public had the effect of expanding the range 
of issues and types of participants in only some respects, while restrict-
ing them in others.
Chapter 10, by Sarah Hartley and Adam Kokotovich, challenges 
the standard view of risk governance by disaggregating the risk-
assessment stage into different components. The authors argue that 
public involvement is necessary whenever regulators make choices 
about values, and they identify a need for value-laden choices in three 
components of risk assessment: risk-assessment guidelines, the process 
of conducting risk assessments and the use of scientific studies within 
risk assessment. This framework allows them to reveal significant 
implications of the much-discussed 1983 and 1996 reports on risk by 
the US National Research Council. The first report, the famous ‘Red 
Book’, distinguished sharply between risk assessment and risk 
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management, and it did not advocate public involvement in risk 
assessment. The 1996 report, in contrast, called for involving stakehold-
ers in an ‘analytic-deliberative model’. From a public engagement 
perspective, the second report has widely been seen as an improvement. 
But Hartley and Kokotovich argue that the 1983 report actually more 
fully departs from the traditional image of value-free science by 
highlighting the role of policy ‘judgments’ in risk assessment. The 
1996 report, in contrast, asserts a distinction between value-free expert 
analysis and value-laden public deliberation. Although the 1996 report 
expanded opportunities for public engagement, it returned to an 
outdated view of science as value-free. It thus created new opportunities 
for public deliberation, while simultaneously constraining its allowable 
topics. Hartley and Kokotovich then turn to the Codex, an organisation 
that sets international food-safety standards. They show how regulators 
failed to address the implicit values in risk assessment, leading to a 
highly constrained role for public involvement. Overall they show 
that, as regulatory science has become increasingly open to public 
involvement, risk-governance procedures have reduced their acknowl-
edgement of values in risk assessment. They conclude by making a 
nuanced case for public involvement in value-based decisions with 
regard to specific aspects of risk assessment.
In chapter 11, Judith Tsouvalis examines the UK’s emergency 
response to a deadly fungal disease affecting ash trees, known as 
Chalara or ash dieback, which gradually spread across Europe during 
the 1990s and early 2000s. When it reached the UK in 2012, scientists 
knew little about the disease, and some of what they knew turned 
out to be wrong. Its arrival thus created an urgent need for government 
action in the face of scientific uncertainty, leading to an opening of 
scientific and public discussion through open-source platforms for 
sharing data and various kinds of citizen science. Tsouvalis shows 
that these efforts, despite using the language of public engagement, 
were framed technocratically as narrow matters of ‘biosecurity’. A 
sense of national urgency was fuelled by apocalyptic media images 
of natural and economic catastrophe. The Government convened an 
expert task force to provide recommendations for managing the disease, 
but it only involved community stakeholders once the work was largely 
complete. The result was a series of narrowly tailored recommendations 
for risk management and border control. There was no genuine opening 
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of public discussion to address larger issues such as global trade, 
which, as the task force members themselves recognised, was a key 
cause of the Chalara outbreak, as well as other plant disease 
epidemics.
The other two chapters in this part show how controversies over 
expertise may generate new publics and new views of the public interest. 
These chapters echo recent work in democratic theory on political 
representation, which examines how representative claims partly 
constitute the same publics they represent (Disch, 2015; Saward, 2010). 
This work does not suggest that representatives create their constituen-
cies out of thin air. When someone makes a claim to represent a 
constituency, the pre-existing features of the audience – well-established 
opinions and interests, as well as social and economic conditions – 
constrain the range of plausible representations and the audience’s 
ability to respond. But what counts as ‘representation’ in any particular 
case and the boundaries and identity of the represented are partly 
determined by the process of representation itself. In a similar vein, 
these chapters show that those claiming to draw on expertise to 
represent a particular public or view of the public interest can easily 
get more than they bargained for, evoking oppositional constituencies 
beyond their intended audience.
In chapter 13, Warren Pearce and Brigitte Nerlich examine the 
famous 2006 climate change documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, by 
former US Vice President Al Gore. Climate change is a notoriously 
difficult issue around which to mobilise publics, because it is a long-term 
problem that seems much less pressing than most people’s everyday 
concerns. And as a global phenomenon, climate change is invisible 
to the human senses. Climate change has various local impacts, but 
the extent to which any particular impact is related to climate change 
can only be discerned with climate science. Gore’s film addressed 
these challenges by combining personal stories from his life with 
scenes of him presenting a slide show and talking to audiences about 
climate science. In some respects, Pearce and Nerlich argue, An 
Inconvenient Truth goes beyond a traditional ‘deficit model’ of science 
communication, which sees the key barrier to political action in the 
public’s deficit of scientific knowledge. By making climate change into 
a personal matter for both himself and the audience, Gore recognised 
that knowledge alone is not enough. In this respect, they note, the 
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film echoes John Dewey’s argument that science education requires 
aesthetic modes of communication, because ‘ideas are effective not 
as bare ideas but as they have imaginative content and emotional 
appeal’ (Dewey, 1988:169). By presenting himself performing his 
slideshow in front of various audiences, Gore sought to ‘create a public 
that in turn would continue the performance’. In this respect, Gore’s 
film was successful in ‘making the impersonal personal and the invisible 
visible’ (p. 223). At the same time, however, Pearce and Nerlich show 
that the film embraces a linear model of science education, which 
assumes that scientific knowledge precedes and compels political 
action. In this respect, Gore’s film promoted a ‘hegemonic’ representa-
tion of climate change, closely linked to his own status as a prominent 
politician of the US Democratic Party. The film thus became a focal 
point for an ‘inconvenient public’ of critics who developed a ‘polemic’ 
counter-representation of climate change as either a complete hoax 
or, at best, an entirely natural phenomenon. Paradoxically, by seeking 
to make climate change meaningful, the film also politicised the issue 
in a partisan sense, linking climate change to ‘a narrow range of policy 
options that were anathema to US conservatives’ (p. 224). In the future, 
Pearce and Nerlich argue, climate policy advocates should be more 
open to engaging with ‘uninvited’ and ‘inconvenient’ publics, as well 
as a wider range of policy options.
Finally, in chapter 13, Sujatha Raman, Pru Hobson-West, Mimi 
Lam and Kate Millar show how the public interest can be constructed 
through science controversies. The ‘Science Matters’ speech by UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002 suggested that scientists and ordinary 
citizens could work together to pursue the public interest. But Blair 
also suggested that science inherently promotes a substantive public 
interest in technological progress, thereby reducing public engagement 
to a means for promoting this pre-given interest. In contrast, the 
authors argue that the public interest cannot be known ‘in advance 
of concrete efforts’ to engage actual citizens (p. 233). They also note 
that research on science controversies typically focuses on procedural 
questions of inclusion and exclusion, which can result in the analysis 
unwittingly reproducing a ‘fragmented, individualised version of the 
public’ (p. 240), as well as a neglect of substantive questions of the 
public interest. Raman and colleagues go beyond a procedural and 
individualised approach by exploring struggles between dominant 
174 Science and the politics of openness
and subordinate advocacy networks over the meaning of the public 
interest, focusing on cases involving animal research in the UK and 
fisheries in Canada. In the case of animal research, public officials 
portrayed those opposed to such research as opponents of the public 
interest. They presented opinion polls supportive of animal research 
as a more authentic representation of the public. In most respects, 
proponents of animal research have so far maintained the upper hand. 
In the fisheries case, in contrast, a Canadian First Nation community 
won a victory against the Government. The Haida Nation opposed 
the Government’s fisheries policy because the policy threatened not 
only its culture and traditional values, but also the local ecology and 
the larger public interest. In a court case the judge concluded that 
the Haida Nation, rather than the Government, had the stronger claim 
to the public interest. With these cases the authors show that public 
engagement often does more than just ‘open up’ science to public 
scrutiny. It may also lead to ‘renegotiating the substantive question 
of what is in the public interest’ (p. 246).
As these four chapters indicate, the relation of scientific expertise, 
the public interest and democratic legitimacy is today highly contested. 
In some respects, this should not be surprising, because democratic 
legitimacy involves an irresolvable tension between majority rule 
and public justification. It requires that the general public accept the 
majority of the people as standing for the entire people (Rosanvallon, 
2011). Popular elections once offered a relatively effective means of 
securing such acceptance, but democracies have not been able to rely 
solely on elections as a source of legitimacy since the late nineteenth 
century. With the adoption of universal voting rights, citizens increas-
ingly questioned the notion that majority rule alone could guarantee 
governmental virtue and competence. A potential remedy appeared in 
the rise of bureaucratic expertise and the administrative state, which 
promised a substantive form of legitimacy to complement procedural 
legitimacy through popular elections. But since at least the 1980s, 
both elections and expertise have faced widespread public scepti-
cism. Many people do not trust experts to remain objective, and ‘the 
people’ are fragmented into a plethora of ever-shifting interest and 
identity groups. In the United States, for example, millions of citizens 
questioned the basic legitimacy of elected presidents George W. Bush 
and Barack Obama, driven by concerns about substantive competence 
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and group identity, respectively. This widespread epistemic scepticism 
and social fragmentation has led to a ‘radical pluralisation of the forms 
of legitimacy’ (Rosanvallon, 2011: 8). Government commissions, expert 
committees and lay deliberative bodies all seek to shore up the faltering 
legitimacy of democratic governments. The emergence of multiple 
forms of legitimacy means that no single expert recommendation or 
political institution, and especially no populist demagogue, should be 
taken as the authentic voice of the people. Just as technocracy reduces 
democracy to the truth claims of science, populism reduces it to a 
monolithic representation of the will of the people.
Avoiding technocracy without fostering populism is a key challenge 
of our time. To what extent should lay citizens become involved in 
shaping expert recommendations? What are the most promising means 
of communicating expert knowledge to diverse constituencies? How 
can we best involve experts in political contests over the meaning and 
content of the public interest? The chapters in this part do not seek 
definitive answers to these questions, but they offer valuable resources 
for thinking about them.
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Disentangling risk assessment: new roles for 
experts and publics
Sarah Hartley, Adam Kokotovich
Risk assessment is an important stage of risk governance, alongside 
risk characterisation, risk evaluation and risk management. A burgeon-
ing literature on public involvement in risk governance and science-
based policymaking more broadly has developed in response to tensions 
in governing environmental risk, particularly the environmental risks 
posed by emerging technologies (Irwin, 2014; Levidow, 2007; Renn 
and Schweizer, 2009; Rothstein, 2013; Wynne, 2006). However, there 
is relatively little investigation of public involvement in the specific 
stage of risk assessment, despite increased demands for such involve-
ment (Borrás et al., 2007; Hartley, 2016; Millstone, 2009; Shepherd, 
2008). European and North American regulatory agencies have a 
statutory obligation to involve the public in risk governance, and in 
recent years many have opened up the traditionally scientific domain 
of risk assessment to public input through online consultations. In 
addition, international bodies have created opportunities to engage 
a broader range of experts and stakeholders. However, there is evidence 
that regulatory agencies and international organisations are not meeting 
their statutory obligations, falling short of their own guidelines in 
practice (Dreyer and Renn, 2014; Hartley, 2016; Herwig, 2014).
We argue that public involvement in risk assessment is not reaching 
its full potential owing to a considerable lack of clarity in the literature 
and in practice about which publics should be involved in risk assess-
ment and at what point they should be involved. Much of the risk-
governance literature examining public involvement fails to disentangle 
adequately the process of risk assessment when examining questions 
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about who to involve, when to involve them, and why. Risk assessment 
is not a single stage of risk governance that can simply be made 
participatory; rather, it is a process with different components that 
need to be considered individually when determining how and why 
to open risk assessment to publics. Furthermore, for the potential of 
public involvement to be fully realised, a particular understanding of 
risk assessment is necessary – one that is detailed and that recognises 
inherent value judgements. Conflating the different aspects of risk 
assessment and the different types of participation makes opening 
risk assessment to publics seem unreasonable and risks the legitimacy 
of regulatory agencies.
We draw on the theoretical, prescriptive and empirical literature to 
disentangle risk assessment for governing human health and environ-
mental risks of emerging technologies. This disentanglement begins 
with an examination of values in risk assessment and restates the case 
for public involvement when value choices are to be made. First, we 
argue that effective and legitimate public involvement is dependent 
upon the degree to which value judgements are acknowledged in the 
different components of risk assessment. Second, we explore variations 
in the prescription literatures of the National Research Council (NRC) 
in the USA, and the international organisation the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC, or ‘Codex’). Third, we examine the way in which 
risk assessment is disentangled in practice through the case study 
of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Finally, we draw on 
these findings to reassemble public involvement in risk assessment, 
making clear who should be involved, where and, importantly, why.
Disentangling values and risk assessment: the need for 
public involvement
Risk governance involves a number of stages, and a plethora of different 
models exist. The delineation of the various stages depends upon the 
degree to which the ‘scientific’ stage can be separated from the ‘policy’ 
stage. In general terms, these models do separate the scientific stage 
(risk assessment) from the policy stage (risk management). However, 
there is considerable evidence to suggest these stages are not separated 
in practice (Millstone, 2009). Much of the risk-governance literature 
that addresses public involvement fails to disentangle risk assessment 
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from risk management adequately; for example, Renn and Schweizer 
(2009) suggest there is a default assumption that public involvement 
should occur in risk management. Kaliarnta et al. (2014) examine 
stakeholder involvement in risk governance but focus on questions 
concerning who should participate and why, how much they should 
participate, and what the participation should address, but they do 
not tease apart the stages of assessment and management to ask where 
public involvement should take place.
Where the literature has distinguished the stages of risk governance 
to examine where public involvement might be best utilised, risk 
assessment remains an epistemic stage that is seen as insulated from 
values – with consequences for how public involvement is envisioned 
in risk assessment. For example, Dreyer and Renn (2014) lay out four 
stages in risk governance –framing (design discourse), appraisal 
(epistemic discourse), evaluation (reflective discourse) and management 
(practical discourse). While they argue that publics can make a 
contribution to the epistemic discourse, this discourse does not involve 
the discussion of value choices, which are dealt with in the evaluation 
and management stages. Therefore, publics, who are often asked to 
comment on published risk-assessment documents in online consulta-
tions, are restricted in terms of the types of input they are able to 
provide during consultation. Consequently, the value choices inherent 
in risk assessment are not open to public scrutiny and publics are 
able to comment only on the scientific aspects of risk assessment, and 
only on scientific terms.
A key aspect of whether and how to involve publics in risk assessment 
is based on how we understand the role of values within risk assessment. 
First, and at the broadest level, choosing to use risk assessment to 
inform decision making is itself a value-based decision. To frame an 
issue in terms of risk and risk assessment will privilege certain actors 
and marginalise other possible ways of understanding that issue 
(Jasanoff, 1999). Second, if risk assessment itself is understood as an 
objective scientific process external to value judgements, there is little 
role for public involvement other than, perhaps, for expert stakeholders 
to ensure the science is completed correctly (Jasanoff, 1987). Once 
the role of values in risk assessment is acknowledged and reflected 
upon, the need for public involvement is strengthened.
There is an extensive body of literature that demonstrates the 
relevance of values throughout the risk-assessment process (Kokotovich, 
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2014; Meghani, 2009). Challenging the notion that values can be 
confined to risk management, this scholarship explores how normative 
values influence all aspects of risk assessment. This work shows that 
such judgements have consequences and thus need to be taken seriously, 
including by opening them to reflection and public involvement. Here 
we identify and review the value-based nature of three key components 
of risk assessment: the guidelines that shape risk assessment, the 
conduct of risk assessment and the science used in risk assessment.
Risk-assessment guidelines
Guidelines establish the steps to follow when conducting a risk assess-
ment and provide assistance both to applicants preparing risk assess-
ments and to risk assessors conducting them. Thus, they incorporate 
value judgements about the scope of future risk assessments, including 
what falls inside the scope of risk assessment; what counts as evidence, 
how much evidence is needed and how it should be interpreted; and 
how uncertainty should be addressed. There is a growing realisation 
of the importance of guidelines. Kokotovich (2014), for example, 
studied two competing sets of guidelines for assessing the risks to 
non-target organisms from insect-resistant genetically modified plants, 
and found their divergent foundational value judgements resulted in 
recommending different processes for risk assessment, and different 
potential outcomes. These judgements involved the adequacy of 
substantial equivalence testing and what species needed to be tested, 
together with the (un)importance of assessing indirect effects, and 
they resulted in the guidelines calling for different kinds of scientific 
studies to be completed to inform the risk assessment. Millstone et 
al. (2008) show that differences in guidelines account for transatlantic 
trade conflicts such as those that arose over beef hormones, recombinant 
bovine somatotrophin and genetically modified maize.
Conducting risk assessment: problem formulation, analysis 
and risk characterisation
Conducting risk assessment is a process that includes problem formula-
tion, exposure and effects analysis, and the characterisation of risk. 
Many of the decisions in risk assessment that are acknowledged as 
value based and that have been opened to public involvement occur 
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in the formulation of the problem (Environmental Protection Agency, 
1998; Nelson et al., 2007). Problem formulation is the initial step of 
the risk assessment that determines the assessment endpoints, the 
conceptual model linking the stressors to the assessment endpoints, 
and an analysis plan. This step is widely seen as the place where values 
most explicitly enter the risk-assessment process. Authors such as 
Thompson (2003) and Jensen et al. (2003) have revealed how decisions 
taken in problem formulation, such as identifying the specific hazard 
to be assessed and determining the time and spatial scale, are value 
based. These decisions alter the scope of the risk assessment in ways 
that can influence the ultimate characterisation of the risk. Problem 
formulation is where values and public involvement are often acknowl-
edged and allowed, and this is also where they are classically confined. 
Similar to the distinction between risk assessment and risk management 
within the classical notion of risk governance, problem formulation 
sets up a dichotomy between science and values. In this understanding, 
values exist in the formulation of the problem, while the scientific 
analysis phase remains free from values. Problem formulation does, 
however, stand apart from the rest of risk assessment owing to the 
type of value judgements that need to be made. Many of these judge-
ments involve explicit value-based, non-technical judgements that do 
not require technical expertise from contributors.
While the discussion of values in conducting risk assessment 
normally begins and ends with problem formulation, the analysis and 
risk-characterisation steps also contain value judgements. For example, 
identifying and synthesising relevant scientific studies and addressing 
uncertainty all involve value judgements that can influence the overall 
assessment of risk (Meyer, 2011; Winickoff et al., 2005). The differences 
in how these value judgements are addressed contribute to the reason 
why different regulatory bodies can arrive at differing assessments of 
risk (Wickson and Wynne, 2012). The value judgements in these steps 
require a greater degree of technical expertise than those at the stage 
of problem formulation.
Scientific studies used in risk assessments
This component of risk assessment is rarely considered distinctly. 
However, the scientific studies used in a risk assessment are also 
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influenced by value judgements and therefore should not escape scrutiny 
(Elliott, 2012; Holifield, 2009). Scientific studies influence the ultimate 
characterisation of risk, yet they themselves can be influenced by the 
different parts of a risk assessment. Both the development of risk-
assessment guidelines and the conducting of a risk assessment involve 
value choices over what scientific studies are relevant (Kokotovich, 
2014). Risk-assessment guidelines can influence how scientific studies 
are completed by, for example, calling for the use of surrogate species 
or local species in laboratory testing (Hilbeck et al., 2011). There can 
also be value judgements in the design and conduct of scientific studies 
that go beyond those stipulated in risk-assessment guidelines and the 
conduct of a risk assessment. Scientific studies used in a risk assessment 
depend on the often subtle value judgements that inform them (Elliott, 
2012; Holifield, 2009). Elliot calls attention to the notion of ‘selective 
ignorance’, or the ‘wide range of often subtle research choices or “value 
judgements” that lead to the collection of some forms of knowledge 
rather than others’ (2012: 331), claiming these judgements will influence 
what knowledge is available to inform decision making or, in our 
case, risk assessment.
The existence of value judgements in these three components of 
risk assessment draws attention to the actors making those value 
judgements. Who is making them and who should do so? The recogni-
tion of these value choices has fuelled the call for democratic account-
ability and public involvement in risk assessment, which has traditionally 
been seen as an expert domain (Hartley, 2016).
Prescribing the treatment of values and publics  
in risk assessment
In reviewing key examples of the existing prescriptive risk-assessment 
literature, specifically documents from the NRC and Codex, we show 
how values are acknowledged and public involvement is proposed by 
the organisations that prescribe risk assessment (NRC, 1983; Stern 
and Fineberg, 1996). In comparing the 1983 and 1996 NRC reports, 
we argue that it is the 1983 report that acknowledges the role of values 
in risk assessment in a more detailed, nuanced and potentially produc-
tive way. This is true even though it calls for a separation of risk 
assessment and risk management, and the 1996 report calls for broader 
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public involvement in risk governance and for an integration of 
assessment and management.
The NRC is part of the National Academies of Science, a private, 
non-profit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged 
in scientific and engineering research. It advises the US Federal 
Government on scientific and technical matters and has published 
several prominent reports on risk assessment (NRC, 1983, 2009; Stern 
and Fineberg, 1996). These NRC reports have influenced regulatory 
risk assessment in the USA and internationally (Suter, 2008), and 
they show how values and the role of public involvement are acknowl-
edged in risk assessment.
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process 
was one of the first major reports on risk assessment. This report has 
become known as the ‘Red Book’ because of its red cover. It supported 
the clear separation of risk assessment from risk management to help 
establish the credibility of risk assessment (NRC, 1983), but, at the 
same time, recognised the value judgements that are entangled in risk 
assessment. For example, the NRC states:
If risk assessment as practiced by the regulatory agencies were pure 
science, perhaps an organizational separation [between risk assessment 
and risk management] could effectively sharpen the distinction between 
science and policy in risk assessment and regulatory decision-making. 
However, many of the analytic choices made throughout the risk assess-
ment process require individual judgments that are based on both 
scientific and policy considerations. (NRC, 1983: 143)
The NRC refers to value judgements as policy judgements, and 
introduces the concept of risk-assessment policy to refer to them in 
conducting risk assessments. The value judgements inherent in risk 
assessment are seen as being different in character from the value 
judgements that exist in risk-management decisions. Making a clear 
distinction between the types of value choices present in risk assessment 
and risk management, the NRC describes how to distinguish between 
scientific and value judgements in risk assessment, which it notes is 
a difficult task. It recommends the development of guidelines, which 
it defines as ‘the principles followed by risk assessors in interpreting 
and reaching judgments based on scientific data’ (NRC, 1983: 51). 
These guidelines help the risk assessor in conducting future risk 
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assessments and are similar to the risk-assessment guidelines that we 
describe above. However, there is no mention of the scientific studies 
used in a risk assessment or the values-based nature of the research.
In this 1983 report the NRC argues that value judgements in risk 
assessment are best made by risk assessors and there is no suggested 
role for public involvement, even though the report recognises the 
implications of such judgements. However, the NRC recommends 
the involvement of experts from a wide range of scientific disciplines 
in the development of guidelines. Overall, then, this report provides 
an understanding of risk assessment in which the role of values in 
risk assessment is acknowledged. These judgements are to be addressed 
by expert risk assessors who will follow risk-assessment guidelines 
that have been developed by a broad range of experts in advance of 
an individual risk assessment.
In 1996 the NRC published the report Understanding Risk: Inform-
ing Decisions in a Democratic Society, which proposes an analytic–
deliberative approach to risk governance, one where ‘deliberation frames 
analysis [and] analysis informs deliberation’ throughout the entire 
risk-governance process (Stern and Fineberg, 1996: 6). In contrast to 
its 1983 report, the NRC extends its thinking about the role of values 
in risk governance and the way in which they should be dealt with. It 
proposes broad involvement in risk governance by experts, decision 
makers, and interested and affected parties. Yet the distinction between 
analysis and deliberation makes clear the separation between analysis, 
an epistemic stage that is the domain of experts, and deliberation, which 
can be opened up to non-experts. Analysis uses rigorous, replicable 
methods developed by experts to arrive at answers to factual questions. 
Deliberation includes value-based decisions with a focus on how issues 
are framed and what questions need to be answered. It uses processes 
such as discussion, reflection and persuasion to communicate, raise 
and collectively consider issues, increase understanding and arrive at 
substantive decisions (Stern and Fineberg, 1996: 20).
Interested and affected parties can influence what analysis is called 
for, but they play less of a role in actually influencing that science and 
the risk-assessment process. Their direct involvement may be possible 
when they have specialised or local knowledge that can help inform 
the analysis. While they are not brought explicitly into the analysis, 
they are seen as having a role in at least checking it:
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Participation is important to help ask the right questions of the science, 
check the plausibility of assumptions, and ensure that any synthesis is 
both balanced and informative. The more likely it is that the science 
will be criticized on the basis of its underlying assumptions or alleged 
omissions, the more important participation is likely to be in a risk 
decision process. (Stern and Fineberg, 1996: 132)
This approach points to the values-based nature of such judgements, 
while not explicitly calling for participation in the development of 
risk-assessment guidelines or in the conduct of a risk assessment 
where the assumptions and synthesis are determined. Overall, this 
report takes a bird’s-eye view of risk governance without the nuanced 
attempt to disentangle the process of risk assessment that the 1983 
report contained. Rather, it proposes the conceptual separation of the 
analytical stage of governance from its deliberative stage. Therefore, 
risk assessment has become a single stage in an approach to risk 
governance which is free of values and the domain of expert risk 
assessors. Public involvement is confined to risk management.
Codex is an international organisation established in 1963 by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) to develop harmonised science-based international food 
standards and risk-assessment procedures in order to protect consumer 
health and ensure fair international trade (Büthe and Harris, 2011). 
It is a heavily expert-led organisation and exclusively science based, 
although this reliance on science and scientific experts to the exclusion 
of non-scientific factors, alternative experts and mechanisms for public 
involvement has been strongly criticised (Foster, 2008; Herwig, 2014; 
Peel, 2010).
Codex constitutes the next phase of thinking about risk assessment, 
developing the concept of ‘risk-assessment policy’ which is similar to 
the risk-assessment guidelines that we described above. According to 
Codex, risk-assessment policy establishes the risk-assessment frame-
work, and is defined as ‘documented guidelines on the choice of options 
and associated judgments for their application at appropriate decision 
points in the risk assessment such that the scientific integrity of the 
process in maintained’ (CAC, 2013: 114). These judgements include 
decisions about the scope of future risk assessments, the type and 
amount of evidence needed, the interpretation of the evidence, and 
the treatment of uncertainty. The concept departs from the NRC’s 
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reports by stipulating that it is the responsibility of risk managers, 
not risk assessors, to develop a risk-assessment policy in consultation 
with all interested parties (CAC, 2013). In 2007, Codex committed 
its 186 members (including the EU and the USA) to develop explicit 
risk-assessment policies through the formal adoption of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Food Safety for Application by Govern-
ments (CAC, 2007).
Similar to the NRC in its 1996 report, Codex acknowledges the 
value judgements in risk-assessment guidelines, yet it maintains the 
clear distinction between risk assessment and risk management. 
Risk-assessment guidelines have been carved off from risk assessment 
and placed under the risk-management phase of risk governance. 
However, the more nuanced discussion about value judgements in 
risk assessment present in the NRC’s 1983 report has been pushed 
aside in favour of a clear and convenient separation between facts 
and values. Risk assessment is now seen to be an exclusively science-
based and objective exercise to be conducted by risk assessors (Herwig, 
2014). Risk management is the stage of risk governance where values 
are acknowledged and where the public should be involved. Next, we 
explore these prescriptions and the tensions that arise in the practical 
application of guidelines through a case study.
The treatment of values and publics in risk assessment  
in practice
The EFSA provides a useful case study to examine the way in which 
risk assessors disentangle risk assessment and involve the public in 
practice. The EFSA gives independent scientific advice to the European 
Commission (EC) on matters related to food safety, and has responsibil-
ity for risk assessment. Risk assessment is defined in the EFSA’s founding 
regulation as ‘a scientifically based process consisting of four steps: 
hazard identification, hazard characterization, exposure assessment 
and risk characterization’ (EC, 2002: 11). The EFSA develops guidance 
documents, which are risk-assessment guidelines establishing the 
principles, procedures and approaches in risk assessment as well as 
specifying data requirements and the handling of uncertainty (Hartley, 
2016; Vos and Wendler, 2006). Applicants conduct risk assessment 
in line with the EFSA’s guidance documents and then the EFSA reviews 
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the applications and publishes a scientific opinion (the output of an 
individual risk assessment). It is then the task of the EC and member 
states (risk managers) to make the decision on whether to approve 
the product or process under scrutiny.
The EFSA relies heavily on independent external scientific experts 
in the development of its scientific outputs. These experts sit on standing 
panels and are called upon to sit on ad hoc working groups. In addition, 
the EFSA has a statutory obligation to engage with publics (EC, 2002: 
Article 42). To meet this obligation, the EFSA holds public consultations 
on its scientific outputs, particularly its guidance documents and 
scientific opinions. Public involvement is guided by an internal policy. 
The EFSA’s approach to public consultations on scientific outputs 
defines publics as ‘the non-institutional stakeholders, which include 
academics, NGOs, industry and all other potentially interested and 
affected parties’ (EFSA, n.d.: 3). The EFSA’s motivation for public 
consultation in risk assessment is driven by the goals of both transpar-
ency and scientific excellence. Public consultations open up the EFSA’s 
processes and decisions to public scrutiny and they also allow external 
input from publics to enhance the scientific quality of the risk assess-
ment by ensuring clarity and completeness (EFSA, n.d.: 3). The EFSA’s 
policy on consultations allows it to launch a public consultation at 
three stages: (1) at the start, to define the scope and major principles; 
(2) at a preliminary stage, to seek information, data, views and sources 
available on a specific topic; and (3) at the end, to ensure the clarity, 
completeness and soundness of the draft scientific output (EFSA, n.d.). 
However, the EFSA has yet to hold a consultation at the first stage to 
define the scope of a risk assessment. In practice, publics are typically 
given two months to comment on a draft scientific output (developed 
by experts) through the EFSA’s website (Hartley, 2016).
The EFSA does not acknowledge that value judgements are made 
in the development of its guidance documents or scientific opinions 
(Klintman and Kronsell, 2010). Independent experts on the EFSA’s 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) panel have made it clear 
that they do not acknowledge or engage in the matter of implicit 
values, instead insisting that the EFSA’s risk assessment is a scientific 
process and value judgements occur at the risk-management stage of 
risk governance and are the responsibility of the EC and member 
states (Perry et al., 2012; Wickson and Wynne, 2012). Further, the 
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EFSA officials and scientific panels do not recognise that guidance 
documents are risk-assessment policies, as defined by Codex, or that 
it is the EC’s responsibility to develop them (Hartley, 2016). Guidance 
documents are treated as scientific outputs free of value judgements. 
However, despite the legal distinction between risk assessment and 
risk management and the EFSA’s insistence that risk assessment is 
value free, in practice the distinction is blurred (Tai, 2010).
The institutional denial of value judgements in risk assessment has 
significant implications for the EFSA’s public consultations. First, it 
means that the EFSA’s public consultations are ‘science based’ and 
publics are allowed only to provide comments related to the science 
of risk assessment. For example, when the EFSA consulted the public 
in the development of its guidance documents on the environmental 
risk assessment of genetically modified animals in 2013, it informed 
potential participants: ‘The EFSA GMO Panel considered all scientifi-
cally relevant comments from the public when finalising the present 
document. [It] did not consider issues related to risk management 
(e.g. traceability, labelling, coexistence). Ethical and socio-economic 
issues are also outside the remit of the EFSA GMO Panel’ (EFSA, 
2013: 6). However, guidance documents are risk-assessment policies 
and the EU’s commitment to Codex rules requires the EC to develop 
them. Hartley (2016) has described these guidance documents as 
policies masquerading as science.
The second implication of the institutional denial of values in risk 
assessment is that it reinforces the authority of experts, and publics have 
minimal opportunity for influence through the consultation. Hartley 
(2016) argues that the public consultations have a minimal impact on the 
EFSA’s scientific outputs owing to the expert-led nature of the process 
and the unjustified restrictions placed on public involvement. Gaskell 
et al. (2007) characterise the EFSA’s public consultation approach as a 
‘sound science’ type of public dialogue, where the EFSA listens to the 
public only in terms of its own expert definition of the problem and 
the possible solutions. Although the EFSA makes public the results 
of the consultation exercises and its response, which shows how the 
results of the consultation exercise are used, publics’ views are heard 
only in so far as publics talk in terms of the EFSA’s scientific remit.
Overall, the EFSA has responsibility for developing risk-assessment 
guidelines, conducting risk assessment and determining the scientific 
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studies used in a risk assessment in the EU’s broader risk-governance 
framework. Each of these components of risk assessment is seen to 
be epistemic and is conducted by the EFSA’s independent experts. 
Publics are involved as a means to improve the quality of the science 
and to make the process of risk assessment transparent. However, in 
practice, the institutional denial of values in risk assessment means 
that it is independent experts who determine the values-based decisions, 
and these experts are not democratically accountable. Public involve-
ment is restricted to matters of science and the value judgements 
made by experts are hidden from public scrutiny.
New roles for public involvement in risk assessment
The academic literature presents compelling evidence of the existence 
of values in risk assessment and makes a convincing case that risk 
assessment has different component parts and should not be considered 
a homogeneous stage in risk governance. The prescriptive literature 
of the NRC and Codex demonstrate the difficulty in disentangling 
risk assessment in practice, showing that since the late 1980s there 
has been a growing reluctance to take a nuanced approach to addressing 
values used in risk assessment. Ironically, this closing down of values 
has been happening at the same time that risk assessment has been 
opened up to publics. At present, there is no harmonised approach 
to acknowledging or handling values in risk assessment, or to thinking 
about how risk assessment should be disentangled. The case of the 
EFSA reveals that the values in risk assessment are denied in practice 
and that the different component parts (risk-assessment guidelines, 
conducting of risk assessment and scientific studies used within a 
risk assessment) are seen as a single stage of risk governance. This 
practice of risk assessment has serious implications for public 
involvement.
The lack of clarity about which publics should be involved in risk 
assessment and at what point they should be involved means that 
public engagement in risk assessment is not reaching its full potential. 
To address this lack of clarity, we have disentangled risk assessment 
into three components: (1) risk-assessment guidelines, (2) conducting 
risk assessment and (3) scientific studies used in a risk assessment. 
Table 10.1 outlines these risk-assessment components. The types of 
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Table 10.1 A framework for public involvement in risk assessment
Risk-assessment components Task at hand Type of public 
to be involved
Risk-assessment guidelines Establishing the 
risk-assessment 
framework









Defining the scope 
of and plan for a 
risk assessment



















which are drawn 




publics to engage with risk assessment will depend upon the component 
of risk assessment.
We make a practical distinction for the purposes of this argument 
between alternative experts and general publics, recognising that this 
distinction may be a false distinction at times. Alternative experts 
need to be sought out by risk assessors for their expert knowledge, 
which expands the existing range of expertise. These experts will be 
able to address the epistemic questions raised in risk assessment and 
may come from a broader range of academic disciplines, including 
the natural, engineering and social sciences. Alternative experts may 
also come from sector-specific policy communities outside the academy 
such as civil society, policymakers and government risk assessors. 
Alternative experts may be brought into existing committees, working 
groups and panels and work alongside risk assessors. On their part, 
190 Science and the politics of openness
general publics will be self-selected in open and transparent engagement 
mechanisms in order to allow stakeholder groups and individuals 
access to information and provide them with the opportunity to 
contribute to values-based questions. General publics cannot be 
restricted to answering epistemic questions.
Mirroring developments in the public-engagement literature, there 
is increasing recognition in the risk-assessment literature of the role 
of public involvement in contributing substantively to risk assessment 
and providing transparency (Klintman and Kronsell, 2010). Indeed, 
the EFSA makes it clear that its public consultations are designed to 
satisfy both these goals. Therefore, the goal of public involvement in 
risk assessment is democratic and epistemic legitimacy. However, 
because the judgements in risk assessment are both science- and 
values-based in nature, epistemic legitimacy requires democratic 
legitimacy. There is a need, then, to involve the appropriate publics 
in the specific component being addressed. Because of the types of 
value judgements that exist in the development of risk-assessment 
guidelines and in the problem-formulation stage of risk assessment, 
including those that do not involve technical expertise, public involve-
ment needs to include both alternative experts and publics more 
broadly. During the analysis and characterisation of risk and for 
scientific studies, it is important to open up to alternative experts 
who hold enough expertise to reflect substantively on the relevant 
values-based questions.
Conclusion
Peel (2010) suggests one of the crucial issues facing risk assessment 
and governance is related to the way in which facts and values are 
addressed: ‘[It is] not whether science or values should triumph, but 
rather how scientific and non-scientific inputs might be blended in 
risk assessment in different settings to ensure a broadly acceptable 
balance of credibility and legitimacy concerns’ (Peel, 2010: 10). We 
argue that in order to satisfy epistemic and democratic legitimacy, 
the different features of risk assessment must be disentangled to lay 
bare the various component parts, and that different publics need to 
be involved depending on the types of questions asked in each 
component.
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This chapter highlights the tensions between evidence, prescription 
and practice in risk assessment which complicate efforts to involve 
publics. However, public involvement in risk assessment presents a 
significant opportunity to debate the value judgements that exist in 
the various components of risk assessment. Indeed, it is precisely 
these implicit value judgements that present the strongest argument 
for public involvement (Finardi et al., 2012). In contrast, denying that 
values exist in risk assessment, relying on a narrow range of expertise 
and limiting public input to epistemic matters imposes a certain set 
of values made by a narrow range of experts that are insulated from 
public scrutiny and debate. This institutional denial of the implicit 
values in risk assessment results in public frustration and lack of trust 
in regulatory authorities (Hartley, 2016; Wynne, 2006).
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Monstrous materialities: ash dieback and 
plant biosecurity in Britain
Judith Tsouvalis
The aim of the edited volume Science and the politics of openness is 
to raise awareness of the double-sided controversial nature of initiatives 
aimed at improving relations between science, policymaking, politics 
and publics. Efforts have been made to strengthen public trust in 
expert knowledge. These include dialogues organised between scientists 
and concerned publics on contentious, ethically complex issues, inviting 
specific publics to help decide the trajectories of controversial scientific 
and technological innovations and opening up the questions of the 
role of science in politics and vice versa to closer scrutiny. All this 
has been much debated in the UK and elsewhere since around the 
turn of the millennium (House of Lords, 2000; Stilgoe et al., 2006; 
Wilsdon and Doubleday, 2013). These ‘monstrous’ sides of relations 
between science, policymaking, politics and publics – aspects that 
are unexpected, uncertain, unknown, uncomfortable, preferably ignored 
and often downplayed– also entail material ones, and these can exert 
a strong influence over how these relations evolve (Latour, 2004, 2013; 
Raman and Tutton, 2010; Tsouvalis, 2016; Tsouvalis and Waterton, 
2015). This chapter begins with a discussion of the monstrous material-
ity of Chalara ash dieback (Chalara), a deadly fungal tree disease that 
has decimated the ash population across Europe since the early 1990s.
On 7 March 2012, Chalara was officially declared present in England, 
following the routine inspection of a nursery in Buckinghamshire. 
The ash saplings infected with the disease were found in a consignment 
of plants imported from the Netherlands. Plant disease outbreaks are 
on the increase worldwide and many are linked to international trade. 
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Countless pathogens, insects and animals circulate through the global 
trade network as travel companions in plants, soil, logs, packaging 
materials, nursery stock, fruit and seeds (Brasier, 2008: 793–794, 
796–797). They pay no heed to political or geographical boundaries, 
and with changing climate conditions their border crossings are 
increasingly common and successful. Unfortunately for native, locally 
adapted plant communities, this is bad news. Generally suffering few 
ill effects from the life forms they have co-evolved with, they often 
succumb to encounters with new ones. Chalara first broke out in 
Poland and Latvia in the early 1990s, having arrived there on infected 
ash saplings imported from East Asia (Drenkhan et al., 2014; Han et 
al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2012). The disease reached Germany in 2002, 
Denmark in 2003, Belgium in 2010 and northern France in 2012.
Given this rapid geographical spread west, it is surprising that the 
British Government did nothing to try to prevent its arrival in Britain. 
Part of the reason for this was that scientific knowledge about the 
cause of the disease was scant and that an error had occurred in its 
taxonomy. The latter played a brief but important role in allowing 
Chalara slip through the net of legislation then in place to prevent 
the trade-related spread of infectious diseases in the EU. It allowed 
the pathogen to spread freely through mainland Europe and eventually 
take a foothold in Britain (Freer-Smith et al., 2013: 23). This is the 
monstrous side of Chalara, a disease that remained terra incognita in 
science for many years, and this is its story.
More than a decade after arriving in Eastern Europe, in 2006 Chalara 
fraxinea was named as the pathogen responsible for the disease 
(Kowalski, 2006). Three years later, however, new research suggested 
that Chalara was only a stage – the asexual form, or anamorph – in 
the life cycle of a fungus called Hymenoscyphus albidus, known to 
science since 1851 and indigenous across Europe and the UK. Histori-
cally considered a harmless saprophytic ascomycete, H. albidus, which 
thrives on ash leaves and plays an important role in the nutrient cycle, 
suddenly assumed the sinister role of the ash-tree killer.
In 2010 molecular studies overturned this verdict, showing that 
the disease was actually caused during the asexual phase of a newly 
identified fungus, Hymenoscyphus pseudoalbidus. Identical to H. albidus 
in appearance, it is distinguishable from it only by molecular analysis 
(Queloz et al., 2010). This case of mistaken identity had serious 
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consequences for Britain, as it prevented the British Government from 
acting on the advice the Forestry Commission (FC) had received from 
the Horticultural Trade Association in 2009: to impose an import 
ban on all ash and ash-related products. When asked why during a 
House of Lords’ debate on Chalara in 2012, the Government’s reply 
was that it had ‘no reason to believe that this [the discovery of Chalara 
in the Buckinghamshire nursery] was anything other than an isolated 
incident’ (quoted in Downing, 2012: 10). Probing deeper, however, 
we find that the FC assumed it was ‘dealing with a pathogen already 
present in the UK and this precluded the UK from initiating an 
emergency response under the EU Plant Health Directive and World 
Trade Organization phytosanitary rules and using import restrictions 
as a means of control’ (Downing, 2012: 10).
The head of Plant Health at the FC thus responded to the Horti-
cultural Association’s letter that ‘our hands are tied’ (Downing, 2012: 
10). The Forest Research branch of the FC could only issue a pest risk 
alert to the forestry and horticultural sectors to make them aware of 
the symptoms of ash dieback. It could not, however, request a full 
pest risk analysis (PRA). A PRA is a protective measure that all EU 
member states can apply for under Council Directive 2000/29/EC. 
Its aim is to prevent the introduction into the EU of organisms harmful 
to plants or plant products and to stop them spreading in the EU. 
Chalara’s monstrous side – a side only molecular analysis could uncover 
– illustrates the complex linkages that exist between materiality, policy, 
legal instruments, human knowledge and understanding, and countless 
other factors in the emergence of relations between science, politics 
and publics. After it was declared that H. albidus was not the cause 
of Chalara, an import ban of ash and ash-related products came into 
effect in Britain on 29 October 2012. By that time, of course, the horse 
had bolted.
Opening up the science of ash dieback
Knowledge about Chalara was scarce and the public response to the 
disease in England was exceptionally strong and emotional. As a result, 
the year 2012 saw an unprecedented opening up of the science of 
Chalara to scientists internationally and concerned publics locally. 
This response also needs to be situated in the context of years of 
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funding cuts in the area of plant pathology in the UK, which had led 
to a steep decline in expertise in this field. In a report published in 
2009, the Royal Society had urged universities and funding bodies to 
collaborate in order to revive the teaching of subjects like agronomy, 
plant physiology, pathology, general botany, soil science, environmental 
microbiology, weed science and entomology. This was no mean feat, 
as an audit of plant pathology undergraduate teaching and training 
commissioned three years later by the British Society for Plant Pathology 
(2012) revealed. It found that many plant pathology research institutes 
and industrial research and development departments had been closed; 
plant pathologists were ageing; retiring higher education institute plant 
pathologists were rarely replaced; fewer than half the 103 higher 
education institutes that offered biology, agriculture, horticulture or 
forestry courses at BSc level still taught plant pathology, and only half 
of these offered practical classes. The British Society for Plant Pathology 
wondered whether higher education institutes would be able to retain 
their capacity to teach plant pathology in five to ten years’ time, given 
that ‘new departmental appointments and RAE/REF assessments are 
driven in part by the Impact Factor (IF) of scientific publications. The 
highly specialised nature of much plant pathology research means 
that many publications are of low IF’ (British Society for Plant Pathol-
ogy, 2012: 2). A key recommendation of the Tree Health and Plant 
Biosecurity Expert Taskforce (THPBET) set up in November 2012 
following the ash dieback outbreak was that ‘key skills shortages’ in 
this field needed to be urgently addressed. To combat Chalara, desperate 
measures were therefore in order. For example, in December 2012, 
the open-source platform OpenAshDieBack (oadb.tsl.ac.uk) was 
launched. It had been designed by scientists from the John Innes 
Centre in Norwich, and invited scientists from around the world to 
share scientific data on Chalara. This unconventional step of rapidly 
generating and releasing genomic sequence data was premised on the 
understanding that ‘to foster open science and make it possible for 
experts around the world to access the data and analyse it immediately 
[would] speed up the process of discovery’ (MacLean, 2016).
Another effort to open up and speed up the science of Chalara was 
the Facebook-based crowdsourcing game Fraxinus, developed by the 
Sainsbury Laboratory in Cambridge. Fraxinus presents players with 
real reference DNA sequences from the ash tree genome and asks 
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them to match up multiple DNA sequence reads from other samples 
with the aim of identifying regions of the genome that display char-
acteristics such as resistance. These could then be used to breed new, 
disease-resistant ash tree varieties. Fraxinus and OpenAshDieBack 
both require mass participation, and between August and December 
2013, 51,057 people played the Fraxinus game.
Opening up in the context of biosecurity, the conceptual framework 
within which plant health risks are currently approached, is closely 
connected to activities like surveillance, monitoring and control, and 
here citizen science came to play a particularly significant role. The 
Living Ash Project, funded by the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (Defra), is one example of an initiative where the 
public can get involved in monitoring Chalara. Another is the smart-
phone app AshTag, developed by the Adapt Low Carbon Group at 
the University of East Anglia and launched in October 2012. Initially, 
AshTag enabled concerned members of the public to record infected 
trees and submit photos of them to experts for assessment. These data 
were then used to map the spread of the disease across the UK. Since 
2016 AshTag has been collecting data on healthy trees in the hope of 
identifying disease-resistant ones. Citizen scientists also help monitor 
tree diseases through the Open Air Laboratories network. All three 
initiatives are focused on monitoring, surveillance and, ultimately, 
disease control. Did these novel and exciting ways of opening up the 
monstrous materiality of Chalara in science correspond to an equal 
opening up of the Pandora’s box of free trade and its role in the perpetu-
ation of plant disease epidemics to broader political scrutiny and 
public debate? Did it correspond to an opening up of policymaking 
in this field?
‘Biosecurity’: turning a complex socio-political problem into 
a techno-scientific challenge
This section attempts to answer these questions. It draws on findings 
from an in-depth qualitative study (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Silver-
man, 2005) conducted in 2014 of the Government’s response to ash 
dieback. The study was funded by the Leverhulme Trust under its 
Making Science Public programme. Sixteen in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews were carried out, nine with members of the THPBET and 
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seven with civil servants and experts otherwise involved in supporting 
and advising the Government on plant biosecurity. The interview 
schedule covered a broad range of topics, including questions about 
the interface between science, politics, policymaking and the public, 
and about how the THPBET worked, made its recommendations, 
and addressed and resolved conflicting views. Data on these and related 
issues were also collected from secondary data sources, including 
newspapers, government documents, non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) reports, legal documents, social media, TV documentaries 
and academic literature.
As indicated earlier, when ash dieback was first discovered the 
British Government had no contingency plan in place to deal with 
plant disease epidemics. Scientists knew very little about the disease 
and plant diseases rarely made it into the headlines of the national 
press. Although the Government had been reminded by the Foresight 
Project on Infectious Disease in 2006 that ‘diseases in plants and 
animals act as barriers to economic development and also threaten 
ecosystems’ (Foresight, 2006: iv), and urged by the Independent Panel 
on Forestry in 2012 to ‘speed up delivery of the Tree Health and Plant 
Biosecurity Action Plan by additional investment in research on tree 
and woodland diseases, resilience and biosecurity controls’ (Independ-
ent Panel on Forestry, 2012: 34), little had as yet been done to enact 
these recommendations. At the European level, in response to the 
steep rise in tree and plant diseases in the EU, the European Com-
mission (EC) had commissioned an evaluation of the EU’s plant health 
regime in 2009.
The key instrument of this quarantine legislative system dating 
from 1977 is Council Directive 2000/29/EC. It is meant to guard 
against all pests and diseases, but in practice only targets the most 
dangerous ones, of which 250 are listed in its annexes. The plant 
health regime encompasses measures like plant inspections at produc-
tion sites, during the growing season and post-harvest; producer 
registration; and issuing plant passports. It forms part of international 
regulatory frameworks, including the International Plant Protection 
Convention of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations, and the World Trade Organization Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(Plant Health) Agreement. Their prime objective is to foster free trade: 
in ‘essence, Biosecurity balances enthusiasm for international trade 
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with the need to protect against risks’ (Manzella and Vapnek 2007: 
vii; emphasis in the original).
The EC considers the EU plant health regime as ‘indispensable for 
protecting the health, economy and competitiveness of the EU plant 
production sector as well as for maintaining the Union’s open trade 
policy’ (EC, 2013). It describes it as ‘unique in that it is an open regime: 
movements of plants and plant products into and within the Union 
are allowed’ (EC, 2013:1). The 2009–2010 review, however, found this 
unique regime was thoroughly inadequate in preventing plant disease 
epidemics and advised that it be modernised through more focus on 
prevention, better risk targeting (prioritisation) and more solidarity (EC, 
2010). In 2013 the EC warned that ‘the existing regulatory framework is 
… unable to stop the increased influx of dangerous new pests caused by 
the globalization of trade’, and predicted that ‘high volumes of imports 
from other continents … imply a high probability of future outbreaks 
of foreign pests’ (EC, 2013: 1). Only a modernised regime, it concluded, 
could ‘effectively address the plant health impacts of globalisation 
[and] mitigate the plant health impacts of climate change’. Proposals 
for improving the EU plant health regulations have since been made 
and are currently under discussion by the European Parliament and 
Council. It is doubtful, however, that they will bring about greater 
plant biosecurity as long as the plant health regime remains tied to the 
objective of fostering free trade, which is considered by some as the 
greatest threat to plant health (Brasier, 2005, 2008). On the contrary, 
plant disease epidemics are likely to increase in number.
At this point, we need to take a closer look at the framing of tree 
and plant pests and diseases as a ‘biosecurity’ risk. In Britain, the 
term ‘biosecurity’ first entered politics in a House of Commons debate 
on the foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001. It is thought that 
because concerns over affairs of state and national security loom large 
at this level, biosecurity discourse became littered with references to 
‘border controls’ and ‘surveillance’ (Donaldson, 2008: 1552), and as 
a result the protection of the ‘native’ from the ‘non-native’, ‘alien’, and 
‘invasive’ (Nerlich et al., 2009). Studies of the effects of the discourse 
of biosecurity have found it to be highly restrictive, preventing alterna-
tive definitions and understandings of disease epidemics from emerging 
(Hinchliffe and Ward, 2014; Vogel, 2008). They have also found that 
tensions between biosecurity governance and neo-liberal international 
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trade priorities remain ill understood (Meyerson and Reaser, 2012), 
that the dominant biosecurity metaphor of security and the fears that 
underpin it direct resource allocation towards the fortification of 
boundaries (Nerlich et al., 2009), and that in some countries biosecurity 
politics are in the process of engineering a new kind of social identity: 
‘biosecure citizenship’ (Barker, 2010).
From a theoretical standpoint, biosecurity discourse can be under-
stood as forming part of the broader trend in Western societies of 
being risk-averse and overanxious about health, safety and security. 
Beck’s (1992) Risk Society thesis, Foucault’s (2004, 2007) biopolitics 
and Latour’s (2003) version of Beck’s thesis using actor-network theory 
have all served here as explanatory sources. The conclusion drawn 
by Defra from the final report of the THPBET exemplifies some of 
these arguments. In prose littered with military metaphors, Defra 
urges the UK to be ‘better prepared in understanding the risks of 
what pests and diseases are likely to arrive, when, where and how 
they might invade, how severe the impact is likely to be and what 
options are available for interception, eradication, mitigation or 
adaptation’ (Defra, 2013: 2).
Framing plant diseases in this way has far-reaching consequences 
for policy and democracy. As Duckett et al. (2015) have shown, risk-
based policy is based on a positivist epistemology that favours objective, 
scientific and technical risk assessment rather than an opening up of 
complex issues to public and political scrutiny and debate. This can 
lead to a form of post-politics which is exacerbated by consensual 
policymaking ‘in which the stakeholders … are known in advance 
and where disruption or dissent is reduced to debates over the 
institutional modalities of governing, the accountancy calculus of risk, 
and the technologies of expert administration or management’ 
(Swyngedouw, 2011: 268). While risk-based approaches can constitute 
a valuable source of knowledge alongside other knowledges and 
approaches, they cannot, on their own, solve the monstrous aspects 
of the increasingly tricky and complex problems we face (Chilvers 
and Kearnes, 2016; Grove-White et al., 2006). This was the conclusion 
drawn by members of the THPBET on the process in which they 
were involved in addressing Chalara.
Public concern over Chalara was great. Apocalyptic imaginaries of 
a landscape devoid of ash trees and bleak economic forecasts of the 
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consequences of the disease flooded the pages of national newspapers 
and social media sites. This response took Defra by surprise, and it 
duly commissioned a study of the THPBET by a social scientist to 
better understand it (Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013). The study concluded 
that Defra was dealing with a case of the ‘social amplification of risk’, 
where numerous, often lingering, anxieties culminate to find expression 
in response to a particular event. The Government reacted to to this 
response by convening a national emergency (Cabinet Office Briefing 
Rooms – COBR) meeting in London in November 2012, with the 
aim of showing people ‘how seriously the Government is taking the 
threat of this disease’ (Defra, 2012a). It also commissioned the FC to 
carry out a rapid, large-scale survey to establish the extent and spread 
of the disease, as the National Forest Inventory of 2009–2012 had 
recorded 103 diseased ash trees among the 15,000 inspected, none of 
which were infected with Chalara (House of Lords, 2012: 10). Finally, 
it set up the THPBET.
This taskforce was entirely composed of ‘Chief Scientific Advisors 
and eminent Government and academic experts’ (Beddington, quoted 
in House of Commons Library, 2012: 1). Its remit was to comment 
and advise on Defra’s scientific evidence and approach to Chalara 
and ‘the current threats from pests and pathogens’. It was also tasked 
with making ‘recommendations about how those threats to trees could 
be addressed’ (Defra, 2012a: 7). The names of the taskforce participants 
are listed in its Final Report (Defra, 2013: 49). Of its fourteen members, 
eleven held professorships at the time and all fourteen were educated 
to PhD level. Ten were natural scientists, four were social scientists, 
and of these, two were economists. The taskforce was supported by 
a public sector officials advisory group, whose members were drawn 
from Defra and the Defra network organisations. External referees 
were invited to comment on the reports, as were a broad range of 
stakeholders. The terms of reference for the taskforce were determined 
before it first convened. The language in which they are formulated 
is indicative of the risk-based approach adopted, containing references 
to ‘best available evidence’, an ‘assessment of risk status’, ‘appropriate 
risk assessment tools’, a ‘rapid evidence assessment’, a ‘risk mitigation 
framework’, ‘contingency planning’, and ‘emergency response arrange-
ments’. Stakeholders and the public played no role in framing the 
problem of ash dieback at this stage, nor did they have a say in who 
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ought to address a challenge of such magnitude. Many stakeholders 
were concerned about this, as the empirical study conducted by the 
author and described at the beginning of this section found:
Conservation organisations in particular were quite critical that it [the 
taskforce] was set up without any sort of conversation with them about 
membership. … They would have liked to have had an opportunity to 
have suggested how the Terms of Reference [were] framed. … They 
were … invited [to] sit on the Stakeholder Advisory Panel … after the 
Terms of Reference and membership had been made. (Respondent 11)
The deadlines for the publication of the two reports to be produced 
were determined from the outset. The interim report was due by 
the end of November 2012 (two weeks after the first meeting of the 
taskforce) and a final report by the spring of 2013 (Defra, 2012b). 
These tight deadlines – indicative of the perceived emergency of 
Chalara – greatly impacted on the speed with which the taskforce 
had to work. The taskforce itself was set up within days of the COBR 
meeting and was purposely kept small. The names of most of its 
members were proposed by Defra. Those able to participate at such 
short notice had to be available for meetings immediately and be 
committed to working to tight deadlines. Apart from several two-day 
meetings, telephone conferences and email exchanges took place and 
participants were assigned to expert groups that tackled specific issues. 
They had to review and comment on vast numbers of documents. Senior 
plant health officials were actively involved in meetings and the chief 
scientific advisor, the chairman of the taskforce, the Secretary of State 
and Minister Lord De Mauley met on a regular basis to discuss any 
progress made.
This tight timeframe and the predefined terms of reference of the 
THPBET, together with the fact that the taskforce was primarily 
composed of experts with existing links to the government department 
they now advised, are characteristic of the technocratic post-political 
approach to risk-based problem solving and policymaking described 
by Duckett et al. (2015) and Swyngedouw (2011) above. Their combined 
effects were explored during interviews. The findings suggest that 
they impacted negatively both on the degree of stakeholder and public 
involvement and on the degree to which disagreement and conflict 
could emerge and be addressed during the THPBET meetings. 
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Concerning stakeholder and public participation, one interviewee 
observed that the taskforce was not a public forum in the sense that 
there were no public meetings and no public dialogue took place. 
Although ‘additional people [from local authorities, trade associations, 
environmental interest groups and others] who were not members 
of the taskforce … were brought into meetings and provided written 
evidence’ (respondent 5), they were invited only to comment on 
materials already produced by the taskforce:
There were several meetings convened, each one had a very specific 
agenda that was marginally directed towards arriving at a useful set of 
recommendations that could be justified on the basis of the scientific 
background. … There was also a later phase where … there was an 
attempt – prior to submission of these recommendations – to basically 
get input from various UK Stakeholder groups. (Respondent 8)
Following the first two-day meeting of the taskforce in November 
2012, an interim report containing eight recommendations was 
published (Defra, 2012). Reviewers for the report were chosen on the 
basis of their ability ‘to constructively contribute to the objectives of 
the taskforce’, and a broad range of stakeholders were invited to 
comment on it (respondent 6). Significantly, this respondent points 
out that the ‘Interim Report came out first and then they [the taskforce] 
used that to refine what they thought their recommendations should 
be and they talked to stakeholders’. The stakeholders could therefore 
only refine conclusions already drawn by the experts and formulated 
as recommendations in their first report. Even then, there was little 
room to accommodate their views:
We were trying to make our recommendations based on science. So we 
weren’t really trying to make them fit with the views of stakeholders at 
all. … There was much less stakeholder input into the expert report 
because it was not meant to be an exercise which drew its information 
from stakeholders. It was meant to be an exercise that drew its information 
from … the best understandings of … both natural science and social 
science. (Respondent 9)
Time, bureaucratic procedures, scientific knowledge, and the Govern-
ment’s framing of tree and plant health as a problem of biosecurity 
all impacted on the issues the taskforce could address and the rec-
ommendations it finally made. Taskforce meetings generally lasted 
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under an hour. This made ‘a deeper engagement and the development 
of conversations’ impossible (respondent 15). However, it proved a 
powerful strategy for keeping conflict at bay: ‘there is a risk … that 
if views were polarised they could be very polarised by the end of 
three hours’ (respondent 15).
Unsurprisingly, most interviewees reiterated the view that there 
had been little disagreement and conflict between taskforce members 
during meetings. Some respondents, however, were unhappy about 
this and thought that ‘there had been things that had not been included 
in the reports’ and that ‘other recommendations could have been 
made’ (respondent 11). This respondent felt that general agreement 
was at least in ‘part to do with the way the discussions were framed’ 
and ‘there was certainly the impression that controversial issues were 
avoided’.
The taskforce’s recommendations reflect this. They include the 
development of a prioritised UK plant health risk register; the appoint-
ment of a chief plant health officer responsible for the UK plant health 
risk register and for providing strategic and tactical leadership for 
managing risks; the development and implementation of procedures 
for preparedness and contingency planning to predict, monitor and 
control the spread of pests and pathogens; and the revision, simplifica-
tion and strengthening of governance and legislation. They also include 
the recommendation that epidemiological intelligence from the EU 
and other regions needs to be better used, and EU regulations for 
tree health and plant biosecurity improved. Biosecurity at the border 
and in the UK needs to be strengthened, capabilities and communica-
tions improved through the development of a modern, user-friendly 
system providing quick and intelligent access to information about 
tree health and plant biosecurity and key skills shortages addressed 
(Defra, 2013: 5).
Many taskforce members described these risk-orientated recom-
mendations as limiting. They were, one observed, ‘quite technical and 
cathedral and as a result less controversial’. It had been easy, the 
respondent explained, to reach agreement on the need for the appoint-
ment of a new chief plant health officer and the creation of a risk 
register (respondent 11). Another saw them as ‘rather sort of 
bureaucratic-type recommendations’ (respondent 2). Some taskforce 
members had expressed concern during meetings about the 
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‘risk-orientated approach’ to biosecurity, saying they would have 
preferred a ‘pathways approach’.
However, they knew that such a paradigm change would have proved 
controversial with the nursery trade, as it would have opened up room 
for a critical appraisal of the role of trade and the single market in 
the spread of plant disease, the checking of plants for disease prior 
to them being moved, consumer behaviour, and the biosecurity 
implications of the work of professionals such as landscape architects. 
Unfortunately, debating such issues was beyond the remit of the 
THPBET. It could therefore not address key drivers of plant disease 
epidemics, including the effects of trade, even though taskforce 
members ‘were all of the view that it would be much better if the UK 
could impose trade restrictions for plant health reasons’ (respondent 
4). Indeed, the respondent went on, ‘We [the taskforce] ought to say, 
if you really want to tackle this you need to ban import on plants, 
which would be politically not useful at all. … we found it more 
difficult to see impossibilities in the human world than in the natural 
world. … and where you see impossibilities affects how you make 
recommendations.’ Echoing this view, another respondent lamented 
that ‘you can make as many recommendations as you like, but the 
science can’t sort those issues out’ (respondent 14).
Conclusion: the many monsters of plant biosecurity
The risk-based approach to ash dieback adopted by the Government 
in 2012 in response to Chalara transformed a highly contentious 
socio-economic, political and material problem of monstrous and 
messy proportions into a neatly defined techno-scientific challenge. 
As a result, trade-related plant disease outbreaks continue to be an 
issue where ‘debate is not only seriously lacking but may also be 
suppressed through non-recognition or even avoidance of the issues’ 
(Brasier, 2005: 54, 2008; Daszak et al., 2000). Such issues, as observed 
by the THPBET member interviewed above, cannot be sorted out by 
science.
Although ash dieback catapulted plant health to the top of the 
Government’s agenda in 2012, many of its monsters remain lurking 
in the dark. The science of plant pathology was opened up in novel 
and exciting ways both to scientists and to the public after the strong 
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public reaction to Chalara, which led to the long-overdue allocation 
of resources in this area. However, interpreting these efforts as a 
democratisation of science or as ‘making science public’ would be a 
mistake. Rather, they formed part of the dominant risk-based approach 
to plant biosecurity endorsed by the Government and were primarily 
directed at surveillance, monitoring and plant disease control and at 
the changing of the very nature (the genetic makeup) of the life forms 
affected by Chalara, ash trees. The risk-based approach adopted also 
meant that the THPBET was structured and designed in ways that 
make it a perfect example of consensual post-political policymaking.
A deeper engagement with the complex economic, socio-cultural, 
material and political drivers behind tree and plant disease epidemics 
was impossible. This raises serious questions about the role scientists, 
social scientists and humanities scholars are often made to play in 
policymaking, especially in the case of emergencies. Concerning plant 
health, for example, there are plenty of studies that document the 
detrimental effects of trade and certain horticultural practices, such 
as the overuse of herbicides and pesticides in nurseries, the importation 
of live trees, or the practice of exporting seeds and importing saplings 
to save labour costs, on plant health. If their findings were more 
powerfully articulated and taken seriously by government institutions, 
this would inevitably put the spotlight on politically more delicate 
and challenging issues, and it is these issues that urgently need address-
ing in this field. To simply exploit scientific ‘evidence’ for the purpose 
of upholding neo-liberal trade arrangements or finding ever more 
life-transforming technologies to counteract their costs is not only 
irresponsible, it is also deeply unethical.
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An Inconvenient Truth: a social 
representation of scientific expertise
Warren Pearce, Brigitte Nerlich
On 30 June 2006 An Inconvenient Truth (AIT) (Guggenheim, 2006), 
a climate-change documentary presented and written by leading US 
Democrat politician Al Gore, was released. The film contains a heady 
mix of expert scientific evidence, personal stories and normative 
political statements. An ‘oral history’, based on interviews with those 
involved in the creation of the film and celebrating this anniversary, 
proclaimed: ‘Somehow, a film starring a failed presidential candidate 
and his traveling slideshow triggered a seismic shift in public under-
standing of climate change’ (Armstrong et al., 2016).
It is likely that AIT has contributed as much as anything or anyone 
to making climate-change expertise public. In particular, it brought 
climate-science expertise, which had steadily accumulated in the 
preceding decades, into the public realm in a new way: combining 
scientific data with personal stories and calls for political action. In 
combining these elements, AIT made climate change public by offering 
a particular social representation of climate change. While primarily 
appealing to a public that was already interested in, and attentive to, 
climate change, AIT also helped to broaden that audience. The film’s 
intended audience was what one may call its ‘convenient’ public. On 
the other hand, the film’s very success in speaking to such a public also 
triggered contestation from what one may call an ‘inconvenient’ public; 
that is, from an audience that disputed the film’s social representation of 
climate-change expertise – in some cases the film and/or its producer 
were framed as ‘monstrous’. The film thus became a successful meme 
and what some saw as a dangerous monster at the same time.
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In this chapter we discuss AIT as an example of taking climate-change 
expertise out of the pages of science journals and into the public sphere. 
We draw on the ideas of John Dewey (1938, 1989) and their elucidation 
by Mark Brown (2009, and see chapter 9) to show how the notion of 
expertise is the key to understanding the film’s motivation, successes 
and critics. While the purpose of the documentary was to persuade its 
audience of the consensual truth imparted by climate-science experts, 
its effect was to become a lightning rod for disagreeing with, criticising 
and debating with that expertise. Overall, AIT created a dominant 
representation of climate change, based on expertise that became a 
touchstone for consent and dissent, action and reaction. This position 
was enhanced by the joint award of the 2007 Nobel Peace prize to 
Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
In the following we shall first provide some background to the 
film’s emergence, highlighting its echoes of Dewey’s argument that 
expert knowledge should be integrated in society (Brown, 2009: 150). 
We use the concept of social representation (Moscovici, 1988) to show 
how Gore combined scientific content with a personal and political 
context in order to provide a meaningful representation of climate-
change expertise. We highlight how AIT sought to create its own 
public for scientific expertise, returning climate-science expertise to 
society as one of the many tools with which citizens make sense of 
the world and solve problems (Brown, 2009: 160–161). We then show 
how the very elements that helped AIT to establish a dominant social 
representation of climate change also contributed to the creation of 
a counter-representation and counterpublic that questioned how AIT 
represented climate-science expertise. With AIT’s success in bringing 
social context to scientific content came inevitable contestation. We 
conclude with some tentative lessons for science communicators from 
the AIT story.
Background
AIT had a huge cultural and political impact following its release in 
2006, winning a host of awards, including the 2007 Academy Award 
for Best Documentary (IMDb, 2015), helping Gore win a share of a 
Nobel Peace prize with the IPCC and providing an anchor for intense, 
prolonged debates about climate change.
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The documentary was timely, which helped it to embed itself in 
global culture and shape both dominant or hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic polemical social representations of climate change. A 
dominant or hegemonic social representation is one that is a coercive 
and widely shared construction of climate change, while a polemic 
one is defined as ‘one which is generated in the course of social conflict, 
and characterised by antagonistic relations between groups’ (Jaspal 
et al., 2014). In 2007 the IPCC released its Fourth Assessment Report, 
which marked a step change in the public visibility of climate science. 
These events represented a political and cultural reinforcement of the 
emerging scientific consensus and were significant in establishing for 
the first time a dominant, hegemonic representation of climate change 
that called for significant personal and political action to address the 
challenge. AIT did not disappear from cultural consciousness after 
2007. Gore made sure that future campaigns such as Climate Reality 
built on its success, seeking to train volunteers as ‘Climate Reality 
Leaders … spreading the word about the truth of climate change and 
the solutions we have today in over 100 countries, making a global 
challenge a personal issue for citizens on every continent’ (Climate 
Reality, n.d.; emphasis added).
This suggests that AIT was a highly successful project, both as a 
cultural event in itself and as a way of bringing meaning to climate 
change and momentum to climate-change mitigation. AIT’s combina-
tion of scientific ideas with personal stories and political activism 
echoes Dewey’s call for ‘bare ideas’ to have ‘imaginative content and 
emotional appeal’ in order to be effective (Dewey, 1989: 115). AIT 
also takes seriously Dewey’s notion that scientific expertise is a social 
product rather than the result of individual scientific brilliance and 
that science communication marks the return of knowledge to its 
rightful owners: the public (Brown, 2009: 150). Indeed, AIT takes this 
one step further by seeking to empower its audience to gain the expertise 
to go out and disseminate locally. Yet, while Dewey points to the seeds 
of AIT’s success, he also shows how the successful communication of 
scientific knowledge and its social consequences brings more public 
scrutiny to bear on expertise (Brown, 2009: 159).
A decade later, AIT remains an important representation of climate-
change expertise. Gore’s name continues to be synonymous with public 
discussions of climate change (Grundmann and Scott, 2014) and AIT 
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continues to act as a salient reference point for climate-change critics 
(e.g. Booker, 2015; Daily Mail Comment, 2015; Turnbull, 2011). In 
the next section we describe the key elements of this representation.
Representing climate-change expertise
Climate science is an example of the scientific representation of nature 
that responds to a problematic situation. Communicating this expert 
knowledge is important as the problematic situation is bound up 
with social conditions (Brown, 2009: 160). Yet Dewey understands 
that if this expert knowledge is to gain purchase within societies, it 
must be communicated aesthetically and imaginatively (Brown, 2009: 
150). As discussed above, this provides a rationale for AIT but it also 
shows that AIT is a social representation of a scientific representation 
of nature (namely, the abstract concept of climate change). Hence, 
concepts from social-representations theory help to show how AIT 
represented climate-science expertise by objectifying climate change 
through humans (personification) and non-humans (ontologisation) 
(Jaspal et al., 2014). This constituted an attempt to establish a coher-
ent, hegemonic social representation of climate-science expertise 
that would gain purchase with the AIT audience, inspiring them to 
take various actions on climate change or to contest such actions 
(Hollin and Pearce, 2015; Jacobsen, 2011; Jaspal et al., 2014; Nolan,  
2010).
According to social-representations theory, a social representation 
is ‘a system of values, ideas and practices’ about a given social object 
(Moscovici, 1973: xiii), as well as ‘the elaborating of a social object 
by the community for the purpose of behaving and communicat-
ing’ (Moscovici, 1963: 251). Such a representation provides a social 
group with a shared social reality and common consciousness of a 
particular social object. The primary function of a social representation 
is to allow a social group to incorporate ‘something unfamiliar and 
possibly troubling into their own network of categories (Moscovici, 
1981: 193). Hegemonic social representations are shared by members 
of a group; they are coercive and uniform. Polemic representations 
are generated in the course of social conflict and are characterised 
by antagonistic relations between groups (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014: 
124–125; Moscovici, 2000: 28).
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Objectification is the process whereby unfamiliar and abstract objects 
are transformed into concrete and objective common-sense realities. 
Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) postulate three subprocesses associated 
with objectification; namely, the personification of knowledge, figuration 
and ontologisation. We focus here on the first and the last. The 
personification of knowledge links the abstract object to a person or 
a group, providing the object with a more concrete existence through 
this association. Ontologisation refers to the process whereby physical 
characteristics are attributed to a non-physical entity, essentially 
‘materialising’ the immaterial.
We will show that while AIT helped to elevate the cultural significance 
of climate change and contributed to forging and disseminating a 
hegemonic representation of climate change, it also prompted the 
emergence of a strengthened polemic-representation counterpublic 
that placed AIT’s representation of climate-science knowledge under 
intense scrutiny. By highlighting some scientific weaknesses in the 
film and Gore’s role as the face of expertise, the counterpublic sought 
to establish a counter-hegemonic or polemical social representation 
of climate change. Here, the monsters lurking under the public face 
of climate change came to life, most notoriously in an episode of 
South Park where Gore was depicted warning of an implausible, unseen 
monster called ManBearPig (Parker, 2006; Delingpole, 2010). Monstrous 
representations continue to this day, with a Breitbart article confusingly 
describing a new sequel to the film (Cohen and Shenk, 2017) as a 
‘scientific monstrosity’ while referring to climate change as ‘a non-
science beast’ (Williams, 2017).
While scientific knowledge plays an important role in the film, 
Gore evidently recognised, like Dewey, that public mobilisation requires 
climate change to be made meaningful, not abstract, by manipulating 
both cognitions and emotions (Beattie et al., 2011) so that ‘enough 
people lock into the same narrative and connect the dots and feel the 
danger facing their children’ (Bates and Goodell, 2007). The emergence 
of scientific knowledge about climate change has given rise to ‘an 
impersonal, apolitical, and universal imaginary of climate change’ 
that has taken over from ‘normative imaginations of human actors 
engaging directly with nature’ (Jasanoff, 2010: 235). AIT attempts to 
redress this balance by personalising and ontologising climate change. 
Most obviously, it positions Gore – for better or worse – as the human 
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face of the climate-change debate (Jaspal et al., 2014: 114). Yet it also 
contains other attempts at personalisation. In a powerful early section, 
Gore tells how his young son was almost killed in a car accident, and 
of the painful days spent at his bedside waiting to see if he would 
recover. The parallel is drawn between Gore’s son and the natural 
world that we assume to be stable, showing that the things that we 
take the most for granted can be taken away from us unexpectedly 
(Murray and Heumann, 2007).
As well as this personalisation of climate or nature, the film seeks 
to reintroduce the personal into the accumulation of scientific knowl-
edge. Knowledge is given credence not only using charts and numbers, 
but by the scientists who produced them. Gore refers to palaeocli-
matologist Lonnie Thompson as ‘my friend’ when arguing that 
Thompson’s research shows a striking correlation between atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentrations and temperature. Science may achieve 
its heft through abstraction (Jasanoff, 2010: 234), but Gore reminds 
his audience that scientific practice is irreducibly human, through his 
account of his son’s accident.
AIT also seeks to mitigate abstraction through the ontologisation 
of climate change by way of various non-human forms. The film begins 
with a paean to the central role of nature in Gore’s early life, which 
is subsequently referenced in the story of his son’s car accident. This 
‘environmental nostalgia’ makes climate change real by presenting it 
as an emotional threat to our own memories of living in nature (Murray 
and Heumann, 2007). Glaciers are used as another material example 
of what we might lose from climate change. However, this was not 
without controversy. One supportive climate scientist’s review of AIT 
argued that while the general point was well made, the particular 
examples used in the film were poorly chosen, as they were probably 
unrelated to temperature change (Steig, 2008). AIT ties climate change 
to the threat of extreme weather, traumatically felt in the USA through 
Hurricane Katrina just prior to the film’s release (Nerlich and Jaspal, 
2014). While Katrina is mentioned prominently in the film, the 
important role of engineering failures in the devastation it caused are 
overlooked; a position described by Rayner as ‘using bad arguments 
for good causes’ (2006: 6).
Criticisms of some of the specific examples used in AIT highlight 
a broader tension underpinning the ontologisation of climate change; 
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that is, that local examples of climate-change-related events are likely 
to be less scientifically certain than global representations of climate 
(Hollin and Pearce, 2015). This is not to say that AIT is entirely 
unsuccessful on this front; merely that scientific representations and 
social representations may often come into conflict. Evaluating how 
these are resolved depends on whether Gore’s role in AIT is ‘as a 
politician, a lay expert, or a spokesperson for science’ (Hulme, 2009: 
81), something that remains unclear during the film.
This section has outlined the social representation of climate-science 
expertise in AIT. The next section demonstrates the integral role of 
the audience in this representation, as Gore returns science to the 
people (Brown, 2009: 160).
Emergence of a public
Empire magazine’s five-star review of AIT begins with an inauspicious 
synopsis: ‘On the face of it, this is the least appealing film in history. 
A failed politico … preaching to the world about global warming 
with the aid of PowerPoint’ (O’Hara, 2015).
Presentation software such as PowerPoint or Keynote1 appears 
to be a questionable medium through which to persuade an audi-
ence of the seriousness of climate change. Even at the time of AIT’s 
release, such software was becoming notorious for homogeneous, 
ready-made slide designs resulting in boring corporate presentations 
(Reynolds, 2005; Tufte, 2003). While Gore’s professionally designed 
slides avoid the template trap, one might wonder why he chose to 
make such a presentation the focus of the film, rather than the front 
line of climate change where the physical effects are beginning to be 
noticed, as subsequent films have done (Orlowski, 2012). In short, AIT 
foregrounded the presentation as that was the tool with which Gore’s 
message would be propagated by his helpers, supporters and acolytes.
Gore makes clear his frustration with inaction on climate policy 
from the US Congress and the then Bush administration, using this 
as the basis for a ‘bottom-up’ approach to spreading his message ‘city 
by city, street by street, house by house’. Gore explains that he has 
been ‘trying to tell this story for a long time’ and that he is focused 
1 Gore’s presentation was developed using Keynote (Reynolds, 2007).
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on ‘getting people to understand’ climate change. Clearly, this is not 
public education as a good in itself; the intermingling of the positive 
and the normative points towards the need for the climate-change 
challenge to prompt particular actions.
AIT ends on an upbeat note, claiming that we already have the 
technologies available to switch from fossil fuels, and that all that is 
stopping us is a shortage of political will. The film ends by fading to 
black, as the text ‘Are you ready to change the way you live your life?’ 
appears on the screen, followed by an intermingling of the film’s credits 
with a mixture of tips on reducing personal environmental impacts 
(e.g. switch to a hybrid car) and bringing about political change (e.g. 
ask your senators what they are doing about climate change). Viewers 
were also directed to a supporting website including more details 
about the film and about climate science, and suggested actions for 
the audience to undertake (‘An Inconvenient Truth > take action’, 2006). 
Taken together, the film, website and accompanying book (Gore, 2006) 
represented a multimedia take on a very traditional linear model of 
science education, with the idea that presenting members of the public 
with more scientific information will prompt them to take action. 
While this is a clear aim of AIT, the film also operated at a more 
sophisticated metalevel.
Gore is the film’s sole cast member, but his audience – his intended 
public – plays an important supporting role throughout. The first 
faces to appear in the film are those of the attendees at the various 
presentations of Gore’s slideshow around the USA. AIT’s main presenta-
tion is staged in a way that ensures the audience’s faces are often in 
view, brightly lit and seated in a horseshoe formation. These are not 
just the faces of people listening to Gore’s story, but of those who may 
retell it to their peers. Soon after the film’s release, Gore led a programme 
of training for people who wanted ‘to tell their friends, families and 
neighbours that human activities are altering global climate and that 
each person can do something about it’ (Haag, 2007). The programme 
continues today through the Climate Reality Leadership Corps that 
encourages peer-to-peer communication and ‘spreading the word 
about the truth of climate change’ (Climate Reality, n.d.).
In this way, AIT went beyond public education to instead aim 
explicitly at the creation of a climate-change public. For a while Al 
Gore became known as the high priest spreading an ‘environmental 
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gospel’ (Mr Americana, 2015; Nerlich and Koteyko, 2009), a title that 
also contributed to conjuring up the counterpublic that the film did 
not intend to create. Overall, then, it was not just the content of the 
slideshow that was important, it was also the performance of the 
slideshow that is a central part of the film. The film was intended not 
only to persuade but to have a much stronger performative force: to 
create a public that in turn would continue the performance. In Dewey’s 
terms, scientific expertise is reinstated as ‘a refinement of commonsense 
inquiry’ rather than ‘a foreign way of knowing to be imposed on the 
common sense of an ignorant public’ (Brown, 2009: 160). However, 
this overt focus on putting scientific expertise back into the hands of 
society was turned back on AIT itself, as a counterpublic questioned 
the film’s representation of climate-science expertise.
Emergence of a counterpublic
The evidence presented thus far suggests that AIT was extremely 
successful, not just as a film in its own right but also in establishing 
a powerful social representation of climate change, an idea that had 
been somewhat nebulous up to that point. AIT was also successful 
in creating a public actively engaged in reproducing the representa-
tion of climate change by training individuals to give presentations 
based on AIT locally. However, individuals are not merely passive 
recipients of representations; they actively contribute to the construc-
tion of new representations in response (Jaspal et al., 2014: 116). 
Some of these individuals assumed a much more critical view of AIT  
and Gore.
Scepticism about climate science predated the film’s release as an 
important part of the ‘struggles over meaning and values in US climate 
science and politics’ (Lahsen, 2008: 216). While such struggles were 
continuing, US climate politics pre-AIT was broadly characterised by 
a lack of federal-level progress on legislation to cut greenhouse gases. 
Congress’s comprehensive rejection of the Kyoto Protocol was followed 
by Gore’s loss to George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election, 
with the subsequent Bush presidency being noted for a stalemate on 
climate policy. The success of AIT towards the end of the Bush presi-
dency provided a window for reframing the US climate debate (Fletcher, 
2009: 807). It also acted as a powerful rallying point for climate critics, 
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both in the mainstream media and the blogosphere, who were opposed 
to more stringent action on greenhouse gases.
A struggle ensued over the film’s accuracy, and as AIT gained greater 
public visibility a counterpublic emerged that sought to destabilise 
the apparently coherent meaning of climate change provided by AIT 
and Gore’s newfound position as a public expert. This counterpublic 
was mobilised through the emerging new media of blogs such as 
Watts Up With That (Watts, 2006) and Climate Audit (McIntyre, 2006), 
as well as syndicated columns in the mainstream media (Elsasser and 
Dunlap, 2013). The movement challenged the links claimed between 
climate change and material events (Hulme, 2010), and the credibility 
of Gore himself (Elsasser and Dunlap, 2013).
It is unsurprising that Gore, as a prominent Democratic politician, 
became a focus of much conservative commentary. A study of conserva-
tive op-eds found him to be by the far most discussed topic related 
to climate change (Elsasser and Dunlap, 2013: 763). Within the sceptical 
blogosphere, the three blogs found by Sharman (2014) to be the most 
central – Watts Up With That, Jo Nova and Climate Audit – have all 
had numerous posts on Al Gore and/or AIT. While Sharman notes 
that these blogs are more likely than mainstream media op-eds to 
focus on scientific issues, their criticisms of AIT and Gore were both 
scientific (Edelman, 2007; McIntyre, 2007; Nova, 2009b) and personal 
(McIntyre, 2008; Nova, 2009a; Watts, 2008). Crucially, these com-
mentators had a (small) number of similarly critical climate scientists 
upon whose knowledge they could draw. Two of these scientists 
published critiques of AIT as part of a series in GeoJournal (Legates, 
2007; Spencer, 2007).
This network of critical actors was akin to a scientific counterpublic 
attempting to challenge the hegemonic representation of climate change 
sought by AIT. They were a relatively small number of scientists with 
connections to other societal actors sharing a concern about the 
interactions between science, power and politics (Hess, 2010: 631). 
This is not to say that the counterpublic is any closer to the truth, or 
freer from external biases, than the dominant public, only that AIT 
and Gore provided important rallying points around which a coun-
terpublic could coalesce (Jaspal et al., 2014). The substance of this 
counterpublic’s criticisms is already well documented in the literature 
(Koteyko et al., 2013; Lahsen, 2013; Matthews, 2015).
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One particular characteristic of these criticisms is focused on 
here; the way in which critics sought to disassociate the notion of 
climate-science expertise from the representation provided in AIT. 
Jaspal et al. describe this as the challenging of science ‘by appealing to 
its norms’ (2013: 383). They highlight a reader comment on climate-
change articles on the Daily Mail website that ‘distances Al Gore from 
“science”, which is interesting in itself, as he is not actually a scientist’ 
(Jaspal et al., 2013: 395). Of course, Gore does not overtly claim to be 
a scientist; however, as the linchpin of AIT Gore became a cornerstone 
for the social representation of climate-science expertise. The reader 
comment claims that ‘Gore stood to gain hundreds of millions of dollars’ 
if legislation were passed lowering carbon emissions (Jaspal et al.,  
2013: 395).
It is indeed the case that two years before AIT Gore co-founded 
an investment management partnership focused on sustainability 
issues (Generation Investment Management, n.d.), and that one 
newspaper report claimed that his ‘green-tech’ investments boosted 
his net worth from $2 million to $100 million between 2002 and 2012 
(Leonnig, 2012). Whether or not these figures are entirely accurate, 
they highlight the importance of the social context that is given to 
Dewey’s ‘bare ideas’, and in particular the contested boundary between 
content and context (Brown, 2009: 159).
Brown (2009: 160) notes that the ‘social conflicts associated with 
genetic engineering do not invalidate the theory of the double helix’. 
Similarly, the financial interests of Al Gore highlighted in the Daily 
Mail comment do not invalidate the fundamentals of atmospheric 
physics. However, the comment highlights the fuzzy boundary between 
content and context in the public sphere, and how a questionable 
context can bring the content into question and destabilise representa-
tions of expertise. Citizens’ willingness to accept or challenge climate-
science expertise is to some degree dependent on their core values 
(Kahan et al., 2011). One can’t please all the people all the time. 
However, even assuming that Gore’s intentions in making AIT were 
of the best, his financial interest in sustainability investments was not 
necessarily a firm foundation for his emerging public status as a 
climate-change expert.
While helping to raise the profile of climate change, AIT seems 
also to have contributed to polarisation and strengthened the voices 
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of what some may call an ‘inconvenient public’ keen on publicising 
‘inconvenient knowledge’ related to Gore’s presentation of climate 
science and his own role as the public face of climate change. The use 
of the film to increase ‘public understanding’ of climate change was 
thus at one and the same time a success and a failure, a miracle and 
a monster.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have outlined the role of AIT in creating a strength-
ened social representation of climate change; making the impersonal 
personal and the invisible visible. By many measures AIT was hugely 
successful, winning numerous awards, earning Al Gore a share of the 
Nobel Peace Prize and providing a springboard for a global campaign 
of public education and activism. Drawing on the work of Brown, we 
have shown how AIT’s focus on creating new audiences for climate-
science expertise echoes Dewey’s original call for science to be returned 
to the people as ‘a refinement of commonsense inquiry’ and not to 
remain an entirely unfamiliar way of knowing (Brown, 2009: 160). 
The film also echoes Dewey in providing an aesthetic, emotional 
communication of expertise, going beyond the persistent deficit model 
in climate-change communications that assumes that the absence of 
concern about climate change is the result of a lack of knowledge 
(Nerlich et al., 2010; Pearce et al., 2015). In many ways AIT provides 
a model for bringing scientific expertise into the public sphere.
However, mistakes were made. In particular, errors on scientific 
content should have been avoided. As Hulme noted in his study of 
Gore’s questionable comments on Mount Kilimanjaro’s glaciers, 
returning scientific knowledge to the people ‘may destabilise knowledge 
as much as it may legitimise it’ and public trust in provisions for 
quality assurance in evidence are key (Hulme, 2010: 322). This goes 
for social representations of climate-change expertise as much as it 
does for scientific representations of nature appearing in the peer-
reviewed literature. Whether these mistakes had a significant bearing 
on public attitudes towards AIT is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, what we have shown is how social representations of expertise 
inevitably bring context to content, and a boundary between the two 
that is contested. In the case of AIT, Gore’s position as a Democrat 
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politician formed part of the film, perhaps making Republican-
supporting viewers less receptive to the film’s message. Counterpublics 
may seek to bring in other contexts as a means of contesting social 
representations. In the example above we show how Gore’s financial 
interests were used as a means of discrediting the scientific content. 
For scientists, this may seem anathema, but is the kind of issue that 
requires attention when returning scientific expertise from academia 
to the broader society.
In its mix of the scientific, personal and political, AIT is perhaps 
best thought of as an ambitious, if flawed, experiment in science 
communication and in making climate change meaningful. It did so, 
whether consciously or not, by politicising climate change and 
reintroducing the human into previously apolitical representations 
of climate change (Jasanoff, 2010). While agreeing with the need for 
politics, not science, to bear the load of dealing with climate change, 
we note that one effect of AIT was to turn climate science into ‘Al 
Gore’s science’, closely tied to a narrow range of policy options that 
were anathema to US conservatives (Sarewitz, 2011). We also note 
that if future engagement on climate change is to improve on the 
experience of AIT, those taking part must be open to engaging with 
publics that might be regarded as inconvenient just as much as with 
invited and convenient ones. Such engagement can be rewarding or 
frustrating to various degrees (Hawkins et al., 2014), something we 
have both personally experienced with diverse publics on the Making 
Science Public blog that we have edited throughout the duration of 
the research programme. However, such engagement should continue 
if there is to be any hope of social representations of scientific expertise 
becoming a source of moderation rather than polarisation. We cannot, 
and should not, seek to vanquish the monsters lurking under the 
public face of science, but we might be able to do a better job of 
taming them.
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‘Science Matters’ and the public interest:  
the role of minority engagement
Sujatha Raman, Pru Hobson-West,  
Mimi E. Lam, Kate Millar
Much has been written about how the public are imagined and 
constituted in recent science–society developments. In this chapter 
we explore the relatively neglected but related question of how the 
relationship between science and the public interest is constituted. 
The question is timely in the wake of Britain’s exit from the European 
Union and the election of Donald Trump as US president. Both have 
raised significant concerns about the future of public support for 
science, and of policymaking supported by scientific facts (see Introduc-
tion). These have spurred public mobilisation and reflection by scientists 
concerned about the implications for their profession (Economist, 
2016), as well as for the public interest as a whole (Guardian, 2017). 
But when members of the public mobilise around scientific research 
or policy decisions involving science, how should we understand their 
relationship to the public interest? This is our focus in this chapter.
At the height of concerns over science–society relations, the then 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered a widely cited ‘Science Matters’ 
speech (Blair, 2002). This speech echoed wider criticism, which still 
continues in Britain and elsewhere, of public protest against topics 
such as genetically modified (GM) crop trials or animal experiments. 
In mobilising to articulate what are minority positions vis-à-vis ‘public 
opinion’ as a whole, such publics seem, at first, to represent a monstrous 
departure from the social order and, in turn, the public interest. 
Following the twin meanings of the figure of the monster (Haraway, 
1992, and see Introduction), we will critically interrogate this assump-
tion and illustrate how minority groups are capable of engaging with 
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science in ways that allow alternative visions of the public interest to 
become temporarily visible and potentially compelling.
The ‘Science Matters’ speech provides an opening for our argument, 
which we develop in the context of two different cases of minority 
engagement with science. We first consider the case of activists 
campaigning against the use of animals in scientific research, who 
are effectively characterised in Blair’s speech as opposed to the public 
interest (as well as to science). Blair also contrasted the UK situation 
with support for science elsewhere in the world, implying that how 
science and publics relate to each other in other countries is relevant 
for how the UK imagines these issues. We therefore also consider a 
case in Canada, where a minority indigenous group engaged with 
both science and a part of the state (the law) to overturn a policy 
decision in fisheries management. This second case shows that science 
and public engagements can sometimes constitute challenges to 
dominant policies held to be against the public interest, as well as 
constituting opposition to established ways of doing scientific research, 
as in the animal activists’ case. Whether or not they succeed in 
overturning the status quo, the engagements of minority groups should 
be seen as central to periodic renegotiation of the social contract with 
science, innovation and wider public policies (Guston, 2000) through 
which the public interest is constituted.
Tony Blair issued a clarion call for ensuring that ‘Government, 
scientists and the public are fully engaged together in establishing the 
central role of science in building the world we want’ (Blair, 2002). 
With this statement Blair essentially invoked the principle that matters 
of importance to science and scientists are also matters of the wider 
public interest, which he was authorised to pursue as head of govern-
ment. Yet, by signalling that the world ‘we’ want will not simply follow 
from the work of either science or government, his speech identified 
a key role for the public in this respect. Blair seemed to suggest that 
only when all parties worked together would it be possible to achieve 
the common goal of co-producing science and the public interest.
In effect, Blair’s ‘Science Matters’ speech opened up a space for 
conceptualising engagement as a way of embedding the public interest 
in science. But how should we conceive of the public interest in scientific 
research in the first place? And what are the grounds on which the 
public might be expected to engage with scientists and the state in 
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pursuit of such a shared interest? Blair’s account reflected more broadly 
shared assumptions: first, the public already has an interest in science 
in advance of its engagement in it, and second, members of the public 
will engage mainly to support and secure this pre-given interest. The 
first represents the substantive aspect of science/public engagement 
(what is in the public interest), while the second captures the procedural 
or processual aspect (how the public interest is to be determined). 
The ‘Science Matters’ speech characterised the substance of the public 
interest in science mainly in terms of the ability of research to offer 
technological solutions to economic, health and environmental chal-
lenges. For Blair and like-minded others, a shared interest in these 
solutions called for a process of engagement by a majority public to 
limit the influence of minority critics. The potential of minority publics 
to stimulate periodic renegotiation of what is taken to be the public 
interest through their engagements with science is, however, missing 
from this picture. To explore this potential, we situate our analysis in 
the context of recent research in science–society relations.
Public engagement is a major theme in this research (e.g. Felt and 
Fochler, 2010; Marris, 2015; Mohr and Raman, 2012; Welsh and Wynne, 
2013), where it has been explored in relation to the inclusion and 
exclusion of particular publics and perspectives, and imagined rep-
resentations of the public and public opinion. How engagement relates 
to the pursuit of a shared public interest is often implicit in these 
discussions, but only rarely is it explored in its own right (but see 
Hess, 2011; Jasanoff, 2011; Wilsdon et al., 2005). In this chapter, we 
seek to fill this gap.
Callon (1994) was one of the first to draw attention to the question 
of how we might think about the relation between science and the 
public good, though this was in a discussion framed by economics 
rather than public engagement. Interest in a wider set of questions is 
emerging, however, with Helga Nowotny, following Yaron Ezrahi, 
recently calling for more sustained analysis of the relationship between 
science and the public interest (Nowotny, 2014). For reasons of space 
we bracket the different lineages of relevant overlapping terms; namely, 
public value, the public good or the common good. We use ‘the public 
interest’ to denote the dual meaning that, first, some matters involving 
scientific research are, in principle, of interest to members of the public 
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and, second, that these matters affect what is in the best interests of 
the collective (‘society’). The first meaning is captured in the Royal 
Society’s (2006) report on science and the public interest, which 
emphasises a need to communicate research results to the public to 
help them understand how these impact on their lives and enable 
them to participate in debates of the day. This is interrelated with the 
second meaning, invoked by Nowotny (2014), of public or collective 
interest, which is commonly defined as distinct from private interest 
alone. This public interest may or may not extend to all aspects of 
research, but we cannot know what it covers in advance of concrete 
efforts to engage with publics or by publics already engaging with 
science matters. Likewise, the nature of this interest is varied, but we 
focus specifically on political interests in and about science. In addition 
to government, scientists and a general public, as spotlighted by Blair 
in his speech, we include other social actors and institutions in govern-
ance (Lam and Pitcher, 2012). These include organised civil-society 
groups and communities as well as other parts of the state; notably, 
the law. Following Mark Brown, the conception of politics we have 
in mind for this inquiry is of ‘purposeful activities that aim for col-
lectively binding decisions in a context of power and conflict’ (Brown, 
2015: 19). Importantly, this conception takes various modes of participa-
tion, including civil-society engagements in governance, as part of 
the pursuit of collective decisions that underlie institutions of repre-
sentative democracy (see also Brown, 2009).
We begin by first developing a framework of five key principles 
distilled from science–society debates, where the public interest question 
has periodically emerged but lacked detailed scrutiny. We then illustrate 
the strengths and gaps of this framework through the two case studies 
of science and minority public engagement, one on animal research 
in the UK and the second on fisheries policy in Canada. In science 
and public engagement research these have been described in process-
based language; so, ‘unruly’ publics are said to be disinvited or otherwise 
excluded from the collective (e.g. de Saille, 2015; Welsh and Wynne, 
2013). While this might be true in particular contexts, such a framing 
in terms of inclusion/exclusion unwittingly detracts from full considera-
tion of wider public-interest arguments that we raise here in our 
examination of minority publics engaging with science.
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Conceptions of science, the public interest and conditions 
of engagement
How should we conceive of the public interest in science? In this 
section we first examine reasons why a common response to this 
question – namely, that science is intrinsically in the public interest 
– is inadequate, and why more socially embedded notions of account-
ability and the usability of science might offer a more nuanced response. 
We then examine limitations of the way accountability and usability 
are commonly framed, which in turn underline the need to consider 
how publics may engage with science. Finally, we ask: on what grounds 
might public engagement be expected to happen? Our response explains 
why engagement is a process not merely for opening up but also 
potentially for renegotiating the substantive question of what is in 
the public interest (see also chapter 1). For instance, renegotiating a 
social contract for ethical fisheries has been promoted as a way of 
managing and protecting fishery resources and other public goods 
(Lam and Pauly, 2010). In practice, both engagement and renegotiation 
may happen only rarely and cannot substitute for socially attuned 
forms of expertise, as Jasanoff (2003) has argued. But the potential to 
renegotiate remains crucial for times when established understandings 
of the public interest are called into question (Barnett, 2007).
The idea that science is intrinsically in the public interest has reso-
nated in the different registers of economics, culture and politics. In 
economic terms, this is underpinned by the classic definition of a 
public good as non-rivalrous and non-excludable, and thus deliverable 
only by a public body, not the market. Scientific knowledge, it is 
argued, meets these requirements (Stiglitz, 1999). However, this abstract 
notion of a good that can be used by people other than the producers 
has been critiqued and qualified to clarify the actual conditions that 
make it more or less possible to fulfil these requirements in practice. 
For example, recognising the rise of partnerships with commerce, 
Callon (1994) argued that science can still contribute to a public good 
but only through the pursuit of diverse questions and approaches, 
alliances with different networks, and the ability to share knowledge 
and support new collectives. Judging by this criterion, Stengel et al. 
(2009) conclude that UK plant science lacks the qualities of a public 
good.
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The cultural case for an intrinsic public interest in science is also 
widely resonant, though the definition of scientific culture is more 
elusive, resting typically on the capacity of individuals and society to 
appropriate science (Godin and Gingras, 2000). This could encompass 
both the appreciation of science as a cultural good and a more 
instrumentalist economic understanding, though both may be linked 
in practice. For example, the local authority in Nottingham aims to 
develop the city as a place of scientific culture through its STEMCity 
initiative, which links education, community engagement and local 
economic development, and which has become a springboard for an 
ambitious responsible research and innovation project (Nucleus 
Nottingham, 2016). But whether made in isolation or in conjunction, 
both cultural and economic arguments for science in the public interest 
ultimately rest on expectations of the wider engagement in and use 
of science.
The limitations of taking the public interest to reside intrinsically 
within science become especially evident in the context of political 
arguments for supporting research. Whether the state should support 
specific lines of research or research in general is obviously a political 
question with public implications and implicit value choices. Political 
arguments for the intrinsic value of science are often mixed up with 
economic, cultural and societal rationales, as in Blair’s ‘Science Matters’ 
speech. But such arguments should be seen as ‘the commencement 
rather than the completion of public policy’ (Guston, 2000: 48; emphasis 
added) and, more generally, an invitation to public discussion on 
what kinds of research are worth supporting and why (Brown and 
Guston, 2009). Precisely because they involve matters of public interest, 
claims on behalf of, say, state-funded, private or do-it-yourself research 
in synthetic biology should all be open to wider debate in the public 
sphere.
Public support for scientific research in turn entails that a public 
voice be heard. This has been recognised and promoted in policy 
through codes such as the Universal Ethical Code developed in 2007 
by the British Government Office for Science, and through initiatives 
in public dialogue in emerging research and technological fields. The 
ethical code refers to science’s need for a social licence to operate, 
based on a continually renewed relationship of trust, resonating with 
the language of good governance, such as openness and transparency, 
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briefly alluded to in ‘Science Matters’. While these terms signify a 
concern with accountability in the sense of requiring research systems 
to give an account and take note of public responses, research councils 
have also emphasised a need to demonstrate the impact or use of 
research in practice. ‘Science Matters’ was primarily a plea to the 
public to engage with and support science rather than a plea for 
scientific accountability, but it emphasised the use-value of research 
in the form of technological benefits. Paralleling similar developments 
in the USA (Guston, 2000), notions of the intrinsic public interest in 
research have disappeared from the British social contract with science, 
which is now firmly centred on demonstrating accountability and 
usability through wider engagement with the public. But, in practice, 
the terms of this engagement have been too narrowly circumscribed. 
We thus set forward five key principles that we believe underpin 
science–society engagement in the public interest.
First, engagement is not the same as endorsement. Public engagement 
can indeed offer the possibility of enhanced public support for research, 
as Blair envisioned and as political theorists Brown and Guston (2009) 
argue. But this does not mean people will support a specific study 
or technological configuration as a result of public discussion, as 
‘Science Matters’ implied. Informed scrutiny has the potential to open 
up substantive issues that may not have been anticipated in research 
systems. Engagement can lead to many alternative outcomes for the 
proposed research: enhanced public support, criticisms leading to 
modifications, or outright rejection (which might still be accompanied 
by the endorsement of other forms of research). All these outcomes 
represent collective efforts to construct what is in the public interest.
Second, engagement can generate learning by different parties. Public 
engagement can expand the scope of issues deemed relevant for discus-
sion beyond those originally imagined. This could cover matters of 
governance on specific areas of research, but also ideological disagree-
ments about the nature, structure and value of these investments. For 
example, de Saille (2015) found that the social-movement activists 
she interviewed were more sceptical about how research is regulated 
than about the research per se. Likewise, Marris (2015) argues that 
governance issues, such as the lack of transparency about commercial 
links, was a real concern for publics critical of synthetic biology 
research, not commercialisation per se or fundamental ideological 
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objections (e.g. ‘tampering with nature’). Others highlight the gap 
between research funded for commercial purposes versus its public 
value (Moriarty, 2008; Wilsdon et al., 2005).
Third, engagement can open up alternative pathways for research 
and innovation. In determining what should be supported in state-
funded research, one must consider the specific area of research (such 
as its risks, benefits and value to specific parties) and opportunity 
costs – that is, what other possibilities are foregone (Brown and Guston, 
2009). If diversity is a criterion of science as a public good (Callon, 
1994), then the market fails as a mechanism for achieving this good, 
as it prioritises only what elites say we ought to want (Jones, 2013). 
Public engagement, properly understood and devised, might stimulate 
discussion not just of the merits of one research area, but the wider 
question of what kinds of research and innovation are needed to fulfil 
the public interest (Jones, 2013). For example, Hartley et al. (2016) 
argue that to properly assess the merits of an emerging technology, 
such as GM insects, due consideration must be given to alternative 
research pathways to address societal challenges.
Fourth, engagement may involve the use of science to open up alterna-
tive policy pathways. Public engagement with science can take different 
forms, ranging from the appreciation of scientific insights to employing 
(say) climate science to make a case for radical political, economic 
and social change, to opposing experiments using animals in research. 
This means engagement does not only refer to efforts initiated by 
research systems and policymakers – it can also emerge from below. 
Nor does it signify just technological goods as a marker of public 
interest. Publics may engage with what Jasanoff (2006: 24) calls ‘public 
science’, i.e. ‘science that underwrites specific regulatory decisions, 
science offered as legal evidence, science that clarifies the causes and 
impacts of phenomena that are salient to society, and science that 
self-consciously advances broad social goals, such as environmental 
sustainability’. Public science may be used by governments or the law 
in support of specific decisions but it may also be used by publics 
appealing against or seeking to overturn such decisions to advance 
their interpretation of the public interest.
Fifth, as a summary principle, engagement can help revivify what 
is understood to be in the public interest. Public engagement is a process 
for opening up and potentially renegotiating what is in the public 
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interest. In addition to efforts by policymakers to engage the public, 
engagement might also include mobilisation from below by publics 
seeking to engage on their own terms (de Saille, 2015), often providing 
‘the basis for publicity for an alternative view of the public benefit’ 
(Hess, 2011: 630; emphasis added). Knowledge from some areas of 
public science may be used to scrutinise or call to account other 
research areas – for example, those on environmental sustainability. 
Such engagements may emerge from ‘scientific counterpublics’ (Hess, 
2011), who form alliances across different organisations and sectors 
(including science, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), profes-
sional groups and sympathetic parts of the state) and claim to offer 
a better account of the public interest than that assumed by dominant 
actors. The example we consider below of the Haida Nation represents 
one such diverse alliance. But engagement with science might also 
come from smaller, less-networked groups who have yet to persuade 
and mobilise a larger alliance of actors, but nonetheless have substantive 
issues to raise, as we will explore in the animal experiments case.
Both our cases highlight the limitations of conceiving public engage-
ment solely as a procedural exercise for capturing the majority position, 
as often painted by policy sponsors of dialogue activities (Mohr and 
Raman, 2012). Studies of public-engagement exercises sometimes 
unwittingly reproduce the process-oriented languages of inclusion of 
public perspectives or the exclusion of uninvited or unruly publics, 
making it harder to focus on engagement as a mechanism for negotiat-
ing and potentially renegotiating substantive issues around science 
and the public interest. We explore these issues in our cases of animal-
research activism and indigenous communities, which, in opposing 
different aspects of the dominant order, can be viewed as ‘monstrous’ 
in Blair’s ‘Science Matters’ terms, or as warnings of the limits of this 
dominant order (Haraway, 1992).
Challenging animal research … and the ‘monstrous’ public
Animal research is a particularly illuminating case through which to 
consider the limitations of the ‘Science Matters’ representation of 
public engagement as a process for endorsing current research systems. 
Animal research is a high-stakes issue, particularly in the UK (Hobson-
West, 2010). Some argue that using animals is not just a method of 
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science, it is the method of modern scientific inquiry (Rupke, 1987), 
creating an animal–industrial complex (Twine, 2013). Social scientists 
have framed animal research as dependent on a tacit social contract 
between scientists, citizens and the state (Davies et al., 2016). We 
show in this section that public engagement with animal research has 
the potential to open up alternative understandings of what kinds of 
research are in the public interest. Such alternatives have not yet been 
successfully established. However, the capacity for research systems 
and embedded notions of the public interest to change in the future 
cannot be ruled out.
In the UK opinion polls are commissioned regularly by the Govern-
ment and receive significant media coverage (e.g. Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2014). Results of these polls have had 
notable impacts on policy – for example, with funders supporting 
initiatives to open up animal research (McLeod and Hobson-West, 
2016), partly on the assumption that this is what polls show the public 
want. Empirical research has also shown how different actors in the 
debate – including researchers using animals and animal-rights charities 
– claim to be aware of, and actually responsive to, public-opinion 
polling (Hobson-West, 2010). For those conducting animal research, 
claims that their actions are in line with public opinion represents a 
kind of legitimisation strategy (Hobson-West, 2012), so that the polls 
themselves become a route to a ‘social licence to research’ (Raman 
and Mohr, 2014). But beyond national opinion polling, or critiques 
thereof, how should we conceptualise different forms of publics in 
the animal-research debate?
One way is to focus attention on how minority groups are sidelined, 
silenced or undervalued in the sphere of animal-research policymaking. 
One key minority perspective is that animal research should not 
continue, either for ethical (cruelty to animals) or for scientific reasons 
(the unreliability of knowledge and technologies generated through 
animal research). This abolitionist view is sidelined in several ways, 
including via the use of opinion-poll results. For example, in the press 
release accompanying the 2014 Mori Poll (Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2014, no pagination), the Government stresses 
that ‘a majority of the British public accept the use of animals in 
scientific (medical) research “where there is no alternative” ’. It then 
mentions the ‘myths’ that still exist, thereby implying that those who 
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are not in the majority are misled. The minority view is also more 
implicitly sidelined in policy statements, for example, via the claim 
from the UK Home Office (2015, no pagination) that ‘We respect the 
fact that people have strong ethical objections to the use of animals 
in scientific procedures. [But] we have legislated so experimentation 
on animals is only permitted when there is no alternative research 
technique and the expected benefits outweigh any possible adverse 
effects.’
In these examples, opponents of animal research can be understood 
as unruly publics (de Saille, 2015) who challenge the status quo. In 
the UK the peculiar history of active (and sometimes violent) protest 
against animal researchers means that labels of extremism abound, 
including in law, where legislation to control animal-rights activities 
was bound up with a government response to terrorism. This fits well 
with Welsh and Wynne’s (2013) category of the ‘threatening public’, 
where the threat is both literal, in the sense of violence, and metaphori-
cal, in that animal research and the life sciences are tied to economic 
growth (Home Office et al., 2014). If animal research is constructed 
as a key to medical progress, then an abolitionist agenda is enormously 
radical. To return to this book’s metaphor, being seen as not on the 
side of health or progress is monstrous – that is, almost inconceivable 
– as an aberration of logic or civility.
However, one limitation with the focus on inclusion and exclusion 
of publics is that it can unwittingly reproduce a fragmented, indi-
vidualised version of the public. An alternative analytical approach, 
following Hess (2011), is to look for dominant and subordinate networks 
and, crucially, to explore how those networks construct the concept 
of the public interest. Applying this lens to animal research, we can 
identify a dominant, currently stable network consisting of government 
departments such as the Home Office, the pharmaceutical and research 
industry, and, arguably, some powerful research charities, such as 
those campaigning for more research into diseases like cancer. The 
subordinate network comprises animal-rights groups, some religious 
groups opposed to using animals, and scientists and funders involved 
in using or searching for alternatives to animal research. In other 
words, opposition to the use of animals in scientific research is no 
longer seen simply as the vision of an aberrant public (as suggested 
by Blair) but as a position embedded within a set of alliances.
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Given the link made between animal research and medical and 
health progress, one of the key discourses of the subordinate network 
is that animal research is not in the public interest. This is achieved 
in several ways, including by questioning the dominant narrative that 
animal research is equal to medical progress. Critics point to examples 
where results seen in animals have not transferred to success in human 
trials, the fact that many diseases remain without cures and the relative 
lack of research into unexplored areas of science, such as into alterna-
tives to use of animals (Hadwen Trust, n.d.). Others question what it 
means socially, culturally and ethically to live in a society that tolerates 
deliberately killing or harming some species. In short, as predicted 
by Hess (2011), this scientific counter-culture is offering an alternative 
vision of the public interest. This is very different to an analysis focusing 
only on public consultation, where animal-rights groups might be 
seen as representing or giving voice to certain groups of individuals, 
or, as is implied by some of the names of campaign groups, such 
as SPEAK (http://speakcampaigns.org/), giving voice to animals 
themselves.
If counter-movements such as animal-research critics are indeed 
articulating alternative visions of the public interest, then, rather than 
being monstrous in the negative sense described by Blair, we could 
perhaps see them in more positive terms, as calling attention to limits 
of established ways of doing research. Following Haraway (1992), 
what these counterpublics potentially demonstrate is that alternative 
visions of medicine and science are possible, and that the established 
order may one day be overturned through the formation of new 
alliances that come to represent new scientific and social norms.
Challenging fisheries policy through a coalition of an 
indigenous community, public science and the law
We now turn to the case of an indigenous community, the Haida 
Nation, which is asserting and renegotiating the terms of its government-
to-government relationship, as established in numerous agreements 
with the Canadian Federal Government, in the management of marine 
resources in its traditional territories. Disputes over fishing rights 
between British Columbia, First Nations, and the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) reflect a history of legalised 
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colonial dispossession and loss of access by aboriginals to fish (Harris, 
2009). We examine the ongoing herring fishery dispute between the 
Haida Nation and the DFO to illustrate how public science can be 
used and combined with alternative forms of knowledge, such as 
traditional ecological knowledge (Berkes, 2012), in policy disputes. 
As in the animal-research case, this example highlights the limits of 
equating engagement with endorsing the object of engagement. But 
unlike that case, it also shows that subordinate networks (Hess, 2011) 
are capable of expanding their base – in this case, through a coalition 
of the indigenous community, stakeholders, indigenous and ecosystem-
based science, and the law – to renegotiate what is understood to be 
in the public interest.
Haida Gwaii (formerly known as the Queen Charlotte Islands) is 
an archipelago on British Columbia’s northwest coast with a population 
of approximately 5,000 residents, both Haida and non-Haida. The 
islands are the ancestral and contemporary home of the Haida Nation, 
which claims aboriginal rights and title to the archipelago. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has recognised that the Haida Nation has a strong 
prima facie case for the aboriginal title to Haida Gwaii, so the Federal 
Government has a duty to consult the Haida people and accommodate 
their interests (Haida Nation v British Columbia, [2004] SCC 73). 
Herring has significant cultural value for the Haida and other British 
Columbia Coastal First Nations, particularly as spawn on kelp, which 
is a traditional source of food and trade for indigenous peoples along 
British Columbia’s coast. As a forage fish, herring plays an important 
provisioning role in the ecosystem, feeding predatory fish, birds and 
marine mammals, as well as supporting commercial roe herring, 
spawn-on-kelp, and food and bait fisheries in British Columbia. Herring 
stocks in the Haida Gwaii major stock area declined to chronically 
low levels in the 1990s and have yet to recover, resulting in closures 
of the commercial roe herring fishery since 2003 and spawn-on-kelp 
fishery since 2005 (Jones et al., 2017). However, in recent years, there 
have been a number of disputes over the proposed reopening of the 
commercial herring fisheries.
The inclusion and public consultation of First Nations’ communities 
is prominent in fisheries management, but it is typically presented as 
a right of these groups to present their own special interests (von der 
Porten et al., 2016). This narrow characterisation of voice is part of an 
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equally limited understanding of public engagement as a process for 
merely consulting different groups and acknowledging their distinct 
perspectives. Again, drawing on Hess (2011), and as implied in Welsh 
and Wynne (2013), we instead consider the possibility that minority 
voices are capable also of articulating a wider public interest. Minority 
communities often build specific claims for change, intervention or 
the protection of nature based on a collective vision of shared values 
and purpose. The Council of the Haida Nation (CHN) has articulated 
traditional Haida values (CHN, 2007) that it believes are important for 
planning marine use and managing fisheries (Jones et al., 2010). Haida 
values of respect, balance, interconnectedness, reciprocity, seeking wise 
counsel and responsibility have been compared to scientific principles 
of ecosystem-based management (Jones et al., 2010). These community 
values, if meaningfully taken into account in the engagement process, 
may widen what constitutes the public interest (Lam, 2015). This 
possibility was initially subverted by the DFO’s use of public science 
to support its case for reopening the commercial herring fishery in 
Haida Gwaii. However, transient alliances between the CHN and the 
fishing industry in 2014 and the law in 2015 successfully challenged 
the DFO’s construction of what was in the public interest.
In 2015, the DFO consulted the CHN and conducted preseason stock 
assessments that provided the option for closing down the commercial 
herring fishery around Haida Gwaii (Jones et al., 2017). Despite this, 
the then Minister of Fisheries reopened the commercial roe herring 
fishery, which led to a legal challenge from the CHN. Public engagement 
had occurred and procedural requirements had been fulfilled, yet the 
substantive arguments and claim presented in the consultation with 
the Haida that their values had been infringed was overridden in the 
final ministerial decision. The CHN filed an interlocutory injunction 
to prevent the reopening of the herring fishery based on four key 
points: (1) the herring stocks had not sufficiently recovered to support 
the commercial fishery opening, disagreeing with the DFO’s scientific 
assessment; (2) given the infringement of Haida rights and title, the DFO 
had not adequately consulted and accommodated with the Haida Nation; 
(3) the DFO had failed to develop an integrated herring management 
framework with appropriate rebuilding strategies; and (4) reopening 
the fishery contravenes existing negotiated management agreements 
between the Crown and the Haida Nation.
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The Federal Court ruled in favour of the Haida Nation (Haida 
Nation v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), [2015] FC 290). Judge Manson 
challenged the Minister’s weighing of the scientific evidence and the 
lack of meaningful consultation and accommodation with the Haida 
Nation, given the significance of herring to the community’s culture 
and traditions. While the Herring Industry Advisory Board supported 
opening the fishery, the judge noted:
The [United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union] UFAWU, who are 
an integral part of the commercial fishery, supports the Haida Nation’s 
position, for the very reasons why this injunction is being granted:
i) the need for a better and independent science review of the 
herring stocks;
ii) lack of inclusive decision-making;
iii) their own assessment of the state of the roe herring stocks;
iv) respect for local First Nations’ insights;
v) a willingness to build a collaborative understanding of the state 
of the herring in the shared ecosystem. (Haida Nation v Canada 
(Fisheries and Oceans), [2015] FC 290 at [59])
Judge Manson cited the potential for irreparable harm to the herring 
and to the Haida Nation, as well as the balance of convenience, which 
weighs the potential prejudice to all parties, including the Haida Nation, 
the DFO, commercial fishers and the public interest. He concluded 
that granting the injunction was ‘very much in the public interest’.
Thus, an alliance of indigenous-community, scientific, stakeholder 
and legal actors effectively challenged the Canadian Government’s 
approach, both to engagement and to the use of science in informing 
policy decisions. Alternative sources of public science, different framings 
of knowledge, the significance of uncertainty and the role of values 
in informing a precautionary approach to resource management all 
became visible and, at least temporarily, powerful.
Conclusion
The fisheries case illuminates how a minority community successfully 
co-produced, with the law and scientific knowledge, an alternative 
vision of policy in the public interest. By contrast, in the animal-research 
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case, activists opposed to the use of animals in scientific research have 
not yet been successful in institutionalising an alternative vision of 
the public interest, but this is not to say that such an alternative is 
precluded in the future. Both cases call attention to thinking more 
deeply about the grounds on which public engagement with science 
contributes to the public interest.
Science–society scholars suggest that the potential to diversify 
scientific practice and engage with diverse stakeholders is crucial for 
science to achieve the public interest (Stengel et al., 2009). They 
distinguish public value from commercial value, raise the importance 
of diversifying forms of innovation and bring in matters of the govern-
ance of cutting-edge science. These are all important but they focus 
mainly on processes for including publics, omitting the substantive 
matter of what is understood to be in the public interest at any one 
time. We have argued that insofar as public engagement is not simply 
a process for endorsing current research and policy practices, we need 
to pay more attention to its capacity to further the periodic scrutiny 
and renegotiation of what kinds of research and wider public policies 
receive support. In conclusion, we reflect on the potential of science–
public engagements to transform what is taken to be in the public 
interest.
In his ‘Science Matters’ speech, Blair suggested that science is vital 
to Britain’s continued future prosperity and that different parties need 
to collaborate to oppose the small band of obstructionists who were 
acting against the general public interest. Blair’s speech invoked the 
legacy of Newton and Darwin and described science as ‘just knowledge’, 
thus attempting to side-step the relationship between science and 
commerce. Littered with references to nano-scale robots, biomedical 
science, hydrogen power and what he called e-science (‘big data’ in 
today’s parlance), his speech overwhelmingly focused on technological 
outcomes from research producing new knowledge of how things 
work and the capacity to transform these operations, all ultimately 
linked to economic and financial benefits alone. He did not discuss, 
for example, the scientific knowledge that was making visible previously 
unforeseen hazards of industrial activity or drawing attention to the 
limits of technological fixes to environmental challenges. Nonetheless, 
Blair was appealing to a commonsensical view of scientific research 
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for the greater good recurrently invoked in public discourse – most 
recently, by journalists urging an extension of the fourteen-day limit 
on embryo research to ensure benefits from medical science (e.g. 
Harris, 2016). In this equation of science and the public interest, the 
public are represented primarily as beneficiaries.
Yet, in principle, Blair’s intervention opened up the possibility of 
renegotiating how the public interest in science is imagined, articulated 
and constructed through interaction among various different actors. 
Rather than taking the public interest as already given, the reference 
to engagement suggests that the interface between science and the 
public interest can on occasion be opened up and politicised in the 
sense of being ‘made into a part of politics’ (Brown, 2015: 18), at least 
until a new settlement is achieved. The case of the Haida Nation’s role 
in overturning a ministerial decision in Canadian fisheries policy by 
an alliance with public science and the law suggests that such renegotia-
tions may be possible, but are likely to remain fragile unless they are 
supported by wider coalitions. So far, action on animal rights does 
not appear to have been able to similarly overturn dominant under-
standings of research in the public interest. However, our analysis 
suggests that we cannot foreclose future changes to received understand-
ings, which are entirely possible through new and unexpected configura-
tions of activism, public science, the law and publics. Until then, it is 
important to cultivate attention to apparently monstrous voices that 
seem to be discordant with the dominant order but may transform 
it in the future.
In conclusion, our two examples obviously do not negate the larger 
challenge of limits to public expertise and capacity to engage and 
scrutinise either science or policy, let alone articulate diverse perspec-
tives. This capacity is necessarily limited in complex societies (Jasanoff, 
2003), where facts are the aggregation of multiple, often proprietary, 
sources and complex institutional arrangements (Turner, 2015). In 
this context, state resources must be devoted to building independent 
and distributed systems of public expertise to engage and scrutinise, 
especially, large-scale research and innovation systems of the kind 
highlighted in Blair’s speech. Until these systems are developed and 
their ability to elicit diverse perspectives is valued as much as research 
and innovation itself, efforts to connect science and the public interest 
are incomplete at best.
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I used to be younger. In 1987 I conducted an ethnography of the 
creationist movement as my dissertation research. Wonderful it was 
to be in the midst of the granddaddy of science and religion contro-
versies in the years when creationism packaged itself as scientific 
creationism. That experience filled my head with ideas about relations 
between science and religion.
A note to our European readers, including the British: yes, I realise 
it is beyond strange that in a major Western nation a large proportion 
of the population continues to challenge evolution on the basis of 
religious belief. I cannot explain that here. I can only note that this 
is an enduring feature of life in the USA. Creationism is not going to 
go away anytime soon. Our conservatives here insist on celebrating 
US exceptionalism, and then the exceptionalism they give us is hostility 
to evolution. Oy vey.
Several years after I finished my work on creationism, when I wrote 
my second book, Conjuring Science: Scientific Symbols and Cultural 
Meanings in American Life (Toumey, 1996), I used a figure of speech 
that I called ‘science in an Old Testament style’. The chosen people 
knew that their God has some human attributes. After all, isn’t he an 
old white guy with a long beard who is frequently angry at the disobedi-
ence of the people he favours? But they know him less by his personality 
than by powerful mysterious signs like pillars of fire, burning bushes 
and dreadful plagues. My point was that many non-scientists respect 
and appreciate science, but for the most part they know science only 
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that can be manipulated to conjure a misleading image of scientific 
authority.
Now, to extend my simile: in the New Testament, God makes himself 
(or is it herself?) much less mysterious by arriving among us in human 
form. Walking with us, talking with us, eating with us and dying with 
us. If we are truly in an age when science is becoming more open 
and more public than before, then let us say that we are approaching 
science in a New Testament style and that we know that this is what 
we aspire to nurture.
One more phase: when we poor humans knew the God of the New 
Testament better than the one of the Old, there arose a new complica-
tion. A hierarchy of popes and bishops emerged to shape and dispense 
our knowledge of God. Another improvement became necessary. 
Martin Luther and others showed 500 years ago that each of us could 
know God personally and directly without needing clerics and theo-
logians to manage our knowledge of God.
Is there an equivalent to the Protestant Reformation in non-scientists’ 
knowledge of science? Do we need experts, and if so how do we need 
them, and how much do we need them?
After I finished my work on creationism I usually avoided those 
issues. One reason why I originally enjoyed my work on societal and 
cultural issues in nanotechnology was because I thought there were 
no issues of origins and ontology in this area. There is no religious 
denomination that I know of that argues that atoms and molecules 
are unreal. But in 2007 Jamie Wetmore at Arizona State University 
showed me that there were indeed some issues of religious reactions 
to nanotechnology, and that they are important. I have circled back 
to questions of the sacred and the profane in science and technology. 
Nanotechnology is unlike evolution, for which I am grateful, but I 
am back to where I should be when I examine new questions of 
science and religion.
I have a reason for sharing those thoughts with you. It is an honour 
for me to introduce the chapters in the theme of faith. As I do so, I 
see our theme not as a stand-alone part separate from the previous 
three themes, but as a question and a problem tightly intertwined 
with the others. Issues of the sacred and the profane can also be issues 
of openness, publics and experts. My figure of speech is a way to 
appreciate the other three themes as matters of the sacred and the 
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profane; meanwhile, our explorations of science and religion benefit 
from the insights in the other three themes. For example, you see that 
I ask how similar is the process of knowing science to the three-
millennium process of knowing the Judeo-Christian God.
And so here we appreciate the two chapters in this part. First, 
in chapter 15, we have a critique by Fern Elsdon-Baker of research 
on creationism and evolution, and specifically of the assumptions 
and methods that shape definitions and measurements of creationist 
sentiment. The author shows us that large-scale survey research on 
public attitudes about creationism and evolution fails to capture the 
nuance and diversity of those attitudes. Creationism, especially, is 
more interesting than what we see in those surveys. For example, 
creationists frame their views as scientific (calling their programme 
creation science or scientific creationism), as opposed to presenting 
themselves as anti-scientific. This then raises a complicated question: 
if creationists say that their programme is scientific, then what do 
they think science is? Survey research does not capture any of these 
interesting problems. In fact, the author’s extended critique steers us 
to the conclusion that large-scale surveys are terribly problematic in 
examining any issue that embodies nuance and complexity, not limited 
to creationist thought. All this implies that a proper understanding 
of creationist and evolutionary thought, especially among multiple 
publics, is going to need the kind of thick description that comes more 
from face-to-face ethnographic work than from large-scale surveys.
A parallel problem is a package of assumptions about the phenomena 
to be measured. Elsdon-Baker tells the reader that researchers’ thinking 
is secular to a fault; also, that they believe that they need to construct 
a contrast between science and religion. This is a tricky problem. 
True, scientific thinking is rightly grounded in secular values, and 
science should not be expected to execute any religious agenda. But 
it does not necessarily follow that science and religion are intrinsically 
incompatible. One hopes that this fallacy is well known, and that 
serious scholars recognise it, and that they frame their research 
accordingly. One hopes, but the author shows that this fallacy unfor-
tunately remains pervasive in research on public attitudes about crea-
tionism and evolution.
The third theme that guides this chapter is the observation that 
most of the work on creation versus evolution controversies has been 
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done in the USA. From this it might seem as if issues of creationism 
and evolution in other nations are imports from the USA, ‘uncritically 
consumed’ in local circumstances, as Elsdon-Baker puts it.
On the contrary, these controversies are just as much situated and 
adapted in local circumstances as the US versions are situated in US 
culture. The author points out that European values are far more 
secular than US ones and that this has clear consequences for the way 
that creationism flourishes, or fails to flourish, beyond the borders 
of the USA. Evolution elsewhere is hardly ever considered the nexus 
of all evil that American creationists believe it to be. This is not to 
say that creationist and evolutionary thought are either reconciled or 
synthesised in other nations, but neither are they amenable to a ‘clash 
of civilisations’ approach.
Here the author corroborates the 2004 collection Cultures of Creation-
ism, edited by Coleman and Carlin. That work tells us that the Institute 
for Creation Research (ICR, located in southern California) produces 
and exports a particular vision of creationism. That vision is well 
received in many places by conservative Christians, e.g. certain mis-
sionaries and their converts in Kenya and South Korea, but then the 
host cultures adapt the ICR message to local circumstances. One might 
say that these variations of creationist belief show that ICR’s message 
undergoes a process of nuance and diversity, exactly as Elsdon-Baker 
suggests (but which ICR probably did not intend).
Which be the monsters here? Creationists who threaten science? 
Fictitious creationists who are fabricated to conform to secular preju-
dices? Or misguided research assumptions and methods that contain 
structural fallacies which have the effect of suppressing the nuance 
and diversity that are part of the reality of creationism?
Next comes chapter 16 by David A. Kirby and Amy C. Chambers, 
on religious judgements about science in the movies of the twentieth-
century USA. Much has been written about science and religion, and 
also about science and film, but this chapter nicely balances those 
three elements. This is important because one’s religious values and 
beliefs often shape one’s attitudes about science and technology.
We can ask whether Catholic and Protestant officials really under-
stood the science – or rather the movie science – that they judged, 
and also whether they overestimated the power of film to shape viewers’ 
minds and morals. Whatever the case, this chapter shows us that 
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certain Christian leaders felt that they needed to control film content, 
and later to merely evaluate it, especially cinematic depictions of 
science. Topics of sexually transmitted diseases, birth control, eugenics, 
evolution and psychiatry aroused their disapproval, which would then 
lead to government bodies that would channel religious sentiment 
into government censorship. It is a relief to me that Kirby and Chambers 
do not try to measure movie science against realistic science. That 
might have been tempting, but it would have distracted from the 
strength of their chapter.
Which be the monsters here? Movie monsters? Monstrous offenses 
to morality that come from movies about science? Or are they the 
self-appointed gatekeepers of our morality who decided which stories 
of science in the movies would meet their approval?
The chapters
The two chapters in this part enhance the theme of tensions between 
experts and publics. Kirby and Chambers show us that self-appointed 
experts intended to control the ways that movie-going publics think 
about science and morality. I dare say that, in the long run, these 
would-be experts discredited themselves by insisting on small-minded 
interpretations of science and religion, and by imagining that they 
controlled audience behaviour more than they really did. I like today’s 
status quo in which religious authorities offer denominational guidance 
and commentary, and in which their publics can accept or reject those 
views. Note that this is very different from a programme of aspiring 
to control what publics see and think about science and religion.
Elsdon-Baker’s chapter adds more to the question of experts and 
publics. The experts who measure and describe creationism in terms 
of large-scale survey research are unlike the censors in the final chapter, 
but here we see that with the best of intentions experts can inadvertently 
distort the descriptions of creationism and creationists which publics 
encounter when survey research appears in mass media.
In much the same vein, we see that the themes of openness and 
responsibility resonate in these two chapters. If openness is good, 
then experts who are responsible to no-one else are contraindicated, 
as a pharmacist might say. It is not always easy to say to whom one 
is responsible, but here we appreciate that being responsible to no-one 
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is bad for openness, and this at a time when there are good reasons 
to embrace openness in relations between science and religion. To 
put it another way, in tune with my earlier comments, it is inadvisable 
to underestimate the virtue and the influence of the Protestant Reforma-
tion. If we are moving in the direction of relations between faith and 
science that approximate the themes of the Protestant Reformation 
– including the theme of expecting experts to justify the need for 
their expertise – then it is good for experts to be responsible for 
explaining and justifying their values and methods.
The theme of transparency runs parallel to the theme of responsibility. 
Imagine how different it might have been if the experts presented in 
these two chapters had been required to explain in detail to their 
publics how they made their decisions.
I thank the editors for inviting me to introduce the chapters in this 
part, and also the authors for raising the issues they put before us. 
My role in this volume reminds me that there will never be anything 
simple about issues of science and religion. True, there are some 
simplistic opinions, but none of them do justice to these topics. There 
have been times when I wanted to walk away from those issues because 
they required more wisdom or more time for reading, research and 
writing than I possess. Good on you, Elsdon-Baker, Kirby, Chambers 
and the editors, for insisting that we must not turn away from difficult 
issues of science and religion.
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The subject of a clash between scientific and religious world views is 
often repeated as a very real ‘fact’ in scholarly, policy and public 
discourse – with creationists being painted as the ultimate unenlight-
ened monsters that threaten scientific, and by extension societal, 
progress. There is, so we are told, a real and inevitable clash between 
world views – one that within extreme iterations can only be negotiated 
by an outright rejection of either science or religion.
We have become so accustomed to this framing of the relationship 
between evolutionary science and religion that it is now a commonly 
accepted norm within media or scholarly representation of evolutionary 
theory. Routinely, these accounts of anti-evolutionary stances tend to 
be reductionist and rarely look beyond polarised epistemic extremes. 
As Toumey notes:
It is common for enemies of creationism to dismiss it as a simple exercise 
in Biblical inerrancy. Human evolution faces opposition supposedly 
because it contradicts Genesis 1:27, and evolutionary chronology is 
thought to attract enmity because it cannot be reconciled with a period 
of six literal 24-hour days. (Toumey, 1993: 296–297)
The frequently repeated account in public-space discourse is then that 
Darwin’s publication of On the Origin of Species caused significant 
public and theological backlash, and there has been an ongoing battle 
between rational scientific champions and creationist dragons ever 
since. The New Atheists are portrayed as only the latest incarnation 
of those who are brave enough to take up the champion’s banner.
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However, there is currently a significant gap in research, either 
historically or contemporarily, into publics’ perceptions of the relation-
ship between science and religion. It is important to note here I am 
purposely using the term ‘publics’, not the public. This is in recognition 
of the fact that there are multiple ways in which we can think about 
the ‘public’ or indeed that members of such ‘publics’ may identify 
themselves within different contexts. There is also an increasing recogni-
tion that the boundaries between expert, scientist or public can be, 
and have historically been, fuzzy. Indeed, an expert in one subfield 
of scientific research is a ‘public’ to another distinct subfield of research, 
even in some cases within the same discipline. We are all – however 
ensconced we may be in an ivory tower, media organisation or system 
of governance – in differing contexts, at one time or another, a member 
of the public.
This broader conceptualisation of publics is often missing from 
research in this field, which tends to focus more narrowly on certain 
communities. What little systematic social scientific work that has been 
done has tended to focus on the US debates concerning ‘creationism’. 
Often, the more sophisticated research that has been undertaken has 
focused on distinct faith communities or those working within elite 
scientific institutions. Therefore, beyond the polar extremes of these 
debates we have no real idea of how the supposed clash between world 
views plays out in the day-to-day lived experience of wider publics, 
or the role of wider identity politics, or indeed geopolitics, in relation 
to the role of religion and science in society. Moreover, we have no 
real understanding of whether this is an issue that has any salience 
or meaningful consequences for publics at all.
In the interests of reflexivity and as it is integral to the argument 
within this chapter, I want to stress that I am myself a lifelong 
atheist, from an atheist and scientific family, and have for a number 
of years worked within science communication – specifically com-
municating evolutionary biology. Indeed, in 2009 I directed the 
Darwin Now project for the British Council, a multi-million-pound 
project that ran educational, public-engagement and academic 
activities related to the Darwin anniversaries in up to fifty countries 
worldwide. It is this experience of working to engage publics with 
evolutionary science across a range of cultural contexts that led 
me to examine in more detail what the social and cultural drivers 
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behind the idea of a necessary clash between science and religion 
might be.
There are a number of key assumptions at the core of this clash 
narrative, the primary one being that science and religion are in some 
form of intractable conflict, especially when it comes to evolutionary 
science. This implicit assumption pervades the way in which much 
of the debate or research surrounding creationism and evolution is 
conducted. These implicit assumptions, and in some cases outright 
prejudices, in the way that data are collected or research is framed, 
indicate that epistemic assumptions within scholarly research may 
contribute to an inflation of scale and threat in the public, policy and 
media gaze of the phenomena we might refer to as creationism, both 
in broader international context and in the USA (Elsdon-Baker, 2009, 
2015; Hill, 2014a). This in turn means that by using reductionist 
categories and making inflated assumptions about their salience to 
individuals, we are in effect creating creationists in the way we collect 
data (Elsdon-Baker, 2015). As Jonathan Hill observes with regard to 
his 2013 National Study of Religion and Human Origins, a nationally 
representative survey of 3,034 US adults:1
When we carefully define the various possible positions, and measure 
the certainty with which they are held, both anti-evolution creationists 
and atheistic evolutionists turn out to be very small proportions of the 
total population. (Hill, 2014b, no pagination)
Unfortunately, some of the larger scale polling work that has been 
undertaken concerning public perceptions of evolutionary science 
and religion is as a result of the implicit assumptions implied by binary 
measures potentially skewed. This is in part due to the nature of the 
methodologies employed in large-scale polling or data collection. But 
it is also in part due to a lack of reflexivity or critical engagement 
with the individual researchers’ own, or traditional disciplinary, 
assumptions; namely, that evolutionary science and religion are 
inevitably in conflict. It is evident from the issues framing in some 
of this research that there is a set of interlinked value judgements or 
implicit biases that may be at play within facets of the research data 
1 For further details of this survey see the publicly available report at: https://biologos.org/
uploads/projects/nsrho-report.pdf.
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collection in this area of study. These assumptions and biases can be 
characterised by the following statements:
• Anti-evolutionism is always creationism and creationism is 
always anti-evolutionism.
• Creationism is a product of religious world views or theological 
concerns and is inevitable within societies that are religious.
→ Therefore, anti-evolutionary stances are always driven by 
strict adherence to religious world views, not by other social 
or cultural factors.
• Creationism as a mainstream world view is a real-world phe-
nomenon that is on the rise and must be tackled.
• Creationism is a threat to evolutionary science or science more 
broadly.
→ Therefore, evolutionary science is increasingly under threat 
from creationism, which is driven by religious world views, 
ergo (evolutionary) science is inevitably under threat from 
religious world views or societies where they are predominant.
→ Ultimately, by extension, therefore, adherence to religious 
world views will inevitably lead to a necessary rejection of 
some or all facets of scientific world views, perspectives or 
research.
Some or all of the above statements might seem to some to be clear 
common sense or common knowledge. However, whilst we might 
see some or all of these statements as given ‘facts’ and obvious parts 
of the contemporary narrative surrounding the communication of 
evolutionary science, it is important to note that these statements are 
not based to any great degree on empirical data. Nor are they based 
on any form of multilayered analysis that allows us to build a systematic 
understanding of what might be happening at a public-space-discourse, 
group or individual level. Furthermore, by ignoring these different 
levels of analysis we are also ultimately making an implicit assumption 
that for an individual to self-identify as a creationist is always to 
self-identify as an anti-evolutionist. This might seem like a very 
counter-intuitive statement. However, both in a categorical sense – that 
is, in the way we collect survey or polling data – and also in the way 
that people may themselves use the label ‘creationist’ as an identity 
marker, there are indeed times when a creationist is not a ‘creationist’ 
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in the anti-evolutionist sense. A good example of this ambiguity over 
language and identity is the Church of England’s website. In an essay 
entitled ‘Good Religion Needs Good Science’ by the Rev. Dr Malcolm 
Brown, he states that:
There is no reason to doubt that Christ still draws people towards truth 
through the work of scientists as well as others, and many scientists are 
motivated in their work by a perception of the deep beauty of the created 
world. (Brown, n.d., no pagination)
The term ‘created world’ is here used in the context of accepting 
Darwinian evolution as the process ‘by which humanity came to be’. It 
is philosophically entirely plausible to accept evolution as a mechanism 
by which a meta-causal deity ‘created’ humans and all other life forms. 
Indeed, it is not unheard of, in my experience, for those who accept 
all facets of evolutionary theory and a ‘God of first cause’ to refer to 
themselves as creationists.
However, this ambiguity or complexity is not often reflected in the 
more binary examples of research data collection. Nor is it considered 
in the ways in which researchers or science communicators, who are 
often working within more ‘secular’ social-science settings or intellectual 
traditions, approach the entire issue.
Such implicit biases or value judgements concern me when think-
ing about how we might collect data that provides us with a clearer 
account of what the social and cultural drivers are for rejecting 
evolutionary theory. I will expand on this point by focusing, firstly, 
on the implications of the geographical focus and gaps in research 
data and methodological concerns in this field of study, and, sec-
ondly, on the philosophical issues relating to the researchers’ own 
cultural, disciplinary and institutional context within the field of 
study itself.
Geography and anti-evolutionism
Beyond pockets of research undertaken in the USA there is a very 
significant lacuna in research of any kind that explores public percep-
tions or attitudes towards evolutionary science, let alone scholarly 
research that examines how broader publics perceive the relationship 
between their personal belief (or non-belief) and their attitudes towards 
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evolution (Elsdon-Baker, 2015). The problem with this US focus in terms 
of both data and researchers is twofold. Firstly, there is a tendency to 
assume this subject has been fully researched by US-based researchers, 
which leads in places to rather naive extrapolations or generalisations 
from US research into public perceptions onto other culturally distinct 
publics. This is perhaps most notably problematic in parts of Europe 
where religion plays a very different role in public-space discourse. 
Here, non-religious, atheistic or indeed anti-religious narratives are 
far more prevalent and more likely to be the dominant narratives in 
these debates, which will, in turn, impact on the social or cultural 
factors at play. It also assumes that creationism is a US export that is 
uncritically consumed and rebroadcast by creationists from different 
belief systems worldwide. This entirely ignores the possibility that 
there may be a distinct set of localised social and cultural drivers 
relating to the rejection of facets of evolutionary science, so that what 
we may be observing are multiple types of creationism and ways of 
being a creationist.
Additionally, in some of the scholarly discussion to date there is an 
almost alarmist agenda or tone. This is becoming increasingly evident 
in discussions of creationism outside the USA, where there is a very 
significant lack of comprehensive data. This, in part, is an understand-
able response of those within broad science, technology, engineering 
and mathematics studies fields to a perception of an increase in creation-
ist discourses outside US contexts (see Blancke et al. (2013) for a good 
example and comprehensive overview of this concern in Europe). 
While I am not denying that creationist or intelligent-design narratives 
and groups do exist in Europe and internationally, we need to be very 
wary – especially when we have little empirical data – of inflating the 
levels of acceptance, salience or influence of such positions. As Blancke 
et al. (2013) show, there have been some quite vocal incursions of 
advocates of creationism (or its fellow traveller, intelligent design) 
into policy discussions within European contexts. As is often the way 
in public debate or online forums, it is often those who shout the 
loudest who gain the most attention, but it would be folly for the 
academy to assume that being vocal or having access to a privileged 
platform means that such individuals are acting in a way that is 
representative of broader publics’ actual perspectives.
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Such a significant lack of information about what publics really think 
with regard to evolution, faith and belief carries the risk that both of 
the counter-oppositional sides of the polarised narratives within these 
debates – ‘creationists’ and ‘hard-line atheistic evolutionists’ – can 
make claims that cannot be countered or refuted in any way. This kind 
of abstract debate might seem to be of limited importance outside 
US educational-policy arenas. But into this research vacuum steps 
speculation, implicit bias and, in some cases, outright prejudice.
Within a broader geopolitical context, the notion of the ‘threat of 
creationism’ is being tied to more pernicious clash-of-civilisation narra-
tives. In the UK, for example, there are some recent cases whereby this 
this kind of implicit bias might be implemented within UK educational 
policy.2 This is particularly evident in relation to concepts of British 
values and the purported, yet to date empirically unfounded, threat of 
Islamic versions of creationism (Elsdon-Baker, 2015; Hameed, 2014).
Data, methods and rejection of evolution
All too often, given the gap in data, scholars are reliant on the few 
quantitative surveys that have been undertaken (e.g. Blanke et al., 
2013; Gallup, n.d.; Hameed, 2008; Miller et al., 2006; Newport, 2014; 
Pew Research Center, 2013). Given the nature of the commissioning 
processes involved and the way in which this kind of polling is 
conducted, this kind of research builds in from the outset a framing 
of research questions that may contribute to an inflation of the numbers 
of people we might classify as creationist, which further serves to 
exacerbate the public and scholarly discourse on the inevitability of 
the clash between evolution on the one hand and creationism on the 
other (see Elsdon-Baker (2015) for a more thorough analysis of issues 
framing in quantitative research in this field). A core component of 
such surveys or studies tends to be the development of measures that 
2 For an interesting example of this in relation to Nicky Morgan, then Education 
Secretary, see the article by Matthew Holehouse in the Telegraph, 7 August 2014: 
‘Toddlers at Risk of Extremism, Warns Education Secretary’ (www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/politics/11020356/Toddlers-at-risk-of-extremism-warns-Education-
Secretary.html), where the teaching of creationism in nurseries is linked to ‘extremism’ 
as part of a counter-terrorist response to the Trojan horse affair.
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seek to ascertain levels of rejection of evolution or acceptance of 
creationism. These are very much based on models that have been in 
use in the USA for the past few decades, and are evident in the Gallup 
polls that have been conducted since 1982, which ask:
Which of the following statements comes closest to your views on the 
origin and development of human beings:
1. ‘Human beings have developed over millions of years from less 
advanced forms of life, but God guided this process’.
2. ‘Human beings have developed over millions of years from less 
advanced forms of life, but God had no part in this process’.
3. ‘God created human beings pretty much in their present form at 
one time within the last 10,000 years or so’. (Gallup, n.d.)
The respondents who chose option 3, the ‘creationist’ option, have 
stayed relatively consistently at 40%–47% between 1982 and 2014 
(Newport, 2014). However, as Hill (2014a) has shown, a systematic 
and conscious affiliation with creationism is more limited. When 
asked, only 8% of survey respondents agreed with all aspects of the 
conventional young-earth-creationist world view, involving the creation 
of earth in seven twenty-four-hour days and a historical Adam and 
Eve. A large proportion (37%) of those classified as creationists in 
Gallup’s terms also do not see correct belief about evolution as ‘very’ 
or ‘extremely’ important.
While this kind of polling is indicative of broader trends, it cannot 
on its own give us an understanding of how salient these matters 
are to individuals in their day-to-day lives, or how other complex 
factors, including cultural identity, might play a role in how people 
respond to these questions. However, this kind of large-scale public-
attitudes measure is relatively commonplace within research to date 
into public perceptions of science. Given the history, agendas and 
development of science communication or public understanding of 
science as an academic field of research (Bauer et al., 2007), and 
also significantly as a practice, in recent decades it is unsurprising 
that there has been little engagement with the growing body of work 
in the sociology of religion that seeks to understand groups’ lived 
experience of beliefs, or approaches that might seek to understand 
belief systems as a form of cultural identity or a form of belief and 
belonging.
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Public understanding and anti-evolutionism
So, while there has been an emphasis in scholarly approaches on 
the perceived rise in creationism and creationist discourses, or in 
bluntly measuring numbers of creationists, contextual research has 
been lacking. Such research would need to explore the salience of 
creationism across populations or cultural contexts, the real lived 
experience of such a phenomenon, and general levels of understanding 
of what key terms in polling or surveying research (e.g. evolution, 
ancestor, creator or god) might mean to the respondents. Furthermore, 
negligible research has been done outside the USA to examine creation-
ist discourses themselves, or the impact and level of influence these 
creationist groups or discourses might have on the general population. 
Additionally, alongside such studies there is a need for more analysis 
of what ‘creationist’ public-space discourses might be responding to, 
for example, in terms of secular humanist discourses or the perceived 
(and real) atheistic framing of evolution and broader cultural-identity 
issues (Hameed, 2014; Toumey, 1993). These approaches would give us 
a much clearer idea of what is being rejected when individuals reject 
evolution in large-scale surveys or quantitative research. In order to 
do this effectively, we need to move away from simplistic models that 
assume that the only reasons one might reject evolution are due to 
a literalist religious stance, or that the debate is purely about a clash 
between epistemic world views (Elsdon-Baker, 2016; Evans and Evans, 
2008; Toumey, 1993).
New approaches and their limits
Therefore, in order to really understand public perceptions of the 
relationship between religious or spiritual belief and science, or indeed 
perceptions of evolution per se, we should try to remove any form of 
value judgment when evaluating the relationship between creation-
ist and evolution. As Wylie and Nelson similarly observe in their 
review of the impact of gendered contextual and epistemic values on 
scientific research: ‘Typically, these effects arise and persist because 
scientists are unaware of the values informing the research traditions in 
which they are educated and in which they work’ (Wylie and Nelson, 
2007: 78).
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However, drawing on the positive impact of feminist approaches in a 
range of fields including anthropology, biological sciences, archaeology 
and the history of science, it is clear that we do not have to retreat 
into relativism if we accept and recognise the epistemic contexts 
within which we work. As Wylie and Nelson (2007) further highlight, 
the enterprise of science itself has a shifting and changing agenda. 
This is both an opportunity and a concern, in terms of the highly 
politicised social-scientific study of religion, the critical reappraisal 
of the secularisation thesis, and the increasingly geopolitical or trans-
national understanding of science and religion debates within society. 
Particularly in light of feminist, or indeed postcolonial, approaches 
to science studies, which have not only sought to avoid disappearing 
gender or race, but have also provided a new lens through which to 
increase our understanding of certain fields.
And yet the problems for the social-scientific study of religion and 
science are manifold. Firstly, there is the real potential for a strong 
conflation between the perceived need for science communication, 
science education or scientific-practice-based research to draw a 
distinct demarcation between ‘science’ and ‘non-science’, and the way 
that researchers in these or related fields may tackle the boundaries 
between public perceptions of ‘science’ and ‘religion’. Such concerns 
might lead to an obfuscation of the more fluid and complex ways 
that we define, practice or engage with that nebulous entity we call 
science. Furthermore, it also fundamentally disregards the possibility 
that ‘science’ can act as a cultural identity as well as a methodological 
framework for understanding the world around us.
Secondly, not only is there a case to be made that there is a disap-
pearing of the epistemic facets of religious belief from the study of 
religion, but also there is an added issue relating to the development of 
the social-scientific study of religion as a ‘secular’ discourse or approach 
(Evans and Evans, 2008). This is largely due to the values-based contexts 
which in places, both historically and within the academy today, have 
at least defined social- or natural-scientific research in contradistinc-
tion to ‘religious’ world views, or at worst have framed science as 
openly anti-religious. In the latter polarising binary narrative, to be 
a scientist (in this case a social scientist) you must be non-religious. 
This is then further compounded by subtle and nuanced differences in 
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terms of the context, disciplinary history, practice and methodologies 
between different cultural contexts in how religion (and science and 
religion) is studied academically, which is in evidence even between 
purportedly similar anglophone contexts, e.g. researchers based in 
the UK and the USA.
By identifying the ways in which an open-minded and reflexive 
examination of scholarly research in the social and cultural study 
of science and religion, as both a subject for empirical enquiry and 
a methodological commitment, we can potentially open up new 
innovative lines of enquiry. To achieve this the submerged biases 
within existing research need to be examined. If we expand Wylie 
and Nelson’s argument beyond the gender biases, which have become 
increasingly more evident in the academy, to the possibility that there 
are secular or Western epistemic biases too, we will have to confront 
the agendas of science as a programme, a cultural identity and a 
geopolitical world view in order to create space for new, more fruitful 
avenues of empirical research which enable us to better understand the 
role of religious (or spiritual) belief in society and public perceptions 
of its relationship with science.
Furthermore, if we were to take a step back from some of the 
value judgements I outlined at the beginning of this chapter, we 
might be able to revisit the entire discussion of what public percep-
tions of evolutionary science are, and what might actually be acting 
as the cultural or social drivers that lead individuals or groups to 
adopt anti-evolutionary stances or to voice concerns or doubts over 
evolutionary science per se. Thus, if we move from simply focusing 
on ‘anti-evolutionism’ as a ‘religious’ reaction to evolutionary theory 
and start to unpick what might be wider moral and ethical, historical, 
cultural, or societal concerns, we will start to develop a more nuanced 
picture of what exactly is driving anti-evolutionary, and by extension 
broader, anti-science stances within certain groups or communities. 
This is especially pertinent for understanding public responses across 
international contexts where differences in colonial experience and 
legacy, or the current geopolitical framing of world views or cultural, 
religious or ethnic identities will undoubtedly influence the ways in 
which people form attitudes or perceptions of evolutionary science 
or indeed ‘Western science’ itself.
270 Science and the politics of openness
Moral values and anti-evolutionism
We therefore need to more carefully examine what exactly the moral 
concerns might be that lead to a rejection of, or lack of trust in, 
evolutionary science. Both historically and contemporarily there have, 
to say the least, been some highly socially objectionable misappropria-
tions of evolutionary science, the most obvious being the ‘scientific 
racism’ and eugenics movement, which saw enforced sterilisations in a 
number of countries worldwide. This may seem like a mere historical 
concern that relates only to the interwar period and the atrocities of 
Nazi Germany. However, eugenical programmes were adopted by a 
number of countries across North and Latin America, Europe, and 
Asia (Broberg and Rolls-Hansen, 2005; Stepan, 1991; Stone, 2001). 
It should also not be forgotten that the last of these laws in the USA 
was not repealed until as late as 1979, and in Alberta, Canada, they 
were not repealed until 1972.
This is within living memory for many publics, individuals or com-
munities. These programmes were not always aimed at those who 
were seen as ‘mentally unfit’, but there were also within a number of 
contexts (including in the US) programmes of enforced sterilisation 
that targeted indigenous, migrant or ethnic-minority populations. This 
can still leave a lasting legacy today, either in the current discourses, 
or perceptions, concerning ethnicity and genetic screening (for a good 
example of this in California, see Stern (2005)). More worryingly, 
forced sterilisation is still a contemporary issue for some ethnic groups, 
leading the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2014 to release an 
interagency statement seeking to tackle: ‘forced, coercive or otherwise 
involuntary sterilisation’, and noting that:
in some countries, people belonging to certain population groups, 
including people living with HIV, persons with disabilities, indigenous 
peoples and ethnic minorities, and transgender and intersex persons, 
continue to be sterilized without their full, free and informed consent. 
(WHO, 2014: 1)
The linking of Darwinism, eugenics and creationism does indeed 
form a part of creationist anti-evolutionary literature. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the fact that it was Charles Darwin’s cousin Francis 
Galton who first coined the term eugenics, even though he did not 
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do so until a year after Darwin’s death in 1882 (it is, however, worth 
noting that Darwin and Galton strongly disagreed on mechanisms 
of inheritance). There are even attempts on websites such as creation.
com to link Richard Dawkins and New Atheist discourses with earlier 
eugenically inspired approaches.3 However, while there is evidence 
of concerns over eugenics in creationism literature and discourse, 
insufficient historical research has been undertaken to examine the 
possible links between the development of anti-sterilisation discourses 
and creationist discourses in North America or elsewhere. As Dack 
(2011) notes in his analysis of the Alberta eugenics movement and 
Sexual Sterilization Act:
[A] number of pamphlets and books were published in Canada during 
the mid-1930s, mostly by religious organizations in Ontario and Quebec, 
which were widely circulated in Alberta and spoke out against the 
province’s sterilization law. (Dack, 2011: 102)
If we take the case of enforced sterilisation in 1930s Alberta, Canada, 
as an example, we can begin to see how the impact of these laws and 
subsequent programmes could possibly be linked to the development 
of creationist anti-evolution discourses. There is, of course, a need 
here for further and systematic historical study.
Even within well-studied contexts such as North America, then, not 
enough research has been done that allows historical insights into the 
impact of social factors such as sterilisation laws and ‘scientific racism’ 
on consolidating public anti-evolutionary stances. What research has 
been done has tended (for sound methodological reasons) to focus 
solely on explicitly creationist discourses and does not tend to explore 
those on the periphery of those debates or who do not explicitly endorse 
a strong creationist stance. However, concerns over sterilisation and 
eugenics are cited in creationist literature as part of a whole package 
of moral issues that are linked to evolutionary theory (Numbers, 1993; 
Toumey, 1993). Within broader international contexts, there has been 
a long legacy of evolutionary theory being perceived as being entwined 
with racial stereotyping and reductionist anthropological approaches. 
This is, again, not just a historically situated concern, but has been 
3 See http://creation.com/dawkins-and-eugenics.
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prevalent in more recent highly problematic articulations of alleged 
‘racial’ differences.
A classic example of this is the publication of The Bell Curve: Intel-
ligence and Class Structure in American Life by Richard Herrnstein 
and Charles Murray in 1994, which controversially discussed racial 
differences in intelligence due to both genetic and environmental 
factors, with people of African descent being seen as inherently less 
intelligent than those of Caucasian or Asian descent. This is a view 
that was heavily echoed in the public scandal caused by the Nobel-
Prize-winning geneticist James Watson in 2007.4
These more recent examples can only add to longer-term concerns 
within some groups or communities that facets of ‘evolutionary science’ 
or ‘genetics’ are inherently racist or sexist. More recently we have 
also seen this in the linking by Richard Dawkins in his rhetoric over 
‘Islamic creationism’ with broader Islamophobic narratives (Hameed, 
2014). Taking into account the issue of race and ethnicity alongside the 
broader issues of perceived links between ‘evolution’ and ‘secularisation’ 
will no doubt play an important role in any research that seeks to 
unpick increasingly complex and geopoliticised debates on Muslim 
perceptions of evolution. As Hameed (2014) states:
The rejection of evolution may be becoming another contested marker 
for Muslim minorities [in Europe] in schools. In fact, one can see why 
evolution may be the target: for many, evolution is one of the prime 
reasons for the secularization of Europe. Furthermore, it is often pitted 
against religion in popular press and many conflate evolutionary biology 
with racism associated with Eugenics and social Darwinism. (Hameed, 
2014: 393)
There is no causal relationship between adopting an evolutionary-
science paradigm for research and some of the atrocities conducted 
under the banner of eugenics, social Darwinism or public policies 
of enforced sterilisation that have affected potentially hundreds of 
thousands of people due to their race, ethnicity, gender or mental 
health status. However, in public perceptions of evolutionary science 
these societal issues clearly do (rightly) count, and will most likely 
4 See www.independent.co.uk/news/science/fury-at-dna-pioneers-theory-africans-are-
less-intelligent-than-westerners-394898.html.
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for some individuals, groups or communities play a role in the way 
in which people might perceive evolutionary science today.
This broader linking of moral or societal concerns and a mishmash 
of identity issues relating to secularism with evolutionary science is 
stressed in the work of Evans and Evans (2008) and builds on the work 
of Toumey (1993), who, when discussing the linking of evolution-
ary theory to secular humanism within US creationist discourses, 
argued that:
The key to understanding the intellectual structure of creationist thought 
is to see that it is part of a larger body of thought, that is, fundamentalist 
moral theory. This latter body of theory addresses a broad range of 
issues and worries about modern American culture and social change. 
As a result, creationist commentaries on both creation and evolution 
often refer, directly or indirectly, to the moral meanings that make those 
issues and worries so urgent to creationists and other fundamentalists. 
Much of the existential content of creationist thought is a broad cultural 
discontent, featuring fear of anarchy, revulsion for abortion, disdain for 
promiscuity, and endless other issues, to which evolution is then 
appended. (Toumey, 1993: 297)
As Evans and Evans suggest, there may be factors beyond epistemologi-
cal concerns at play, stating that ‘public debates between religion and 
science are no longer about truth, but rather about values’ (Evans and 
Evans, 2008: 100).
The influence of these kinds of social and cultural narratives upon 
the views held by broader populations globally about evolution or the 
relationship between science and religion has been understudied, as 
has the wider link between being anti-evolution and anti-science, or 
the levels of trust in science among individuals or groups who reject 
Darwinian evolution.
Unfortunately, due to the primary, and in some cases sole, focus 
of social scientists on a kind of literalist or religious fundamentalist 
creationism as the only show in town when it comes to reasons for 
rejecting evolution, these wider, more nuanced and, on occasion, 
entirely credible social concerns over the perceived application of 
evolutionary science in society or public policy are often lost. Added 
to this is the compounding factor that the individuals, groups or 
communities most likely to be impacted on by such discourses are 
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often the least likely to have a voice in public science or education 
policy. Moreover, they are seldom seen as an important or primary 
audience for science communication initiatives. Lumping together 
these important – yet often complex and nuanced – moral, social, 
political and geopolitical concerns with what are caricatured as extreme 
fundamentalist religious positions inhibits us from building a better 
understanding of what might be at play when people say they reject 
evolution. Little or no data have been systematically collected across 
publics to discern how these factors may or may not impact on the 
ways in which people negotiate, accept or reject evolutionary science.
Future research directions
What is needed, then, is a more internationally focused programme of 
research into these kinds of social and cultural narratives that moves us 
away from a less reflexive or reductionist approach towards a contextual 
whole-systems approach which incorporates both quantitative and 
qualitative data collection. Indeed, I am currently directing one such 
programme of research with sociologists, social scientists, historians, 
social psychologists and myself as the token philosopher. We expect that 
this type of research will go some way towards allowing a multilayered 
analysis of the different social and cultural drivers for the rejection 
of evolutionary science across a spectrum of publics at the level of 
individuals, groups, communities and societies. Far from arguing that 
quantitative research plays no role in this more systematic approach, 
I am arguing that we need to recognise that the kind of survey work 
discussed above should not be used solely to give us one-off snapshots. 
Instead, it is important to examine in more depth the issues framing 
within question design, together with the cross-correlation between 
survey items, and to resist using simple measures to draw comparative 
conclusions across cultural contexts. This kind of survey research, when 
used in conjunction with more in-depth historical, social psychological 
and qualitative data, can provide us with an opportunity to understand 
trends within the broader societal narratives. Given the contextual 
and translation issues inherent in international research, we should be 
careful to view this as part of a package of cultural- or country-specific 
case studies, as opposed to some kind of pseudo-comparative league 
table, as has been in evidence in some of the literature in this field. 
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As Bauer (2008: 124) notes in his review of survey research and the 
public understanding of science, ‘The abuse of survey data is clearly 
possible and documented … But the misuse of an instrument does 
not exhaust its potential.’
There is therefore a clear need to develop a more systematic field 
of humanities and social-science research (incorporating expertise 
from the currently predominately distinct study of both ‘science’ and 
‘religion’) that seeks to explore these questions and to ask: ‘Is public-
space religion always public-space science’s ultimate “other”?’ This is 
not only important in terms of our own research practice, but could 
enable a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
science and religion that provides space for a productive dialogue 
and avenues for public engagement across a range of issues relating 
to the role of science in society both nationally and internationally.
To return to the theme of this book: if we go looking for monsters 
real or imagined, we will often find them, as is the case with creationists. 
However, sometimes we should be aware that these are monsters only 
because we choose to see them that way. Furthermore, in terms of 
truly critically engaging with our own disciplinary norms, hegemonies 
and implicit biases (or indeed prejudices), it may well be that the 
monster we fear the most is the one we will find if we look too closely 
in the mirror.
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Playing God: religious influences on the 
depictions of science in mainstream movies
David A. Kirby, Amy C. Chambers
Research on public attitudes towards science has revealed that individu-
als’ personal values and belief system are crucial factors in determining 
how they respond to new developments in science, technology and 
medicine, such as nanotechnology (Brossard et al., 2009; Nisbet and 
Scheufele, 2009; Scheufele et al., 2009; Toumey, 2011). Few cultural 
institutions have more influence on personal values and belief systems 
than religion, and few cultural products have as much impact on 
public perceptions of science as the mass media.
In popular works and in many scholarly texts the interface between 
science and religion has traditionally been depicted as one of unbridge-
able conflict (Evans and Evans, 2008). This divide has a long pedigree 
in British Gothic literature. It takes early form in Mary Shelley’s 1818 
novel Frankenstein (Shelley 1998), where a scientist plays God and 
creates a grotesque creature, rendering himself monstrous in the 
making of what the outside world deems a monster. In Bram Stoker’s 
Dracula (2003 [1897]), the fearless vampire hunters must turn to 
ancient religious rites to defeat a monster that has descended upon 
an unsuspecting and technologically advanced London on the cusp 
of a new century. A distrust of scientists, who have turned away from 
morality and religion to dabble disastrously in questions of creation, 
runs through classic science fiction stories of biological horror and 
hybridity, like H. G. Wells’s The Island of Dr Moreau (1996 [1896]) 
and Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde (2000 [1886]), respectively.
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Despite the cultural resonance of this conflict narrative, though, 
scholars have raised doubts in recent years about its historical and 
contemporary basis (Ferngren, 2002). Nonetheless, the relationship 
between science and religion remains a topic of concern for the scientific 
community as well for various religious communities. One of the 
spaces where these concerns play out is in the stories we tell about 
science in the mass media, which occasionally identify metaphorical 
monsters in the double sense of the word – to warn and to show – as 
outlined by Nerlich et al. in the Introduction to this volume.
In our research we find that religious communities, primarily Western 
mainstream Christians, have often attempted to influence the way 
stories about science have appeared on cinema screens because they 
believed that movies were a powerful force in determining our percep-
tions of the world. These religious groups were concerned about the 
ways that movies portrayed science’s role in society and science’s place 
as a knowledge producer, and tried to control how the stories were 
told and how audiences interpreted them. By examining the negotiations 
between religious groups and the entertainment industry, we reveal 
how the culturally powerful medium of cinema has historically served 
as an arena where science, religion and morality come into conflict.
In this chapter we will explore the ways that filmmakers have 
converted the sciences into cinematic products and how religious 
groups have altered, responded to and appropriated these scripts by 
formal and informal censorship, negotiations with filmmakers during 
production and distribution, and reviews written as guidance for 
religious audiences. This topic is far too large to be adequately covered 
in a single chapter. We can only provide a historical overview that 
focuses on Christian responses in the USA. This focus is justified by 
the fact that the USA has historically been the world’s predominant 
producer of entertainment media and religious responses to movies 
have primarily emanated from Christian communities. The Christian 
community is not a monolithic entity, however.
This chapter will cover the diverse responses to science in movies 
among Christian groups, including differing responses from Catholics 
and Protestants. Through this exploration we provide some insights 
into what religiously minded people considered to be morally offensive, 
indecent, threatening or ‘monstrous’ about science and scientific ways 
of thinking. Religious responses to movie narratives show us the kinds 
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of stories moral reformers did, and did not, want told about science 
as a social, political and cultural force.
1900–1933: origins of film censorship and movies as  
social propaganda
Religious anxieties about the moral impact of movies on the public 
began with the proliferation of nickelodeons in the 1900s. A number of 
reform organisations with religious orientations, such as the Women’s 
Christian Temperance Union and the Federation of Churches, 
complained about the perceived immoral content of early movies. 
These groups worried that ‘obscene’ messages in films were degrading 
the morals of lower class and immigrant populations (Grieveson, 
2004). Pressure from religious groups led to the creation of local 
censorship boards in municipalities and states across the USA in 
the 1910s. But the presence of local censors did not mollify religious 
protestors, who continually pushed for a government-administrated 
national censor board. Fearing this, the film industry established an 
autonomous self-censorship organisation called the National Board 
of Censorship in 1909 (renamed the National Board of Review in 
1915). Although mainstream film producers agreed to submit their 
scripts to this board for approval, it proved to be ineffective, leading 
religious reformers to call for the creation of a federally run censorship 
board. Hollywood’s response was to bring in Postmaster General Will 
H. Hays, who was also a Presbyterian deacon, in 1922 to head a new 
self-censorship organisation called the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America, which became popularly known as the ‘Hays 
Office’ (Black, 1996).
Religious groups’ (and thus censors’) concerns about the persuasive 
power of the cinema were in line with the thinking of contemporary 
social-science researchers about the influence of media messages on 
attitudes and behaviour, especially after witnessing the effectiveness 
of strategic propaganda during World War I. Activist groups of all 
types considered movies an ideal tool for social propaganda. These 
activists included public health officials, medical researchers and 
progressive reformers who used movies in campaigns to dissemi-
nate scientific discoveries about public health and to promote faith 
in scientific solutions to what were referred to as ‘social diseases’ 
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such as syphilis, as well as other science-related social issues like 
eugenics and birth control (Parry, 2013; Pernick, 1996; Schaefer,  
1999).
The producers of medical propaganda films believed that they were 
contributing to the moral good by persuading people to change their 
behaviour, but these films proved to be highly controversial. Initially, 
the difficulty for censors was that these films were all related to sexual 
reproduction and sex was the one subject that every censor board 
agreed was inappropriate for mainstream movies. But censors also 
considered that stories featuring modern medical science were emotion-
ally upsetting and aesthetically unpleasant. Ultimately, responses to 
films dealing with venereal disease (VD), reproductive technologies 
and eugenics shaped subsequent national censorship policies by 
broadening censors’ views on what aspects of a film were censorable 
beyond just sexual content.
Damaged Goods (1914) was the first motion picture to tackle the 
issue of VD, a term used until the 1990s, when it was replaced by the 
phrase ‘sexually transmitted diseases’. The box office success of this 
sexually provocative morality tale resulted in the production of a host 
of other ‘sex hygiene’ films in the late 1910s, such as The Spreading 
Evil (1918) and The Scarlet Trail (1918). Despite their significant sexual 
content there was very little official censorship of these films because 
they endorsed morality and abstinence as the weapons for fighting 
VD (Schaefer, 1999). After World War I, however, censors’ policies 
on VD films shifted dramatically when two government-produced 
educational films, Fit to Fight (1918) and The End of the Road (1918), 
were released to wider audiences. They differed from earlier films by 
focusing on the use of prophylactics as a method for reducing the 
spread of VD, which led to widespread condemnation by Catholic 
groups (Parry, 2013). In addition, one of the very first studies into 
the effect of the cinema on audiences concluded that VD films could 
be harmful to mixed-gender audiences and should not be shown 
indiscriminately (Grieveson, 2004). These studies, combined with the 
Catholic protests, forced censorship groups to re-evaluate the entertain-
ment value of VD films and their appropriateness for public consump-
tion. Ultimately, VD films spurred censors’ construction of a distinction 
between entertainment and educational films. This distinction played 
a crucial role in later censorship policies and it led to the physical 
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segregation of the places where these two types of film could be shown 
(Pernick, 1996).
The inclusion of prophylactics in VD films was a major issue for 
religious groups because they were concerned with any cinematic 
narrative depicting birth-control technologies. Contraceptives were 
illegal in the USA before 1918, but a large number of activists were 
working to repeal these laws. Movies became a battleground upon 
which both sides of the birth-control controversy tried to sway public 
opinion, with advocate Margaret Sanger’s Birth Control (1917) compet-
ing with anti-birth-control films such as The House Without Children 
(1919). Unlike VD films, which escaped early censorship, birth-control 
films were heavily censored and often banned outright by state censor 
boards. In some cases birth-control proponents tried to get around 
religiously based censorship by promoting birth control as a better 
alternative to abortion, but this tactic was unsuccessful (Parry, 2013).
Religious organisations were not the only cultural group supporting 
censors’ efforts to restrain public access to films featuring controversial 
medical topics like birth control. Medical scientists also strongly 
opposed activists’ use of film. Birth control was a subject best left to 
scientific experts because its filmic depiction might undermine 
confidence in the medical professions by empowering the public to 
challenge medical authority. In this case, scientists joined religious 
reformers in endorsing the distinction censors made between entertain-
ment and educational films (Ostherr, 2013).
Eugenics was one of the most controversial medical topics during 
this time and the subject appeared in a large number of propagandistic 
fictional films produced between 1910 and the mid-1920s, including 
the pro-eugenics Heredity (1915) and the anti-eugenics The Regeneration 
of Margaret (1916). Eugenics was a particularly thorny subject because 
it often led to overt discussions of birth control, sterilisation and 
euthanasia. In addition, religious groups considered these stories 
immoral because they portrayed human reproduction as an outcome 
of scientific tinkering rather than as the spiritual expression of 
matrimonial love. But censors targeted eugenics films not just for 
their sexual morality but also because they were intellectually demand-
ing, emotionally upsetting and aesthetically unpleasant (Pernick, 1996). 
Many religious film viewers and censors believed that the images of 
Playing God 283
deformed bodies were too distressing for most viewers and could 
even cause birth defects in pregnant women.
The desire to eliminate ‘unpleasant’ medical subjects provoked 
censors to go beyond merely policing sexual morality to enforce 
visual standards for movies. In this way eugenics and other medical 
films played a central role in the emergence of what Martin Pernick 
(2007: 30) refers to as ‘aesthetic censorship’. Many of the informal 
censorship policies that had arisen in direct response to medical films 
were formalised by the later adoption of the Motion Picture Produc-
tion Code. This meant that films that dealt with VD, birth control 
and eugenics had virtually disappeared from commercial theatres 
by 1930.
Although the Hays Office took a strong position on medical films, 
it ultimately proved to be as ineffective as the National Board of Review. 
Hays believed that the only way studios would abide by his office’s 
recommendations was if they agreed to adhere to a formal set of 
guidelines as to what was censorable. In 1930 studio heads agreed to 
abide by a code of standards called the Motion Picture Production 
Code that had been written by two prominent Catholics (Leff and 
Simmons, 2001). Martin Quigley was editor of the trade paper Motion 
Picture Herald; Father Daniel A. Lord was a Jesuit priest. (We will use 
the term Production Code to refer to the Motion Picture Production 
Code of 1930.) The Hays Office, however, could not force studios to 
accept their suggestions. This meant that, despite their agreement to 
abide by the Production Code, studios still frequently ignored its 
recommendations (Olasky, 1985). The director of the Hays Office at 
this time, Colonel Jason Joy, took a particularly lax approach to the 
Production Code, which he viewed as a flexible set of guidelines rather 
than a hard and fast set of rules. Because of Joy’s lenient approach, 
the period between 1930 and 1934 is referred to as the pre-Code era.
There were no specific policies addressing science in the Production 
Code, although the document did include language explicitly addressing 
previous issues related to eugenics, VD and birth control. Other aspects 
of medical science became censorable because they fell under the 
heading of ‘repellent subjects’. The Hays Office warned studios about 
the potentially ‘gruesome’ nature of film sequences involving surgical 
operations (Lederer, 1998).
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Science did run afoul of local censor boards’ religious sensibilities 
during this period. The rise of the horror film caused a number of 
censorship problems, including concerns about the monstrous nature 
of modern science. Censors were concerned about the stories frighten-
ing audiences and the gruesomeness of monsters. But one of the 
primary issues was the blasphemous nature of plots in several films 
involving scientists usurping God’s role as creator, including Frank-
enstein (1931), which several state boards banned for this reason. 
Censor boards also removed specific dialogue in which the scientists 
claimed to be ‘playing God’ in films such as Frankenstein, The Invisible 
Man (1933) and Island of Lost Souls (1932). The fact that the Hays 
Office did not remove these lines at the script stage indicates how 
lenient Joy’s interpretation of the Code was before 1934.
1934–1966: controlling stories about science in the age  
of censorship
From the perspective of religious protestors, the Hays Office’s failure 
to rigorously enforce the Production Code meant that movies were 
just as morally problematic as they were before its adoption. In response, 
Will Hays created the Production Code Administration (PCA) as a 
way to curtail calls by religious groups for a government censorship 
organisation (Black, 1996). This pressure also led the Catholic Church 
to form its own censorship organisation, the Catholic Legion of 
Decency, in 1933 (Walsh, 1996). (The organisation changed its name 
to the National Legion of Decency in 1935, but we will refer to it only 
as the Legion of Decency.) Tough-minded Catholic Joseph Breen took 
over as director of the PCA in 1934. Breen had the power he needed 
to force studios to alter their scripts to conform to the Production 
Code’s standards, or he would withhold the PCA’s seal of approval 
(Leff and Simmons, 2001). The Production Code consisted of twelve 
major categories: crimes against the law, sex, vulgarity, obscenity, 
profanity, costume, dances, religion, locations, national feelings, film 
titles and repellent subjects. As such, the PCA and the Legion of 
Decency exerted significant influence over the types of stories studios 
could tell about science.
The intersection between science and sex continued to be a problem 
for censors. The censors’ ban on VD films, for example, nearly prevented 
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Warner Brothers from producing Dr Ehrlich’s Magic Bullet (1940) about 
the scientist who discovered the first cure for syphilis (Lederer and 
Parascandola, 1998). Negotiations with the PCA ultimately led to a film 
that celebrates the scientist without any references to his science (Kirby, 
2014). The PCA also routinely censored scripts that used science in 
conjunction with criminal activity, such as the deployment of scientific 
progress as a justification for criminal activity in The Amazing Dr 
Clitterhouse (1938), or the use of scientific methods to commit the 
‘perfect’ crime in Before I Hang (1940).1 But broad notions of blasphemy 
and indecency allowed the PCA to censor science under almost any 
of the twelve categories. A scientist manipulating the soul in Captive 
Wild Woman (1943) violated the category of religion, while the PCA 
removed a lab experiment performed on a former church altar in the 
unproduced 1951 script ‘Green Light’ under the category of locations.
The PCA considered certain scientific fields to be particularly 
problematic under the Production Code. Stories involving evolution 
were a constant issue for the PCA, especially after the controversial 
Scopes Trial in July 1925. Island of Lost Souls may have made it through 
the Hays Office unscathed during Jason Joy’s directorship in 1931, 
but the inflexible PCA removed every evolutionary element when 
Paramount rereleased the film in 1941. The PCA also forced filmmakers 
to alter scripts for films such as Dr Renault’s Secret (1942) because 
they believed discussions of Darwin and evolution would offend 
religious individuals.
While the PCA altered films before production, the Legion of Decency 
classified films after their completion. The Legion’s film classification 
system to guide Catholic viewers about which films were suitable and 
which were questionable used three levels: A – morally acceptable, 
B – morally objectionable in part and C – condemned.2 The Legion’s 
judgement could seriously impact on a film’s box office potential, so 
filmmakers were anxious to avoid a B or C classification (Black, 1996). 
Few films received C classifications for their scientific content, and 
1 All information in this chapter concerning the PCA’s censorship activities comes 
from the individual film files in the PCA files at the Margaret Herrick Library, 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Los Angeles, CA.
2 All information in this chapter on the Legion of Decency’s censorship activities 
comes from the individual film files in the Legion of Decency files at the Catholic 
University of America, Washington, DC.
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those that did were either VD films such as Damaged Goods (1937), 
or films concerning reproduction like Men in White (1934).
Many films were given B classifications during this period because 
of the theological implications of their scientific depictions. For example, 
the Legion censured films that used scientific explanations to support 
the notion of transmigration of souls, as in The Man with Two Lives 
(1942) and I’ve Lived Before (1956). They also disliked film narratives 
that portrayed scientific progress as a more powerful progressive force 
than religion, as was the case with Madame Curie (1943). Like the 
PCA, the Legion took issue with films featuring psychiatry and evolu-
tion, but their responses to these depictions evolved over time along 
with Catholic policies. Before 1950 any depictions of evolution 
automatically led to a B classification. But the Legion embraced films 
with overt evolutionary themes like Inherit the Wind (1960) after Pope 
Pius XII acknowledged the Church’s acceptance of biological evolution 
in his encyclical of 1950, Humani generis.
Fear of not obtaining the PCA’s seal of approval or of receiving a 
B or C classification from the Legion of Decency led studios to appease 
these groups by altering their scripts or editing their final films. But 
filmmakers also took a number of other actions in order to get their 
scripts through the PCA or to avoid a B or C classification. The PCA 
often instructed filmmakers to consult the Catholic Church’s Hollywood 
representative, Father John Devlin. Father Devlin’s suggestions changed 
the scientific content of several films, including Red Planet Mars (1952), 
whose story originally involved a scientist perpetrating a religious 
hoax. Even before receiving formal feedback, studios would often 
consult the Legion of Decency or other religious groups as a means 
of proactively placating censors and smoothing the approval process, 
as was the case for the biopic Freud (1962), where the Legion provided 
advice on how to make this scientific story palatable to religious 
audiences. In the case of The Beginning or the End (1947), the filmmakers 
consulted extensively with Cardinal Francis Spellman, which led to 
overt religious overtones in a film about the development of the atomic 
bomb (Gilbert, 1997: 52). This means that modifications to cinematic 
stories about science often came not through censorship itself, but 
through the actions of filmmakers who were anticipating censure.
Despite the power of the PCA and the Legion of Decency, many 
religious organisations did not support the idea of movie censorship, 
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even in the 1940s when the PCA and the Legion of Decency were at 
their most powerful. The Protestant Motion Picture Council (PMPC), 
for example, felt that censorship was morally reprehensible. Instead, 
they provided faith-based reviews in the Christian Herald that guided 
viewers but allowed the public to make their own decision about a 
film (Linnell, 2006).3 The PMPC’s reviews were not exclusively about 
morally problematic science in cinema. Reviews also covered stories 
about science that they found inspirational or that they believed 
reflected their value system. Unlike the PCA and Legion of Decency, 
the PMPC celebrated films about psychiatry, including giving a Picture 
of the Month award to Alfred Hitchcock’s Spellbound (1945). They 
also embraced films featuring brave scientists undertaking expeditions 
in the pursuit of scientific progress, such as Scott of the Antarctic 
(1948), which they also named Picture of the Month. Ultimately, the 
PMPC preferred stories in which the goals of science aligned with 
the goals of religion by improving the human condition, as in Sister 
Kenny (1946).
Unlike the PCA and the Legion of Decency, the PMPC trusted 
audiences to make the ‘correct’ interpretations about science in 
cinema. Proponents of censorship like the PCA, however, felt that it 
was a better strategy to modify movie plots in order to tell what they 
considered more appropriate narratives about science. These differ-
ences in approach reflected differing attitudes to morality between 
Catholics and Protestants in the 1940s and 1950s. The Catholic Church 
dictated its conceptions of morality to its followers, who were then 
expected to adhere to these judgements. Protestants offered guidance 
but wanted people to make their own choices about morality (Curran, 
2008).
The threat of censorship during this period forced filmmakers to 
make decisions about which science to include or remove, based on 
reasons that had nothing to do with artistic merit, as they anticipated 
censure. The censors’ sense of moral certainty did not require them 
to even understand the science upon which they were passing judge-
ment. Ultimately, the PCA and the Legion of Decency began to lose 
their influence in the 1960s owing to broader cultural changes, including 
3 All information in this chapter on the PMPC comes from the individual film reviews 
in the Christian Herald.
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the rise of television, an increasingly permissive social stance towards 
sexual matters and a more socially progressive attitude in the Catholic 
Church (Leff and Simmons, 2001). The PCA became less worried 
about the theological implications of science and refocused their efforts 
on retaining some influence over the growing depiction of graphic 
sex and violence. But concerns among religious groups about scientific 
content in films remained after the end of official censorship. Without 
the power to censor movies, however, these groups had to find other 
ways to influence the way that audiences interpreted cinematic stories 
about science.
1967–1992: new Hollywood and new science require  
new approaches
The Classification and Rating Administration (CARA) replaced the 
PCA in 1968. CARA advised and negotiated with studios over proposed 
movie content in order for a film to get its desired rating, but it did 
not censor content. Hoping the new system would increase audiences 
owing to the production of more ambitious films with uninhibited 
themes, the industry received the introduction of ratings warmly 
(Wyatt, 2000). Filmmakers, freed from the prohibition or restriction 
of material that they had endured under the religiously constrictive 
Production Code, created an adventurous and vibrant cinema (Neale, 
2005). Science played an important role in this period, as immediate 
post-censorship Hollywood movies positioned controversial science 
and scientific ideas at the core of their narratives. The shift from 
censorship to ratings influenced the ways religious groups responded 
to the film industry.
Film reviews became one of the primary Christian strategies for 
dealing with Hollywood’s perceived onscreen depravity. The Catholic 
church dissolved the Legion of Decency in December of 1965 and 
established a new movie oversight organisation named the National 
Catholic Office for Motion Pictures (NCOMP). Like the PMPC in 
the 1940s, the NCOMP decided to provide guidance at the point of 
reception rather than attempting to censor material prior to release 
(Gillis, 1999; Romanowski, 2012). The NCOMP’s bimonthly Catholic 
Film Newsletter provided reviews through the lens of Catholic values, 
including their assessment of scientific content. The NCOMP was 
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particularly sensitive to the deification of science and scientists in the 
films of the 1970s. They believed that films like The Andromeda Strain 
(1971), Zardoz (1974) and The Terminal Man (1974) ‘worshipped’ 
science and technology and apparently attempted to demythologise 
God.4 The NCOMP also found recurrent science versus religion narra-
tives to be problematic. For example, Catholic reviews were unhappy 
that religion was framed as the antithesis to science in Planet of the 
Apes (1968). Even films that depicted religion as morally right, such 
as The Exorcist (1973) and A Clockwork Orange (1971), still placed 
religion in opposition to science and this caused the NCOMP concern.
Another approach that religious groups took to controlling movie 
content after the censorship era was the introduction of film awards. 
Religious groups used film awards as way of praising the film industry 
when it produced films that they felt aligned with their religious values, 
and believed that these awards would encourage the production of 
more films with appropriate moral principles. The NCOMP launched 
annual film awards in 1965. Some of the earliest awards were given 
to science-based movies. The organisation awarded the 1966 Film of 
the Year to the controversial The War Game (1965), which was about 
the impact of a nuclear war and atomic science policy in Britain. In 
1969 the National Council of Churches and the NCOMP awarded 
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) their Film of the Year 
as part of a joint award programme. It also won the NCOMP’s Film 
of Best Educational Value that year. Religious groups readily interpreted 
Kubrick’s science-based film as a religiously valuable film because of 
its dealings with supreme beings, whether metaphorical, alien or divine. 
They hoped that these awards would encourage studios to produce 
science-based films that allowed for discussions of the nature of the 
divine and promoted a role for morality in scientific progress.
Filmmakers’ post-censorship freedom allowed them to tackle more 
serious science-based topics. Humanity’s stewardship of the earth 
became a prevalent theme; a concern also shared by religious com-
munities during this time. The growing environmental movement 
inspired eco-films like Silent Running (1972), Omega Man (1971), 
4 All information in this chapter on NCOMP’s activities comes from the individual 
film files in the NCOMP files at the Catholic University of America, Washington, 
DC.
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and Soylent Green (1973). Protestant publications like the Christian 
Century suggested that the church should be more active in the 
environmental movement and that religious groups must rethink their 
traditional attitudes to reproduction (Cobb, 1970). This attitude was 
reflected in their reviews of eco-films that celebrated nature but warned 
against humanity destroying creation (Kavanaugh, 1971). In the eco-
horror Soylent Green, where starving humans unknowingly eat processed 
human remains, the church survives as a refuge for the masses and 
attempts to treat those whom science has failed. This was a theme 
that the NCOMP’s reviewers found ‘consoling’. Religion and faith 
became frequent elements of science-based films throughout the latter 
part of the twentieth century, appearing not only in opposition to 
science, but also as its ally.
Religious communities may have lost their direct input into film 
productions (via script and final approval) but there was still open 
dialogue between filmmakers and religious communities. Although 
this was an era of cinematic experimentation, many filmmakers 
continued to court religious audiences. Audiences would be quick to 
associate Charlton Heston of the biblical films of the 1950s with his 
title role in late 1960s and early 1970s dystopian narratives. Reviews 
of Planet of the Apes, Omega Man and Soylent Green pointed out that 
it was Moses fighting apes, humanoids and evil corporations in these 
cinematic futures.5 Heston’s casting allowed filmmakers to court 
traditional and religious audiences. Studios also supported the produc-
tion of viewing guides, including those published by the Lutheran 
Church. There was even a Lutheran Church Study Guide created for 
the religiously controversial movie The Exorcist, which other Protestant 
groups, such as the Methodist Church, asked to use after the film’s 
release.6
Filmmakers in the 1960s and 1970s also continued to work directly 
with religious organisations when their films dealt with sensitive topics. 
For example, director William Friedkin was in constant correspondence 
with the Roman Catholic Church in the USA throughout production 
5 These film reviews can be found in the clippings files at the Margaret Herrick Library, 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Los Angeles, CA.
6 See the Lutheran Study Guides Folder in the William Friedkin Papers at the Margaret 
Herrick Library, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Los Angeles, CA.
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of The Exorcist, discussing the technical correctness of the religious 
rituals and the church’s attitudes towards scientific practice.7 Friedkin’s 
consultation with the Church meant that, despite erroneous reports 
of Catholic outrage in the popular press, the NCOMP’s response to 
the film was mostly positive because they appreciated the film’s ‘salutary 
reflections on religious belief and the limits of science’ (NCOMP, 
1974).
Many science fiction films released between 1968 and 1977 were 
dystopian and serious, drawing upon imagined science and futures that 
would see the end of humanity. But the unexpected success of a 20th 
Century Fox release in 1977 signalled a significant shift in the depiction 
of science and the future. Star Wars ushered in a new genre, and the 
era of science fantasy, as George Lucas termed it, began. Star Wars 
rejected the scientific realism that had defined science-based movies 
since 1968 by positioning itself firmly within the fantasy genre. The 
movie was well received by religious groups as a ‘breath of fresh air’ 
that avoided the unsettling science that had defined the science fiction 
of the 1960s and 1970s (Siska, 1977: 668). Comments from some of the 
film’s producers backed up this religious reading. Star Wars producer 
Gary Kurtz, for example, told the First Congregational Church in Los 
Angeles that the film was a parable and that the spiritual nature of the 
characters and the notion of the Force were intended as touchstones 
for a predominately Christian audience (quoted in Dart, 1978). Other 
science fantasy movies of the late 1970s and early 1980s, including 
Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977), E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial 
(1982) and Back to the Future (1985), offered religious groups little 
to worry about with their blockbuster, family-friendly focus.
1993–2015: courting religious audiences with reconciliatory 
narratives
Throughout the 1980s, religious groups continued to focus most of 
their attention on Hollywood’s predilection for violence and sex rather 
than scientific content. But with the release of Jurassic Park in 1993 
the religious community took a renewed interest in cinematic science. 
The film’s success resulted in a subsequent flood of science-themed 
7 See the William Friedkin Papers.
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films that has not diminished (Kirby, 2011). Film reviews continued 
to be an important way for religious groups to respond to the science 
in movies. The rise of the internet in the 1990s increased the number 
of outlets for these reviews. But filmmakers were also beginning to 
appreciate the growing economic power of the Christian community. 
This awareness not only encouraged Hollywood filmmakers to court 
religious audiences for their science-based movies, it also convinced 
the Christian film industry that their own science-based movies could 
find success in mainstream theatres.
The high profile of Jurassic Park and the prominence of its evolution-
ary themes led to an almost unprecedented response from conservative 
Christians, who sought to blunt or reframe the film’s scientific messages. 
Conservative Christian film reviews consistently deplored the film’s 
overt discussions of dinosaur and bird evolution, with one reviewer 
calling it an ‘unceasing barrage of evolutionist propaganda’ (Dickerson, 
1993). Several conservative Christian groups even tried to counter 
the film’s pro-evolutionary stance by producing booklets and pamphlets 
explaining creationism and the ‘real’ origins of Jurassic Park’s dinosaurs 
(see figure 16.1). But it was the emergence of the internet during this 
period that led to an explosion of film reviews attacking the film’s 
Figure 16.1 Pamphlet on the creationist origins of Jurassic Park’s dinosaurs 
disseminated by the Southwest Radio Church.
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position on evolution. The lack of gatekeepers for this new medium 
meant that anybody could disseminate their ideas online about the 
blasphemous science of Jurassic Park. A large number of anti-Jurassic-
Park webpages sprang up soon after the film’s release, including one 
hosted by Probe Ministries (Bohlin, 1995). Fundamentalist Christian 
communities were not the only religious groups upset about the film’s 
pro-evolution narrative. Some Orthodox Jews protested against the 
use of Jurassic Park promotional material on milk cartons in Israel, 
because they believed that ‘dinosaurs symbolise a heresy of creation’ 
(Goldman, 1993: 7).
Nowadays, while official censorship is no longer a threat, it is possible 
to indirectly censor a movie through means other than directly changing 
a script or banning a film. Movies can face a de facto ban if theatres are 
unwilling to show the film or if the film is unable to find distribution. 
This was the case for the 2009 film Creation, which was unable to 
initially find a distributor in the USA because its sympathetic portrait of 
Charles Darwin was considered to be ‘too controversial’ (Singh, 2009). 
According to Christian commentators this was not censorship; it was 
an example of market forces in action (Silvestru, 2009). From their 
perspective, it was not because of its subject matter that conservative 
Christian groups were keeping the film out of the USA. Rather, they 
believed that distributors had decided for financial reasons that the film 
would not be able to find an audience in a country in which only 39% 
of the population believed in the theory of evolution (Newport, 2009). 
In the end, Creation received a limited distribution through Newmarket 
Films, a company that specialised in distributing controversial films, 
including Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ (2004).
The same economic concerns about potential Catholic protests that 
fuelled the development of the PCA and the Legion of Decency back 
in the 1930s also drove studios to consult the Catholic Church during 
the production of two films in the late 2000s. The Golden Compass 
(2007) and Angels and Demons (2009) were both based on controversial 
books whose plots revolved around depictions of the Catholic Church 
as an organisation that actively obstructs scientific progress. In order 
to avoid Catholic boycotts of the film adaptations, the studios sub-
stantially reduced or removed any indication of an anti-science stance 
on the part of the Church. In a move reminiscent of the Legion of 
Decency, the studios also showed rough-print versions to Church 
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officials while indicating that they might be willing to edit out any 
problematical elements (Pacatte, 2011). In spite of the studios’ attempts 
to appease Catholic viewers, the films still ran into significant opposition 
and boycotts from Catholic organisations.
Although some films during this period feature contestation nar-
ratives about science and religion, filmmakers have also crafted a 
number of movies that function as reconciliation stories. Space 
exploration films such as Contact (1997), Gravity (2013) and Interstellar 
(2014) use a sense of wonder about the universe to introduce metaphysi-
cal ambiguities that can be understood as both scientifically and 
religiously inspired. Several recent films include scientist characters 
struggling with their faith in the face of scientific discoveries, such 
as Knowing (2009) and Prometheus (2012). Despite sympathetic 
portrayals of both science and faith, the Christian community’s 
responses to these films were mixed. Christian commentators received 
Knowing’s message of benevolent extra-terrestrials rekindling a scientist’s 
religious faith warmly (DeMar, 2009). Interstellar’s almost spiritual 
exploration of themes relating to love, death and sacrifice also resonated 
with many Christian reviewers (McCracken, 2014). On the other hand, 
while some Christians were pleased with the scientist’s religiosity in 
Prometheus, most were disturbed by the notion of ancient alien creators 
in the film. Despite the earlier award for the similarly themed 2001, 
the Catholic News Service’s review of Prometheus found that the plotline 
of alien-directed human evolution ‘renders “Prometheus” extremely 
problematic for viewers of faith’ (McCarthy, 2012).
Reconciliation narratives were meant to appease religious audiences 
who might have taken offence at these films’ clear reverence for science. 
But some filmmakers have gone even further, by crafting science-heavy 
films that are directly aimed at courting religious audiences. The box 
office success of The Passion of the Christ provided a blueprint of how 
to use grassroots marketing to attract the religious right (Russell, 
2013). Two films in the mid-2010s, Noah (2014) and Exodus: Gods 
and Kings (2014), used this blueprint to target religious audiences. 
But the directors of both films consciously attempted to frame tradi-
tional religious narratives as scientifically viable in order to also appeal 
to secular audiences (Bowman, 2016).
Ridley Scott looked to scientific rationales rather than miracles to 
explain the parting of the Red Sea and the ten plagues of Egypt in 
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Exodus (Vilkomerson, 2014), while Darren Aronofsky openly merged 
religion with science in Noah (Chattaway, 2014). Although they were 
adaptations of biblical stories, neither film managed to garner the 
approval of religious audiences. Noah proved to be problematic for 
religious audiences who rejected the science-based creation narrative 
as well as Noah’s obsessive focus on contemporaneous environmental 
concerns (Masters, 2014). In the cases of Noah and Exodus, religious 
audiences rejected science’s intrusion into their stories of faith, while 
the scientific explanations were not enough to attract secular audiences 
to these biblical tales.
The recent proliferation of streaming services such as Netflix has 
meant that Christian films have become available to significantly larger 
audiences. Improved production values also mean that Christian films 
are often indistinguishable from major Hollywood movies. Many of 
the most successful mainstream Christian films have explored scientific 
and medical themes, including October Baby (2011), God’s Not Dead 
(2014) and Heaven Is For Real (2014) (Macauley, 2015). Since 1968, 
religious organisations can no longer exert direct control over the 
scientific content in mainstream Hollywood movies. The current 
strategy for religious groups is to produce their own cinematic stories 
about science, and they have experienced a modicum of success in 
this outside their traditional Christian audience.
Conclusions
The created nature of movies makes them useful in understanding 
society’s relationship with science because movies reveal the kinds of 
stories people want to tell about science. Filmmakers have made specific 
decisions to tell stories about science in particular ways. But our 
research demonstrates that decisions about scientific depictions in 
movies were not always left solely in the hands of filmmakers. Since 
the beginnings of cinema, religious groups in America have tried to 
influence the way that filmmakers used science to tell their cinematic 
stories, or they have tried to influence the way audiences interpret 
these stories about science. Religious organisations based their approach 
on simplistic assumptions about the nature of movies and the nature 
of communication. From their perspective, films told linear stories 
using a heightened visual realism that conveyed easily understandable 
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narratives to a monolithic audience. From this simplistic viewpoint, 
cinema seemed to be a powerful force in determining our perceptions 
of the world. As such, they were concerned about the ways that movies 
portrayed science’s role in society, science’s status as a knowledge 
producer and science’s relationship to the spiritual.
In cinema’s early days, religious reformers believed that by controlling 
the content of scripts and distribution of finished films they could 
ensure that movies disseminated only morally or theologically appropri-
ate messages about science. For many religious groups, censorship 
seemed to be a rational response to the dangers of cinema, especially 
at a time when activists were using the medium to promote scientific 
solutions to sexually based social issues such as VD, birth control and 
eugenics. Anticipating censure or boycotts forced filmmakers to make 
decisions about what science to include or remove, based on reasons 
that had nothing to do with artistic merit. In the case of the Hays 
Office, the PCA and the Catholic Legion of Decency, censorship 
decisions were founded on beliefs rooted in mid-twentieth-century 
American Christianity. These organisations’ sense of moral certainty 
did not require their censors to understand the scientific topics upon 
which they were passing judgement, including evolution, psychiatry 
and atomic science.
When filmmakers were no longer under the threat of censorship, 
they could address more serious science-based topics, including 
environmental issues and biomedical ethics. This meant that religious 
groups had to change their tactics to address the scientific messages 
in films when direct censorship was no longer an option. Instead of 
preventing immoral messages, they decided to encourage studios by 
giving awards to films containing what they considered to be morally 
and theologically appropriate messages about the uses of science. 
Religious groups also began to provide their own movie reviews as a 
way to influence audiences’ interpretations of scientific stories in films. 
These reviews allowed them to call attention to themes they found 
problematic. Reviews were also a means by which groups could celebrate 
narratives about science that they found inspirational, such as films 
promoting the spiritual nature of science. Mainstream filmmakers 
subsequently realised that they could achieve greater box office successes 
for their science-based films by incorporating scientific themes that 
appealed to Christian audiences. Ultimately, the Christian film industry 
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decided that the easiest and, for their purposes, perhaps best way to 
control scientific themes in movies was by creating their own science-
based films.
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Afterword: monstrous markets – 
neo-liberalism, populism and the demise of 
the public university
John Holmwood, Jan Balon
There is a crisis in the idea of the university. It has emerged from the 
application of neo-liberal policies which have reduced the public values 
of the university to instrumental purposes. This poses a considerable 
threat to liberal education (Brown, 2015, Collini, 2012; Ginsberg, 
2011; Holmwood, 2011; Nussbaum, 2010). In the UK, government 
ministers and policy advisers seek a ‘cultural’ change directing academic 
research and student recruitment towards the market and in service 
of a global knowledge economy. There are few dissenting voices among 
those with institutional responsibility for the academy – namely, its 
vice-chancellors and senior representatives. Vice-chancellors have not 
spoken out to protect the university’s wider public values, and few 
learned societies have either. Senior university personnel have mostly 
been interested in maintaining funding, especially in the context of 
the politics of austerity after the financial crisis of 2008 (Smith, 2011). 
Learned societies and research councils have had similar concerns 
about funding, and have been concerned to establish the utility of 
research, especially in the context of the impact agenda. Dissent comes 
mainly from some individual academics and from students. The latter 
have experienced a dramatic rise in their costs alongside diminishing 
labour market opportunities, notwithstanding an emphasis on their 
private investment in human capital as a justification of the reduction 
in the public funding of undergraduate education.
In part, this quiescence itself derives from a mode of governance 
specific to neo-liberalism which operates through the co-production 
of policy objectives. This involves consultation with those affected by 
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proposed policies and with interests in the outcome, generally called 
the ‘stakeholders’. Consultation might appear to be an evidence-based 
process with consensus as its aim, but, in truth, interests are frequently 
not reconcilable and what the parties put forward is interest-based 
evidence. In this context, government acts as mediator of such evidence, 
which it collates and selects according to its own policy objectives 
while managing alternative views. At the same time, stakeholders also 
lobby government independently of the consultation process. In this 
way, consultation operates in the interest of the most powerful 
stakeholders and requires wider publics (who might bear the conse-
quences of the policies) to be represented by a ‘stakeholder’ or accept 
the fiction that it is the government itself that represents their interests 
(for example, as ‘taxpayers’, or as the guardian of the interests of students 
as ‘consumers’).
In the case of recent university reforms in the UK – which have 
shifted from direct public funding of undergraduate higher education 
to what is primarily fee-based funding via a system of publicly supported 
student loans – the government retains the ability to determine the 
revenue received by universities and so can maintain compliance from 
vice-chancellors and representative bodies, while opening the sector 
to for-profit providers and allowing the title of ‘university’ to single-
subject, teaching-only entities. In this way, despite the UK government 
proposing the most fundamental changes to higher education, this 
has occurred with little active debate or challenge to the underlying 
market logic that guides those changes. The university is under threat, 
but all universities are busy ‘co-producing’ these changes and have 
passed their voices into the dominant neo-liberal discourse.
The problem of populism
The place of the university within public culture is not separate from 
the fate of public culture itself. To some extent, the crisis in the idea 
of the university reflects a crisis of public culture, one that has become 
most evident in the rise of the ‘far right’ and ‘populism’. The UK 
referendum vote to leave the European Union (‘Brexit’) and the election 
of Donald Trump as President of the United States are each widely 
understood as involving a ‘populist’ rejection of ‘elites’ and ‘economic 
globalisation’. It is significant that each has taken place in a country 
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where neo-liberal public policy has been paramount. However, the 
rise of authoritarian populist regimes elsewhere (for example, in Turkey 
and India) and of far-right political parties having increasing political 
influence (for example, the National Front in France, Sweden Demo-
crats, and the Freedom Party of Austria) indicates that ‘populism’ is 
a more general issue. It has also been reported that Chinese President 
Xi Jinping has called for intensified ideological control over universities 
(Philips, 2016), including, presumably, the sixty-four ‘branch’ operations 
of transnational higher-education institutions currently operating in 
China, of which Nottingham University Ningbo is one (He, 2016).
Oxford Dictionaries (2016) has marked this new political mood 
by announcing online that ‘post-truth’ was its ‘word of the year’, 
‘denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential 
in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief ’. 
This followed a statement in a television interview by the then British 
Minister for Justice and Vote Leave campaigner, Michael Gove, that 
he thought that ‘the British Public have had enough of experts’. Where 
does this leave the university? The trade magazine of the profession 
in the UK, Times Higher Education, has suggested that the very intel-
lectual character of universities is anti-populist and, thus, that they 
contribute to a polarisation of politics rather than being able to 
moderate the effects of such a polarisation (Morgan, 2016). Indeed, 
the report commented that ‘a THE poll before the vote found that 
88.5 per cent of university staff intended to vote Remain and 9.5 per 
cent Leave. That was just a shade out of line with the actual UK result, 
which saw 48.1 per cent vote Remain and 51.9 per cent vote Leave’ 
(Morgan, 2016: n.p.).
The article also suggested that universities might ‘reposition 
themselves as the voices of moderation. In other words, as the populists 
head off to extremes, some believe that US universities should move 
more towards the centre politically – or rightwards from where they 
currently are – in an attempt to “depolarise” their relationship to wider 
society’ (Morgan, 2016). If universities, including those in the UK, 
do not do so, the article warned, ‘they will clearly need to tread very 
carefully lest they portray themselves as part of the global elite resented 
by populist supporters. Otherwise, they will only intensify the risks 
to their funding, their culture and their educative missions’ (Morgan, 
2016).
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However, this is a poor understanding of populism and the problems 
it poses for universities. As Müller (2016) has recently argued, it is 
the very nature of populism to represent itself as speaking for the 
‘people’, with pluralism seen as ‘bad faith’. There can be no ‘de-
polarisation’ where populism is identified as one of the polar positions, 
since it admits no compromise. In this way, according to Müller, 
populism is both a product of representative democracy and, at the 
same time, a denial of democracy since it depends on ‘othering’ those 
it opposes as reflecting the interests of deracinated cosmopolitan ‘elites’ 
and without a legitimate voice in ‘democratic’ debate.1
In both the USA and the UK, ‘populism’ is also a form of ‘nativism’ 
manifest in calls to ‘take back our country’, with its hostility both to 
external powers that might limit the scope of action and to those 
within the nation who are not seen as properly part of it. In both 
cases, those who are not part of the ‘we’ are racialised minorities, 
immigrants and what Enoch Powell in the UK context once chillingly 
called the ‘immigrant descended’. In the UK, Dame Louise Casey 
(2016), in a recent review into ‘Opportunity and Integration’, has 
called for migrants to ‘swear an oath of allegiance’ on arrival into 
the UK, while schools, under the Prevent agenda, are obliged to teach 
‘British values’.
Danielle Allen (2004) has made a similar argument to Müller’s 
about the problematic idea of popular sovereignty that is frequently 
represented as a republican ideal. For example, incorporated in the 
US Declaration of Independence and reproduced daily in US schools 
is the Pledge of Allegiance to ‘one Nation indivisible with liberty and 
justice for all’. The idea of ‘one Nation indivisible’ implicitly passes all 
voices into one, but what would happen, Allen asks, were we to propose 
instead an allegiance to the ‘whole Nation indivisible’? The whole nation 
would be understood as a nation of parts – that is, as differentiated 
– and an obligation towards indivisibility would be an obligation 
towards difference and its recognition.
What does this mean for the nature and culture of the univer-
sity; that is, for the role of higher education in the public life of a 
1 As newly appointed post-Brexit UK Prime Minister Theresa May put it (buying into 
the populist mood), ‘if you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere’ 
(May, 2016).
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nation? We shall suggest that one aspect of this role must be the 
facilitation of inclusive democratic public debate. Nor could this 
be understood simply as providing the knowledge that might form 
the evidence base for public policy where the latter is directed at 
policymakers rather than at wider publics, as argued by the Campaign 
for Social Science (2015). Morgan suggests that there is a risk that 
universities will be perceived as aligned with a global elite and that 
this might cost them their funding. However, part of the problem 
is that universities have put their cultural and educative mission at 
risk precisely because of their concern with funding, while ignoring 
how the conditions of that funding have been tied to a change in 
their mission.
In this afterword, we will draw on the work of John Dewey, especially 
his The Public and Its Problems (1927), to suggest that populism is a 
problem of ‘publics’ and the institutions in the public sphere that 
support them. In brief, we shall argue that neo-liberalism represents 
an attempt to replace publics with markets, a process that is facilitated 
by the privatisation of public institutions, including that of the university 
itself. This ‘hollowing out’ of the public sphere is precisely what creates 
the space for populism. Neo-liberalism requires a strong interventionist 
state on behalf of markets, but it also requires democratic legitimation. 
This makes populism an ideology of justification (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006) supplementary to that of the market – one that is 
mobilised against the public sphere, which has come to be characterised 
as dominated by liberal elites, notwithstanding that the promotion 
of the market itself operates to widen inequalities.
The neo-liberal knowledge regime
Changing inequalities are particularly significant for universities, but 
this is something that has been relatively neglected. As Clark Kerr, 
architect of the California ‘Master Plan’ (initiated at the same time as 
the Robbins reforms in the UK in the 1960s), argued, the rise of mass 
higher education and public funding would make the university 
increasingly subject to political scrutiny (Committee on Higher 
Education, 1963; Kerr, 2001 [1963]). The expansion of public higher 
education was not a simple extension of arguments that had justified 
public secondary education and its compulsory nature. The latter was 
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universal in character and, therefore, could be represented as a ‘social 
right’ that secured a public benefit; namely, a common education for 
citizens, a benefit recognised even by Milton Friedman (1962). Participa-
tion in public higher education was not intended to be universal, 
merely to be expanded (in the UK case, closer to the level already 
attained in the US). In this context, there was potentially the issue 
that higher education secured a private benefit for those who graduated 
from it, when compared with those that did not.
At the same time, no matter how much participation might be 
widened, it would be likely to attract proportionally more of its 
participants from socially advantaged backgrounds. However, at the 
time, there was a general expectation of a shift from an industrial to 
a post-industrial, knowledge-based, economy, where there would be 
increased demand for educated labour and a general ‘adaptive upgrad-
ing’ of all jobs. Indeed, this was evident in the way in which a secular 
trend in the reduction of inequalities was regarded as ‘institutionalised’ 
across most Western societies, even if the level of inequalities was 
significantly greater in some (the US) than in others (Sweden, or the 
UK up until the 1980s). In effect, this was endorsed as ‘fact’ by Kuznets 
(1953) and his ‘curve’ demonstrating how declining income inequality 
emerged alongside economic growth.
Public spending on higher education, then, could be justified in 
terms of its wider benefits; even if an individual’s educational attain-
ments and preferences did not take him or her to university, there 
would be a benefit from the greater integration of higher education 
and the economy. The economic growth to which expanded higher 
education and research would contribute was understood to be inclusive, 
associated with what was perceived to be a secular decline in inequality. 
This also included changes in what might be regarded as the ‘status 
order’ of employment relations, as the terms of the labour contract 
became more similar across manual and non-manual work, and rights 
previously enjoyed by non-manual workers were extended to all 
employees. This idea of inclusive economic growth was integral to 
the idea of an emerging ‘knowledge society’ – as distinct from a 
‘knowledge economy’ – and, in the telling phrase used by Clark Kerr 
(2001 [1963]), what had emerged was a ‘multiversity’ meeting multiple 
functions – direct economic functions, certainly, but also wider social 
functions, including amelioration and democratisation. In other words, 
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higher education was part of a wider ‘moral economy’ underpinned 
by social rights (Holmwood and Bhambra, 2012).
It is precisely this ‘moral economy’ that is called into question by 
neo-liberalism, and not simply in terms of seeking to deny the existence 
of social rights. Wider neo-liberal policies have given rise to widening 
inequalities and reductions in taxation, especially progressive taxation. 
Moreover, the deregulation of labour markets has created new forms 
of labour contract and a new polarisation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
jobs (Brown et al., 2011; Kalleberg, 2011). The function of higher 
education to support economic growth remains, but inclusive economic 
growth is no longer a government objective. In this context, government 
policies to reduce taxation put pressure on university funding, while 
widening inequality increased calls for the beneficiaries of higher 
education to pay. In the UK this was first introduced as a fee contribu-
tion by students alongside direct public funding in 1999, following 
the Dearing Review of 1997, but became wholly fee based for arts, 
humanities and social sciences in 2010 following the financial crisis 
of 2008 and cuts to government spending under the mantra of 
austerity.
The irony is that just as the argument that it is right that students 
should pay fees because they are private beneficiaries was being put 
forward, the opposite argument was made with regard to research. 
The UK Government put forward an ‘impact’ agenda, where all publicly 
funded research should be undertaken with specific ‘beneficiaries’ in 
mind. Here, the argument was that publicly funded research should 
show a direct benefit, but the beneficiary should not pay. In part, the 
purpose of the impact agenda was to shorten the time from ‘idea to 
income’ or the research-development cycle.
It might seem that this was a simple continuation of the perceived 
function of research for economic growth that was described by Kerr 
(2001 [1963]). However, the context is significantly different. First, 
as we have suggested, economic growth that is publicly funded is no 
longer inclusive in its benefits (see also Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2015). Second, the neo-liberal 
policies directed towards wider corporate governance have emphasised 
share-holder value, which has made companies more concerned with 
profits in the short term. In consequence, private investment in research 
and development has fallen, such that the UK has moved from having 
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one of the largest investments (as a proportion of GDP) among OECD 
countries in the 1960s to now having one of the smallest (Jones, 2013). 
Finally, the emphasis on delivering the benefits of research over a 
shorter time has altered the balance between privately funded and 
publicly funded research within the research–development ecosystem, 
and undermined the longer-term and more fundamental benefits that 
publicly funded research can achieve (see Mazzucato, 2011).
Of course, the UK Government’s impact agenda is wider than simple 
commercial benefits, however pronounced the latter are within it. It 
also includes impact on public policy and other aspects of social 
well-being. What is common across commercial and non-commercial 
impacts, however, is that impact has to be demonstrated with specific 
beneficiaries and that the strong recommendation of research councils 
is that this be done through ‘co-production’ of the research with them 
(that is, including likely beneficiaries at all stages of the research, 
including that of its design).
‘Co-production’ as a term derives from the work of Gibbons and 
his colleagues (1994), involving a distinction between ‘mode 1’ 
knowledge directed at academic audiences and ‘mode 2’ knowledge 
directed at non-academic audiences (see also chapter 6). The latter is 
frequently interdisciplinary applied-problem-solving knowledge, and 
the idea of co-production is used to capture the ‘larger process in 
which discovery application and use are closely integrated’ (Gibbons 
et al., 1994: 46). Gibbons and his colleagues did not anticipate that 
mode 2 knowledge would supplant mode 1 knowledge, but it is clear 
that the impact agenda promotes mode 2 knowledge.2 Nor did they 
consider the wider environment in which co-production took place; 
that is, from the perspective of its beneficiaries.
It is clear that the beneficiaries are commercial organisations, 
government bodies (at national or local levels) or civil society actors 
(non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and charities, etc.). We have 
already suggested that neo-liberal public policy has the effect of hol-
lowing out the public sphere. This takes place in two ways. The first 
2 The argument for mode 2 knowledge has been extended by Etzkowitz (2008), and 
the idea of the ‘triple helix’ of interdependencies between government, industry and 
university.
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is by the direct privatisation of public bodies, the second by recom-
mending that charitable bodies and NGOs be involved in the provision 
of services. The latter also includes charities and other voluntary 
associations operating together with for-profit organisations. The 
emphasis on the co-production of research is part of a wider neo-liberal 
project that includes the binding of the beneficiaries into government 
policy by the fact that they are frequently dependent on government 
for their own funding.3
Tying civil-society organisations to government objectives involves 
a deformation of the public sphere that constitutes the context for the 
rise of populism. It is something in which universities are directly 
implicated. For example, the Academy of Social Sciences drew up 
a report under the auspices of its Campaign for Social Science – 
significantly, entitled The Business of People – to campaign for public 
funding of social science, prior to the 2015 election. This was the 
election that included a Conservative manifesto commitment to a 
referendum on membership of the European Union. The report was 
preceded by the widespread news coverage of Thomas Piketty’s Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century (2014) with its depiction of widening social 
inequality. Concerns about inequality were also raised in OECD reports.
3 This became particularly evident following new Cabinet Office rules to prevent 
bodies in receipt of government funding from engaging in lobbying. This followed 
intense lobbying from a neo-liberal think tank, the Institute for Economic Affairs, 
against what it called ‘sock puppets’ (Snowdon, 2012). The action was directed against 
charities like Save the Children, Action on Smoking and Health, and Alcohol Concern. 
Universities were alarmed that they might be included and that the proposals were 
antithetical to the impact agenda. Universities were subsequently declared exempt 
and the proposals watered down. However, the implications for civil-society organisa-
tions and the vulnerability of their funding should they be perceived to be too 
politically active in pursuing their remit is clear. This is explicitly recognised by a 
report for the National Coalition of Independent Action: ‘The force of entering the 
welfare market, increasingly as bid candy, has had disastrous consequences for 
voluntary services and their ability to respond to community needs. The capitulation 
by many in the voluntary sector, including its national and local leadership bodies, 
to these government agendas has done much damage to the ability of voluntary 
organisations to work with and represent the interests of individuals and communities 
under pressure. Privatisation and co-option into the market is driving down the 
conditions of staff working in voluntary services, diminishing their role in advocacy 
and jeopardising the safety of people using such services’ (Waterson, 2014: 2).
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Yet, structured social inequality is not mentioned at all in the report, 
nor is race and ethnicity, nor any other research on social structure. 
These profoundly affect the circumstances of people’s lives, yet all 
the report has to say about them is of their derived consequences 
in terms of people’s attitudes and behaviours and how those may 
be a problem for policymakers and practitioners in attaining their 
objectives. The report is overwhelmingly instrumental and designed 
to appeal to the ‘Treasury, ministers, MPs and policy makers’ (Cam-
paign for Social Science, 2015: ‘Foreword’). Its focus on policymakers 
and practitioners is unremitting: ‘Advancing and applying science 
depends on profits, policies, markets, organisations and attitudes’ 
(2015: ‘Executive summary’). The attitudes of the public, on the other 
hand, are presented as potential obstacles to policy objectives. For 
example, it argues that ‘study of public values and attitudes is vital, 
too, especially when innovation prompts uncertainties and concerns, 
as with genetically modified crops or shale gas extraction’ (2015: 6). 
And it warns that ‘without a better grasp of people, technological 
advances may be frustrated, or blocked, and fail to realise their potential’ 
(2015: 5).
In short, a report on the value of the social sciences produced in 
the context of a general election made no reference at all to problems 
of inequality and no reference to their contribution to the facilita-
tion of democratic debate. Instead, it was directed entirely at what 
populist rhetoric described as the ‘political establishment’ and its 
‘experts’.
The problem of democratic knowledge
As we suggested earlier, one of the problems in current understandings 
of the democratic significance of the university is that its role as an 
institution in the public sphere is weakly expressed (see also Holmwood, 
2016b). In addition, government is allowed to stand as representing 
the ‘public’ and, in consequence, its policies constitute a working 
definition of the public interest. It is precisely these understandings 
that have been exposed by the rise of populism and are in need of 
reformulation.
We have also suggested that an alternative formulation can be 
found in the work of John Dewey, and especially his book on The 
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Public and Its Problems (1927). Significantly, for our purposes, the 
book was written in a similar context of an intense debate on the 
nature of the relation between expertise and democracy. Dewey was 
responding to the argument of Walter Lippmann (1925) that increased 
social complexity undermines the possibility of democracy being able 
to approximate the forms endorsed by standard liberal accounts of 
representative democracy. The public, for Lippmann, was increasingly 
ill equipped to make the sort of judgements attributed to them within 
democratic theory.
In consequence, he argues that the public is a ‘phantom category’ 
(that is, something that functions only in theories of democracy and 
has little real substance). For Lippmann, what Dewey came to call 
the ‘eclipse of the public’ is a necessary consequence of the complexity 
of modern societies that increasingly requires organised expertise of 
various kinds. In consequence, ‘expert opinion’ would replace ‘public 
opinion’ and democracy would necessarily be attenuated. Lippmann 
anticipated that expert opinion would operate in conjunction with 
the state and economic corporations and, in effect, would be ‘co-
produced’ by them. However, it is significant that Lippmann also 
prefigured what would become another part of the neo-liberal solution; 
namely, the shift of decisions from the political sphere to the economic 
sphere, or from the state to the market.4
Dewey noted that the ‘eclipse of the public’ is prefigured in the 
very idea of the market economy, in which decisions by (consumer) 
sovereign individuals are perceived to be efficiently aggregated through 
impersonal market exchanges. This is held to be in contrast to their 
inefficient aggregation by collective political decision making through 
the agency of the state. In other words, according to Dewey, the idea 
of a political realm in which the public expresses its democratic will 
is already severely compromised by the liberal distrust of ‘group’, or 
collective, actions, and the idea that it is only the market that can 
properly express the general interest.
Dewey proposed to rescue the public from its eclipse by market 
and expert opinion alike by a radical refocusing of political philosophy, 
4 He was a participant in the Colloque Walter Lippmann, which met in 1938 and was 
named in his honour. It was the first to coin the term ‘neo-liberalism’ for its 
position.
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not as a theory of the state and its forms, but as a theory of the public 
and of the relation of institutional forms to the public, with the 
university as one crucial institutional form. He did so through an 
account of the ‘social self ’, which he contrasted with the ‘liberal self ’, 
as expressed in economics and political theory (in this way, also 
indicating the normative assumptions in the liberal idea of instrumental 
knowledge).
Dewey began from the argument that the individual is necessarily 
a social being involved in ‘associative life’, and that this is true of what 
are conventionally regarded as private actions as well as of public 
actions.5 For Dewey, individuals form associations, but they are also 
formed by associations. At the same time, the multiplicity of associations 
and their interconnected actions have consequences. In all of this, 
Dewey’s idea of a ‘public’, and of the several natures of ‘publics’, is 
crucial. It contains a strong idea of democracy associated with participa-
tion and dialogue, but does not deny that there will be functionally 
differentiated publics, whose articulation will be at issue. The key to 
his definition of a public is contained in the idea of action in the 
world having effects and consequences that are ramified and impact 
upon others who are not the initiators of the action. Essentially, all 
action is associative action, but a public is brought into being in 
consequence of being indirectly and seriously affected by those actions 
of others. His analysis of the problem of modern democracy, then, 
was concerned with the imbalance in the development of associations 
and the proliferation of problems in areas where the public cannot 
properly defend itself.
This immediately raises the issue of the state as the representative 
of the ‘public’. It is the point at which Dewey shifted gear to argue 
that the wider idea of a public can achieve a level of generality that 
requires organisation and personnel to express it. This is the idea of 
a state understood as a set of public authorities. Thus, Dewey proposed 
that ‘the lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated 
activity bring into existence a public. In itself it is unorganized and 
5 It is precisely this that Dewey suggested allows the understanding of the changing 
definition of the boundaries of what are conventionally regarded as private and 
public. The conventional definition of the ‘private’ is that of associated life that does 
not impinge with wider consequences upon others.
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formless. By means of officials and their special powers it becomes a 
state. A public articulated and operating through representative officers 
is the state; there is no state without a government, but also there is 
none without the public’ (1927: 67).
Dewey by no means suggested that these developments mean that 
a state necessarily will act in the public interest – power can be accrued, 
authority exercised despotically, and, indeed, the personnel of govern-
ment can act on their own private or other special interests. The 
fundamental point, however, is that the state takes its meaning from 
the idea of a public and its interests, and that this is conceived as a 
dynamic thing. This means that, for Dewey, not only associations 
external to the state, but the state itself and its modes of organisation, 
are subject to change and revision in the light of other changes in the 
development of associative life. In other words, although the state 
exists in relation to the problems of associative, social life that create 
a public, its own forms and modes of organisation may come to 
constitute a problem for the expression of that public, although, 
paradoxically, that is its raison d’être.
Dewey had as his target two pathologies. The first sets the state 
against the public and is attributed to liberal individualism and its 
argument for the minimum state. The second is attributed to the 
conditions of modern corporate capitalism, in which there appears 
to be an ‘eclipse of the public’ brought about by the dominance of 
corporate interests over the state. Dewey argued that the first under-
mines the individual as surely as it seeks to set the individual free. 
This is because the ruling idea of liberalism is that of the individual 
free of associations, which is linked with the idea of the ‘naturalness’ 
of economic laws (embodied in market exchanges). It is precisely 
the ideology of liberal individualism, according to Dewey, that 
suggests that the market can replace the state as the regulator of 
social life, but leaves the individual vulnerable to the outcomes of 
the market.
However, according to Dewey, this doctrine emerged just as the 
idea of an ‘individual’ free of associations was being rendered untenable 
by the very developments of corporate capitalism with which it was 
linked. Thus, Dewey said that ‘ “the individual”, about which the new 
philosophy centred itself, was in process of complete submergence in 
fact at the very time in which he was being elevated on high in theory’ 
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(1927: 96). The ideology which operates in the name of the individual, 
then, serves to undermine the very protection of the individual from 
egoistic, corporate associations that are themselves the very antithesis 
of the doctrine being espoused.
For Dewey, what is necessary for the proper expression of the public 
and for democracy is a ‘Great Community’. Without it, there would 
be nothing more than state-supported corporate interests, together 
with partial and ad hoc responses. In contrast, Dewey wrote of 
democracy in the ‘Great Community’ that, ‘from the standpoint of 
the individual, it consists in having a responsible share according to 
capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which 
one belongs and in participating according to need in the values 
which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands 
liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony 
with the interests and goods which are in common. Since every 
individual is a member of many groups this specification cannot be 
fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and fully in 
connections with other groups’ (1927: 147).6
Reclaiming the public university
Dewey was also writing at the birth of the ‘multiversity’. Knowledge 
production and professional services were coming increasingly to be 
university based, and, at the same time, the university was becoming 
increasingly involved in the corporate economy with the commodifica-
tion of research. As I have argued, these are all aspects of our current 
impact agenda. Yet, Dewey wished to argue that the university has a 
role for democracy and in facilitating the Great Community. The final 
issue I want to address is whether the complexity attributed to con-
temporary society and the problems it poses for a democratic public 
can be answered by the role of ‘experts’.
Quite apart from the undemocratic implications of Lippmann’s 
claim that experts can represent publics, Dewey also challenged it on 
sociological grounds. Co-production takes the structure of associations 
6 The transformation of university decision making from collegial to hierarchical, 
managerial modes of organisation is significant in the context of this quotation (see 
Holmwood, 2016a).
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as given, when the issue of publics is always how they are to be brought 
into a responsible share in the direction of activities. ‘Co-production’ 
is necessarily based upon forms of inclusion and exclusion. Finally, 
while the operation of economic interests can be unseen, precisely 
because of the formal separation of economic and political institutions 
typical of modern capitalism, the application of expert knowledge 
must necessarily take place in front of the public.
While the argument about the role of experts depends upon the idea 
that the public is unable to judge complex matters, it remains the case 
that it will be able to judge the pretensions of experts. Moreover, it is 
likely to be vulnerable to populist mobilisations by the very interests 
that expert opinion is being called upon to moderate. Thus, Dewey 
wrote that ‘rule by an economic class may be disguised from the 
masses; rule by experts could not be covered up. It could only be 
made to work only if the intellectuals became the willing tools of big 
economic interests. Otherwise they would have to ally themselves 
with the masses, and that implies, once more, a share in government 
by the latter’ (1927: 206). As soon as ‘expertise’ is defined in terms of 
the instrumentalisation of knowledge, there arises the problem that it 
is aligned with interests and, thereby, a problem of trust.
Dewey’s concern with the problem of experts and their relation to 
wider publics speaks directly to our own circumstances. As expertise 
is increasingly co-produced, what seems to be attenuated is the role 
of the wider public. In a context where risks of concentrated activities 
– whether of nuclear power production or carbon-hungry economic 
profit seeking, to give just two examples – are also seen to be widely 
(indeed, globally) distributed, those that are affected are displaced 
from participation in decisions about them. At the same time, the 
nature of democracy is that wider public opinions can be made to 
count in elections and are subject to populist influence by advertising 
and by mass media, precisely as Dewey set out.
For Dewey, however, the significance of expert knowledge is how 
it can facilitate public debate, not government and corporate decision 
making independent of the participation of the wider public. The 
character of expert knowledge increasingly embedded within corpora-
tions and government serves to delegitimate expertise precisely by 
these forms of associations. It is necessarily part of the ‘eclipse of the 
public’. As Dewey put it, ‘the essential need … is the improvement 
318 Science and the politics of openness
of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. 
That is the problem of the public’ (1927: 208).
If the improvement of debate, discussion and persuasion is the 
problem, then the university is necessarily part of the answer. But 
it is only part of the answer if it is at the service of the public. A 
university at the service of the public, in Dewey’s sense, is a uni-
versity that should properly be regarded as a public university. This 
would not be the only function of a university, but it is a necessary 
function and it is one that would place social justice at the heart 
of community engagement. Anything less and the university is just 
another private corporation in which a corporate economy has become 
a corporate society. The neo-liberal university would finally have given 
up any pretension to a social mission other than being at service to 
whoever paid.7
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Epilogue: publics, hybrids, transparency, 
monsters and the changing landscape 
around science
Stephen Turner
Science, science journalism and the academic study of science itself are 
grappling with rapid changes in the nature of their object in the three 
disciplines of science and technology studies, philosophy of science, and 
history of science. Science is no longer the familiar world of laboratories 
and chalkboards full of equations, with the public at a discreet remove, 
buffered by a set of benign images of unworldly scientists pursuing 
arcane interests. These images of science were captured by the Ronald 
Reagan movie Bedtime for Bonzo (de Cordova, 1951), which featured a 
charming scientist living with a chimpanzee to test his theories about 
nature and nurture. The science was individualistic, rather than a team 
effort; the scientist was a sincere and harmless seeker of truth and 
friend of humanity removed from ordinary concerns and bumbling 
in his human interactions, and the results were understandable in 
human terms, though largely without practical significance.
The disciplines studying science, journalists and scientists them-
selves upheld aspects of this image well into the 1960s. Science was a 
separate world of special practices and rituals, with an individualistic 
epistemology, in which science was ultimately a matter, as Michael 
Polanyi put it, of personal knowledge (1958). In this idealised image 
of science, it was governed by merit. Funding, self-promotion, and 
academic and scientific politics and conflict were neatly excised from 
the image of the scientist. Science occasionally challenged our sense 
of ourselves as humans, or our place in the universe, but for the most 
part it was hidden from the public and appeared in popular science 
magazines and boys’ fiction as technology.
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Elements of this image have been gradually chipped away, however 
incompletely, in the disciplines studying science. But scientists them-
selves, as well as their publics, have now progressed beyond chipping 
away at the image into consciously transforming it: ‘opening’ science. 
The sciences are being opened in many ways. The chapters of this 
book begin to address this change. As in all large-scale social change, 
it is difficult for the participants to understand: the old landmarks 
remain, chalkboards can still be found and laboratories are more 
impressive than ever, but the landscape itself has become strange.
Like the British landscape itself, the British science landscape is 
imbued with meaning and ancestral meanings that lurk below the 
surface, together with a few monsters. The issue of social class was 
central to the Great Devonian controversy of the early nineteenth 
century (Rudwick, 1985), which was itself the result of a novel form 
of public science – survey geology sponsored by the state. By the end 
of that century Karl Pearson was promoting a vision of modernity 
shorn of religion, with scientists as the new priests and the state, run 
by experts, as the new object of veneration (1888: 20, 130–131, 
133–134). With it came a model for science education in which workers 
were taught elementary science with the goal of impressing on them 
the greatness of science and its authority. By the 1920s, fear of the 
effects of science led to calls for a moratorium on new discoveries by 
the Bishop of Ripon (Burroughs, 1927: 32). In the 1930s, under the 
influence of Marxism, a vast body of popular science writing promoted 
the idea that the full use of science was central to economic well-being, 
and that it was being held back by backward capitalist elites working 
through relations of production that had been made obsolete by the 
forces of production of modern technology. This was called – the title 
of one of the key texts of the era – The Frustration of Science (Hall, 
1935), a concept endorsed by such major figures as Frederick Soddy 
and John Desmond Bernal.
Where was the public in all this? It was present, surprisingly. The 
geniuses of science were known to the public, discoveries were cel-
ebrated, and science education was initiated in Britain in the form of 
working men’s institutes with lectures on elementary science, and 
there were best-selling books, such as Mathematics for the Million 
(Hogben, 1937) and the ABC of Relativity (Russell, 1925). There was 
a lively interest in amateur science: radio clubs, for example, sent 
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small donations to support Jodrell Bank, the array of radiotelescopes 
that was the first major achievement of post-war British science. And 
this produced a particular inflection on the relation of science and 
the public – scientists wanted support and deference, and also, especially 
in the leftist science writing of the 1930s, claimed to have a fundamental 
solidarity with the working class by ascribing scientific knowledge to 
craftsmen and identifying scientists with the ‘workers’.
These writings, directed at the public, promoted a model of public 
engagement of science that was not far removed from Pearson’s: 
scientists were workers, but workers whose capacity for rationalising 
production and economic life generally made them primus inter pares 
in the future planned society, in which science itself would be planned 
for the public benefit. The plan would be produced collectively by the 
trade unions, representing the productive units of the plan, coordinated 
at the top by science. Science itself was understood as technology, a 
form of rational engineering that could be effectively applied to the 
problems that had formerly been addressed by markets and politics.
The idea of planning was a fetish of the 1930s. It was opposed 
by liberal scientists and economists, with the scientists calling for 
the preservation of the autonomy of science and its freedom. They 
also rejected the equation of science and technology. In both cases, 
part of the justification was efficiency – ironically, an idea central 
to Pearson – that made free markets and free science superior to 
planned science. And they did not support the idea that science could 
replace politics. But, in one of those dialectical moments that history 
occasionally provides, this discussion was upended by a scientific, 
technological and planned achievement that produced a radically new 
problem on the status of science and its relation to the public: the 
atomic bomb project.
The shock of the bomb led to a new sense of the responsibilities of 
scientists for the consequences of science. The reaction was powerful: 
scientists organised to assert themselves and sought ways to control the 
nuclear menace. The anti-nuclear movement in science was paralleled by 
a powerful social movement, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
This added a new element that simultaneously empowered scientists, 
placed them in the public eye and demanded something new out of 
them. But their reaction traded on the same image of science as the 
font of authority, and the idea that this authority extended to politics, 
Epilogue 325
especially to a domain of politics outside the planning paradigm: 
international politics. The idea was still that scientists, not politicians, 
should be in control.
This sense evolved in the face of political reality, and new hybrid 
organisations were created, especially the Pugwash conferences devoted 
to the eventual elimination of nuclear arms. This still asserted the 
authority of science. On the website of the organisation we read that 
‘The mission of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 
is to bring scientific insight and reason to bear’ (Pugwash Conferences 
on Science and World Affairs, n.d). But it did so by ‘meetings and 
projects that bring together scientists, experts, and policy makers’. 
This may seem like a minor change, but it was nevertheless important. 
The older social relations of the science movement, with its reliance 
on the model of craft unions to organise scientific workers, owed 
its inspiration to the guild socialism of the 1930s and to the idea of 
exclusion. Pugwash, which had a highly active UK branch, was based 
on a recognition that science was not the only voice that needed to 
be heard in order for scientists to carry out their own responsibilities.
Nuclear weaponry was a novel issue with implications for the future 
of humanity: a monster. It was an intellectual challenge and a com-
prehensive one: it challenged basic ideas of security and the meaning 
of life, as well as the whole notion of warfare and national security. 
It took a long time for central political institutions as well as their 
intellectual coteries in the fields of international relations and security 
studies to even grasp the issues. And the positions that ultimately 
emerged were not especially friendly to scientists. The topic was so 
large and complex that it generated counter-expertise, and a whole 
panoply of actors – scientists speaking as citizens and sometimes 
politicians, self-proclaimed spokespersons for humanity, social move-
ments, a bomb literature like the war literature of the past, and many 
more. We now have more monsters and more people who have a 
stake in science, together with opinions that diverge from those of 
scientists and more organised movements and currents of thought.
From this point on one can discern two movements: on the one 
hand, science, in the form of such things as evidence-based decision 
making, risk analysis and regulatory science, appears in more and 
more domains. On the other, the practitioners in these new domains 
are compelled to deal with the people who already occupy them or 
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who have a stake in them and special knowledge about them: the 
public, policymakers, and practitioners and participants in related 
social movements or causes. The new landscape was produced by 
these two directions of change. Science now consisted of much more 
than laboratories and chalkboards, but there was no guide to this new 
landscape; its meanings had to be constructed on the fly.
The merit of detailed case studies is that they tell us something 
new. They tell us where old templates and old expectations are wrong, 
and complicate the attempt to reduce novel phenomena to a simple 
formula. In the case studies in this volume we find many complications.
In the first part of this book, on transparency and openness, we 
can begin to see the larger outlines of the problem. Openness and 
transparency are ideas that conceal many different and potentially 
conflicting agendas, even agendas that are entirely opposed, such as 
the use of the concept to enable the powerful to engage in surveillance 
as well as to empower the disempowered by giving them access to the 
knowledge and practices of the powerful in order to monitor them. 
From the point of view of democracy, this means that transparency 
can cut in many different ways to diminish the privacy and therefore 
autonomy of subjects as well as those of the powerful, who use secrecy 
as a weapon (see Worthy and Hazell, 2013). Open access is an example 
of the complexities of the consequences of actual policies, as Stephen 
Curry shows. The simple motivation is to get the taxpayers access to 
the science they have paid for, and perhaps more quickly than can be 
done by the traditional journal model of publication. But one startling 
effect, as he points out, is that the distinctions between real science 
and something less real are being radically undermined by the rise 
of rapid response blogging, which blurs the line between academic 
criticism controlled by the journal system and sheer opinion. He gives 
the example of a blog response to the questionable claim by NASA to 
have found microbes on Mars, to which NASA declined to respond. 
But recent events have shown this blurring to be more pervasive. 
There is the long-running (and much despised by scientists) practice 
of blogs criticising the claims of climate science, together with the 
example of ‘methodological terrorism’ practised by critics of the work 
of Princeton psychologist Susan Fiske in blogs, and not through private 
channels or the journal system (Association for Psychological Science, 
2016; Letzter, 2016; Singal, 2016). Non-response to criticism is no 
longer an option, if one’s public reputation matters.
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Yet there can be strong motivations for transparency even where 
there are fundamental conflicts. Carmen McLeod shows, in her discus-
sion of the issue of research involving laboratory animals, how openness 
initiatives in various countries attempted, with partial success, to 
overcome the distrust of animal-rights activists. As she notes, this is 
one of the longest running and most intense of all conflicts between 
science and society, marked by anti-vivisectionist legislation and 
occasional violence. Here, an organised effort by scientists to open 
up research has been made, with the aim of reducing opposition and 
increasing public trust. But cherry-picked information and the kinds 
of rationalistic utilitarian arguments presented with this information 
may, as she shows, have no effect on trust itself. Evidence-based policy 
is one of the mechanisms by which so-called expert practices suspected 
of arbitrariness can be opened up to scrutiny in contested spheres. 
But what is evidence? As Roda Madziva and Vivien Lowndes show, 
in the case of an immigration officer’s determinations of persecution, 
the evidence is itself subject to systemic biases and errors, leading to 
new kinds of contestation.
In each of these cases, transparency is a double-edged sword. It is 
assumed that transparency places everyone at the same level. But, in 
part because of the different viewpoints of those whose activities are 
being made transparent and of those who are assessing the activities, 
the result is often the opposite: more contention and less trust. These 
are, however, cases of hands-off opening up and transparency, without 
actual engagement, geared more to the relations of science with an 
abstract public, such as the simple making of scientific publications 
available through open access. A new dimension is introduced with 
the attempt to deal with the same kinds of issues through the self-
conscious creation of new, hybrid, organisational forms.
Future Earth is a project of exactly this kind: an attempt to bring 
together different forms of sustainability knowledge and create both 
a new kind of science and a new social contract between science and 
society. As Eleanor Hadley Kershaw, in the first chapter of the second 
part of the book, devoted to responsibility and openness, shows, this 
project is, however, plagued by ambiguities resulting from its ambition. 
The extent to which it can be regulated and made coherent and the 
openness to diversity required by its remit are particularly ambiguous. 
This points to a problem that becomes apparent in the next part of 
the book, on expertise: whether it is possible to create such a new 
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science with a new relation to society without the limitations of normal 
disciplinary knowledge. She suggests that perhaps the tensions and 
ambiguities are a virtue that will help sustain the project.
Alison Mohr describes a revealing example of another organisational 
innovation: a project to provide for a transition from traditional energy 
sources to low-carbon forms of energy in the global South. The SONG 
project was an attempt to co-design off-grid systems in Bangladesh 
and Kenya. It was transdisciplinary and offered an active role for social 
scientists. The framework, nevertheless, was top down. What emerged 
were unanticipated conflicts over justice and differing aspirations for 
the future between generations and genders, in a setting in which 
community inclusion was required. Here, the unexpected conflicts 
over issues of justice worked to undermine the project itself.
These cases raise a fundamental question about monstrousness, and 
the monstrousness of the unsolved and unresolved, which animates 
these conflicts. As Stevienna de Saille and Paul Martin note, the 
anthropologist Martijn Smits, writing on novel technologies, says that 
monsters embody ‘characteristics that make them both horrifying and 
fascinating at the same time’ (p. 149). This produces simultaneous fear 
and attraction that can never be reconciled. They are thus especially 
mythogenic, which becomes apparent in the controversies over 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the earlier controversy 
over recombinant DNA and the use of synthetically modified algae 
as a source of oil to replace palm oil by a natural food company 
named Ecover. In these cases, engaging the public was not enough: 
the imaginaries constructed around the products, which were fed 
by larger social imaginaries, prevented these monsters from being 
tamed. And the idea of responsible innovation itself may be an attempt 
to resolve irreducible contradictions intrinsic to the innovations 
themselves.
One apparent solution to the problem of resistance to innovations is 
public inclusion in decision-making processes themselves. In the next 
part, entitled Expertise, Sarah Hartley and Adam Kokotovich deal with 
an example of this: the formal requirements for public involvement in 
risk assessment; that is, opening up the risk-assessment process itself. 
These are not often met in practice. But why? As the authors show, 
in the case of the European Food Safety Authority, the bureaucratic 
division of labour purports to separate value issues from science 
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and allocate distinct roles for the public and science. But this means 
that the implicit value judgements that are part of the science are 
excluded from public control and scrutiny. And the chapter points 
to another important phenomenon. Risk assessment itself is a case in 
which a bridge discipline is created that is not purely scientific and 
becomes ‘disciplinary’ in character, with the effect of undermining 
its openness to the public, despite the formal machinery provided of 
public involvement.
Judith Tsouvalis’s study of ash dieback shows the complexity of the 
entanglement of science with regulatory and legal regimes, and the 
way in which these regulatory regimes can be backward looking. This 
makes it difficult for novel scientific results to have an effect. But the 
study points to a result similar to that found by Hartley and Kokotovich. 
Particular bureaucratic and academic specialties with quasi-scientific 
status, such as ‘biosecurity’, figure in this case, and these hybrid fields 
mediate between the more traditional science of plant pathology and 
an interested public. On the one hand, this novel discipline empowers 
the public by giving it someone to represent it and its interests. But 
it does so in ways that disempower the public by narrowing the issues 
into technical ones and excluding the public’s own voices.
The issues we have encountered so far have typically involved 
conflicts between broader notions of participation and top-down 
models of public understanding of science, which involve the acceptance 
of the special authority of science. There is also a tropism toward 
disciplinarisation. The same tropism is evident in the development 
of the novel discipline of climate science. But climate science from 
the start had a policy objective and sought to influence public policy. 
It became spectacularly successful in this respect. But how? The film 
An Inconvenient Truth (AIT) by Al Gore (Guggenheim, 2006) represents 
an instructive case. Gore spoke both to, and on behalf of climate 
science, and for the people to the politicians. But the Gore story 
presents even more ambiguities. Gore created himself as a new type, 
a prophet–politician–activist–explainer of science, and the mediatisation 
of global warming shows new aspects of the relation between the 
public and science. The public needs, as Gore understood, to be created 
– to be formed, enlightened and energised as a force. And he succeeded 
by creating a phrase, ‘an inconvenient truth’, which, as Warren Pearce 
and Brigitte Nerlich explain, became instantly recognisable and part 
330 Science and the politics of openness
of the language. But Gore’s efforts also produced a counter-politics 
and a scientific counterpublic, made possible by the exaggerations 
that made AIT so successful.
Gore’s movie is a solution to the problem of including the public. 
We can think of these cases as failed or only partially successful attempts 
at hybridisation and openness, but none of them were self-conscious 
attempts to open science or create a new relation between science 
and the public. Instead they were attempts to achieve goals or values 
of different kinds, from different perspectives and sources of knowledge, 
but in concert with one another, and in doing so they required the 
invention of particular forms, such as new discipline-like bodies of 
publicly valuable knowledge, or new templates that could be used to 
mobilise public sentiment. This differs from a self-conscious pursuit 
of novel forms of hybridity in the name of openness as a value, or 
out of a desire to bring science and the public together under a novel, 
organised intellectual structure.
But what is the public? Sujatha Raman, Pru Hobson-West, Mimi 
E. Lam and Kate Millar approach this problem through the issue of 
minority perspectives. As they note, discussions of the pluralisation 
of the public into unruly and competing perspectives has led to a 
neglect of the processes by which the public interest is itself constructed. 
In the case of animal research in the UK, where this is an especially 
salient issue, the construction involves opinion polls that serve to 
sideline protesters. The example of Canadian fisheries policy and the 
Canadian Government’s legally adjudicated conflicts with First Nations’ 
interests and conceptions shows how these minority viewpoints are 
marginalised, but also how they might be inserted into broader discus-
sions of the public good.
What if science itself is the monster? This is the problem posed by 
the oldest of these conflicts, the conflict between religion and science, 
explored in the last part of the book, devoted to faith. In the two final 
chapters the theme is taken up by Fern Elsdon-Baker and by David 
Kirby and Amy Chambers, who make an interesting point about the 
ways that this conflict has been both managed and inflated. Elsdon-
Baker discusses the construction of creationism as an alien doctrine 
threatening scientific progress and social progress. But as she shows, 
few people adhere to the full menu of the creationist doctrine, and 
ethical concerns over the doctrines of eugenics and practices of forced 
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sterilisation have historically fuelled opposition to a Darwinian world 
view. The inflated bogey of creationism is a monster that obscures 
these and other moral concerns. Kirby and Chambers reveal a history 
in which the Catholic Church in the USA endeavoured to influence 
the image of science through the mechanisms of quasi-voluntary 
censorship agreed to by Hollywood. Its concerns were various, but 
many of them involved the idea that science could replace God or 
lead to a future without God. It was the opposition of religion to 
science itself that especially perturbed it: the Church sought instead 
a kind of accommodation in which the limits of science were acknowl-
edged and a place for religion retained. These chapters show that the 
binary oppositions between science, which Elsdon-Baker describes 
as a ‘nebulous object’, and its various ‘others’ are unstable and constantly 
being constructed and reconstructed. This is a lesson of the other 
chapters as well. Once we look closely at such things as the public, 
they, too, fragment and disappear.
When Hadley Kershaw alludes in her title to the Leviathan, the 
Hobbesian monster created by our actions in the form of a mysterious 
act of collective willing, it is a reminder that science is not the only 
creator of monsters. The state, with its inhuman power, the ‘mortal 
God’, as Hobbes put it, is also is one of those things that has ‘charac-
teristics that make them horrible and fascinating at the same time’. 
Science routinely produces such results: whether it is the horrors of 
the treatment of laboratory animals or the idea that we have inadvert-
ently, through our normal daily actions, produced the collective 
catastrophe of anthropogenic global warming, science is a special and 
prolific source of monsters. Openness and transparency are the sup-
posed cure for this sense of the monstrous: they make science less 
alien. We can tame these monsters by turning them into ordinary 
objects of expert knowledge; for example, by making risk into the 
sort of thing that can be subjected to a bureaucratic regime, with a 
hybrid discipline of risk assessment and a special provision for public 
input. Or we can mediate the oppositions that give rise to the monsters 
and which the monsters in their dual nature embody by constructing 
and reconstructing them, or by creating social and epistemic move-
ments, such as Future Earth, in which the oppositions become prosaic 
organisational problems. But in the end these devices create new 
monsters that are as alien as the old ones.
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